[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 151 (Tuesday, August 6, 2002)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 50824-50835]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-19840]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Research and Special Programs Administration
49 CFR Part 192
[Docket No. RSPA-00-7666; Amendment 192-77]
RIN 2137-AD64
Pipeline Safety: High Consequence Areas For Gas Transmission
Pipelines
AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This final rule defines areas of high consequence where the
potential consequences of a gas pipeline accident may be significant or
may do considerable harm to people and their property. The definition
includes: current class 3 and 4 locations; facilities with persons who
are mobility-impaired, confined, or hard to evacuate, and places where
people gather for recreational and other purposes. For facilities with
mobility-impaired, confined, or hard-to-evacuate persons and places
where people gather, the corridor of protection from the pipeline is
300 feet, 660 feet or 1000 feet depending on the pipeline's diameter
and operating pressure. This final rule
[[Page 50825]]
is the first step in a two-step process to develop integrity management
program requirements for gas transmission operators. In the second
step, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) will
propose requirements to improve the integrity of gas transmission
pipelines located in these high consequence areas. This definition
satisfies, in part, the Congressional mandate in 49 U.S.C. 60109 for
RSPA to prescribe standards that establish criteria for identifying
each gas pipeline facility located in a high-density population area.
RSPA developed the definition from the comments received on the
notice of proposed rulemaking, and the earlier notice that invited
public comment about integrity management concepts as they relate to
gas pipelines. The definition does not yet require any specific action
by gas transmission pipeline operators. Action will not be required
until we issue integrity management program requirements that use the
definition.
DATES: This rule is effective September 5, 2002.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Israni by telephone at (202) 366-
4571, by fax at (202) 366-4566, or by e-mail at
[email protected], regarding the subject matter of this rule; or
the Docket Facility (202) 366-9329, for copies of this rule or other
material in the docket. All materials in the docket may be accessed
electronically at http://dms.dot.gov. General information about the
RSPA/OPS programs may be obtained by accessing OPS's Internet page at
http://ops.dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On January 9, 2002, RSPA published a notice of proposed rulemaking
(67 FR 1108) that proposed to define areas of high consequence where a
gas pipeline accident could do considerable harm to people and their
property. The proposed definition included as high consequence areas:
Class 3 and 4 locations as defined in 49 CFR part 192; areas where a
pipeline is within 660 or 1000 feet of a building with mobility-
impaired or confined persons (hospitals, schools, retirement and day-
care facilities); and areas where a pipeline is within 660 or 1000 feet
of a place where 20 or more people gather at least 50 days in any 12-
month period (playground, camping ground). The 1000-foot area was
proposed for a pipeline with a diameter larger than 30 inches and
operating at a pressure greater than 1000 psig.
In the Notice proposing the definition, we explained that because
of differences in the physical properties and consequences of a gas
release versus a hazardous liquid release, and the benefits of gas
transmission operators already maintaining accurate data on population
near their pipelines, the definition differed from the definition we
developed for hazardous liquid pipelines (49 CFR 195.450). The primary
differences were that we structured the proposed definition to use the
data pipeline companies already collect and maintain, and we did not
include environmentally sensitive areas. A more detailed discussion of
why the definitions were structured differently for liquid and gas
pipelines can be found in the NPRM (67 FR 1108; Jan. 9, 2002).
Advisory Committee Consideration
On July 18, 2002, the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee
(TPSSC) met to review the proposed high consequence area definition for
gas transmission pipelines. TPSSC is the Federal advisory committee
charged with responsibility for advising on the technical feasibility,
reasonableness, cost-effectiveness, and practicability of proposed
natural gas pipeline safety standards. The committee voted unanimously
to approve our proceeding with the high consequence area rule with
consideration of several issues. First, the committee recommended that
the preamble clarify that, although the definition requires no specific
action on the part of operators, the rule applies only to gas
transmission pipelines. RSPA has made the clarification. Second, the
committee recommended that wording be included in the preamble
clarifying that the definition is the first step in the process of
defining requirements for managing the integrity of gas pipelines. RSPA
has clarified the preamble. The upcoming proposed integrity management
rule for gas transmission pipelines will describe the additional
integrity assurance measures gas transmission operators will be
required to implement for pipeline segments that are located in high
consequence areas. Third, the committee recommended that we modify the
provision defining areas where people congregate to add the word
``known.'' RSPA agrees with the intent of this comment and has revised
the definition and preamble to reflect this intent. Finally, the
committee recommended that RSPA consider renaming the definition as
``Potential'' High Consequence Areas. In making this recommendation,
the committee was under the impression that the proposed integrity
management rule would give operators the opportunity to analyze high
consequence areas using the ``potential impact zone'' concept to
identify areas within the high consequence area where no additional
integrity management measures would be required. Because this issue
will be addressed directly in the upcoming proposed integrity
management rule, RSPA believes that renaming the definition would not
be appropriate.
Comments to NPRM
We received comments from 28 sources in response to the NPRM:
Three (3) public interest groups or individual members of the public
Citizens for Safe Pipelines (a New Mexico citizens' group)
Cook Inlet Keeper
Gary L. Smith
Five (5) state agencies
Iowa Utilities Board
State of New York Department of Public Service (NYDPS)
State of New York, Office of the Attorney General
Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology)
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC)
Five (5) industry associations
American Gas Association (AGA)
American Public Gas Association (APGA)
Gas Piping Technology Committee (GPTC)
Interstate National Gas Association of America (INGAA)
New York Gas Group (NYGAS)
18 natural gas pipeline operators
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company, ChevronTexaco, CMS Energy,
Consumers Energy Company, Duke Energy Gas Transmission, El Paso
Corporation, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., Enron Transportation
Services, Kinder Morgan, National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation, the
Energy Distribution Segment of NiSource Inc. (NiSource EDG), North
Shore Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, PECO Energy,
Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, Questar Regulated Services,
Southwest Gas and, Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Company.
One (1) risk management consulting company
Accufacts, Inc.
One (1) suspension bridge engineering and construction company
SEFBO Pipeline Bridge, Inc.
In the following section we discuss these comments and how we
addressed them in developing the final definition
[[Page 50826]]
of high consequence areas for gas transmission pipelines.
General Comments
Placement of Definition
The Notice proposed to place the definition of high consequence
areas in a new section in Part 192, subpart M on integrity management.
Southwest Gas Corporation suggested that the definition of high
consequence area be added to the general definition section in part 192
(Sec. 192.3) so that all definitions are in the same location.
Response: We will leave the definition of high consequence areas in
the section on integrity management. Because this definition will be
used in the forthcoming integrity management program regulations, it
fits better in this section rather than in the section on general
definitions.
Lines Covered
The proposed definition of high consequence areas applied to all
gas transmission pipelines.
Several commenters recommended excluding certain low stress
pipelines from the definition. These commenters explained that lower
stress pipelines tend to result in leaks, rather than ruptures.
Suggestions varied on which low stress pipelines we should exclude.
Many of the commenters (AGA, APGA, Consumers Energy, National Fuel
Gas Supply Corporation, North Shore Gas, New York Gas Group, Peoples
Gas, Questar, Southwest Gas) recommended that the definition be limited
to transmission pipelines operating at or above 20% of specified
minimum yield strength. Baltimore Gas & Electric recommended exempting
transmission piping operated as part of and integral to a distribution
system if the piping is operated below a determined pressure, such as
300 psig and is less than a determined diameter, such as 30 inches. CMS
Energy recommended excluding from the definition pipelines that operate
at pressures lower than 40% of the maximum hoop stress. Energy
Distribution Segment of NiSource Inc. recommended that high consequence
areas be limited to pipelines operating at or above 30% SMYS.
The Iowa Utilities Board suggested RSPA consider developing
separate integrity management program requirements for pipelines
operating at stress levels below 30% SMYS. The Utilities Board
maintained that the C-FER method is not an appropriate indicator of the
high consequence area for pipelines operating at stress levels below
30% SMYS. The Iowa Board explained that because these pipelines fail by
leakage rather than by rupture, the C-FER formula significantly
overestimates the potential impact zone. (More discussion on the C-FER
formula appears later in this document.)
New York State Department of Public Service urged that integrity
management be applied to all gas transmission pipelines, not just those
that traverse a high consequence area. The Department suggested that
pipelines in high consequence areas could have higher priority for
testing and repair.
Response: We have not revised the definition to exclude pipelines
operating below a certain stress level. The high consequence area
definition applies to gas transmission pipelines, as those lines are
defined in part 192. Lines not falling withing the definition of
transmission line are not covered. We will consider ways to address
transmission pipelines operating at lower stress in developing the
proposed integrity management rule for gas transmission pipelines.
However, as discussed later in this document, we have added to the
definition a 300-foot zone for small diameter pipelines operating at
lower pressure.
As for extending integrity management to all transmission lines,
RSPA's initial goal is to provide greater assurance of pipeline
integrity in geographic areas where a gas pipeline rupture could do the
most harm to people. Once we propose and implement the integrity
management program requirements for the areas we define, we will study
the results and consider how effective it would be to extend added
protection to other areas.
Class 3 and 4 Locations--Proposed 49 CFR 192.761 (a) and (b)
The proposed definition of high consequence areas included class 3
and class 4 locations, as those areas are defined in Sec. 192.5. In the
Notice, we said that because class location definitions are based on
population density, gas operators already maintain current data on the
location of people in areas adjacent to their pipelines. It seemed more
logical to structure a definition using this data rather than basing
the definition on a Census Bureau definition, as we had done for
hazardous liquid pipelines.
All commenters supported basing the definition of high consequence
areas on current class location regulations.
However, several pipeline distribution companies (Baltimore Gas &
Electric, NiSource EDG, PECO Energy) objected to RSPA's assumption that
information about population density is in the hands of operators.
These commenters explained that many local distribution companies
utilized class four criteria when constructing a facility, and,
therefore, never established a population density baseline and do not
track changes in population density.
AGA and APGA disagreed with our statements in the NPRM about the
quality, timeliness and accuracy of class location data. AGA and APGA
objected to the assumption that class location regulations require
operators to periodically monitor and record data on increases in
population near their pipelines, and that this data monitoring gives an
accurate picture of where people live and work who can be affected by a
release. These associations explained that many operators in
metropolitan areas design their transmission lines for a Class 4
location even though the classification might be a class 2 or 3;
therefore, subsequent population increases do not require detailed
surveys of the area. Or if a pipeline is in a class 3 location, the
operator need only determine if buildings of four or more stories
become prevalent, rather than perform a survey of population density.
AGA and APGA further objected to our characterizing the data operators
have on buildings within 660 feet as adequate to identify the high
consequence areas. They explained that the existing house count data is
good information but it may not be extensive, detailed or approach
real-time analysis.
Consumers Energy pointed out that by including class 3 areas, the
burden is placed on local distribution company feeder systems. The
company explained that its entire system would be treated as a high
consequence area whereas many cross-country pipelines have few class 3
areas. PECO Energy commented that annual aerial photography and weekly
aerial or foot patrols would be needed to keep current information on
populations or buildings within 660 feet of its pipeline.
Response: RSPA recognizes that some operators, particularly local
distribution companies, may have designed their pipelines for a class 4
location, and, as a consequence, may not maintain current data on the
number and location of buildings near their pipelines. However, we
continue to believe that it is preferable to base a definition for high
consequence areas for gas transmission operators on the existing class
location definitions, and to allow the majority of operators to use the
information they have on people and buildings near their pipelines
rather than to base the definition on the Census Bureau
[[Page 50827]]
definitions. An operator who does not maintain the data needed to
define a class location will need to decide whether to treat its entire
system as being within a high consequence area, or to take steps to
identify which segments of the system are actually in high consequence
areas. Either decision will be acceptable to OPS.
Hard-To-Evacuate Facilities--Proposed Secs. 192.761 (c) and (d)
The NPRM proposed to include areas where a pipeline lies within 660
feet of a hospital, school, day-care facility, retirement facility,
prison, or other facility having persons who are confined, are of
impaired mobility or would be difficult to evacuate. The proposed area
of protection increased to 1000 feet for a pipeline greater than 30
inches in diameter and operating at a maximum allowable operating
pressure greater than 1000 psig. In the NPRM, we said we wanted to
ensure that areas where there are facilities with people who may not be
able to evacuate the area quickly are better protected from a potential
release.
The State of New York's Office of the Attorney General supported
the proposed definition. As discussed below, other commenters
recommended revisions.
AGA and APGA supported including areas with buildings occupied by
persons with limited mobility, but maintained that we should better
define these facilities to allow operators a reasonable chance of
identifying them. The trade associations explained that it would be
impractical for operators to identify ``other facilities having persons
who are confined, are impaired, or would be difficult to evacuate''
because these facilities could include home-based day-care facilities
housing only one or two people. APA and APGA proposed that we include
clarifying language such as ``licensed facilities'' or ``known
facilities that are visibly marked and occupied by a defined number of
people.'' AGA and APGA also noted that the phrase ``difficult to
evacuate'' could refer to either the building itself or to the
occupants of the building.
Baltimore Gas & Electric maintained that it would have problems
identifying facilities unless there is some publicly available data
source. The distribution system operator argued that without
corresponding data validation source references, the definition creates
an unattainable requirement on system operators.
CMS Energy argued that there was no method for distinguishing what
constitutes a facility or how many people need to occupy a building for
it to be considered a school or hospital. The transmission system
operator commented that a definition needs a minimum number of people
that have to be associated with a day care facility, school or
retirement facility to prevent including residences that are used for
such purposes. CMS Energy suggested using the number from the outside
area of the class 3 definition, because operators could use information
currently available to them and minimal retraining of field personnel
would be needed.
Consumers Energy commented that facilities, such as day care
facilities, are difficult to discover because they may be small,
located within homes and have short business lives. The company
recommended adding a requirement that at least 20 persons occupy a
facility for it to be included. Consumers Energy further suggested
revising the phrase difficult to evacuate because the phrase could be
interpreted as meaning the people are difficult to evacuate, or the
facility is difficult to evacuate because of lack of staff.
Duke Energy recommended that the language be clarified to state
that facilities must be public, licensed, and marked visibly as viewed
from the nearest public roadway. Duke Energy argued that operators
cannot be expected to determine the locations of private, home-based
day-care facilities or private homes. The company further recommended
that the phrase difficult to evacuate be removed because the language
is vague.
El Paso commented that revising the definition to include
facilities that are public, licensed and visibly marked when viewed
from the nearest public roadway would help operators identify the
facilities.
Enbridge recommended specifying that facilities have to be clearly
identified by external signs. Enbridge explained that there are
numerous family day-care settings, group homes for home-schooled foster
children, ill or elderly, but that operators cannot be expected to
identify these facilities unless they are marked. Enbridge further
explained that because licensing requirements vary, operators cannot
always get this information through public officials.
Enron Transportation supported including these facilities in the
definition but suggested we clarify the definition by adding ``or other
similar, well defined facility having persons who are confined * * *''
The Gas Piping Technology Committee suggested that RSPA discuss
what attributes qualify a facility for coverage, whether commercial
databases are available, and if public officials have this information.
The technical committee recommended that facilities be known, and that
they normally have at least 20 persons.
INGAA recommended that the facilities included in the definition be
public, licensed and marked visibly from the nearest public roadway,
because operators could not be expected to identify private, home-based
daycare facilities or private homes with retirement-age people. INGAA
further argued that the phrase difficult to evacuate is vague.
National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation suggested we more closely
delineate the facilities covered by the definition because operators
cannot identify unmarked homes with handicapped persons.
New York Gas Group commented that local distribution companies
would not be able to identify these facilities. The trade association
explained that unless the facilities are licensed or are on lists
maintained by local municipalities, it would be too resource intensive
and impractical to locate these facilities. New York Gas Group
recommended that we require operators to obtain the lists on a periodic
basis.
North Shore objected that the proposed language did not include a
minimum number of people that have to be in a facility, and suggested a
20-person minimum. North Shore argued that without a minimum, places
such as a small police station or in-home day care would be included.
The distribution company further suggested that the definition require
facilities to be known, and the phrase difficult to evacuate be
clarified to apply only to facilities with confined or mobility-
impaired persons.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company recommended specifying a minimum
number of 20 persons in a facility. The company also recommended we
require that the facility be licensed to help ensure the information is
available or that we work with the states to develop a database of all
facilities that should be considered high consequence areas.
PECO Energy recommended specifying that the facilities be known
facilities to ensure that operators have knowledge of the facility. The
company explained that small operators might not have knowledge of
newer facilities constructed or buildings renovated for these purposes.
Peoples Gas recommended adding a lower bound on the number of
people that are present in the facility, and to add the word ``known.''
Peoples Gas suggested that the phrase difficult to
[[Page 50828]]
evacuate apply to facilities with confined or mobility-impaired persons
and not be an additional, separate factor because any structure in an
emergency could be difficult to evacuate.
Questar commented that it was unclear if the proposed language
refers to buildings that are difficult to evacuate because of the
number of occupants, the design of the building, or because the
occupants are confined or are impaired. Questar argued that the focus
should not be on building design. Questar was not in favor of including
schools in the examples. Questar explained that schools would probably
be covered under the existing class location definitions, and that many
types of schools are not in use all week and are not occupied by
persons with impaired mobility. The company suggested that because day-
care facilities may be home-based, and not visibly marked, and not
known to local governments, and because certain types of retirement
facilities may be difficult to identify, we should limit the definition
to licensed day care and retirement facilities that are clearly marked
and visible from a public roadway. Questar further recommended adding a
threshold number of occupants, such as 20.
Gary Smith favored including a distance greater than 660 feet from
a larger diameter pipeline for individuals with limited mobility, but
did not know how realistic it would be to monitor for such individuals.
Response: RSPA has revised the definition to better define the
types of facilities that are to be included. We have clarified that the
facilities we are focusing on have people that because of impaired
mobility or because they are confined, or because of other reasons,
such as age, would be difficult to evacuate. The definition makes clear
that it is focusing on the occupants not the design of the building.
We have added a requirement that the building with the occupants
who are confined, mobility-impaired, or hard to evacuate has to be an
identified site. An identified site is a building that can be
identified through any of the following means--it has a sign; it is
licensed or registered by a federal, state or local agency; it is known
to public safety officials; or it appears on a list or map that is
available through a federal, state or local agency, or through a
publicly available or commercially available database. This revision
should alleviate the concern that operators will be required to
identity a family home that has elderly or disabled persons, or day-
care age children.
We have kept schools in the list of examples. We agree that many
schools will likely fall within the definition for a class 3 or 4
location, and that many may not contain persons who are mobility-
impaired. However, schools are facilities occupied by groups of people,
most likely children, who may, because of their age, number or fear, be
difficult to organize and evacuate during an emergency.
We have not required that these be public facilities. Many day care
facilities and assisted-living and retirement facilities and
communities are private. To limit the definition to public facilities
would eliminate a great number of facilities housing children and the
elderly. We have not specified a minimum number of occupants that need
to be in these facilities because the populations in these facilities
are in constant flux. Although a facility can be identified because it
has a sign or is on a list maintained by a governmental agency, it is
unlikely there would be information on how many persons occupy the
facility.
The information many operators currently maintain on people and
buildings near their pipelines should help operators to identify these
facilities. This information may have to be supplemented with patrols
that specifically look for these types of facilities along the right-
of-way. This information will need to be periodically updated to ensure
that newer facilities are not overlooked. To supplement this
information, government websites provide listings of nursing homes,
assisted-living facilities and communities that house elderly. For
example, the Federal Government's Firstgov (www.firstgov.gov) website
provides information on nursing home and elder care facilities in all
areas of the country, as well as providing information on state
websites, and state and local agencies that can be contacted for
information to help locate facilities. The website also provides a
hyperlink to the National Center for Education Statistics, which lists
all private and public schools in any geographic area. In addition,
telephone directories offer a listing source for many of the types of
facilities an operator will need to identify. Addresses obtained
through phone listings can be located using commercially available Web
sites such as mapblast (www.mapblast.com) or mapquest
(www.mapquest.com).
Areas Where People Congregate--Proposed Sec. 192.761(e)
The proposed definition of high consequence area included an area
where a pipeline was within 660 feet or 1000 feet, depending on the
diameter and operating pressure of the pipeline, of a place where 20 or
more persons gather at least 50 days in any 12-month period. We listed
examples of beaches, camping grounds, recreational facilities and
museums. The 20-person minimum used in the proposed definition was
based on the number used in the current definition of a class 3
location, and it was a number we believed typical of the number of
people that frequent a recreational area. We stated that although gas
transmission operators are not currently required to maintain data on
areas where people congregate near their pipelines, they are required
to patrol their pipeline rights-of-way, and should have knowledge about
these areas. We further stated that this information should also be
available from local public safety officials.
AGA and APGA thought this part of the definition should be limited
to well-defined outside areas. The associations were against including
buildings, such as museums, because they are likely covered by other
parts of the definition, and against including seldom-used or unmarked
buildings, which would require daily patrols to identify. AGA and APGA
further suggested that the frequency of usage be 20 or more persons at
least 5 days a weeks for ten weeks, because that is consistent with
current regulations requiring operators to survey areas within 330 feet
of the pipeline for well-defined areas.
Baltimore Gas & Electric maintained it was not practical or
attainable to analyze every place where people may congregate on an
intermittent basis.
Chevron Texaco was opposed to including places where people might
congregate, and preferred focusing the definition on cities, towns,
buildings and roads. Chevron thought that using Carlsbad as an example
was too broad and could end up including all areas unless on company-
owned property.
Citizens for Safe Pipelines urged that public recreation areas be
included. The group thought that the proposed standard was too high and
would be difficult to measure, and suggested that the standard should
simply be evidence of public use, including evidence of vehicle traffic
or camping sites, particularly near watercourses. The citizens' group
explained that in the west, watercourses are places where people
congregate on public land for recreation. The group recommended that
operators use regular aerial patrol and consult with public land
management and local government officials to identify these areas. The
group also recommended including religious buildings, because
significant numbers of people regularly congregate in these buildings.
[[Page 50829]]
Consumers Energy commented that the example of a museum did not fit
because the proposed definition was aimed at outdoor facilities. The
company maintained that the language was too broad and should be
limited to well-defined areas, or data would be difficult to develop
and maintain. Consumers Energy further maintained that the proposed
occupation period was too restrictive, and too hard to identify, and
suggested using a weekly basis for the occupation period or eliminating
it.
Cook Inlet Keeper was not convinced that the proposed definition
would cover the location of the Carlsbad pipeline accident. The
organization recommended that to ensure that Carlsbad and similar areas
are covered, we lower the proposed 50-day threshold, and instead, use
as the trigger whether the operator has any knowledge of periodic use
for recreational or other purposes.
CMS Energy maintained that the proposed definition would require
operators to monitor pipelines 24-hours, 7 days a week, 365 days a
year. The company objected that the proposed language could be
interpreted to include areas, such as large parks or golf courses where
people might not be close to the pipeline. CMS Energy objected to the
example of a museum because this expands the definition to include
buildings, and buildings such as rural churches might be covered. The
company recommended limiting the area to a small, well-defined area
within 220 yards (or 333 yards for larger pipelines).
Duke Energy acknowledged the difficulty in defining areas where
people gather. The company suggested using 50 days when defining the
frequency of use, a rate that would cover one day per week or a full
weekend during the summer months. Duke maintained that the word area by
itself was too illusive, and should be modified by the phrase ``small,
well-defined outside area.'' Duke explained that without this
modification, operators would have to include beaches, parks or other
large areas. Duke suggested removing museums as an example because
current regulations address land use associated with structures such as
office buildings, restaurants and museums, but do not address outdoor
areas where people gather for weekend-type use. Duke argued that use of
the word outside is critical to capture the recreational land user.
Enbridge recommended that we revise the definition to focus on
areas of significantly higher consequence. Enbridge suggested focusing
on areas of significant, specific, well-defined outdoor congregation,
otherwise, the proposed criteria would incorporate rural places of
worship or other facilities used only for an hour or two per week.
Enbridge further recommended that the definition specify areas that are
clearly and publicly identified, because operators can only be expected
to identify areas that have visible signs, or are on official local
maps or in public information sources. The operator suggested that we
base the definition on data that is public, accessible and verifiable.
Enron was against including buildings such as museums because these
have multiple exits and would be protected from an accident. Enron
recommended that the definition focus on small, well-defined outdoor
areas, because operators will not be able to identify areas used on
occasional weekends or evenings unless they are defined.
The Gas Piping Technology Committee noted that the proposed
definition targets weekend activity, which will require operators to
conduct weekend patrols at some frequency. The committee suggested RSPA
clarify if its intent is to include organized congregation in camping
grounds and other areas or to include any place where people
congregate. The committee suggested revising the definition to include
known areas, at established weekend or seasonal recreational
facilities, such as campgrounds, beaches, or parks within a well-
defined area.
INGAA expressed concerns with the proposed definition. INGAA argued
that local officials could only be expected to identify well-defined
and frequently-used areas, and that it was unreasonable to expect
operators to identify areas, similar to the Carlsbad site, that are
undefined and infrequently used. The industry association objected to
including museums in the examples of areas where people congregate,
because operators would have to include buildings or structures,
particularly, seldom-used buildings, such as rural churches or bingo
halls. INGAA commented that having to include these seldom-used
structures would require operators to increase the frequency of
monitoring, and to monitor on weekends and evenings. INGAA submitted
substitute language that it maintained is more consistent with existing
regulations, and easier for operators to comply with. This language
defined the areas as small, well-defined outside areas within 660 feet
of a pipeline, and occupied by 20 or more people on at least 5 days a
week for ten weeks in any 12-month period. The association argued this
language would preclude operators from having to include large
facilities of low usage, such as golf courses or national parks. INGAA
explained that requiring an area to be well-defined would allow better
utilization of land use data operators have collected, and that a usage
rate of 5 days a week would not require surveillance during evening and
weekend hours and is more consistent with existing regulations.
Kinder Morgan suggested that areas where people congregate only be
included if they are within the pipeline's defined hazard area
calculated from the C-FER model.
National Fuel commented that the proposed area would be too
difficult to define, and should be revised to refer to small, well-
defined outside areas.
NiSource EDG disagreed with our statement in the NPRM that the
patrolling frequency required in the class location regulations is
sufficient for an operator to have knowledge of where people congregate
near its pipeline. The company thought only daily patrolling would
uncover the proposed level of use. NiSource EDG was not aware of any
public safety agency that collects, maintains and distributes
recreational land use information on a statewide basis. NiSource EDG
further commented that the proposed definition was subjective and
imprecise, and should be revised to enable operators to identify with a
level of certainty and precision the kinds of facilities that make an
area high consequence.
New York Gas Group commented that based on its members' experience,
it is unlikely that the proposed areas could be identified under
current patrolling requirements. The trade association maintained that
securing this information would require an excessive resource
expenditure for expanded patrolling. New York Gas Group further
maintained that such information is not available from local officials
or available in standardized format.
New York State Department of Public Service commented that it is
unclear whether we intended for areas where people congregate to
include facilities such as transportation terminals, manufacturing
facilities or business locations, and recommended clarifying the
language to include these facilities. The Department of Public Service
questioned the basis for the 20 or more persons congregating at least
50 days in a 12-month period, and explained that a stadium or arena may
be used less than 50 days per year but, nonetheless, attract large
crowds to individual events.
[[Page 50830]]
North Shore Gas suggested that the areas where people congregate be
known and well-defined. The company also suggested the usage rate
should be 5 days a week for 10 weeks in a 12-month period instead of
the proposed 50 days in 12 months, because it would be easier for
operators to monitor. North Shore Gas thought that the example of a
museum is out of place if outside areas are being targeted.
Pacific Gas recommended that RSPA provide the pipeline industry
with references to help identify public gathering areas or provide
additional guidance for identifying these locations. The company
further recommended that we revise the definition to known locations
that can be identified by patrols during the business week.
PECO Energy suggested adding the words known or established because
small operators might not have knowledge of these facilities. The
company argued that operators could be forced to instigate weekend
surveillance to identify the proposed areas.
Peoples Gas recommended that areas an operator has to identify be
known and well-defined. Peoples Gas suggested changing the proposed 50
days of occupancy to 5 days per week for 10 weeks, otherwise, increased
monitoring is needed. The company further suggested that we delete
museum from the examples to focus on outdoor areas.
Questar recommended focusing the definition on well-defined outside
areas where large groups of people congregate near gas transmission
pipelines, and requiring that the areas be known and controlled by
public officials. Questar was opposed to including buildings because
they are picked up in other sections of the definition, and seldom-used
buildings would be difficult to identify.
Response: We have revised the part of the definition addressing
areas where people congregate. The intent in including these areas was
to pick up areas that are used for recreational purposes. Such areas
typically are used on weekends, and after business hours. Although an
operator may only patrol during business hours during the week, it may
have to expand its efforts to identify areas that people frequent at
other hours. A pipeline does not shut down during evening and weekend
hours, when people are using these areas. Even if an operator does not
expand its patrolling, it should be able to identify these areas
through its procedures for continuing surveillance or through its
communications with local public safety officials.
We have revised the definition to require that there be evidence of
use at an identified site. As with the buildings with mobility-impaired
or confined persons, an identified site is a building or outside area
that has a visible sign, is registered or licensed by a Federal, State
or local agency, is known by public officials, or is on a list or map
available through a Federal, State or local agency or that can be
obtained through a publicly available or commercially available
database. At the site there needs to be evidence that the site is used
by 20 or more persons on at least 50 days in any 12-month period. These
revisions should alleviate concerns operators expressed about the
proposed definition being too vague and the areas too difficult to
identify. The definition now provides criteria for identifying
locations where people congregate.
We have revised the examples. In the list of examples, we have
included stadiums. Although stadiums holding large crowds may be
located in Class 3 or 4 locations, we want to ensure such facilities
are not ignored if they are located in a less densely populated area.
We have added buildings used for religious purposes because groups of
people are likely to gather in these buildings on weekends and in the
evening. We have also added crossings of water bodies to the examples.
We agree with the comment that the area near a pipeline crossing of a
waterway may be used as a camping or recreational area.
We have not added modifiers, such as small and well-known. An
adjective such as the word small is open to interpretation. One
person's idea of small could be 10 feet, whereas another operator might
consider 500 feet as small. Similarly, there would likely be
disagreement about what makes an area a known area. Would it be enough
that local residents know and frequent the area or would it have to be
on a list maintained by a local agency for it to be known? What if it
is an area known by local officials but the operator only conducts
patrols during the week and has no knowledge that it is being used on
weekends? By requiring that there be evidence of use at an identified
site we are focusing on any area that can be identified as an area
where there is regular activity by people around the pipeline.
Although concern was expressed that golf courses and national parks
may have to be included, the area that needs to be looked at is only
300, 660 or 1000 feet from a pipeline. Even if the area falls within a
large area as a golf course or park, the operator only has to determine
if the specified area around the pipeline shows evidence of regular use
by people, or the operator can assume that people regularly frequent
the area near the pipeline.
We have not limited the definition to outside areas but have
included other structures that may be used for recreational or other
purposes during weeknight or weekend hours. As explained above we
included in the examples stadiums and religious buildings. We have
taken out the example of a museum, because we agree that this type of
building is most likely covered under the class location definitions.
We have not changed the usage rate from what was proposed. We
believe this is a valid rate to pick up areas that are used as
recreational areas because the rate will support identification of
areas that are used only during week days in a typical ten (10) week
summer, and areas that are used only on weekends throughout the entire
year. The number of people is appropriate for a recreational activity
such as baseball, football or soccer, and for a moderately used
facility such as a campground.
We continue to believe that evidence of recreational use can be
determined through required patrols of the pipeline right-of-way,
perhaps, supplemented with patrol on a weekend or after business hours
during the week. Operators are already required to have procedures for
continuing surveillance and to have emergency procedures that provide
for maintaining communication with public officials. Thus, it should
not be burdensome for operators to consult with these officials to
determine if the officials have knowledge about these areas. In
addition, most recreational areas will be designated areas such as
parks or campgrounds for which records are retained by governmental
units at the local, county or state level.
660 and 1000-Foot Corridors
Where a pipeline is near a building with mobility-impaired or
confined persons, or near an area where people congregate, we proposed
that the protected area from the pipeline should be 660 feet or 1000
feet, depending on the diameter and operating pressure of the pipeline.
In the NPRM we explained that we based the proposed 660-foot and 1000-
foot corridors on a model developed by C-FER, a Canadian research and
consulting organization. (More information on this model is in Docket
7666). The C-FER analysis was based on a simplified model of a
gas pipeline rupture. The model included a simplified mathematical
treatment of several phenomena important to characterizing the extent
of damage following a pipeline rupture, as for
[[Page 50831]]
example, critical heat flux, the time of ignition of the escaping gas,
the height of the burning jet, and the pipe decompression rate. The
model also included estimates of several important parameters
associated with the phenomena. The model validated the distance of 660
feet as the impact area for pipelines smaller than 30 inches in
diameter and operating at 1000 psig or less. The model also showed that
a pipeline with a diameter greater than 30 inches and operated at a
pressure greater than 1000 psig has the potential to impact an area
greater than 660 feet from the pipeline.
Several commenters supported our expanding the area of protection
from 660 feet to 1000 feet to accommodate large pipelines operating at
high pressure, but recommended decreasing the area for small-diameter
pipelines operating at low pressure. These operators maintained that a
decreased area would reduce the costs of surveillance and record
keeping.
APA and APGA recommended that instead of the proposed 660 and 1000
foot corridors, a high consequence area be defined by the C-FER
equation. AGA and APGA explained that this equation would calculate the
pipeline affected zone i.e., the zone affected by the heat emitted from
the burning gas.
CMS Energy urged RSPA to include along with the proposed 660-foot
and 1000-foot corridors, a smaller corridor for small diameter, lower
pressure lines. CMS explained that this would more accurately use the
information in the C-FER report and allow operators to use technical
justification to concentrate on areas of greater consequence.
Consumers Energy observed that using the C-FER model for smaller
pipelines operating below 1000 psig would reduce the area of influence
but that the model is more useful because it uses actual pipeline
attribute data to determine the heat affected zone.
El Paso encouraged that, instead of the 660 and 1000-foot areas, we
incorporate into the definition the concept of a pipeline-affected
zone, as used in the C-FER study. Enbridge made the same
recommendation.
GPTC commented that the C-FER Report forms a sound technical basis
for determining a zone of thermal influence for a potential gas
pipeline rupture, but that the simplified model we used does not
consider small diameter low pressure pipelines.
INGAA recommended that we include the pipeline-affected zone
equation used in the C-FER study so that operators could better use the
data they have been collecting since 1970. INGAA argued that use of
programmed distances, such as the proposed 660 feet and 1000 feet, does
not utilize the findings of the C-FER study.
The Iowa Utilities Board commented that two pipelines in the State
and at least one that is proposed for construction in Iowa would have
impact zone widths of greater than 1000 feet, using the C-FER formula.
The Board also pointed out that the C-FER formula will predict smaller
impact zones than those proposed for some pipelines having diameter
greater than 30 inches with operating pressure over 1000 psig. The Iowa
Board suggested we consider specifying operators use the C-FER formula
for pipelines with diameter greater than 30 inches and operating
pressure over 1000 psig rather than the proposed 1000-feet limit.
New York Department of Public Service maintained that the heat flux
value of 5000 btu/hr-ft\2\ used in the C-FER formula is too high. A
lower critical heat flux value should be used, which would increase the
width of the predicted impact zone.
Pacific Gas and Electric recommended using the C-FER equation in
class 3 and 4 areas to determine which portions of these areas require
an integrity management plan, and focusing efforts on those portions
where the pipeline's impact zone encompasses a structure such as a
school or hospital containing a specified number of people. The company
further suggested that the definition use the C-FER equation to
determine the extent of the pipeline that requires integrity
verification.
Questar recommended that operators be allowed to use the C-FER
equation to determine the pipeline affected zone rather than the
proposed 660 or 1000 feet.
The State of New York, Office of the Attorney General supported the
660 and 1000-foot areas, but cautioned that the C-FER model used to
define these dimensions does not consider low-angle, horizontal jet
fires. The New York State Attorney General's office explained that this
type of rupture would cause more of the heat-radiating flame surface to
be concentered near the ground surface in the direction of the initial
horizontal jet, potentially creating a heat flux for more than 1000
feet.
Williston Basin agreed that zones of damage can extend out from the
current class location defined distance of 660 feet during a release,
but disagreed with applying the C-FER model only when the hazard radius
exceeds 660 feet. The company thought the model should be applied over
the full spectrum of pipeline operating conditions because more can be
accomplished by focusing resources on the hazard radius area.
Response: RSPA has revised the definition to include a third zone
for small diameter, low pressure pipelines. For a pipeline with a
diameter of 12 inches or less and an operating pressure of 1200 psig or
less, the area of protection will be 300 feet. Although the C-FER model
predicted a potential impact area of less than 300 feet for a pipeline
of the above-specified size, we will not include an area smaller than
300 feet. In addition, RSPA is further exploring ways to address low
stress pipelines in the proposed gas pipeline integrity management
rule. We are also considering the comment about use of the C-FER model
in calculating the zone of impact in developing that proposed rule.
While arguments, such as that by the New York State Attorney General's
Office, may be theoretically possible, the actual incident data
developed at gas pipeline rupture sites over a twenty-year period were
used to validate the predictions of the C-FER model. Thus, a spectrum
of different events produced burn radii that were reasonably accurately
predicted by the simple formulation contained in the C-FER model. The
forthcoming proposed integrity management rule will address situations
where the pipe diameter and operating pressure are sufficiently large
that the predicted impact zone using the C-FER model could exceed 1000
feet.
Other Area of Potential High Consequence Not Proposed
Environmental Areas
In the NPRM we explained because of the way gas products behave, a
rupture would affect a very limited area, and would not pollute
drinking water or ecological resources. Because any environmental
consequences following a rupture would be limited, we did not include
environmentally sensitive areas in the proposed definition.
Citizens for Safe Pipelines recommended adding watercourses to
better protect these areas from spills of natural gas condensates.
Cook Inlet Keeper favored adding environmentally sensitive areas
because natural gas condensates form in transmission pipelines and can
pose environmental hazards. Cook Inlet Keeper also listed eight recent
releases of natural gas pipeline condensates (spills of up to 10
gallons of condensate) in the Cook Inlet region in Alaska.
The State of New York, Office of the Attorney General recommended
including pipelines within the Great Lakes because of environmental
sensitivity.
The Washington State Department of Ecology recommended including
[[Page 50832]]
unusually sensitive areas and navigable waterways as high consequence
areas, because these may be affected by a fire ignited by a gas
pipeline rupture. The Department also recommended that we require
operators to consult with state and local government officials to
identify environmentally sensitive areas.
The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission urged RSPA
to include environmentally sensitive areas in the definition. The
Commission explained that a habitat for a threatened or endangered
species in the heat affected zone could be destroyed by a pipeline
rupture and ignition. The Commission also urged that operators be
required to consult with state and local government agencies to ensure
that environmentally sensitive high consequence areas have been
correctly identified.
Response: As we explained above in the section discussing areas
where people congregate, we have added recreational areas near water
bodies to the definition. However, we have not revised the definition
to include environmental areas. RSPA believes that the limited physical
impact of a gas pipeline rupture and the short duration of the impact
justify excluding these areas. A natural gas release is limited to the
area immediately adjacent to the pipeline, so that any resulting fire
would do limited damage to a sensitive area or to a species in the
area. We recognize that gas condensates that form in gas transmission
pipelines can pose an environmental hazard should the pipeline rupture.
However, because we believe that these discharges tend to be small and
do limited damage, we are not at this stage including these areas in
the definition.
Other Areas
Cook Inlet Keeper recommended adding to the definition high-traffic
areas and passenger and flammable cargo rail areas. The organization
also recommend including religious buildings because significant
numbers of individuals are confined in these buildings on a regular
basis.
The New York State Department of Public Service thought the
definition should be expanded to consider important infrastructure
including major electric transmission corridors and substations, other
pipeline facilities, bridges, major roads and railways. The Department
recommended we also consider historic landmarks near transmission
pipelines and services that would be disrupted and would have a major
impact on people and businesses.
SEFBO argued that pipeline bridges represent potential high
consequence areas in themselves, and should be separately included as
high consequence areas. SEFBO agreed that pipeline crossings of roads,
highways and railroads should not be included because disruption from
an explosion of a gas pipeline at such a crossing should be fairly
localized and relatively short. According to SEFBO, an explosion of a
natural gas pipeline on a bridge poses a unique risk of substantial
economic disruption, and on a heavily traveled bridge may cause injury
or death to a substantial number of persons.
Washington State Department of Ecology pointed out that recent
experience has shown that a rupture of a gas pipeline could impact a
near-by liquid pipeline (within 1000 feet), causing an explosion or oil
spill.
Response: The primary purpose of this definition is to define areas
where a pipeline rupture would lead to the greatest consequences to the
public. Most areas are adequately protected by current pipeline safety
regulations. In most cases, a rupture of a gas pipeline will result in
limited physical damage from a pipeline rupture, and be of short
duration (one or more hours). We are focusing the definition on those
areas where additional protection may be necessary because the
consequences to people are potentially the greatest. Except for those
areas previously discussed, we have not revised the definition to
include the suggested areas.
Our review of accident data concluded that the maximum spill from a
gas rupture resulting in a spill from a liquid pipeline has been too
small to necessitate additional protection. We believe the impact of
pipelines on infrastructure is adequately treated by existing
regulations, although we will consider the comments about pipeline
bridges in developing the integrity management program requirements.
For example, pipelines supported by bridges (vehicular, railroad,
pedestrian, pipeline), or that cross public roads, highways or
railroads have special design factors. (Sec. 192.111). Special welding
requirements apply to pipeline crossings of rivers, railroads,
highways, tunnels and bridges (Sec. 192.243 ). More frequent patrols
are required at highway and railroad crossings (Sec. 192.705).
As previously discussed, we added religious buildings to the list
of examples of areas where people congregate. Transportation terminals,
manufacturing facilities or business locations would usually fall
within a class 3 or 4 location, or be covered under the high
consequence area definition if they normally have 20 or more people on
at least 50 days a year.
Costs Associated With the Definition
In the NPRM, we explained that the proposed definition had no cost
impact on the pipeline industry because the definition did not by
itself require an operator to take action. Costs would be incurred once
we issued integrity management program requirements that required an
operator to take action on transmission pipelines located in these
areas.
AGA and APGA thought we should consider in this rulemaking the
initial costs associated with determining the high consequence areas,
including identifying the areas, documenting them and verifying them
periodically.
The Gas Piping Technology Committee also pointed out that we had
not considered the initial costs, the frequency of verification and the
potential recurring costs associated with determining the high
consequence areas. The Committee recommended we consider these costs in
this rulemaking so as not to overlook them in the integrity management
program rulemaking.
Kinder Morgan commented that operators will incur additional costs
to determine the applicability of the definition, and will have to
gather additional information to identify the facilities with mobility-
impaired persons and areas where people congregate. The company noted
that operators will also have to conduct additional field surveys to
identify the facilities and areas within 1000 feet of a pipeline.
New York Gas Group commented that the definition would require
additional company resources and significant paperwork to identify
facilities with mobility-impaired persons and areas where people
congregate in class 1 and 2 areas.
NiSource EDG observed that this definition will drive future costs
because it will dictate the integrity management actions an operator
will have to take with respect to those pipelines located in the high
consequence areas.
Questar commented that we need to discuss the incremental costs
associated with determining the high consequence areas, such as the
incremental costs for identifying, documenting and re-verifying the
high consequence areas, and expanding the survey corridor.
Williston Basin commented that assessment costs are a significant
expense and that the definition will directly affect assessment costs.
The company argued that because the high
[[Page 50833]]
consequence area definition and integrity management rulemaking are
directly related, the definition cannot be complete without evaluating
the definition under the requirements of the integrity management rule.
Response: We have not changed our conclusion that there are no
costs associated with the definition because the definition by itself
does not require an operator to take any action. We recognize that once
we issue regulations requiring action based on this definition, there
will be costs. Thus, when RSPA issues its notice of proposed rulemaking
for gas integrity management, RSPA will estimate the cost to gas
pipeline operators to determine which segments in its system satisfy
the definition of high consequence areas, and other costs associated
with identifying and periodically re-verifying the areas.
The Final Rule
In the final rule RSPA has defined high consequence areas to
include--
Class 3 areas. A Class 3 area is defined in the pipeline
safety regulations as a class location unit with 46 or more buildings
intended for human occupancy. A class location unit is an area that
extends 220 yards on either side of the centerline of any continuous
one-mile length of pipeline. A class 3 area is also an area where the
pipeline lies within 100 yards of either a building or a small, well-
defined outside area, such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor
theater, or other place of public assembly, which is occupied by 20 or
more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month
period. Neither the days nor the weeks need be consecutive.
Class 4 areas. A Class 4 area is any class location unit
where buildings with four or more stories are prevalent.
We have included class 3 and 4 location areas, as those areas are
defined in Sec. 192.5, to give additional protection to populated areas
from a gas release. These areas will encompass about 85% of populated
areas. These are the areas where most gas transmission pipeline
operators maintain data on population and buildings near their
pipelines. However, because the class location definitions may not
cover all areas where a pipeline may pose a risk to the public, we have
also included as high consequence areas:
Areas where the pipeline is within 300, 660 or 1000 feet
of a building occupied by persons who are confined, or are of impaired
mobility, or would be difficult to evacuate, and
Areas where the pipeline is within 300, 660 or 1000 feet
of a building or outside area where 20 or more persons congregate at
least 50 days in any 12-month period. (The days need not be
consecutive.)
The definition picks up facilities with people who may not be able
to evacuate an area quickly and most recreational areas or other areas
where the public may not live, but may gather regularly for
recreational or other purposes. Our analysis of data on the area
affected by a pipeline accident demonstrated the need for special
consideration of buildings located near a pipeline that house people
with limited mobility and of areas where people congregate. These last
two elements explicitly include distances between the pipeline and the
facility or recreational area where greater protection will be
provided. Defining these distances is necessary for two reasons. First,
there is a need to limit the magnitude of the search to identify
facilities and recreational areas that can potentially be affected by a
pipeline rupture. Second, recently completed research has defined the
extent of the area potentially affected by a pipeline rupture and
subsequent ignition and fire. The results from this research has been
used to define the distances we have included in the definition.
Our analysis of research data on the area affected by a pipeline
accident demonstrated that, for most pipelines, the area affected by
the rupture and fire extended no greater than 660 feet from the
pipeline. The recently completed research demonstrated that the extent
of the area potentially affected by a rupture increases in direct
proportion to the square root of the pressure at which the pipeline is
operated, and increases in direct proportion to the pipe diameter.
Therefore, the rupture of smaller pipelines can impact facilities and
recreational areas at distances less than 660 feet, and the rupture of
larger pipelines can impact facilities and recreational areas at
distances greater than 660 feet. Our analysis determined that, for a
pipeline with a diameter of 12 inches or less and a maximum allowable
operating pressure of 1200 psig or less, the distance from the pipeline
of potential impact is 300 feet. For pipelines with a diameter greater
than 30 inches and a maximum allowable operating pressure greater than
1000 psig, the distance from the pipeline of potential impact is 1000
feet.
The research that we used as the basis for the 300, 660 and 1000-
feet distances is in the docket and is referred to as the C-FER model.
We compared the predictions from the C-FER model against RSPA accident
data and concluded that the impact distances predicted by the model are
consistent with the burn radii observed in accidents that have occurred
during the past twenty years. For example, a rupture of a 30-inch
diameter pipeline operating at a maximum pressure of 1000 psig would
affect an area no greater than 660 feet from the pipeline. Our research
also showed that a rupture or release from a smaller-sized pipeline (a
pipeline 12 inches or less in diameter and operating at a pressure of
1200 psig or less) would affect an area no larger than 300 feet from
the pipeline. Therefore, for these smaller pipelines, we have defined a
smaller area in which operators must identify buildings housing
mobility-impaired or confined people and areas where people congregate.
Similarly, for larger pipelines (a pipeline with a diameter greater
than 30 inches and operating at a pressure greater than 1000 psig), we
have defined a larger area of 1000 feet from the pipeline.
Because operators were concerned that they would be required to
identify home-based day care and private homes with elderly occupants,
the definition provides that the facility has to be an identified site.
An identified site would be a building with confined or mobility-
impaired persons that can be identified by any of several means: it has
a sign; it is licensed or registered by a Federal, State or local
authority; or it is on a list or map that is available from a Federal,
State or local authority, or through a publicly available or
commercially available database. Similarly, because of concerns raised
about identifying recreational areas where people congregate, we have
required that the building or outside area be an identified site
(described above) that has evidence of use by 20 or more persons on at
least 50 days a year.
The areas we have defined as high consequence areas go beyond
current pipeline safety regulations in the following ways:
1. A current Class 3 location includes buildings or areas where
people congregate located within 300 feet of the pipeline. The
definition extends these areas out to 660 feet for pipelines of
diameter greater than 12 inches and out to 1000 feet for larger
pipelines (those greater than 30 inches in diameter and operating at
pressures greater than 1000 psig).
2. Current Class location regulations include no explicit provision
for facilities housing people with limited mobility. The definition
includes these facilities.
3. The definition places more emphasis on areas where people
congregate near a pipeline, such as
[[Page 50834]]
camping grounds and recreational areas near bodies of water. These
areas may not be identified under the current class 3 location
definition.
Regulatory Analyses and Notices
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
DOT considers this action to be a non-significant regulatory action
under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 958 FR 57135;October 4,
1993). Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not
reviewed this rulemaking document. This final rule is also not
significant under DOT's regulatory policies and procedures (44 FR
11034; February 26, 1979).
Several commenters to the proposed rule (67 FR 1108-1115, January
9, 2002) disagreed with RSPA's determination that the proposed rule
would incur no costs because it was only a definition. These comments
were discussed above. As we previously explained, this definition does
not require operators to take any action. Until there are requirements
for the pipeline segments that are located in the high consequence
areas we have defined, there are no cost impacts on the pipeline
industry or the public. The costs will be incurred when we issue
integrity management program regulations that require gas transmission
operators to take actions on pipelines located in the high consequence
areas. When we issue proposed regulations on integrity management for
gas operators, we will then consider the costs involved in identifying
and periodically re-verifying the high consequence areas.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601, et seq.) RSPA
must consider whether a rulemaking would have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities. This final rulemaking will not
impose additional requirements on pipeline operators, including small
entities that operate regulated pipelines. As this action only involves
a definition, there are no cost implications, and thus we have
determined it has no immediate impact on small entities. Costs are
likely to result once we issue requirements for actions that use this
definition. When RSPA proposes integrity management requirements for
gas transmission pipelines in high consequence areas, RSPA will then
examine the costs and benefits of the proposed requirements, including
actions based on the high consequence area definition. Based on this
information demonstrating that this rulemaking will not have an
economic impact, I certify that this final rule will not have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This final rule contains no information collection subject to
review by OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507
(d)). Therefore, RSPA concludes the final rule contains no paperwork
burden and is not subject to OMB review under the paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995.
This final rule defines high consequence areas, but does not
require an operator to take any action. The definition will be used in
the forthcoming rulemaking on ``Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity
Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission Operators)''.
RSPA will prepare a paperwork burden analysis for that proposed rule.
Executive Order 13084
This final rule was analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 13084 (``Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments''). Because this final rule
does not significantly or uniquely affect the communities of the Indian
tribal governments and does not impose substantial direct compliance
costs, the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order
13084 do not apply.
Executive Order 13132
This final rule was analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 (``Federalism''). This
final rule does not have any requirement that:
(1) has substantial direct effects on the States, the relationship
between the national government and the States, or the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the various levels of government;
(2) imposes substantial direct compliance costs on States and local
governments; or
(3) preempts state law.
Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements of Executive
Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; August 10, 1999) do not apply. Nevertheless,
in public meetings on November 18-19, 1999, and February 12-14, 2001,
RSPA invited the National Association of Pipeline Safety
Representatives (NAPSR), an organization that includes State pipeline
safety regulators, to participate in a general discussion on pipeline
integrity. RSPA also had conference calls with NAPSR to receive their
input before proposing a definition of high consequence areas. Several
state agencies responded to the NPRM and their comments were considered
in developing the final definition.
Unfunded Mandates
This final rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of
$100 million or more to either State, local, or tribal governments, in
the aggregate, or to the private sector, and is the least burdensome
alternative that achieves the objective of the rule.
National Environmental Policy Act
We analyzed the final rule for purposes of the National
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and determined the
action would not significantly affect the quality of the human
environment. The Environmental Assessment is available for review in
the docket.
The Environmental Assessment (EA) considered the impacts of the
definition, in conjunction with future requirements of an integrity
management rule. The EA found that the definition by itself, did not by
itself have any impact on the environment. When integrity management
program requirements are issued which will incorporate the definition,
there should be positive environmental benefits for the areas receiving
additional protection. However, because the environmental consequences
from a gas release are limited, any impact is expected to be minimal.
Therefore, the definition of high consequence areas for gas pipeline
integrity management will not have a significant environmental impact.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 192
Pipeline safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
In consideration of the foregoing, RSPA is amending part 192 of
title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 192--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 192 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5103, 60102, 60104, 60108, 60109, 60110,
60113, and 60118; and 49 CFR 1.53.
2. Section 192.761 is added under a new undesignated centerheading
of ``High Consequence Areas'' in subpart M to read as follows:
Subpart M--Maintenance
* * * * *
[[Page 50835]]
HIGH CONSEQUENCE AREAS
Sec. 192.761 Definitions.
The following definitions apply to this section and Sec. 192.763:
A high consequence area means any of the following areas:
(a) An area defined as a Class 3 location under Sec. 192.5;
(b) An area defined as a Class 4 location under Sec. 192.5;
(c) For a pipeline not more than 12 inches in nominal diameter and
operating at a maximum allowable operating pressure of not more than
1200 p.s.i.g., an area which extends 300 feet from the centerline of
the pipeline to the identified site;
(d) For a pipeline greater than 30 inches in nominal diameter and
operating at a maximum allowable operating pressure greater than 1000
p.s.i.g., an area which extends 1000 feet from the centerline of the
pipeline to the identified site; and
(e) For a pipeline not described in paragraph (c) or (d) of this
section, an area which extends 660 feet from the centerline of the
pipeline to the identified site.
(f) An identified site. An identified site is a building or outside
area that--
(1) Is visibly marked;
(2) Is licensed or registered by a Federal, State, or local agency;
(3) Is known by public officials; or
(4) Is on a list or map maintained by or available from a Federal,
State, or local agency or a publicly or commercially available
database; and
(5) Is occupied by persons who are confined, are of impaired
mobility, or would be difficult to evacuate. Examples include, but are
not limited to hospitals, prisons, schools, day-care facilities,
retirement facilities, and assisted-living facilities; or
(6) There is evidence of use of the site by at least 20 or more
persons on at least 50 days in any 12-month period. (The days need not
be consecutive.) Examples include, but are not limited to, beaches,
playgrounds, recreational facilities, camping grounds, outdoor
theaters, stadiums, religious facilities, and recreational areas near
bodies of water.
Issued in Washington, DC, on August 1, 2002.
Ellen G. Engleman,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 02-19840 Filed 8-5-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P