[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 132 (Wednesday, July 10, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45710-45712]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-17283]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Interim Management of Nuclear Materials
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Supplemental record of decision.
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SUMMARY: On December 12, 1995, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and Notice of Preferred Alternatives,
60 FR 65300 (December 19, 1995), for the final environmental impact
statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (IMNM EIS) (DOE/EIS-
0220, October 1995), at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South
Carolina. As part of that ROD, DOE decided to stabilize plutonium-239
solutions stored in H-Canyon by one of three methods: processing to
metal in FB-Line, processing to oxide in H-Area facilities, or
vitrification in F-Canyon. In that same ROD, the Department announced
that ``a subsequent Record of Decision will be issued to specify the
final strategy for stabilizing the plutonium-239 solutions'' (60 FR
65302). DOE issued a Supplemental ROD on September 6, 1996 (61 FR
48474, September 13, 1996), selecting the Process to Metal alternative
for managing the H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions. DOE subsequently
amended this decision (62 FR 61099, November 14, 1997) and instead
selected the Process to Oxide alternative for managing these solutions.
Now, after further review of stabilization costs, schedules, and
program requirements, DOE has decided to implement the Processing and
Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility
alternative as well as the Process to Oxide alternative previously
selected for the management of the H-Canyon plutonium solutions. The
environmental impacts of the newly-selected alternative were analyzed
in the IMNM EIS. This alternative includes the transfer of the
solutions to the SRS high-level waste (HLW) system, vitrification of
the liquid HLW in the Defense Waste Processing Facility, and storage of
the resultant canisters in appropriate waste storage facilities at the
SRS pending disposal in a geologic repository.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: For further information on the interim
management of nuclear materials at the SRS, to receive a copy of the
final IMNM EIS or the IMNM ROD(s), contact: Andrew R. Grainger,
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Compliance Officer, U.S.
Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, Building 730B,
Room 2418, Aiken, South Carolina 29802, (800) 881-7292. Internet:
[email protected].
For further information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Carol M.
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-42), U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC
20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
NEPA Reviews and Decisions
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final environmental
impact statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (IMNM EIS)
(DOE/EIS-0220, October 1995), in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Council on Environmental Quality
regulations implementing NEPA, and DOE implementing procedures. The
IMNM EIS assessed the potential environmental impacts of actions
necessary to safely manage nuclear materials at the SRS, near Aiken,
South Carolina, until decisions on their future use or ultimate
disposition are made and implemented. The IMNM EIS grouped the nuclear
materials at the SRS into three categories: Stable, Programmatic (three
material types), and Candidates for Stabilization (seven material
types). Some of the ``Programmatic'' and all of the ``Candidates for
Stabilization'' materials could have presented environmental, safety
and health vulnerabilities in their then-current storage condition. For
materials that could present environmental, safety, or health
vulnerabilities within approximately 10 years of the NEPA analysis
(performed in 1995), the implementation of the IMNM EIS action
alternatives would allow safe storage of plutonium and uranium
materials pending decisions and actions on the ultimate disposition of
the materials.
The IMNM EIS analyzed several alternatives, including the No Action
alternative (Continued Storage), for the interim management of eleven
(11) types of nuclear materials at the SRS. All of the alternatives,
except No Action, would support DOE's objective of removing nuclear
materials from vulnerable conditions and from vulnerable facilities in
preparation for facility decontamination and decommissioning. For ten
of these material types (all but Stable), DOE evaluated the impacts of
the Processing for Storage and Vitrification in the Defense Waste
Processing Facility alternative. The previously-issued
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IMNM RODs include decisions to undertake stabilization and processing
actions for all ten nuclear material types categorized as ``Candidates
for Stabilization'' and ``Programmatic.'' DOE decided to continue
existing actions for the ``Stable'' nuclear material category.
On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and
Notice of Preferred Alternatives [60 FR 65300, published December 19,
1995], on the interim management of several categories of nuclear
materials at the SRS. As part of that ROD, DOE decided to stabilize
plutonium-239 solutions stored in H-Canyon by one of three methods:
processing to metal in FB-Line, processing to oxide, or by
vitrification in F-Canyon. In that same ROD, DOE announced that a
subsequent ROD would be issued to select a final strategy for managing
these solutions. Accordingly, DOE issued a Supplemental ROD on
September 6, 1996 (61 FR 48474, September 13, 1996), selecting the
Process to Metal alternative for managing the H-Canyon plutonium-239
solutions. DOE subsequently amended this decision (62 FR 61099,
November 14, 1997) and instead selected the Process to Oxide
alternative for managing these solutions.
Potential Environmental Impacts
The IMNM EIS analyzed potential impacts of alternatives for
managing all SRS nuclear materials, both those materials that were
expected to present environment, safety, or health vulnerabilities, as
well as those determined to be stable. Summaries of potential impacts
from the alternatives are presented in the IMNM EIS, Table 2-2 through
Table 2-12 (pp. 2-48 through 2-58).
The IMNM EIS indicated that there would be minimal environmental
impacts from the implementation of any alternative (including
stabilization in the Defense Waste Processing Facility) in the areas of
geologic, ecological, cultural, aesthetic and scenic resources, noise,
and land use. Impacts in these areas would be limited because facility
modifications or construction of new facilities would occur within
existing buildings or industrialized portions of the SRS. The existing
SRS workforce would support any construction projects and other
activities required to implement any of the alternatives, and thus
negligible socioeconomic impacts would be expected from implementing
any of the alternatives.
Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous
liquid effluents from any of the alternatives would be very small and
well within, often by several orders of magnitude, applicable standards
and existing regulatory permits for the SRS facilities. DOE expects
minimal impacts from any of these releases. Similarly, for any of the
IMNM EIS alternatives, potential transuranic waste, mixed hazardous
waste, and low-level solid waste generated would be handled by existing
waste management (treatment, storage, and disposal) facilities at the
SRS.
Processing for Storage and Vitrification in the Defense Waste
Processing Facility
While the IMNM EIS indicates that potential environmental impacts
from any of the nuclear material management alternatives are small,
those management alternatives requiring the processing of nuclear
material through the large chemical separations facilities (F- or H-
Canyon and FB- or HB-Line), or processing plutonium materials for
vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility, would have the
greatest environmental impacts during the time that dissolving,
processing or conversion activities are underway, as compared to the
time when these facilities are merely storing nuclear materials. The
plutonium within the H-Canyon plutonium solutions had already been
dissolved and transferred to storage tanks at the time the IMNM EIS was
prepared. The impacts of storage of these solutions were fully
evaluated in the IMNM EIS.
The IMNM EIS describes several technical challenges that would have
to be overcome in order to stabilize plutonium solutions using the HLW
system and the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Since the preparation
of the IMNM EIS, technical and operational developments have led DOE to
reassess this alternative for the H-Canyon plutonium solutions. As a
result, DOE has determined that the two primary challenges described in
the IMNM EIS, prevention of nuclear criticality for significant
quantities of plutonium solutions, and management of the solutions in
the SRS Tank Farm, have now been overcome. Specifically, the
reassessment indicates that: (1) Gadolinium is a suitable alternate
neutron poison for quantities of plutonium of a criticality concern;
(2) gadolinium is compatible with the existing Canyon and HLW
processes; (3) very little dilution is expected to be required, so that
there would be only a slight increase in the number of waste canisters
required to be produced at the Defense Waste Processing Facility; and
(4) the transferred plutonium solution could be sent directly from H-
Canyon to the Defense Waste Processing Facility feed tank and vitrified
with the subsequent sludge batch, thereby bypassing the Tank Farm.
For that portion of the H-Canyon plutonium solutions managed under
this approach, implementation of the Processing and Storage for
Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility alternative
would avoid the impacts of processing the solutions through HB-Line,
and the impacts of the subsequent packaging and storage of the
resultant plutonium oxide. Additionally, by vitrifying the plutonium in
HLW canisters at the Defense Waste Processing Facility, the plutonium
would be stabilized in a form suitable for ultimate disposition in a
geologic repository. In the IMNM EIS, DOE evaluated the impacts of the
Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste
Processing Facility for the H-Canyon plutonium solutions, and found the
potential impacts to be similar to the impacts of the Process to Metal
or the Process to Oxide alternatives.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
The IMNM EIS indicated that while certain management alternatives
are expected to result in lower environmental impacts than others, a
single alternative was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all
environmental factors evaluated by DOE. The health effects from any of
the alternatives are all low and well within regulatory limits. In its
December 1995 ROD (60 FR 65300), DOE indicated that the environmentally
preferable alternative for the H-Canyon plutonium solutions was the
``Vitrification (F-Canyon)'' alternative. This alternative would have
involved use of equipment that would have been installed in a portion
of F-Canyon for vitrification of certain programmatic material.
However, DOE subsequently cancelled this project (66 FR 55166, November
1, 2001) due to project cost growth and schedule extension. Of the
remaining alternatives, DOE believes that the Process to Oxide
alternative is the environmentally preferable alternative for the H-
Canyon plutonium solutions. The Process to Oxide alternative would
result in the smallest health effects and less HLW, low-level
radioactive waste, and saltstone waste, although it would result in
greater volumes of transuranic and mixed waste than the Processing for
Storage and Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility
alternative.
Decision
After review of plutonium stabilization costs, facility operation
schedules, and programmatic requirements, including preparation of
[[Page 45712]]
material for disposition, DOE is supplementing its November 1997
Supplemental ROD (62 FR 61099) in regard to stabilization of plutonium
solutions stored in H-Canyon. DOE will stabilize these solutions using
either the Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense
Waste Processing Facility alternative, as described and evaluated in
the IMNM EIS, or the previously selected Process to Oxide alternative.
Under the newly-selected alternative, the solutions will be transferred
to the HLW system prior to vitrification with HLW in the Defense Waste
Processing Facility.
Using both of these methods will allow DOE to optimize the use of
the HB-Line Phase II facility for plutonium-239 and neptunium-237
stabilization. Implementation of this additional management method will
reduce the amount of plutonium that would need to be processed to meet
the plutonium storage standard (DOE-STD-3013), reduce vault storage
space requirements for plutonium and the associated storage container,
lower vault surveillance and maintenance costs, and enable the
plutonium to be ultimately disposed of in a geologic repository. There
is no programmatic need for the plutonium contained in these solutions.
Issued at Washington, DC, June 26, 2002.
Jessie Hill Roberson,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 02-17283 Filed 7-9-02; 8:45 am]
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