[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 212 (Friday, November 1, 2002)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 66578-66588]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-27701]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

RIN 3150-AG48


Voluntary Fire Protection Requirements for Light Water Reactors; 
Adoption of NFPA 805 as a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Alternative

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to 
amend its fire protection requirements for nuclear power reactor 
licensees. The proposed rule would permit reactor licensees to 
voluntarily adopt a set of fire protection requirements contained in 
the National Fire Protection

[[Page 66579]]

Association (NFPA) Standard 805, ``Performance-Based Standard for Fire 
Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 
Edition'' (NFPA 805). The proposed rule would provide existing nuclear 
power plant licensees with an alternative set of risk-informed, 
performance-based fire protection requirements.

DATES: Submit comments by January 15, 2003. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is only able to ensure consideration of comments received on 
or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking 
and Adjudications Staff. Written comments may also be hand-delivered to 
11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 
p.m. on Federal workdays.
    Documents related to this rulemaking may be examined and copied for 
a fee at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), One White Flint North, 
11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland (NFPA standards 
and copyrighted NFPA 805 may only be examined in the PDR). Copies of 
NFPA 805 may be purchased from the NFPA Customer Service Department, 1 
Batterymarch Park, P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101 and in PDF 
format through the NFPA Online Catalog (www.nfpa.org) or by calling 1-
800-344-3555 or 617-770-3000.
    The NRC maintains an Agencywide Documents Access and Management 
System (ADAMS), which provides text and image files of the agency's 
public documents. These documents may be accessed through the NRC's 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS, or if you 
encounter any problems in accessing the documents stored in ADAMS, 
contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) Reference Staff by 
telephone at 1-800-397-4209, or 301-415-4737, or via email to 
[email protected]. Certain documents (other than NFPA 805) may also be 
accessed electronically via the NRC's interactive rulemaking Web site: 
http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Leon E. Whitney, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 
20555-0001. Mr. Whitney can also be reached by telephone 301-415-3081, 
or via email at: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background and Rulemaking Initiation
II. Discussion
III. Analytical Processes for Plant-Wide Reviews
IV. Licensee Impact
V. Benefits
VI. Additional Issue for Public Comment
VII. Availability of Documents
VIII. Electronic Access for Comment Submission
IX. Plain Language
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant 
Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Regulatory Analysis
XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
XV. Backfit Analysis

I. Background and Rulemaking Initiation

    In 1971, the NRC promulgated General Design Criterion (GDC) 3, 
``Fire protection,'' of Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50. Subsequently 
(largely as a result of the fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in 
1975), the NRC developed specific guidance for implementing GDC 3, as 
provided in Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary Power Conversion 
Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, ``Guidelines for Fire Protection for 
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated May 1, 1976, and Appendix A to BTP APCSB 
9.5-1, ``Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants 
Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976,'' dated February 24, 1977. In the late 
1970s, the NRC worked with licensees to establish configurations that 
meet this guidance, reaching closure on most issues. However, to 
resolve the remaining contested issues, the NRC published the final 
fire protection rule (10 CFR 50.48, ``Fire Protection'') and Appendix R 
to 10 CFR part 50 on November 10, 1980 (45 FR 76602).
    Light water reactor licensees are currently required to have fire 
protection programs that comply with 10 CFR 50.48 and Criterion 3 of 
Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50 (GDC 3). A fire protection program that 
satisfies Criterion 3 is required for all operating nuclear power 
plants by 10 CFR 50.48(a). Criterion 3--``Fire protection,'' requires 
that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety 
shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety 
requirements, the probability and effects of fires and explosions. 
Further it requires that fire detection and fighting systems of 
appropriate capacity and capability be provided and designed to 
minimize the adverse effects of fires on SSCs important to safety. 
These fire protection requirements are deterministic.
    As stated in 10 CFR 50.48(b)(1), with the exception of Sections 
III.G, III.J, and III.O of Appendix R, nuclear power plants that were 
licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, are exempt from the 
requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50, to the extent that 
features meeting the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical 
Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 had been accepted by the NRC staff. These 
reactor plants otherwise must meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, as well as 
any requirements contained in plant specific fire protection license 
conditions and/or technical specifications. Nuclear power plants that 
were licensed to operate after January 1, 1979, must comply with 10 CFR 
50.48(a) as well as any plant-specific fire protection license 
conditions and/or technical specifications. Their fire protection 
license conditions typically reference Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) 
generated by the NRC as the product of initial licensing reviews 
against either Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and the criteria of 
certain sections of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, or against NUREG 0800, the 
NRC's Standard Review Plan (SRP) for fire protection (which closely 
follows the structure of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R).
    The NRC has issued approximately 900 exemptions from the technical 
requirements specified in Appendix R. These exemptions were granted to 
licensees that submitted a technical evaluation demonstrating that an 
alternative fire protection approach satisfied the underlying safety 
purpose of Appendix R. During the initial implementation period for 
``Pre-1979 Appendix R plants,'' the NRC granted exemptions under the 
provisions of 10 CFR 50.48(c)(6), which has since been deleted. For 
exemptions requested by ``Pre-1979'' plants after the licensee's 
initial Appendix R implementation period, the NRC has conducted its 
reviews in accordance with the provisions specified in 10 CFR 50.12 
``Specific exemptions.'' ``Post-1979'' plants have also requested and, 
when deemed acceptable by the staff, received approval to deviate from 
their licensing requirements. The processing of exemption and deviation 
requests has placed a significant burden on the resources of the NRC 
and the nuclear industry.
    Industry representatives and some members of the public have 
described the current deterministic fire protection requirements as 
``prescriptive'' and an ``unnecessary regulatory burden.'' Beginning in 
the late 1990s, the Commission provided the NRC staff with guidance for 
identifying and

[[Page 66580]]

assessing performance-based approaches to regulation (see SECY-00-0191, 
``High-Level Guidelines for Performance-Based Activities,'' dated 
September 1, 2000, and Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) entitled 
``White Paper on Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulation,'' 
dated March 1, 1999, issued subsequent to SECY-98-144). This guidance 
augmented the risk-related guidance in the NRC's Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) Policy Statement and Regulatory Guide 1.174, ``An 
Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed 
Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' dated 
July 1998.
    In SECY-00-0009 dated January 13, 2000, the NRC staff requested and 
received Commission approval for proceeding with a rulemaking to permit 
reactor licensees to adopt NFPA 805 as a voluntary alternative to 
existing fire protection requirements. On February 24, 2000, in a Staff 
Requirements Memorandum (SRM) titled ``Rulemaking Plan, Reactor Fire 
Protection Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Rulemaking,'' the 
Commission directed the staff to proceed with this rulemaking.
    The NFPA Standards Council approved 2001 Edition of NFPA 805 as a 
performance-based American National Standard for light water nuclear 
power plants, effective February 9, 2001. The NRC cooperatively 
participated in the development of NFPA 805. The standard specifies the 
minimum fire protection requirements for existing light water nuclear 
power plants during all modes (``phases'' in NFPA 805) of plant 
operation, including, shutdown, degraded conditions, and 
decommissioning.
    The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) expressed support for the 
rulemaking in a letter dated September 13, 2001. The staff prepared a 
memorandum, dated October 9, 2001, informing the Commission that the 
staff had revised the rulemaking plan such that the staff would submit 
the proposed rule revision to the Commission by July 2002, and the 
final rule revision 12 months after the NRC published the proposed rule 
revision for public comment. Additionally, the staff informed the 
Commission that it was pursuing development of the implementation 
guidance to be endorsed by a regulatory guide. NEI is currently 
developing this guidance.

Draft Rule Language and Public Comment

    On December 20, 2001 (66 FR 65661), the NRC published in the 
Federal Register draft rule language proposing to endorse NFPA 805, and 
posted this draft language on the NRC's interactive Rulemaking Forum 
Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. The NRC requested public comment 
on the draft rule language.
    The comment period on the draft rule language ended on February 4, 
2002. In response to the Federal Register notice the NRC received five 
sets of comments from the NRC staff, industry consultants, licensees 
and industry organizations, as summarized below:
    An NRC staff member pointed out that the draft rule language 
inadvertently overlooked an entire class of licensees (i.e., the so-
called ``post January 1, 1979 licensees''). The NRC agrees with this 
comment and has corrected this oversight in the proposed rule by 
including this class of licensee.
    The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) disagreed with a proposed NRC 
exception to NFPA 805 which would not endorse the italicized exception 
contained in Section 3.3.5.3 of NFPA 805. This italicized exception had 
the effect of permitting existing electrical cable which does not 
comply with a flame propagation test acceptable to the NRC to remain as 
is. Compliance with an electrical cable flame propagation test has been 
in NRC guidance since 1981 (NUREG 0800, the NRC's Standard Review Plan 
or SRP). The largest single contributor to combustible fire loading in 
most areas of a nuclear power plant is electrical cable insulation in 
open cable trays. This was demonstrated by the cable fire at Brown's 
Ferry in 1975. The electrical cable insulation safety hazard in nuclear 
power plants should be mitigated by successful completion of a cable 
insulation fire propagation test (or the application of a fire 
retardant coating or the installation of fixed, automatic fire 
suppression, as stated in the rule language). Therefore, the NRC cannot 
endorse the italicized exception contained in Section 3.3.5.3 of NFPA 
805.
    NEI submitted a number of other specific comments, which were 
endorsed as a group by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), none of 
which resulted in the NRC choosing to make changes to the draft rule 
language. These comments regarded: (1) Appropriate radiological limits 
for fire suppression activities; (2) licensee freedom to establish 
secondary fire protected safe shutdown paths; (3) the standing of 
``docketed licensing-basis information'' within Chapter 3 of NFPA 805; 
(4) the need for the NFPA 805 Section 3.5.4 seismic/Class 1E emergency 
power buses fire pump requirements; (5) the need for seismically 
designed fire hose station standpipes in lieu of a plan for manual fire 
capabilities following an earthquake (see Section 3.6.4 of the 
standard); (6) the degree of flexibility in the deterministic 3-hour 
fire area boundary rating requirement of Section 4.2.3.2 of NFPA 805; 
(7) the use of recovery actions within the deterministic approach of 
the standard.
    An industry consultant commented that the NRC should endorse, as 
part of the rulemaking, NFPA 805, Appendix B, ``Nuclear Safety 
Analysis,'' and its post-fire safe shutdown circuit analysis 
methodology for use by licensees in meeting the standard. Appendix B is 
now endorsed as discussed in section II below.
    Another comment from an industry consultant stated that the rule 
should permit licensees to adopt only those NFPA 805 requirements that 
relate to post-fire safe shutdown, without meeting NFPA 805 
requirements related to combustible/ignition control, and detection and 
suppression. This comment did not result in the NRC choosing to make 
any changes to the draft rule language.

II. Discussion

Discussion of Proposed Rule

    The NRC has conducted a review of the technical requirements 
contained in NFPA 805, related to nuclear safety and radiological 
release, and has concluded that NFPA 805, taken as a whole, provides an 
acceptable alternative for satisfying General Design Criterion 3 (GDC 
3) of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The standard contains a number of 
changes to the character of fire protection features when compared to 
current fire protection requirements (e.g., no cold shutdown 
requirement, no specific requirement for emergency lighting, and no 
provision for an alternative shutdown capability). However, the NRC 
participated in the development of the standard, and has determined 
that NFPA 805, as excepted, when taken as an integrated whole, meets 
the underlying intent of the NRC's existing fire protection regulations 
and guidance, and achieves defense-in-depth and the goals, performance 
objectives, and performance criteria specified in Chapter 1 of the 
standard.
    To determine that NFPA 805 contains the elements of an acceptable 
fire protection program, the NRC uses Regulatory Guide 1.189, ``Fire 
Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants''. Section C, 
``Regulatory Position,'' contains a description of the eight elements 
of an acceptable fire

[[Page 66581]]

protection program. The NRC determined that all eight elements are 
adequately addressed in NFPA 805:
    1. The delineation of organization, staffing, and responsibilities.
    Section 3.2.2 of the standard defines the management authorities 
and responsibilities and establishes the general policy for the fire 
protection program. This section adequately meets the intent of this 
element in RG 1.189.
    2. A fire hazards analysis sufficient to perform safe shutdown 
functions and minimize radioactive material releases in the event of a 
fire.
    Within the standard, nuclear safety goals and performance criteria 
are defined in Chapter 1. Section 2.4.2 defines the methodology for 
performing a nuclear safety capability assessment necessary to meet 
these goals and criteria. The criteria in the standard is adequate to 
meet the intent of this element of RG 1.189.
    3. The limitation of damage to structures, systems, and components 
important to safety so that the capability to safely shut down the 
reactor is ensured.
    Within the standard, Chapters 4 & 5 establish the methodologies to 
determine the fire protection elements needed to limit fire damage and 
protect structures, systems, and components important to safety. The 
criteria in the standard is adequate to meet the intent of this element 
of RG 1.189.
    4. Evaluation of fire test reports and fire data to ensure they are 
appropriate and adequate for ensuring compliance with regulatory 
requirements.
    Section 3.11.2 establishes fire test qualifications for fire 
barriers to be in accordance with NFPA 251, Standard Methods for Tests 
of Fire Endurance of Building Construction and Materials or E-119, 
Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and 
Materials. These standards are adequate and meet the intent of this 
element in RG 1.189.
    5. Evaluation of compensatory measures for interim use for adequacy 
and appropriate length of use.
    The standard has an adequate definition of compensatory actions and 
requires procedures to be established to accomplish these compensatory 
actions and limit the duration, Sections 1.6.8 and 3.2.3(2) 
respectfully. The criteria in the standard is adequate to meet the 
intent of this element of RG 1.189.
    6. Training and qualification of fire protection personnel 
appropriate for their level of responsibility.
    Section 2.7.3.4 discusses the qualification of personnel who apply 
engineering analysis and numerical models. Section 3.4 discusses the 
training and qualifications of the fire brigade and those plant 
personnel who will respond to a fire. The criteria in the standard is 
adequate to meet the intent of this element of RG 1.189.
    7. Quality assurance.
    Throughout the standard and in particular, Section 2.7, discusses 
the requirements for program documentation, configuration control, and 
quality. The NRC considers the standard adequate to meet the quality 
assurance guidance in RG 1.189.
    8. Control of fire protection program changes.
    Chapter 2 discusses plant change evaluations and configuration 
control of design basis documents. These sections will assist in 
maintaining compliance with the fire protection regulatory requirements 
and are adequate to meet the change control guidance in RG 1.189.
    For these reasons, the NRC believes that NFPA 805 adequately 
provides requirements to meet the elements of an acceptable fire 
protection program.
    Public Health and Safety Considerations: The NRC has determined 
that public health and safety and the common defense and security would 
continue to be adequately protected under NFPA 805. This determination 
is based, in part, on the goals, objectives, and performance criteria 
specified in Chapter 1 of NFPA 805. Those goals, objectives, and 
performance criteria provide for defense-in-depth to control fires; 
prevention of radioactive releases that adversely affect the public; 
and control of plant reactivity, inventory, and pressure, as well as 
decay heat removal, vital auxiliaries, and process monitoring.
    The overall approach of NFPA 805 is consistent with the key 
principles for evaluating licensing basis changes, as described in NRC 
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174. Namely, the proposed change is consistent 
with defense-in-depth philosophy, maintains sufficient safety margins, 
and when the proposed change results in an increase in core damage 
frequency (CDF) or risk, the increase is small and consistent with the 
intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement. In Section 
2.2.9 of the standard, objective criteria for plant change evaluations 
are set forth: ``a risk-informed plant change evaluation shall be 
performed and the results used * * * to ensure that the public risk 
associated with fire-induced nuclear fuel damage accidents is low and 
that adequate defense-in-depth and safety margins are maintained. 
Therefore, the concepts and processes in NFPA 805 comprise a risk-
informed, integrated, performance-based decision making process for 
evaluating plant changes related to fire protection systems and 
features. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(4), because NFPA 805 
contains its own change control process, reactor plant changes 
conducted under NFPA 805 therefore will not be subject to the 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
    As stated in Section 2.4.4 of NFPA 805, the Standard's general 
methodology requires that the plant change evaluation process must 
consist of an integrated assessment of the acceptability of change in 
risk, defense-in-depth, and safety margins. This approach requires 
engineering evaluations to assess the adequacy of the fire protection 
elements (e.g., combustible and ignition control, fire detection and 
suppression, and fire confinement) and the nuclear safety element 
(e.g., post-fire safe shutdown capability), to ensure that defense-in-
depth philosophy is maintained.
    The NFPA 805 approach also includes requirements, Section 2.4.3, 
for the application of acceptable codes and standards to assess the 
calculated margin between designed and qualified fire protection 
features versus specified nuclear safety and radioactive release 
performance criteria, as well as provisions for evaluating acceptable 
change in risk in terms of small increases in Core Damage Frequency 
(CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) based on risk acceptance 
guidelines, as presented in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174.
    Chapters 1 and 2 of NFPA 805 specify performance criteria, nuclear 
safety objectives, and radioactive release performance criteria; 
provide flexibility for the program, processes, and analytical 
approach; and ensure that a performance failure will not result in an 
immediate safety concern (through application of the fire protection 
defense-in-depth philosophy and the assurance of adequate safety 
margins). Potential performance failures are assessed in advance to 
ensure that the licensee is capable of detecting the performance 
failure, and that adequate time is available to take the needed 
corrective actions upon detection.
    NFPA 805 achieves the risk principles of the Commission's PRA 
Policy Statement (60 FR 42622) in the following manner:

    PRA Policy Statement 1: The use of PRA technology should be 
increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the 
state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that 
complements the NRC's deterministic approach and supports the

[[Page 66582]]

NRC's traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.

    NFPA 805 Appendices B, C, and D providing methodologies for nuclear 
safety analysis (which includes post-fire safe shutdown circuit 
analysis), fire modeling, and PSA methods respectively, are state-of-
the-art analytical approaches representing a consensus of members of a 
diverse national standards committee (the NFPA Technical Committee on 
Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities).
    The NFPA 805 deterministic approach (Section 4.2.3) was derived 
from existing NRC deterministic requirements.
    In Section 4.2.4.1.5 of NFPA 805, the alternative NFPA performance-
based approach includes the requirement that ``the effectiveness of 
fire protection systems and features shall demonstrate that the 
circuits and components required to achieve the nuclear safety 
performance criteria are maintained free of fire damage.'' Combined 
with the deterministic requirements of Section 3.3.1.2 (Control of 
Combustible Materials) and Section 3.3.1.3 (Control of Ignition 
Sources), Sections 3.4 (Industrial Fire Brigade), 3.5 (Water Supply), 
3.6 (Standpipe and Hose Stations), 3.7 (Fire Extinguishers), 3.8 (Fire 
Alarm and Detection Systems), 3.9 (Automatic and Manual Water-based 
Fire Suppression Systems), 3.10 (Gaseous Fire Suppression Systems) and 
3.11 (Passive Fire Protection Features), and the Nuclear Safety Goal, 
Objective and Performance Criteria of Chapter 1 of NFPA 805, NFPA 
strongly supports the NRC's traditional fire protection defense-in-
depth and nuclear safety defense-in-depth philosophies.

    PRA Policy Statement 2: PRA and associated analyses (e.g. 
sensitivity studies, uncertainty analyses, and importance measures) 
should be used in regulatory matters, where practical within the 
bounds of the state-of-the-art, to reduce unnecessary conservatism 
associated with current regulatory requirements, license 
commitments, and staff practices * * *

    The performance-based approach of NFPA 805 (Section 4.2.4) would 
utilize the concepts of: Damage threshold; minimum damage threshold; 
fire scenario for the fire area under consideration; and sufficient 
margin between the maximum expected fire scenario and the limiting fire 
scenario in the context of protection of required nuclear safety 
success paths. These performance-based approach concepts reduce the 
conservatisms associated with the current largely deterministic reactor 
plant fire protection requirements, license commitments and NRC staff 
practices.

    PRA Policy Statement 3: PRA evaluations in support of regulatory 
decisions should be as realistic as practicable and appropriate 
supporting data should be publicly available for review.

    Section 2.7.1.1 of NFPA 805 says: ``The analyses performed to 
demonstrate compliance with this standard shall be documented for each 
nuclear power plant (NPP). The intent of the documentation is that the 
assumptions be clearly defined and that the results be easily 
understood, that results be clearly and consistently described, and 
that sufficient detail be provided to allow future review of the entire 
analyses. Documentation shall be maintained for the life of the plant 
and be organized carefully so that it can be checked for adequacy or 
accuracy either by an independent reviewer or by the AHJ [authority 
having jurisdiction].''
    Section 2.7.2 of NFPA 805 addresses configuration control, and 
Section 2.7.3 addresses the quality of the calculational or numerical 
models, the appropriateness of their application, and the 
qualifications of the personnel who apply them.
    Therefore, there would be a well-founded expectation that licensee 
NFPA 805 analyses would be readily available for review by the NRC or 
independent reviewers supporting licensee quality assurance activities.

    PRA Policy Statement 4: The Commission's safety goals for 
nuclear power plants and subsidiary numerical objectives are to be 
used with appropriate consideration of uncertainties in making 
regulatory judgements on the need for proposing and backfitting new 
generic requirements on nuclear power plant licensees.

    As a voluntary regulation, the proposed rule does not represent a 
new generic requirement on nuclear power plant licensees, and could be 
considered to not be bound by PRA Policy Statement 4. However, the 
following two qualitative safety goals and two supporting quantitative 
objectives would be met by licensees meeting Section 1.3.1 of NFPA 805 
(Nuclear Safety Goal) and Section 1.3.2 of NFPA 805 (Radioactive 
Release Goal), and their supporting NFPA 805 nuclear and radioactive 
release objectives and performance criteria.
    The NRC's two qualitative safety goals are: (1) Individual members 
of the public should be provided a level of protection from the 
consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that individuals 
bear no significant additional risk to life and health, and (2) 
Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation 
should be comparable to or less than the risks of generating 
electricity by viable competing technologies and should not be a 
significant addition to other societal risks.
    Two quantitative objectives are used in determining achievement of 
the above safety goals: (1) The risk to an average individual in the 
vicinity of a nuclear power plant of prompt facilities that might 
result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one 
percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting 
from other accidents to which members of the U.S. population are 
generally exposed, and (2) The risk to the population in the area near 
a nuclear power plant of cancer fatalities that might result from 
nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one 
percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting 
from all other causes.
    As an outgrowth of the Commission's PRA Policy Statement, the NRC 
has embarked upon an effort to risk-inform 10 CFR Part 50. In SECY-99-
264 (later endorsed in a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated 
February 3, 2000) the NRC staff informed the Commission that it would 
conduct its work applying the set of safety principles established in 
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174. The NRC staff stated that it expects that 
changes to requirements would be consistent with the defense-in-depth 
philosophy, would maintain sufficient safety margins, would be 
performance-based to the extent possible, and would result in safety 
improvements or only small increases in risk, and would reduce any 
unnecessary burden. The NRC staff also stated that their approach would 
also ensure that adequate protection continues to be maintained. These 
considerations are addressed individually below:
    Defense-in-Depth: This topic is fully discussed in connection with 
PRA Policy Statement 1 above.
    Sufficient Safety Margins: Plant change evaluations are required by 
Section 2.4.4 of the standard. Section 2.4.4.3 of the standard states 
that plant change evaluations shall ensure that sufficient safety 
margins are met. Section A.2.4.4.3 of the standard explains safety 
margins in theory and in the contexts of fire modeling and fire PSA. 
Section 4.2.4.1.4 of the standard requires sufficient safety margin 
between the maximum expected fire scenarios and the limiting fire 
scenarios for required equipment and cables.
    Performance-Based: NFPA 805 is inherently performance-based in that 
it requires the achievement of performance criteria.
    Safety Improvements or Small Increases in Risk: NFPA has provisions

[[Page 66583]]

for evaluating acceptable change in risk in terms of CDF (core damage 
frequency) and LERF (large early release frequency). NFPA 805 Section 
2.4.4.1 of the standard provides that ``The change in public health 
risk from any plant change shall be acceptable to the AHJ (NRC). CDF 
and LERF shall be used to determine the acceptability of the change.'' 
The NRC bases its risk acceptance guidelines on the information 
provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach for Using 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant 
Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis. In RG 1.174, ``small'' is 
defined in relation to total CDF (e.g., when the calculated increase in 
risk is calculated to be in the range of 10E-6 per reactor year to 10E-
5 per reactor year, the risk increase is acceptable if it can be 
reasonably shown that the total CDF is less than 10E-4 per reactor 
year).
    Unnecessary Burden: The proposed rule is expected to reduce the 
need for licensee developed exemption requests targeted at relief from 
the existing deterministic, prescriptive fire protection requirements. 
Additionally, the proposed rule is expected to result in net reduced 
operating, training, and maintenance costs (through the elimination of 
conservatively required deterministic barriers and fire protection 
features) over the remaining life of the reactor plants and during 
their decommissioning.
    Adequate Protection: Licensees which adopt NFPA 805 will be 
required by Section 2.4.4.1 of the standard to monitor the cumulative 
risk changes. Therefore, a series of small increases in public health 
risk (see ``Safety Improvements or Small Increases in Risk'' above) 
will not be allowed to accumulate into a significant total increase in 
fire risk. Therefore, adequate protection of the public from the 
effects of nuclear power plant fires will be maintained.
    The NRC has considered the regulatory practicality of the proposed 
rule. The areas considered are as follows:
    Change Control Processes: NFPA 805 Sections 2.2(h), 2.2(i), 2.2(j), 
2.2.9, 2.2.10, 2.4.4, 2.6, and 2.7 contain direction relating to change 
control processes. The major change control process features addressed 
in these sections are plant change evaluations (assessment of changes 
in public health risk against risk acceptance criteria, defense-in-
depth and safety margins), a plant fire risk performance monitoring 
program (addressing availability, reliability and performance and 
including corrective action), and fire protection program documentation 
adequacy, analysis quality, and configuration control. Under 10 CFR 
50.59(c)(4), the existence of these change control process features 
would therefore mean that the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 would not 
apply to licensees which have adopted NFPA 805. Therefore, the NRC 
expects no difficulties in licensee efforts to control and document 
plant changes under this rule.
    Licensee Implementation: Sufficient methodologies are provided in 
NFPA 805 and adequate risk, fire and nuclear safety data are available 
to implement them. In Section III of this Federal Register notice 
(FRN), NFPA 805 analytical processes for plant-wide reviews are 
summarized. Therefore, the NRC expects no difficulties in licensee's 
efforts to implement this rule.
    Inspectability: NFPA 805 Section 2.7.1.1 states: ``The analyses 
performed to demonstrate compliance with this standard shall be 
documented for each nuclear power plant (NPP). The intent of the 
documentation is that the assumptions be clearly defined and that the 
results be easily understood, that results be clearly and consistently 
described, and that sufficient detail be provided to allow future 
review of the entire analyses. Documentation shall be maintained for 
the life of the plant and be organized carefully so that it can be 
checked for adequacy and accuracy either by an independent reviewer or 
by the AHJ.'' Therefore, the NRC expects no difficulties in inspector 
efforts to review licensee implementation of this rule.
    Enforcability: The proposed rule does not affect the existing 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(a), which include fire protection plan 
compliance with General Design Criterion (GDC) 3--``Fire Protection,'' 
seven specific fire protection plan requirements and features, the 
requirement to retain fire protection plan changes ``until the 
Commission terminates the reactor license'' and fire protection 
procedures for three years after they are superceded. Section (c)(3) of 
the proposed rule requires adopting licensees to maintain a fire 
protection program which complies with NFPA 805. Therefore, all 
requirements of that standard would be subject to enforcement, 
including the nuclear and radiological goals, performance objectives 
and performance criteria of Chapter 1 of NFPA 805. Therefore, the NRC 
expects no difficulties in enforcing against licensee failures to 
comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a), (f) or the main body of NFPA 805.
    Quality Assurance: Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805 requires that each 
analysis, calculation or evaluation performed shall be independently 
verified, calculational models and numerical methods shall be verified 
and validated, engineering methods and numerical models shall be used 
only within the scope, limitations and assumptions prescribed for them, 
personnel applying engineering analyses and numerical models shall be 
competent in their field and experienced in the application of these 
methods as they relate to nuclear power plants, nuclear power plant 
fire protection, and power plant operations. Therefore, the NRC expects 
no difficulties in licensee efforts to maintain the quality of their 
application of NFPA 805 requirements.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 50.48(c) National Fire Protection Standard NFPA 805
    The proposed rule would add a new Paragraph (c) to 10 CFR 50.48. 
Paragraph (c) would permit reactor licensees to voluntarily adopt NFPA 
805, with certain exceptions stated in the rule language, as an 
alternative set of fire protection requirements for the operation and/
or decommissioning of light-water reactors. NFPA 805, when and if 
adopted by licensees, would constitute an acceptable means for 
operating reactors to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a), and would be an 
alternative to meeting their existing fire protection requirements, and 
for decommissioning reactors would be an acceptable method for meeting 
10 CFR 50.48(f).
Section 50.48(c)(1) Approval of Incorporation by Reference; 50.48(c)(2) 
Exceptions, Modifications and Supplementation of NFPA 805
    Appendices B, C, and D of NFPA 805 constitute methodologies for 
conducting nuclear safety circuit analyses, nuclear power plant fire 
hazard modeling, and fire probabilistic safety assessments, 
respectively. At a number of locations within the standard appendices 
are referred to as ``acceptable methods,'' and at other locations 
within the standard the reader is directed to them for ``considerations 
when performing analyses.'' Although each of the three appendices 
begins with a disclaimer in the form ``Appendix (letter B, C or D) is 
not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included 
for informational purposes only,'' the methodologies contained therein 
are nevertheless considered by the NRC to be ``specified in NFPA 805'' 
within the meaning of section (c)(4) of the proposed rule language, and 
therefore their use by licensees need not be

[[Page 66584]]

preceded by NRC approval of a license amendment request.
Section 50.48(c)(2)(i) Life Safety Goal; 50.48(c)(2)(ii) Plant Damage/
Business Interruption Objectives
    The Life Safety Goal and Plant Damage/Business Interruption 
Objectives of NFPA 805 are not within the regulatory charter of the NRC 
(see the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974) and, therefore, the NRC 
does not endorse them.
Section 50.48(c)(2)(iii) Use of Feed-and-Bleed
    This paragraph does not accept the use of a high-pressure charging/
injection pump coupled with the pressurizer PORVs as the sole fire 
protected shutdown path for maintaining reactor coolant inventory, 
pressure control, and decay heat removal capability (i.e., feed-and-
bleed) for PWRs.
Section 50.48(c)(2)(iv) Uncertainty Analysis
    This paragraph makes clear that licensees need not prepare 
uncertainty analyses when conducting deterministic analyses under 
Section 2.2.6 and Chapter 4 of NFPA 805.
Section 50.48(c)(2)(v) Existing Cables
    In lieu of installing cables meeting flame propagation tests as 
required by Section 3.3.5.3 of the standard, a flame retardant coating 
may be applied to the electric cables, or alternatively an automatic 
fixed fire suppression system may be installed. Either alternative 
would establish an equivalent level of fire protection to that provided 
by the presence of flame propagation test compliant cables. The 
italicized exception to Section 3.3.5.3 is not endorsed.
    Electrical flame propagation test compliance has been in NRC 
guidance since 1981 (NUREG 0800, the NRC's Standard Review Plan or 
SRP). The NRC is unaware of any licensees which are using electrical 
cable which does not comply with flame propagation tests where an 
alternate means of protection (e.g., fire retardant coating or 
automatic fixed suppression) has not been provided. Accordingly, the 
NRC does not expect any licensee to be adversely affected by this 
proposed exception.
Section 50.48(c)(2)(vi) Water Supply and Distribution
    The italicized exception to Section 3.6.4 is not endorsed.
    This paragraph would not allow a standpipe/hose station system in 
place of seismically qualified standpipes and hose stations unless 
previously approved in the licensing basis. Seismically qualified 
standpipes and hose stations have been in NRC guidance since 1976 
(Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1. The NRC is 
unaware of any licensees using a non-seismically qualified standpipe/
hose station system in place of a seismically qualified standpipe/hose 
station system. Accordingly, the NRC does not expect any licensee to be 
adversely affected by this proposed exception.
Section 50.48(c)(3) Compliance With NFPA 805
    The use of the term ``Authority Having Jurisdiction'' (AHJ) within 
the standard, for the purposes of this rulemaking, means the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    For purposes of transitioning to NFPA 805, the NRC expects that 
licensees will be able to treat existing reactor plant fire protection 
elements as ``previously approved'' for the purposes of the Chapter 3 
delineation of fundamental program elements. This approach would 
normally be acceptable because licensees should either be in compliance 
with regulatory requirements or should have obtained approval from the 
NRC for exemptions or deviations from those requirements. Fire 
protection elements that have not been previously reviewed and approved 
would continue to be subject to normal NRC inspection and enforcement.
     Section 50.48(c)(3)(i). A licensee may maintain a fire protection 
program that complies with NFPA 805 as an alternative to complying with 
paragraph (b) of this section for plants licensed to operate before 
January 1, 1979; or the fire protection license conditions for plants 
licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. The licensee shall submit a 
request to comply with NFPA 805 in the form of an application for 
license amendment under Sec.  50.90. The application must identify any 
orders and license conditions that must be revised or superseded, and 
contain any necessary revisions to the plant's technical specifications 
and the bases thereof. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, or a designee of the Director, may approve the application 
if the Director or designee determines that the licensee has identified 
orders, license conditions, and the technical specifications that must 
be revised or superseded, and that any necessary revisions are 
adequate. Any approval by the Director or the designee of the Director 
shall be in the form of a license amendment approving the use of NFPA 
805 together with any necessary revisions to the technical 
specifications.
    This paragraph of the proposed rule language would allow licensees 
to adopt NFPA 805 as an acceptable means of meeting the fire protection 
program and GDC 3 requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(a). This section also 
describes the methods by which the licensees will submit their requests 
to adopt NFPA 805. If the NRC approves a licensee's request to use NFPA 
805, the Director of NRR (or a designee of the Director) will issue a 
license amendment that: (1) removes superseded license conditions, and 
(2) includes a license condition imposing the use of NFPA 805. In 
addition, the NRC will issue an order revoking unnecessary and 
superseded exemptions and orders.
    Licensees who are approved under paragraph (c)(3)(i) to use NFPA 
805 are permitted to later return to compliance with paragraph (b) and 
their previous licensing basis. However, each licensee must comply with 
all applicable requirements, including submitting an application for a 
license amendment, and, as applicable, a request for exemption if the 
licensee wishes to reinstate a revoked exemption.
    Section 50.48(c)(3)(ii). The licensee shall complete its 
implementation of the methodology in Chapter 2 of NFPA 805 (including 
all required evaluations and analyses) and, upon completion, modify the 
fire protection plan required by paragraph (a) of this section to 
reflect the licensee's decision to comply with NFPA 805, before 
changing its fire protection program or nuclear power plant as 
permitted by NFPA 805.
    This section of the proposed rule language requires licensees to 
complete all of the NFPA 805 evaluations and analyses, and also modify 
their fire protection plan to indicate that they are adopting NFPA 805 
as an alternative set of fire protection requirements. This is to 
ensure that the changeover to an NFPA 805 configuration is conducted in 
a complete, controlled, integrated, and organized manner. This also 
ensures that the NRC reactor oversight (inspection) process can 
effectively identify and monitor the changeover. This requirement of 
the proposed rule has the effect of precluding licensees from 
implementing NFPA 805 on a partial or selective basis (e.g., in some 
fire areas and not others, or truncating the methodology within a given 
fire area).
    50.48(c)(4) Alternative Methods and Analytical Approaches. A 
licensee may submit a request to use alternative methods and analytical 
approaches, including alternatives to the fundamental fire protection 
program

[[Page 66585]]

and minimum design requirements identified in Chapter 3 of NFPA 805, in 
lieu of those methods and approaches specified in NFPA 805. The request 
must be in the form of an application for license amendment under Sec.  
50.90. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or a 
designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director 
or designee determines that the alternative methods and analytical 
approaches:
    This section of the proposed rule language provides licensees with 
a mechanism to gain plant-specific NRC approval of alternative methods 
and analytical approaches to those specified in NFPA 805. It allows 
licensees maximum flexibility to identify and apply new methods of 
analysis that may be appropriately used within NFPA 805. This approval 
mechanism is broad enough to allow licensees to apply risk-informed, 
performance-based methods to establish the (deterministic) fundamental 
elements of a fire protection program and the minimum design 
requirements for fire protection systems and features.
    Section 50.48(c)(4)(i). Satisfy the goals, performance objectives, 
and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear 
safety and radiological release.
    Section 50.48(c)(4)(ii). Maintain safety margins.
    Section 50.48(c)(4)(iii). Maintain fire protection defense-in-depth 
(fire prevention, fire suppression, and post-fire safe shutdown 
capability).
    50.48(f) Licensees that have submitted the certifications required 
under Section 50.82(a)(1) shall maintain a fire protection program to 
address the potential for fires that could cause the release or spread 
of radioactive materials (i.e., that could result in a radiological 
hazard). A fire protection program that complies with NFPA 805 shall be 
deemed to comply with the requirements of this paragraph.

III. Analytical Processes for Plant-Wide Reviews

    This section describes how a licensee choosing to comply with NFPA 
805 would conduct a plant-wide review in accordance with the NFPA 805 
analytical process (under paragraphs (c)(3)(ii) of the proposed rule). 
The discussion first addresses the actions of licensees for operating 
light water reactors, and then addresses the actions of licensees for 
light water reactors that are undergoing decommissioning.

A. Operating Reactors

    Section 2.2.1: Licensee establishes fundamental fire protection 
elements in accordance with Chapter 3 of NFPA 805 on a plant-wide 
basis, taking credit for alternatives that have been ``previously 
approved'' by the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) (NRC).
    Section 2.2.2: Licensee identifies fire area boundaries and fire 
hazards (possibly unchanged from the previous fire protection licensing 
basis).
    Sections 2.2.3, 2.2.4, and 2.2.5: Licensee evaluates plant design 
on a fire area basis against the nuclear safety and radiation release 
performance criteria of Chapter 1, using either a deterministic or 
performance-based approach. A result of this analysis is the 
identification of the structures, systems, and components that are 
necessary to meet the two criteria (analogous to the ``protected 
systems'' identification process of Appendix R analyses).
    Sections 2.2.6, 2.2.7, and 2.2.8: For a deterministic nuclear 
safety analysis, the licensee compares the existing fire protection 
licensing basis (e.g., exemptions granted under Appendix R to 10 CFR 
part 50, SERs, approved deviations, and licensee-developed generic 
letter (GL) 86-10 engineering evaluations [see GL 86-10 Paragraph C: 
``Documentation Required to Demonstrate Compliance'']) against the 
deterministic approach criteria of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. A 
licensee may demonstrate compliance with Section 4.2.3 using existing 
engineering equivalency evaluations (e.g., licensee-developed GL 86-10 
engineering evaluations, or NRC approved exemption requests) if the 
licensee ensures that the reactor plant meets the threshold of Section 
2.2.7 (that ``these existing engineering evaluations shall clearly 
demonstrate an equivalent level of fire protection compared to the 
deterministic requirements'').
    For a performance-based nuclear safety analysis, the licensee will 
perform the engineering analyses (e.g., using fire modeling or 
probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) methods) under either Section 
4.2.4.1 or 4.2.4.2 of NFPA 805. For a deterministic or performance-
based radiation release analysis, the licensee performs the analytical 
method in Section 4.3 to assess the fulfillment of Chapter 1 criteria.
    Section 2.2.9: In the event of a change to a fire protection 
program element during the above analytical steps, the licensee will 
evaluate the risk impact to ensure that the public risk associated with 
fire-induced nuclear fuel damage accidents is low, and that adequate 
defense-in-depth and safety margins are maintained.
    Section 2.2.10: The licensee shall establish a monitoring program 
to assess the performance of the fire protection program in meeting 
NFPA performance criteria.
    Section 2.2.11: The fire protection program documentation must be 
developed and maintained in such a manner that facility design and 
procedural changes that could affect the fire protection engineering 
analysis assumptions can be identified and analyzed (see Section 2.3).
    Section 2.7 of the standard has adequate requirements for the 
retention of licensee NFPA 805 analyses and evaluations so that NRC 
inspectors may effectively monitor the conduct and effect of licensee 
fire protection program changes.
    B. Decommissioning Reactors: A licensee of a light water reactor 
that is being decommissioned or has permanently ceased operations would 
comply with the requirements of Chapter 5 of NFPA 805.

IV. Licensee Impact

    Licensees may voluntarily adopt the NFPA 805 standard, and any 
additional burden associated with adopting the standard will be at 
their discretion. The NRC anticipates that significant additional 
analysis, beyond that currently documented by licensees, may be elected 
by licensees that choose to adopt NFPA 805. The level of effort 
required for each plant will depend upon the degree to which risk-
informed and performance-based approaches have already been adopted for 
the subject reactor plant (e.g., within the exemption or deviation 
processes for 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50), and the 
degree to which the licensee initiates changes to the reactor plant.

V. Benefits

    The current fire protection requirements (10 CFR 50.48) were 
developed before the NRC or industry had the benefit of probabilistic 
risk assessments (PRAs) for fires, and before there was a significant 
body of operating experience. A revised fire protection rule could 
provide flexibility in achieving adequate fire protection. In addition, 
as discussed in SECY 96-134, ``Options for Pursuing Regulatory 
Improvement in Fire Protection Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants,'' 
dated June 21, 1996, a revised fire protection rule that would 
facilitate the use of alternative approaches may reduce the need for 
exemptions.

VI. Additional Issue for Public Comment

    As well as seeking public comment on the proposed rule itself, the 
NRC is also seeking public comment regarding any other alternative 
consensus standards

[[Page 66586]]

that the agency should consider as voluntary alternatives to the 
current fire protection regulations. The NRC expects that once adopting 
the new licensing basis that provides additional flexibility above that 
provided by Appendix R, licensees will not return to an Appendix R 
licensing basis. Nevertheless, the NRC requests a response to the 
following specific questions: (1) Is there any likelihood that 
licensees who are approved to use NFPA 805 would later decide that they 
would like to comply with paragraph (b) and the licensing basis that 
existed immediately prior to approval of NFPA 805? and (2) Do you agree 
that a license amendment would be required to revert to compliance with 
Section 50.48(b), and if not, why not?

VII. Availability of Documents

    The NRC is making the documents identified below available to 
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as 
indicated.
    Public Document Room (PDR). The NRC's Public Document Room is 
located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland.
    Rulemaking Forum Web Site. The NRC's interactive Rulemaking Forum 
Web site is located at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. These documents may 
be viewed and downloaded electronically via this Web site.
    NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room (PERR). The NRC's Public 
Electronic Reading room is located at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. The subject document may be accessed using the ADAMS accession 
number (e.g., 
``ML
'') provided below.
    The NRC staff contact. The NRC's task manager for this rulemaking 
in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) is Leon Whitney. Mr. 
Whitney can be reached by telephone at 301-415-3081, or via email to 
[email protected].

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Document                     PDR              Web                  PERR               NRC staff
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulatory Analysis................               X                X   ML021300034                            X
Environmental Assessment...........               X                X   ML021300039                            X
NFPA 805 Rule Language.............               X                X   ML021300030                            X
Comments Received..................               X                X   ML020360038
Comments Received..................               X                X   ML020360039
Comments Received..................               X                X   ML020360043
Comments Received..................               X                X   ML020390248
Comments Received..................               X                X   ML020630629
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Electronic Access for Comment Submission

    In addition to the addresses previously provided (see ADDRESSES 
section above) for submitting written comments, interested parties may 
submit comments via the NRC's interactive Rulemaking Forum Web site 
(http://ruleforum.llnl.gov). The Rulemaking Forum enables the industry 
and public to transmit comments as files (in any format), provided that 
your web browser supports that function. Information on the use of the 
Rulemaking Forum is available on the site. For additional assistance on 
the use of the interactive Rulemaking Forum Web site, contact Ms. Carol 
A. Gallagher by telephone at (301) 415-5905 or via email to 
[email protected].

IX. Plain Language

    The Presidential memorandum entitled, ``Plain Language in 
Government Writing,'' dated June 1, 1998, directed that the Government 
must write in plain language. This memorandum was published in the 
Federal Register on June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883). In complying with this 
directive, the NRC has made editorial changes to improve the 
readability of the proposed rule language. The NRC requests comment on 
the proposed rule specifically with respect to the clarity and 
effectiveness of the language used. Comments should be sent to the 
addresses listed under either the ADDRESSES or ``Electronic Access for 
Comment Submission'' sections above.

X. Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Advancement and Transfer Act of 1995, 
Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical 
standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus 
standards bodies, unless the use of such standards is inconsistent with 
applicable law or otherwise impractical. Under this proposed rule, the 
NRC would provide holders of operating licenses for nuclear power 
plants with the option to voluntarily adopt NFPA 805, as excepted, as 
an alternative set of fire protection requirements. The NRC is not 
aware of any consensus standard that could be adopted instead of NFPA 
805, but will consider using an alternative standard if identified. If 
an alternative consensus standard is identified, the notifying 
submittal from the member of the public or industry should explain how 
it is comparable to, and how it could be used in addition to or instead 
of, NFPA 805 in the proposed rule.

XI. Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant 
Environmental Impact

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 
Subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this proposed rule, if adopted, would 
not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement 
is not required. The NRC determined that there would not be significant 
radiological or non-radiological impacts. Under NFPA 805, the 
environment would continue to be adequately protected because the 
methods used for fire detection, suppression, and mitigation are the 
same as those used under the existing fire protection requirements. 
Further there will be no change in the release of radiological or 
nonradiological effluents to the environment.
    This determination is based on an evaluation of the goals, 
objectives and performance criteria in NFPA 805. These provide for 
defense-in-depth to control fires; control of plant reactivity, coolant 
inventory, and pressure; decay heat removal; vital auxiliaries; and 
process monitoring to minimize radioactive releases. The NRC has 
determined that the environmental impacts of the proposed action, the 
no-action alternative, and an alternative in which the NRC would 
develop its own risk-informed standard, were similar. Further, the NRC 
determined that the proposed action does not involve the use of any 
different resources than those considered in the current rule.
    The general public should note that the NRC is seeking public 
participation. Comments on any aspect of the environmental assessment 
may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under either the ADDRESSES or 
``Electronic Access for Comment Submission'' sections above.
    The NRC has sent a copy of the draft environmental assessment and 
this

[[Page 66587]]

proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their 
comments on the environmental assessment.

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This proposed rule contains information collection requirements 
that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 
et seq). This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget for review and approval of the information collection 
requirements.
    The burden to the public for these information collections is 
estimated to average four hours per response, including the time for 
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 
information collection. In addition, there is a one-time estimated 
burden of 20,000 to 65,000 hours for each licensee, who chooses to use 
NFPA 805, to complete the required one-time plant-wide re-analysis of 
the reactor's fire protection systems, equipment, features, and 
procedures. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public 
comment on the potential impact of the information collections 
contained in the proposed rule and on the following issues:
    1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the 
information will have practical utility?
    2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?
    3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of 
the information to be collected?
    4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized, 
including the use of automated collection techniques?
    Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information 
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the 
Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail at 
[email protected]; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0011), Office of Management 
and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
    Comments to OMB on the information collections or on the above 
issues should be submitted by December 2, 2002. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance 
of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a request for information or an information collection 
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid 
OMB control number.

XIII. Regulatory Analysis

    The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis of this 
proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of 
the alternatives considered by the Commission. The draft regulatory 
analysis may be examined and/or copied for a fee at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Room 01-F15, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.
    The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory 
analysis. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as 
indicated in either the ADDRESSES or ``Electronic Access for Comment 
Submission'' sections above.

XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 
605(b), the Commission certifies that this proposed rule, if adopted, 
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. This proposed rule would affect only the licensing and 
operation of nuclear power plants. The companies that own these plants 
do not fall within the definition of ``small entities'' found in the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act or within the size standards established by 
the NRC in 10 CFR 2.810.

XV. Backfit Analysis

    The NRC has determined that a backfit analysis is not required for 
this proposed rule, because the rule does not involve any provisions 
that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1). The 
proposed rule will establish voluntary alternative fire protection 
requirements for licensees with construction permits prior to January 
1, 1979 (all existing LWR reactor plants). Licensees may adopt NFPA 805 
as an alternative set of fire protection requirements by submitting a 
license amendment. However, current licensees may continue to comply 
with existing requirements. Any additional burden incurred by adopting 
NFPA 805 would be at the licensee's discretion. The proposed rule does 
not impose any new requirements, and therefore, does not constitute a 
backfit as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1).

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50

    Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire 
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, and Reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements.

    For the reasons given in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to 
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50:

PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 
FACILITIES

    1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 
Stat. 936, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 
Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 2232, 
2233, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 
as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).
    Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 
2951, as amended by Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 
U.S.C. 5851). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 185, 68 
Stat. 936, 955, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. L. 
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), 
and 50.103 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 
U.S.C. 2138). Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued 
under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 
50.55a and Appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 
Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued 
under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 
also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 
50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 
U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 
(42 U.S.C. 2237).

    2. In Sec.  50.48, paragraph (c) is added and paragraph (f) is 
revised to read as follows:


Sec.  50.48.  Fire protection.

* * * * *
    (c) National Fire Protection Standard NFPA 805--(1) Approval of 
incorporation by reference. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
Standard 805, ``Performance-Based for Fire Protection for Light Water 
Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition'' (NFPA 805), which is 
referenced in this section, was approved for incorporation by reference 
by the Director of the Federal Register. A notice of any changes made 
to the material incorporated by reference will

[[Page 66588]]

be published in the Federal Register. Copies of NFPA 805 may be 
purchased from the NFPA Customer Service Department, 1 Batterymarch 
Park, P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101 and in PDF format through 
the NFPA Online Catalog (www.nfpa.org) or by calling 1-800-344-3555 or 
617-770-3000. Copies are also available for inspection at the NRC 
Library, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland 20852-2738, and at the NRC Public Document Room, Building One 
White Flint North, Room O1-F15, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland 20852-2738. Copies are also available at the Office of the 
Federal Register, 800 N. Capitol Street, Suite 700, Washington, DC.
    (2) Exceptions, modifications, and supplementation of NFPA 805. As 
used in this section, references to NFPA 805 are to the 2001 Edition, 
with the following exceptions, modifications, and supplementations:
    (i) Life Safety Goal. The Life Safety Goal of Section 1.3.3 is not 
endorsed.
    (ii) Plant Damage/Business Interruption Objectives. The Plant 
Damage/Business Interruption Objectives of Section 1.3.4 of NFPA 805 
are not endorsed.
    (iii) Use of feed-and-bleed. In demonstrating compliance with the 
performance criteria of Sections 1.5.1(b) and (c) of NFPA 805, a high 
pressure charging/injection pump coupled with the pressurizer power-
operated relief valves (PORVs) as the sole fire-protected safe shutdown 
path for maintaining reactor coolant inventory, pressure control, and 
decay heat removal capability (i.e., feed-and-bleed) for pressurized-
water reactors (PWRs) is not permitted.
    (iv) Uncertainty analysis. An uncertainty analysis performed in 
accordance with Section 2.7.3.5 is not required to support 
deterministic approach calculations.
    (v) Existing cables. In lieu of installing cables meeting flame 
propagation tests as required by Section 3.3.5.3 of the standard, a 
flame retardant coating may be applied to the electric cables, or an 
automatic fixed fire suppression system may be installed to provide an 
equivalent level of protection. In addition, the italicized exception 
to Section 3.3.5.3 is not endorsed.
    (vi) Water supply and distribution. The italicized exception to 
Section 3.6.4 is not endorsed.
    (3) Compliance with NFPA 805. (i) A licensee may maintain a fire 
protection program that complies with NFPA 805 as an alternative to 
complying with paragraph (b) of this section for plants licensed to 
operate before January 1, 1979; or the fire protection license 
conditions for plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. The 
licensee shall submit a request to comply with NFPA 805 in the form of 
an application for license amendment under Sec.  50.90. The application 
must identify any orders and license conditions that must be revised or 
superseded, and contain any necessary revisions to the plant's 
technical specifications and the bases thereof. The Director of the 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or a designee of the Director, 
may approve the application if the Director or designee determines that 
the licensee has identified orders, license conditions, and the 
technical specifications that must be revised or superseded, and that 
any necessary revisions are adequate. Any approval by the Director or 
the designee of the Director shall be in the form of a license 
amendment approving the use of NFPA 805 together with any necessary 
revisions to the technical specifications.
    (ii) The licensee shall complete its implementation of the 
methodology in Chapter 2 of NFPA 805 (including all required 
evaluations and analyses) and, upon completion, modify the fire 
protection plan required by paragraph (a) of this section to reflect 
the licensee's decision to comply with NFPA 805, before changing its 
fire protection program or nuclear power plant as permitted by NFPA 
805.
    (4) Alternative methods and analytical approaches. A licensee may 
submit a request to use alternative methods and analytical approaches, 
including fundamental fire protection program and minimum design 
requirements identified in Chapter 3 of NFPA 805, in lieu of those 
methods and approaches specified in NFPA 805. The request must be in 
the form of an application for license amendment under Sec.  50.90. The 
Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or designee of 
the Director, may approve the application if the Director or designee 
determines that the alternative methods and analytical approaches:
    (i) Satisfy the goals, performance objectives, and performance 
criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and 
radiological release.
    (ii) Maintain safety margins.
    (iii) Maintain fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, 
fire suppression, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).
* * * * *
    (f) Licensees that have submitted the certifications required under 
Sec.  50.82(a)(1) shall maintain a fire protection program to address 
the potential for fires that could cause the release or spread of 
radioactive materials (i.e., that could result in a radiological 
hazard). A fire protection program that complies with NFPA 805 shall be 
deemed to comply with the requirements of this paragraph.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of October, 2002.

    For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 02-27701 Filed 10-31-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P