[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 242 (Monday, December 17, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65005-65010]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-30971]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-390]
Tennessee Valley Authority; Notice of Consideration of Issuance
of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-90 issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee)
for operation of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1, located in
Rhea County, Tennessee.
The proposed amendment would change Technical Specifications (TSs)
to allow WBN to provide incore irradiation services for the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE). This change would allow TVA to insert up to
2304 tritium-producing burnable absorber rods
[[Page 65006]]
(TPBARs) into the reactor core to support DOE in maintaining the
nation's tritium inventory for national defense purposes. Each WBN core
contains 193 fuel assemblies and each fuel assembly contains 264 fuel
rods. In this amendment request, TVA proposes to insert up to 24 TPBARs
in selected fuel assemblies (adjacent to but not in place of the 264
fuel rods). The TPBARS absorb neutrons and are similar to (and would
replace) normal burnable neutron absorber rods that serve to shape
neutron flux in the core. The TPBARs contain no fissile material and
will be installed in fuel assemblies where burnable absorber rods are
normally placed in selected fuel assemblies. Therefore, the TPBARs
would fill the same role as burnable absorber rods in the operation of
the reactor. However, most of the neutron absorber (lithium) in the
TPBARs still remains at the end of core life as compared to normal
burnable neutron absorbers (boron or gadolinium). Therefore, the
proposed license amendment involves increasing the required boron
concentration for both the cold-leg accumulators (TS 3.5.1) and the
refueling water storage tank (TS 3.5.4), removing the Region 2 burnup
credit racks in the spent fuel pool and clarifying fuel storage
restrictions (TSs 3.7.15 and 4.3.3), adding a limit on the number of
TPBARs that can be irradiated (TS Section 4.2.1), and implementing a
TPBAR consolidation activity. This submittal also provides proposed
revisions to the associated TS Bases to modify the switchover time for
containment sump to hot leg recirculation (TS B3.5.2) and to modify the
hydrogen recombiner section to properly describe the possible sources
of hydrogen gas (TS B3.6.7). The uranium-235 (U-235) enrichment of fuel
assemblies containing TPBARs must be increased to no more than 4.95
weight percent to compensate for the higher neutron absorbing
properties of the lithium-7 in the TPBARs. The NRC has previously
approved maximum U-235 fuel enrichments of 5.0 weight percent for WBN
Unit 1. Five percent enrichment is the NRC's upper limit for reactor
licensing. Therefore, enrichments resulting from the proposed amendment
are bounded by the current WBN Operating License and licensing basis.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration in its application
dated August 20, 2001, which is presented below:
A. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
1. TS 3.5.1--Cold Leg Accumulator--Boron Concentration Increase
The accumulator boron concentration does not affect any
initiating event for accidents currently evaluated in the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The increased concentrations
will not adversely affect the performance of any system or component
which is placed in contact with the accumulator water. The integrity
and operability of the stainless steel surfaces in the accumulator
and affected Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) components/systems
will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH is small and will
not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the Class 1E
instrumentation and control equipment will be maintained since the
lower sump pH, resulting from the increased boron concentrations, is
still within the applicable equipment qualification limits. These
limits are set to preclude the possibility of chloride[-]induced
stress corrosion cracking and assure that there is no significant
degradation of polymer materials. The design, material and
construction standards of all components which are placed in contact
with the accumulator water remain unaffected. Therefore, the
possibility [probability] of an accident has not been
[significantly] increased.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the
UFSAR will not be [significantly] increased. The change in the
concentrations increase the amount of boron in the sump during a
Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The increased boron in the sump is
sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Testing
has indicated that TPBARs can experience cladding breach at Large
Break LOCA (LBLOCA) conditions if the cladding temperature and
internal pressure of the TPBARs reach limiting values. Consequently,
the post-LOCA critical boron calculations account[ed] for the
potential loss of a LiAlO2 [lithium aluminate] pencil, as
well as partial leaching of lithium from the remaining pencils.
Based on conservative assumptions, the calculations confirm that the
tritium production core will remain subcritical following a LOCA.
Also, a revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will
be implemented in the plant Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).
Thus, there will be no boron precipitation in the core following a
LBLOCA.
The only non-LOCA event that assumes accumulator actuation is
the Major Rupture of a Main Steamline event, however, it assumes a
minimum amount of boron. Furthermore, there is no impact on the SGTR
[steam generator tube rupture] event since the accumulators are not
assumed to be actuated, and the SLB [steam line break] M&E [mass and
energy] release evaluation relies on control rods for shutdown
margin and assumes a minimum boron concentration.
In addition, the increase in accumulator boron concentrations
and subsequent slight decrease in containment sump and spray pH does
not impact the LOCA dose evaluation since the analysis of record
does not credit sump pH as an input or assumption regarding volatile
iodine removal efficiencies. Therefore, the present analysis remains
bounding. Also, the slight decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH
has been evaluated to not significantly impact the corrosion rate
(and subsequent generation of Hydrogen) of Aluminum and Zinc inside
containment. Further, the decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH
has been evaluated to not affect the amount of hydrogen generated
from the post-LOCA radiolytic decomposition of the sump and core
solution. The likelihood of containment failure due to hydrogen
deflagration is therefore not impacted by pH changes.
In view of the preceding, it is concluded that the proposed
change will not [significantly] increase the radiological
[probability or] consequences of an accident previously evaluated in
the FSAR.
2. TS 3.5.4 and the Associated TS Bases Page--Refueling Water Storage
Tank (RWST)--Boron Concentration Increase
The RWST boron concentration does not affect any initiating
event for accidents currently evaluated in the UFSAR. The increased
concentration will not adversely affect the performance of any
system or component which is placed in contact with the RWST water.
The integrity and operability of the stainless steel surfaces in the
RWST and affected NSSS components/systems will be maintained. The
decrease in solution pH is small and will not degrade the stainless
steel. Also, the integrity of the Class 1E instrumentation and
control equipment will be maintained since the lower sump pH,
resulting from the increased boron concentrations, is still within
the applicable equipment qualification limits. These limits are set
to preclude the possibility of chloride[-induced stress corrosion
cracking and assure that there is no significant degradation of
polymer materials. The design, material and construction standards
of all components which are placed in contact with the RWST water
remain unaffected. Therefore, the probability of an accident has not
changed.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the
UFSAR will not be [significantly] increased. The change in the
concentrations increases the amount of
[[Page 65007]]
boron in the sump following a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump
is sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. This
analysis assumes partial leaching. Testing has indicated that TPBARs
can experience cladding breach at LBLOCA conditions if the cladding
temperature and internal pressure of the TPBARs reach limiting
values. Consequently, the post-LOCA critical boron calculations
accounted for the potential loss of a LiAlO2 pencil, as
well as partial leaching of lithium from the remaining pencils.
Based on conservative assumptions, the calculations confirm that the
tritium production core will remain subcritical following a LOCA.
Also, a revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will
be implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
The Inadvertent Operation of Emergency Core Cooling System
(ECCS) event is the only non-LOCA event which assumes the maximum
RWST boron concentration, and an evaluation has shown that the
proposed increase does not cause an adverse impact on this
transient.
The Steam Line Break (SLB) mass and energy (M&E) release
evaluation relies on control rods for shutdown margin and assumes a
minimum boron concentration. For the Steam Generator Tube Rupture
(SGTR) event, the increased boron concentration will help maintain
adequate shutdown margin, which will be evaluated as part of the
reload process.
In addition, the increase in RWST boron concentrations and
subsequent slight decrease in containment sump and spray pH does not
impact the LOCA dose evaluation. While higher pH helps maintain
volatile iodine in solution and lower pH drives the equilibrium to
favor volatile iodine in a gaseous state, the change in sump pH is
not sufficient to result in any measurable change in post LOCA
releases.
Furthermore, current radiological analyses do not take credit
for volatile iodine removal efficiencies based on sump pH.
Therefore, since the change in pH is minimal, and no credit is taken
in release analysis, the present analysis remains bounding. Also,
the slight decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH has been
evaluated to not significantly impact the corrosion rate (and
subsequent generation of Hydrogen) of Aluminum and Zinc inside
containment and the present analysis remains bounding. Further, the
decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH has been evaluated to not
affect the amount of hydrogen generated from the radiolytic
decomposition of the sump and core solution and therefore will not
challenge containment integrity.
In view of the preceding, it is concluded that the proposed
change will not [significantly] increase the radiological
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in
the FSAR.
3. TS 3.7.15 and the Associated TS Bases Pages--Plant Systems/Spent
Fuel Assembly Storage
The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in TS section 4.3.3
are not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize
this storage option. Therefore, since they are not installed, there
is no [significant] increase in the probability or consequences of
an accident previously evaluated.
4. TS 4.2.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies
The insertion of TPBARs into the WBN reactor core does not
adversely affect reactor neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance;
therefore, they do not significantly increase the probability of
accidents or equipment malfunctions while in the reactor. The
neutronic behavior of the TPBARS mimics that of standard burnable
absorbers with only slight differences which are accommodated in the
core design. The reload safety analysis performed for WBN Unit 1
prior to each refueling cycle will confirm that any minor effects of
TPBARS on the reload core will be within fuel design limits.
As described in the [Department of Energy's] TPC [Tritium
Production Core] Topical [Report, NDP-98-181, Revision 1], the TPBAR
design is robust to all accident conditions except the large break
LOCA where the rods are susceptible to failure. However, the failure
of TPBARs has been determined to have an insignificant effect on the
thermal hydraulic response of the core to this event, and analysis
has shown that the core will remain subcritical following a LOCA.
The impacts of TPBARs on the radiological consequences for all
evaluated events are very small, and they remain within [well
below]10 CFR 100 regulatory limits. The additional offsite doses due
to tritium are small with respect to LOCA source terms and are well
within regulatory limits.
The TPBAR could result in an increase in combustible gas
released to the containment in a large break LOCA. This increase was
found to be approximately 1474 scf [standard cubic feet] which
remains within the capability of the recombiners.
Analysis has shown that TPBARs are not expected to fail during
Condition I through IV events [as described in Chapter 15 of the
UFSAR, Condition I being normal operation and operational
transients, Condition II being faults of moderate frequency,
Condition III being infrequent faults, and Condition IV being
limiting faults]. TPBARs may fail during a LBLOCA or as a result of
fuel handling accident. The radiological consequences of these
events are [well] within 10 CFR 100 limits. Therefore, there is no
significant increase in the [probability or] consequences of these
previously evaluated accidents.
5. TS 4.3.3--Design Features/Fuel Storage/Capacity
The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in this TS section
are not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize
this storage option. Due to the deletion of the Region 2 racks, the
additional detail provided clarifies existing storage restrictions.
Therefore, since they are not installed, there is no [significant]
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
6. TS Bases 3.5.2--Emergency Core Cooling Systems/ECCS Operating
Due to the increase of the boron concentration in the RWST and
the accumulators, initial mixed boron concentrations are higher and
the precipitation concentration is reached sooner. As a result, the
hot leg switchover is being shortened. However, the time being
shortened does not change the switchover function. Therefore, this
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
7. TS Bases 3.6.7--Hydrogen Recombiners
This change is administrative in nature and involves only
identifying another source of hydrogen gas (tritium) to the bases.
The functions for the hydrogen recombiners remain the same.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
8. TPBAR Consolidation Activity
TPBAR consolidation and associated handling activities are
designed to be consistent with the existing fuel handling and heavy
load handling processes and equipment currently utilized at the
facility, and are designed to preclude increased probability of an
accident previously evaluated.
Consequences of a fuel handling accident for fuel containing
TPBARs is evaluated and does not result in exceeding [or even
approaching] 10 CFR Part 100 limits for off-site dose. All
consolidation and heavy load handling activities are designed such
that the current fuel handling accident scenario remains bounding.
Therefore the consequences of an accident previously evaluated
remains within acceptable limits.
B. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
1. TS 3.5.1--Cold Leg Accumulator--Boron Concentration Increase
The change to the accumulator concentration does not cause the
initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting
single failure. The change does not result in a condition where the
design, material, and construction standards of the accumulators and
other potentially affected NSSS components, that were applicable
prior to the changes, are altered. The integrity and operability of
the stainless steel surfaces in the accumulator and affected NSSS
components/systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH
is small and will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the
integrity of the Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will
be maintained during a LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting from
the increased boron concentrations, is still within the applicable
equipment qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the
possibility of chloride[-]induced stress corrosion cracking and
assure that there is no significant degradation of polymer
materials.
The changes in the concentrations increase the amount of boron
in the sump following
[[Page 65008]]
a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is sufficient to maintain
the core in a subcritical condition. Also, a revised hot leg
switchover time has been calculated and will be implemented in the
plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron precipitation in the core
following a LOCA.
All systems, structures, and components previously required for
the mitigation of an event remain capable of fulfilling their
intended design function. The proposed change has no adverse affect
on any safety-related system or component and does not challenge the
performance or integrity of any safety related system. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
2. TS 3.5.4 and Associated TS Bases Page--RWST--Boron Concentration
Increase
The change to the RWST concentration does not cause the
initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting
single failure. The change does not result in a condition where the
design, material, and construction standards of the RWST and other
potentially affected NSSS components, that were applicable prior to
the changes, are altered. The integrity and operability of the
stainless steel surfaces in the RWST and affected NSSS components/
systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH is small and
will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the
Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will be maintained
during a LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting from the increased
boron concentrations, is still within the applicable equipment
qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the
possibility of chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking and assure
that there is no significant degradation of polymer materials.
The changes in the concentrations increase the amount of boron
in the sump following a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is
sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Also, a
revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will be
implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
All systems, structures, and components previously required for
the mitigation of an event remain capable of fulfilling their
intended design function. The proposed change has no adverse affect
on any safety-related system or component and does not challenge the
performance or integrity of any safety[-]related system. Therefore,
the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. TS 3.7.15 and Associated TS Bases Pages--Plant Systems/Spent Fuel
Assembly Storage
The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in section 4.3.3 are
not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize
this storage option. Therefore, since they are not installed, this
change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind
of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
4. TS 4.2.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies
TPBARS have been designed to be compatible with existing
Westinghouse 17x17 fuel assemblies and conventional Burnable Poison
Rod Assembly (BPRA) handling tools, equipment, and procedures, and
therefore, no new [or different kind of] accidents or equipment
malfunctions are created by the handling of TPBARs * * *
TPBARs use materials with known and predictable performance
characteristics and are compatible with pressurized water reactor
(PWR) coolant. The TPBAR design has specifically included material
similar to those used in standard burnable absorber rods with the
exception of internal assemblies used in the production and
retention of tritium. As described in the TPC Topical Report, these
materials are compatible with the reactor coolant system (RCS) and
core design. Therefore, no new [or different kind of] accidents or
equipment malfunctions are created by the presence of the TPBARs in
the RCS.
Mechanical design criteria have been established to ensure that
TPBARs will not fail during Condition I or II events. Analysis has
shown that TPBARs, appropriately positioned in the core operate
within the established thermal-hydraulic criteria. Due to the
expected high reliability of TPBAR components the frequency of TPBAR
cladding failures is very small, such that multiple adjacent TPBAR
failures in limiting locations is not considered credible. In
addition, analysis has shown that if a single TPBAR fails
catastrophically in a high power location during normal operation
and the lithium is leached out, the global reactivity increase is
negligible and the local power peaking is small enough that DNBR
[departure from nucleate boiling ratio] limits and fuel rod
integrity are not challenged. Therefore, no new [or different kind
of] accidents or equipment malfunctions are created by the presence
of the TPBARs in the reactor.
Analysis has shown that TPBARs will not fail during Condition
III and IV events. TPBARs may fail during a cold leg large break
loss-of-coolant-accident or as a result of a fuel handling accident.
The radiological consequences of these events are within 10 CFR 100
limits. Therefore, there is no significant increase in consequences
of these previously evaluated accidents.
TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor neutronic or thermal-
hydraulic performance; therefore they do not create the possibility
of accidents or equipment malfunctions of a [new or] different type
than previously evaluated while in the reactor.
5.TS 4.3.3--Design Features/Fuel Storage/Capacity
The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in this section are
not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize
this storage option. Due to the deletion of the Region 2 racks, the
additional detail provided clarifies existing storage restrictions.
Therefore, since they are not installed, this change would not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
6. Bases 3.5.2--Emergency Core Cooling Systems/ECCS Operating
Due to the increase of the boron concentration in the RWST and
the accumulators, initial mixed boron concentrations are higher and
the precipitation concentration is reached sooner. As a result, the
hot leg switchover value is being shortened. This time being
shortened does not change the switchover function. Therefore, this
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
7. Bases 3.6.7--Hydrogen Recombiners
This change is administrative in nature and only involves only
identifying another source of hydrogen gas (tritium) to the bases.
The functions for the hydrogen recombiners remain the same.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
8. TPBAR Consolidation Activity--
The consolidation and handling activities are bounded by current
fuel handling evaluations. Therefore, this proposed amendment does
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any previously evaluated.
C. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
1. TS 3.5.1--Cold Leg Accumulator--Boron Concentration Increase
The change does not invalidate any of the non-LOCA safety
analysis results or conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety
analysis acceptance criteria continue to be met. The licensing basis
SBLOCA analyses does not credit the accumulator boron and is not
affected by the proposed change.
Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin to the Peak clad
temperature (PCT) limit for the SBLOCA. There is no increase in the
Best Estimate LBLOCA PCT; therefore, there continues to be a high
level of probability that the ECCS acceptance criteria limit is not
exceeded with regard to the LBLOCA analysis. The increased boron
concentration is sufficient to maintain subcriticality during the
LBLOCA, and a post-LOCA long term core cooling analysis demonstrated
that the post-LOCA sump boron concentration is sufficient to prevent
recriticality. The revised hot leg switchover time, which will be
implemented in the EOPs, will prevent boron precipitation. The
licensing basis containment and SLB M&E releases remain bounding,
and the SGTR event acceptance criteria continue to be met.
Furthermore, the changes do not affect the safety[-]related
performance of the accumulator or related NSSS components.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in the margin of
safety.
2. TS 3.5.4 and Associated TS Bases Page--RWST--Boron Concentration
Increase
The change does not invalidate any of the non-LOCA safety
analysis results or
[[Page 65009]]
conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety analysis acceptance
criteria continue to be met. The licensing basis SBLOCA analyses
does not credit the RWST boron and is not affected by the proposed
change. Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin to the PCT
limit for the SBLOCA. There is no increase in the Best Estimate
LBLOCA PCT; therefore, there continues to be a high level of
probability that the ECCS acceptance criteria limit is not exceeded
with regard to the LBLOCA analysis. The increased boron
concentration is sufficient to prevent recriticality. The revised
hot leg switchover time, which will be implemented in the EOPs, will
prevent boron precipitation. The licensing basis containment and SLB
M&E releases remain bounding, and the SGTR event acceptance criteria
continue to be met. Furthermore, the changes do not affect the
safety[-]related performance of the RWST or related NSSS components.
Therefore, there is no significant reduction in the margin of
safety.
3. TS 3.7.15 and Associated TS Bases Pages--Plant Systems/Spent Fuel
Assembly Storage
The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in section 4.3.3 are
not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize
this storage option. Therefore, since they are not installed, this
change would not involve a [significant] reduction in a margin of
safety.
4. TS 4.2.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies
TPBARs have been designed to be compatible with existing fuel
assemblies. TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor neutronic or
thermal-hydraulic performance. Analysis indicates that reactor core
behavior and offsite doses remain relatively unchanged. For these
reasons, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
5. TS 4.3.3--Design Features/Fuel Storage/Capacity
The Region 2 burnup credit racks described in section 4.3.3 are
not currently installed in the plant. Since the time that these
racks were licensed, TVA has determined not to install or utilize
this storage option. Due to the deletion of the Region 2 racks, the
additional detail provided clarifies existing storage restrictions
and does not reduce the margin of safety in existing storage
requirements. Therefore, since they are not installed, this change
would not involve a [significant] reduction in a margin of safety.
6. Bases 3.5.2--Emergency Core Cooling Systems/ECCS Operating
Due to the increase of the boron concentration in the RWST and
the accumulators, initial mixed boron concentrations are higher and
the precipitation concentration is reached sooner. As a result, the
hot leg switchover value is being shortened. This time being
shortened does not change the switchover function. Therefore, this
change does not involve a [significant] reduction in the margin of
safety.
7. Bases 3.6.7--Hydrogen Recombiners
This change is administrative in nature and only involves only
identifying another source of hydrogen gas (tritium) in the bases.
The functions for the hydrogen recombiners remain the same.
Therefore, this change does not involve a [significant] reduction in
the margin of safety.
8. TPBAR Consolidation Activity
The changes do not significantly affect the safety[-]related
performance of any plant operations, system, structures, or
components. The consolidation activity is bounded by current fuel
handling evaluations. Therefore, there is no [does not involve a]
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the no significant hazards consideration
analysis provided by TVA with respect to the three criteria listed in
10 CFR 50.92(c). The staff's safety evaluation is in its early stages
and will require several months to complete. However, in terms of 10
CFR 50.92(c), the staff finds that the TVA application addresses all
applicable accidents discussed in the UFSAR, including LOCAs, SGTRs,
and fuel handling considerations. Insertion of the TPBARS for the
purpose of producing tritium (which is sealed inside the TPBARs)
requires a higher degree of fuel enrichment with U-235. Because the
TPBARs neither contain fissile material nor replace normal reactor
fuel, and because the TPBARs will not adversely affect reactor
neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance, their presence in the core
should have no effect upon the probability or consequences of
previously analyzed accidents, including fuel handling accidents. For
the same reasons, the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident would not be expected to result from irradiation of the TPBARS
in the WBN reactor core. TVA's analysis of a possible reduction in
safety margins addressed PCT limits resulting from an SBLOCA and the
increased boron concentration to maintain subcriticality.
Based on the NRC staff's review of the analysis provided by the
licensee, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Documents may
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document
Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By January 16, 2002, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714, which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland, or electronically on the Internet at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/index.html. If there are problems in accessing the
document, contact the Public Document Room Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by E-mail to [email protected]. If a request for a
hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date,
the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by
the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the
Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will
issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's
[[Page 65010]]
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the
possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on
the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the
specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which
petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for
leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the
petition without requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to
the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such
an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described
above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. A copy of the
petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to
General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, ET 11A, 400 West Summit
Hill Drive, Knoxville, TN 37902, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
Further details with respect to this action may be found in the
application for amendment dated August 20, 2001, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the
Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room, or electronically on the Internet at the NRC
Web site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/index.html. Persons who do not have
access to ADAMS, or who encounter problems in accessing the documents
located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference
staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by E-mail to
[email protected].
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of December 2001.
L. Mark Padovan,
Project Manager, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-30971 Filed 12-14-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P