[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 185 (Tuesday, September 24, 2002)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 59800-59809]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-24236]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 571
[Docket No. NHTSA 02-13393; Notice 1]
RIN 2127-AI71
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; response to petitions for
rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: This document responds to petitions for rulemaking from the
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Toyota, and DaimlerChrysler
requesting changes in the advanced air bag final rule that we published
in May 2000. The requirements of that rule are being phased in during
two stages, the first of which takes place from September 1, 2003 to
August 31, 2006.
In response to the petitions, we are proposing in this document to
reduce the percentage of vehicles that must comply with the advanced
air bag requirements during the first year of the phase-in, i.e., from
September 1, 2003 through August 31, 2004, from 35 percent to 20
percent. This proposed change reflects the technical challenges being
faced by the vehicle manufacturers in meeting the new requirements and
the fact that two of the automotive suppliers have dropped plans to
offer devices that suppress the passenger air bag when a child is
present. We are otherwise either denying the petitions or, as to
certain requests, dismissing them because the agency has subsequently
considered or is considering the same requests in the context of
another rulemaking proceeding.
In addition, in response to a petition for rulemaking from Porsche,
we are considering possible adjustments in the alternative phase-in
requirements available to limited line manufacturers.
DATES: You should submit your comments early enough to ensure that
Docket Management receives them not later than October 24, 2002.
ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments in writing to: Docket
Management, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
Alternatively, you may submit your comments electronically by logging
onto the Docket Management System (DMS) Web site at http://dms.dot.gov.
Click on ``Help & Information'' or ``Help/Info'' to view instructions
for filing your comments electronically. Regardless of how you submit
your comments, you should mention the docket number of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The following persons at the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC, 20590:
For technical issues:
Mr. Louis Molino, Office of Crashworthiness Standards, NPS-11,
telephone (202) 366-2264, facsimile (202) 493-2739.
For legal issues:
Mr. Edward Glancy, Office of the Chief Counsel, NCC-20, telephone
(202) 366-2992, facsimile (202) 366-3820.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background: The Advanced Air Bag Final Rule
II. Petitions for Rulemaking
A. Alliance Petition
B. Toyota Petition
C. DaimlerChrysler Petition
III. Response to Petitions and Proposal to Revise Percentage Phase-
in Requirement for First Year of Phase-In
A. Requests That Have Been Overtaken by Events
B. Request for Deferral of Requirements Using 6-year-old Child
Dummies
C. Requests for Expanded Availability of On-off Switches
D. Request for Allowance of Transponder Technology for Reliable
Child Restraint System Detection
E. Requests for Revisions to Percentage Phase-in Requirements
and Proposal To Revise First-year Percentage
IV. Petition for Rulemaking from Porsche Concerning the Alternative
Phase-in Available to Limited Line Manufacturers
V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
VI. Submission of Comments
I. Background: The Advanced Air Bag Final Rule
On May 12, 2000, we published in the Federal Register (65 FR 30680)
a rule to require advanced air bags. (Docket No. NHTSA 00-7013; Notice
1.) The rule amended Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, to
require that future air bags be designed so that, compared to current
air bags, they create less risk of serious air bag-induced injuries,
particularly for small women and young children, and provide improved
frontal crash protection for all occupants, by means that include
advanced air bag technology.
To achieve these goals, the rule added a wide variety of new
requirements, test procedures, and injury criteria, based on the use of
an assortment of new dummies. Among other things, it replaced the
current optional sled test with a rigid barrier crash test for
assessing the protection of unbelted occupants.
The issuance of the rule completed the implementation of our 1996
comprehensive plan for reducing air bag risks. It was also required by
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA 21), which was
enacted in 1998. That Act required us to issue a rule amending Standard
No. 208:
to improve occupant protection for occupants of different sizes,
belted and unbelted, under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No.
208, while minimizing the risk to infants, children, and other
occupants
[[Page 59801]]
from injuries and deaths caused by air bags, by means that include
advanced air bags.
(Emphasis added.)
The rule will improve protection and minimize risk by requiring new
tests and injury criteria and specifying the use of an entire family of
test dummies: the existing dummy representing 50th percentile adult
males, and new dummies representing 5th percentile adult females, 6-
year-old children, 3-year-old children, and 1-year-old infants. With
the addition of those dummies, Standard No. 208 will more fully reflect
the range in sizes of vehicle occupants.
The rule will be phased in during two stages. The first stage
phase-in will improve protection by requiring vehicles to be certified
as passing the unbelted test requirements \1\ for both the 5th
percentile adult female and 50th percentile adult male dummies in a 32-
40 km/h (20-25 mph) rigid barrier crash, and belted test requirements
\2\ for the same two dummies in a rigid barrier crash with a maximum
test speed of 48 km/h (30 mph). In addition, the first stage will
minimize the risk of injury from air bags by requiring vehicles to
include technologies that will minimize the risk of air bag-induced
injuries for young children and small adults.
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\1\ ``Unbelted test requirements'' are requirements that specify
the use of unbelted dummies in testing vehicles.
\2\ ``Belted test requirements'' are requirements that specify
the use of belted dummies in testing vehicles.
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During the first stage phase-in, from September 1, 2003 to August
31, 2006, increasing percentages of motor vehicles will be required to
meet requirements for minimizing air bag risks, primarily by either
automatically turning off the air bag when young children are present
or deploying the air bag more benignly so that it is much less likely
to cause serious or fatal injury to out-of-position occupants.\3\ If
they so wish, manufacturers may choose to use a combination of those
approaches. All of the petitions addressed in this notice asked for
modifications to the risk minimization requirements.
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\3\ The rule also establishes very general performance
requirements for dynamic automatic suppression systems (DASS) and a
special expedited petitioning and rulemaking process for considering
procedures for testing advanced air bag systems incorporating a
DASS.
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Manufacturers that decide to turn off the passenger air bag will
use weight sensors and/or other means of detecting the presence of
young children. To test the ability of those means to detect the
presence of children, the rule specifies that child dummies be placed
in child seats that are, in turn, placed on the passenger seat in both
proper and (to simulate misuse) improper ways. It also specifies tests
that are conducted with unrestrained child dummies sitting, kneeling,
standing, or lying on the passenger seat.
The ability of air bags to deploy in a low-risk manner will be
tested using child dummies on the passenger side and the small adult
female dummy on the driver side. For manufacturers that decide to
design their passenger air bags to deploy in a low risk manner, the
rule specifies that unbelted child dummies be placed against the
instrument panel in two different positions. The air bag is then
deployed with the dummies in each position. This placement was
specified because pre-crash braking can cause unrestrained children to
move forward into or near the instrument panel before the air bag
deploys. The ability of driver air bags to deploy in a low risk manner
will be tested by placing the 5th percentile adult female dummy against
the steering wheel in two different positions and then deploying the
air bag with the dummy in each position.
The second stage phase-in will require vehicles to be certified as
passing the belted test requirements for the 50th percentile adult male
dummy at a test speed up to 56 km/h (35 mph). This requirement will
provide improved protection for belted occupants.
On December 18, 2001, we published in the Federal Register (66 FR
65376) a final rule that responded to petitions for reconsideration of
the advanced air bag final rule. We granted portions of the petitions
and denied other portions of the petitions. We made several changes to
the advanced air bag final rule in response to the petitions. These
changes included a number of refinements to the positioning procedures
for the low risk deployment tests and, to a lesser degree, for the
automatic suppression tests. We also changed the test duration for the
low risk deployment tests. In addition, the test used for determining
the stage(s) of the air bag to be used for the passenger side low risk
tests was modified. Other changes included modifying the definition of
``small volume manufacturer'' for the purpose of the rule's phase-in
schedule and adding an option to use human children instead of the
newborn or 12-month-old dummies to test a vehicle's occupant
recognition system.
II. Petitions for Rulemaking
In October 2001, NHTSA received three petitions for rulemaking
requesting changes in the advanced air bag final rule that we published
in May 2000. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance),
Toyota, and DaimlerChrysler submitted these petitions.\4\
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\4\ DaimlerChrysler's petition was submitted on behalf of
DaimlerChrysler and Mercedes-Benz USA.
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A. Alliance Petition
The Alliance made four requests in its petition for rulemaking.
First, that organization requested that implementation of the
static out-of-position requirements using dummies representing 6-year-
old children be temporarily deferred for three years. The Alliance
argued that the development of occupant classification technologies has
not advanced as rapidly as expected, and that prototype occupant
classification systems currently available for installation in
September 2003 are not able to consistently and reliably distinguish
between the Hybrid III 6-year-old child dummy and the Hybrid III 5th
percentile adult female dummy. That organization argued that
manufacturers choosing suppression as the means to reduce the risk to
children are faced with the probability that, in the real world, the
air bag will not deploy in some instances when it is potentially
beneficial for a small adult, or will deploy in some instances when it
is not wanted because a child is present. The Alliance argued that a
delay in the requirements using dummies representing 6-year-old
children would permit optimization of the advanced air bag system to
make it more likely that the air bag will deploy when it is needed for
small adults in the real world.
Second, the Alliance asked that the specified 300 millisecond time
period for measuring injury criteria in the low risk deployment tests
be adjusted to 10 milliseconds after dummy interaction with the air bag
ceases, to facilitate the adoption of low risk deployment air bags as
either a compliance option or as a redundant protection system for
vehicles certified under the suppression option.
Third, the Alliance requested that manufacturers be permitted to
provide a manual three-way override switch (on-off-automatic) for
passenger-side air bags in vehicles with three-position front seating
systems. That petitioner argued that currently available prototype
occupant classification systems cannot detect and classify right front
occupants consistently and properly when a center occupant is present
on a three-position front bench seat. According to the Alliance, the
most serious risk is that the sensor will misunderstand the weight
distribution of the two passengers and erroneously conclude that one
adult is present
[[Page 59802]]
instead of two children. Under these circumstances, the sensor will
direct the air bag system to deploy when it should have been
suppressed. A manual three-way override switch would enable the driver
to override the occupancy classification decision by manually setting
the switch to ``on'' or ``off.''
Fourth, the Alliance petitioned that we revise the first year's
phase-in requirement from 35 percent to 10 percent of a manufacturer's
production. The petitioner stated that this change is necessitated by
the unanticipated technical challenges of making occupant sensing
technology work properly in reasonable foreseeable real world
conditions, and by the departure from the market of some major
suppliers.
B. Toyota Petition
Toyota requested that manufacturers be permitted to provide a
manual three-way override switch (on-off-automatic) for passenger-side
air bags in all vehicles with advanced air bags. It stated that while
occupant classification systems exist which comply with the technical
requirements of Standard No. 208, manufacturers have serious concerns
with the ability of these systems to adequately characterize all real-
world situations. Toyota stated that air bag systems which are designed
to assure suppression for six-year-old child dummies while providing
deployment for 5th percentile adult female dummies will sometimes
suppress the air bag for small statured adults in the real world. That
company stated that if manufacturers choose to drop the sensor output
to ensure deployment for all adults, the air bag will no longer
reliably suppress the air bag for six-year-old children and will in
many cases deploy for larger and older children. Toyota argued that,
given these limitations, customers should have the ability to override
the ``decision'' made by the suppression system by means of a manual
three-way override switch.
C. DaimlerChrysler Petition
DaimlerChrysler requested the following five changes to the
advanced air bag requirements:
(1) Allow passenger air bag ``on/off/auto'' switches for vehicles
with three-across front seating;
(2) Allow transponder technology for reliable child restraint
system detection;
(3) Provide at least a 9 mph speed separation between the low risk
deployment threshold and lowest speed unbelted rigid barrier test and
for the 16 mph threshold test, specify the 5th percentile adult female
dummy or allow, at the manufacturer's option, the same dummy as the one
used in the static low risk deployment test;
(4) Revise the ``low risk'' deployment out-of-position test
duration to less than 100 milliseconds; and
(5) Revise the percentage phase-in requirements from 35-65-100
percent to 10-40-100 percent for Phase I of the new requirements.
III. Response to Petitions and Proposal To Revise Percentage Phase-In
Requirement for First Year of Phase-In
A. Requests That Have Been Overtaken by Events
In responding to the petitions for rulemaking, we begin by noting
that several of the requests have been overtaken by events. When the
three petitions for rulemaking were submitted, i.e., in October of
2001, the agency was still in the process of considering a number of
petitions for reconsideration of the May 2000 final rule on advanced
air bags. As indicated above, in December of 2001, we published a final
rule responding to those petitions for reconsideration. Moreover, we
have now received, and are in the process of considering, several
petitions for reconsideration of the December 2001 final rule.
One of the issues that we addressed in the December 2001 final rule
was the appropriateness of the 300 millisecond time period for
measuring injury criteria in the low risk deployment tests. In response
to the petitions, we changed that time period. We note, however, that
petitions for reconsideration of our December 2001 final rule have
requested further changes. Given that we addressed this issue in the
December 2001 final rule, subsequent to the filing of the petitions for
rulemaking addressed in this document, and are also considering the
issue in the context of the petitions for reconsideration of the
December 2001 final rule, we are dismissing the Alliance's petition
with respect to its second request identified above, and
DaimlerChrysler's petition with respect to its fourth request
identified above.
We are similarly dismissing DaimlerChrysler's petition with respect
to its third request identified above, i.e., its request that we
provide at least a 9 mph speed separation between the low risk
deployment threshold and lowest speed unbelted rigid barrier test and
for the 16 mph threshold test, specify the 5th percentile adult female
dummy or allow, at the manufacturer's option, the same dummy as the one
used in the static low risk deployment test. We addressed these issues
in the December 2001 final rule and decided to specify use of the 5th
percentile adult female dummy on the passenger side for the 16 mph
threshold test. We are also considering the speed separation issue
further in the context of a petition for reconsideration of the
December 2001 final rule submitted by DaimlerChrysler.
B. Request for Deferral of Requirements Using 6-year-old Child Dummies
As noted earlier, the Alliance requested that implementation of the
static out-of-position requirements using dummies representing 6-year-
old children be temporarily deferred for three years. That organization
argued that the development of occupant classification technologies has
not advanced as rapidly as expected, and that prototype occupant
classification systems currently available for installation in
September 2003 are not able to consistently and reliably distinguish
between the Hybrid III 6-year-old child dummy and the Hybrid III 5th
percentile adult female dummy. The Alliance cited a June 2001 report of
the United States General Accounting Office, titled ``Vehicle Safety:
Technologies, Challenges, and Research and Development Expenditures for
Advanced Air Bags,'' in support of this position.
The Alliance argued that manufacturers choosing suppression as the
means to reduce the risk to children are faced with the probability
that, in the real world, the air bag will not deploy in some instances
when it is potentially beneficial for a small adult, or will deploy in
some instances when it is not wanted because a child is present. The
Alliance argued that a delay in the requirements using dummies
representing 6-year-old children would permit optimization of the
advanced air bag system to make it more likely that the air bag will
deploy when it is needed for small adults in the real world.
According to the Alliance, it is at least 15 times more likely that
an adult or teenager will be sitting in front of a passenger-side air
bag, when those seating positions are occupied during a frontal crash,
than a sub teen (children between 5 and 12 years old). The Alliance
stated that this fact, in combination with the current development
status of prototype occupant classification technology, leads it to
believe that the prudent public policy choice is to suspend temporarily
the test requirements applicable to the Hybrid III 6-year-old child
dummy, because of the compromise in safety to small adults in the real
world under those requirements. The Alliance stated that it
[[Page 59803]]
anticipates that improvements in occupant classification sensor
technology are likely to permit the test requirements to be met by MY
2007.
In responding to the Alliance, it is helpful to distinguish between
compliance issues and real world safety issues. Our concern about
compliance issues arises in part from our statutory mandate to ensure
that our safety standards are ``objective'' and ``practicable.'' To the
extent that vehicles can't be built to achieve the specified
performance requirement or there is uncertainty about what performance
is required, the American public does not realize the expected benefit
of the performance requirement.
It is our understanding that there are not currently any compliance
issues with respect to occupant classification sensors. This
understanding is based in part on meetings we have had with vehicle
manufacturers to discuss the status of their plans for meeting the
advanced air bag requirements, which have included the discussion of
confidential information. The Alliance petition notes these meetings.
Toyota's petition acknowledged in its discussion of suppression systems
that ``systems exist which have demonstrated an ability to 'comply'
with the technical requirements of FMVSS 208 in a laboratory test
environment under tightly controlled test conditions.'' Thus, we do not
understand that there are compliance issues related to the ability of
occupant classification sensor technology to distinguish between 6-
year-old child dummies and small adult dummies.
However, being able to demonstrate compliance in a laboratory is
important primarily because it is expected to translate into effective
safety protection to real people in real traffic situations. To the
extent that the vehicle manufacturers are suggesting in their petitions
that the real world effectiveness of occupant classification sensor
technology is inadequately assessed by the current compliance test
procedures, we are very concerned.
First, the real world data make it clear that a technology to
distinguish between 6-year-old children and small adults is needed, so
long as suppression is the selected means for minimizing risks to
children. As we discussed in the preamble to the May 2000 final rule on
advanced air bags, while air bags have been highly effective in
reducing fatalities from frontal crashes, they have sometimes caused
fatalities, especially to children, in relatively low speed crashes. As
of April 1, 2002, NHTSA's Special Crash Investigation (SCI) program had
confirmed a total of 208 fatalities induced by the deployment of an air
bag. Of that total, 129 were children, 69 were drivers, and 10 were
adult passengers.
Deferring the requirements using the 6-year-old child dummy could
eliminate, for the duration of the deferral, nearly two-thirds of the
benefits for children age 1 to 12 that we expect from advanced air
bags.
In the agency's Final Economic Assessment (FEA), we estimated that,
assuming all vehicles in the on-road fleet had pre-MY 1998 air bags, a
total of 105 children aged 1 to 12 years old would be projected to be
killed by air bags annually. This figure provided a baseline for
estimating potential benefits from the various advanced air bag
requirements.
The static suppression tests would not address all of the 105
children. First, the tests would only address children who weighed 54
pounds or less, as the 6-year-old child dummy weighs 54 pounds. Since
suppression devices classify occupants based on weight or similar
factors, they are assumed to be effective for occupants up to the
weight of the specified dummy, but not for occupants above that weight.
About 83 of the 105 children were estimated to weigh 54 pounds or less.
Moreover, eight of these children were estimated to be sitting on the
lap of an adult passenger and would thus not likely be identified as a
child. Therefore, in the FEA, the agency estimated that the static
suppression tests would save 75 children (the 83 children minus the
eight on adult laps).
If we deferred the tests using the 6-year-old child dummy, however,
the remaining tests would only directly address children who weighed 36
pounds or less, as the 3-year-old child dummy weighs 36 pounds. Of the
75 children aged 1 to 12 who were estimated to be saved by suppression,
about 49 weighed between 36 and 54 pounds. If the tests using the 6-
year-old child dummy were eliminated, we could no longer assume that
these 49 children (nearly two-thirds of the total of 75) would be
saved.
We note that, due to a combination of air bag design changes and
behavioral changes, the number of children who are being killed by air
bags has significantly declined since the pre-MY 1998 period which the
FEA used as the baseline for estimating benefits. However, the fact
that children weighing between 36 and 54 pounds (children represented
by the six-year-old child dummy and not the three-year-old child dummy)
represent a high-risk group has not changed. Given that the tests using
6-year-old child dummies account for nearly two thirds of the benefits
for children aged 1 to 12 that we expect from advanced air bags, we are
obviously reluctant to defer it. We have, nonetheless, carefully
considered the petitioners' arguments that a delay in the requirements
using dummies representing 6-year-old children would permit
optimization of the advanced air bag system to make it more likely that
the air bag will deploy when it is needed for small adults in the real
world. After considering these arguments, however, we have concluded
that the petitioners have not presented information that would justify
a deferral of these requirements.
NHTSA notes that if a manufacturer selects the suppression option
for one or more of the child dummies, the vehicle must also meet
requirements to help ensure that the air bag is not inappropriately
suppressed for small-statured adults. The air bag must be activated
during several static tests using a 5th percentile adult female dummy
(or a human being of a weight and size similar to that dummy) in the
right front passenger seat. Moreover, Standard No. 208 includes high-
speed tests using both 5th percentile adult female dummies and 50th
percentile adult male dummies.
Given these tests, we believe the current requirements will ensure
appropriate air bag protection for those occupants for whom air bags
have proven to be a valuable safety measure. We recognize that,
assuming a manufacturer selects the suppression option for the six-
year-old child dummy, Standard No. 208 does not specify whether the air
bag should deploy for occupants between the weight of the six-year-old
dummy and the 5th percentile adult female dummy, i.e., between 54
pounds and 108 pounds. The deploy/non-deploy decision for occupants
within this weight range is left to the vehicle manufacturer's design
choices, including the nominal weight threshold it selects and the
technologies it uses, and presumably will also reflect technological
limitations. In addition, for whatever occupant weight a manufacturer
selects as the nominal threshold for deployment, there will be some
gray zone. However, the gray zone issue is not a new one and is
comparable to the gray zone issue that exists for deployment/non-
deployment based on crash severity.
Similarly, the petitioners have not demonstrated that possible non-
deployment of the air bag for adults in non-normal seating positions
will create any significant safety problem. We note that
DaimlerChrysler submitted a chart,
[[Page 59804]]
on a page titled ``Known Challenges for Interim Technology,'' showing
four seating positions in which an adult might be classified as a
child. These positions can generally be described as the occupant
leaning back with his/her feet on top of the dashboard, leaning back
with his/her legs braced against the dashboard, leaning back with the
seatback in a reclined position, and in a forward position with his/her
knees against the dashboard and hands on top of the dashboard.
DaimlerChrysler expressed concern that variation in sitting posture may
create consumer dissatisfaction and loss of confidence in the system,
citing the telltale that illuminates when the passenger air bag is off.
We agree that an air bag should not become deactivated as a result
of normally seated adults making minor adjustments in their posture.
However, the petitioners are not discussing that situation. The issue
is instead one of possible non-deployment of the passenger air bag for
adults in non-normal seating positions.
We believe this concern is appropriately addressed by the
requirement for a telltale that illuminates when the passenger air bag
is off. If a non-normal seating position results in the passenger air
bag being deactivated, illumination of the telltale will warn the
passenger and encourage him/her to adopt a normal seating position. We
also observe that the benefits of air bags to occupants in non-normal
seating positions are uncertain. Moreover, with reference to some of
the positions cited by DaimlerChrysler, in which the occupant is
extremely close to the air bag and even in contact with the air bag
cover, suppression of the air bag might be preferable to activation,
even for adults.\5\
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\5\ We note that our DASS requirements contemplate the
possibility of air bags being suppressed for adults who are
extremely close to the air bag.
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We note that a supplier and a large-volume vehicle manufacturer
have developed an algorithm that minimizes deactivation of the air bag
in these types of circumstances. That algorithm is available to
petitioners.
We recognize that owners of vehicles equipped with weight-based
suppression systems need to be informed about how the systems work, the
telltale, and the appropriate action to take when the telltale is
illuminated. This type of information should be provided in the owner's
manual.
C. Requests for Expanded Availability of On-Off Switches
Three of the petitioners requested expanded availability of on-off
switches. The Alliance and Daimler Chrysler requested that
manufacturers be permitted to provide a manual three-way override
switch (on-off-automatic) for passenger-side air bags in vehicles with
three-position front seating systems, while Toyota requested that
manufacturers be permitted to provide these switches on all vehicles
with advanced air bags.
The Alliance argued that currently available prototype occupant
classification systems cannot detect and classify right front occupants
consistently and properly when a center occupant is present on a three-
position front bench seat. According to the petitioner, the most
serious risk is that the sensor will misunderstand the weight
distribution of the two passengers and erroneously conclude that one
adult is present instead of two children. Under these circumstances,
the sensor will direct the air bag system to deploy when it should have
been suppressed. A manual three-way override switch would enable the
driver to override the occupancy classification decision by manually
setting the switch to ``on'' or ``off.''
Toyota stated that while occupant classification systems exist
which comply with the technical requirements of Standard No. 208,
manufacturers have serious concerns with the ability of these systems
to adequately characterize all real-world situations. Toyota stated
that air bag systems which are designed to assure suppression for six-
year-old child dummies while providing deployment for 5th percentile
adult female dummies will sometimes suppress the air bag for small
statured adults in the real world. That company stated that if
manufacturers choose to drop the sensor output to ensure deployment for
all adults, the air bag will no longer reliably suppress the air bag
for six-year-old children and will in many cases deploy for larger and
older children. Toyota argued that, given these limitations, customers
should have the ability to override the ``decision'' made by the
suppression system by means of a manual three-way override switch.
In addressing the subject of on-off switches, we begin by noting
that, as part of our May 2000 decision on advanced air bags, we decided
to allow both original equipment and retrofit air bag on-off switches
until September 1, 2012, under the same circumstances under which they
have been permitted for the past several years. Thus, during this time
period, vehicle manufacturers are permitted to provide as original
equipment manual on-off switches for passenger air bags in vehicles
without rear seats or with rear seats too small to accommodate a rear
facing child safety seat. Similarly, 49 CFR part 595, Retrofit On-Off
Switches for Air Bags, covers vehicles manufactured during this time
period. This regulation exempts, under certain conditions, motor
vehicle dealers and repair businesses from the ``make inoperative''
prohibition in 49 U.S.C. 30122 by allowing them to install retrofit
manual on-off switches for passenger and driver air bags in vehicles
owned by people whose request for a switch is authorized by NHTSA.
In our May 2000 decision on advanced air bags, we explained that we
believe that by the end of the initial phase-in, i.e., August 31, 2006,
manufacturers will have developed advanced air bag systems for most
vehicles that are sufficiently reliable to obviate the need for manual
air bag on-off switches. However, public acceptance of those advanced
air bag systems may not be assured. Allowing on-off switches for some
period after all vehicles are equipped with advanced air bag systems
will provide parents with additional confidence until the reliability
of all such systems has been verified based on real-world experience.
We also explained that we continue to believe that allowing
manufacturers to install switches indefinitely would be counter-
productive. The switches provide an opportunity for misuse. Adults
could turn off their passenger air bag systems even though those
systems pose virtually no risk to an adult occupant, particularly one
who is belted. In such circumstances, the occupant would not receive
the benefit of the air bag in a high-speed crash. The same possibility
for misuse would exist for children in vehicles certified to the low
risk deployment option.
We accordingly decided to allow both original equipment and
retrofit air bag on-off switches until September 1, 2012, two years
after the end of the second phase-in. This additional time was intended
to allow manufacturers to perfect the suppression and low risk
deployment systems in all their vehicles. Additionally, it will provide
parents with additional time to satisfy themselves that the advanced
systems work.
We also noted that there will be some need for deactivation of some
sort (via on-off switch or permanently) for at-risk individuals who
cannot be accommodated through sensors or other suppression technology
(such as
[[Page 59805]]
handicapped individuals or individuals with certain medical
conditions). We stated that, at this time, we believe such needs can be
best accommodated through the permanent deactivation authorization
system currently used by NHTSA.
The Alliance, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota petitions all requested
expanded availability of on-off switches for advanced air bags, beyond
the circumstances that we have previously determined to be appropriate
for non-advanced air bags. For reasons discussed below, we believe such
expanded availability would adversely affect safety.
We have conducted an analysis of FARS data and the available data
concerning the use of existing on-off switches to calculate the
potential safety consequences of expanding the availability of on-off
switches to permit a manual three-way override switch (on-off-
automatic) for passenger-side air bags in vehicles with three-position
front seating systems. The misuse rate of existing passenger air bag
on-off switches for occupants over 12 years old was 18 percent in a
recent NHTSA survey, i.e., the air bag was turned off when it should
have been turned on. (Evaluation Note, Preliminary Results of the
Survey on the Use of Passenger Air Bag On-Off Switches, Christina
Morgan, July 2001, DOT HS 809 306) Our analysis shows that, given this
misuse rate, expanding the availability of on-off switches in the
manner requested by the Alliance and DaimlerChrysler could result in
nearly 100 additional fatalities to teenage and adult passengers each
year. This disbenefit would overwhelm any possible benefit that might
result from the on-off switch. The potential disbenefits, and net
disbenefits, would be even greater for the expanded availability of on-
off switches requested by Toyota. A copy of our analysis has been
placed in the docket.\6\ (Analysis of Allowing a 3-Way On/Off Override
Switch for 3-Position Front Seating Positions)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ NHTSA-2001-11110-21
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As to the concerns that Toyota raised about the limitations of
occupant classification systems, much of our discussion in the
preceding section concerning the request of other petitioners to defer
requirements using 6-year-old child dummies is relevant to this topic.
First, the deploy/non-deploy decision for occupants between the
weight of the six-year-old dummy and the 5th percentile adult female
dummy is left to the vehicle manufacturer's design choices, including
the nominal weight threshold it selects and the technologies it uses,
and will include some gray zone. However, the gray zone issue is not a
new one and is comparable to the gray zone issue that exists for
deployment/non-deployment based on crash severity.
Second, the petitioners have not provided data to demonstrate that
possible non-deployment of the air bag for adults in non-normal seating
positions will create any significant safety problem. Moreover, this
concern is appropriately addressed by the requirement for a telltale
that illuminates when the passenger air bag is off.
Third, to the extent vehicle manufacturers using suppression
systems wish to reduce the nominal weight threshold for deployment/non-
deployment to a level where an air bag might deploy for occupants who
are the weight of the six-year-old child dummy, they are free to do so
if they certify compliance with the low risk deployment option for the
six-year-old child dummy. This option has always been available under
the advanced air bag rule.
To the extent Toyota or other vehicle manufacturers wish to ensure
provision of air bag deployment for occupants smaller than 5th
percentile adult females, whether very small statured adults or
children, but find that reducing the nominal weight threshold for
deployment/non-deployment might result in deployment for six-year-old
children, the appropriate solution is to comply with the low risk
deployment option for the six-year-old child dummy. We specifically
provided the low risk deployment option for six-year-old (and three-
year-old) child dummies in light of possible air bag benefits to small
occupants.
Expanded availability of on-off switches that provide the ability
to override the suppression system is not an appropriate answer,
because of the problem of misuse.
We note that Toyota claimed in its petition that ``(a)ccording to
FMVSS 208, adults should always receive an air bag while children below
age 12 should never receive an air bag.'' This is an
overgeneralization.
Toyota's statement was made in a section of its petition titled
``Background-Suppression Systems.'' Assuming that a vehicle
manufacturer selects the suppression option for all of the child
dummies, i.e., the infant dummy, three-year-old child dummy, and six-
year-old child dummy, suppression is only required for children up to
the weight of the six-year-old child dummy, i.e., 54 pounds. If a
manufacturer selects the option to certify to the suppression
requirements using human children, suppression is only required for
children weighing up to 56 pounds.
Moreover, the activation requirements require activation of the air
bag for 5th percentile adult female dummies. These dummies weigh 108
pounds. If a manufacturer selects the option to certify to the
activation requirements using human adult females, activation is only
required for adult females of weights beginning at 103 pounds.
Standard No. 208 does not specify deployment or non-deployment of
the air bag for occupants between the weights of the six-year-old child
dummy and the 5th percentile adult female dummy (or between the
specified similar weights for human children and human adult females).
Thus, manufacturers are free to deploy their air bags for occupants in
this weight range, if they believe that is helpful, or not deploy them,
if they believe that is appropriate.
The low risk deployment requirements, of course, contemplate the
possibility of air bag deployments for children of all ages. The DASS
requirements contemplate the possibility of systems that suppress air
bag deployments whenever an occupant is extremely close to the air bag,
whether that occupant is a child or an adult.
NHTSA's policy concerning air bags and children remains that the
back seat is the safest place for children whether or not there is an
air bag, and that a rear-facing child seat should never be put in the
front seat unless an air bag is off.
D. Request for Allowance of Transponder Technology for Reliable Child
Restraint System Detection
DaimlerChrysler requested that we allow ``transponder-based,
tagging detection systems for child restraint systems.'' It made this
request in the context of a stated concern that current sensing systems
cannot discriminate adults from children in child restraint systems for
all real world conditions. That company stated that transponder
technology is the most reliable means to detect child restraints and
suppress air bag deployment. The petitioner cited the agency's action
in the LATCH rulemaking, in which it recognized the need for both child
restraint and motor vehicle manufacturers to take action to protect
children, as a model that could be followed in this area.
DaimlerChrysler stated that the same could be done here, where both
future vehicles and child restraints would have compatible transponder/
receiver
[[Page 59806]]
devices. The petitioner stated that it takes note of the agency's
concern about a transition period, but believes action should be
initiated now.
We begin by noting that, if a vehicle manufacturer selects the
suppression option for the infant dummy, 3-year-old dummy, and/or 6-
year-old dummy, it must certify compliance using the dummy (or a human
child) in any child restraint on a specified list of representative
child restraints that are appropriate for a child the size of the
applicable dummy. We believe the specified child restraints \7\ are
adequately representative of the restraints generally being sold to
help ensure that the air bag will be suppressed regardless of the
particular brand and model child restraint actually being used. Parents
or other caregivers will be able to look at the telltale to confirm
whether the air bag is suppressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ We note that we are considering issues relating to the
availability of the specified child restraints in the context of the
petitions for reconsideration of our December 2001 final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our May 2000 final rule, we addressed a previous request by
DaimlerChrysler and one by International Electronics Engineering (IEE)
to permit certification to the suppression requirements using tag-based
systems. See 65 FR at 30710-12. We recognized that these companies
might be correct in saying that tag-type systems could offer greater
reliability, assuming that the correct tagged child restraint is also
used. We explained, however, that such systems would not ensure safety
for the numerous different child restraint designs and potential
restraint positions that are used by the general public. We also noted
that even making tags widely available, as DaimlerChrysler suggested,
would not account for those individuals who do not have a tag on their
particular child restraint, either because the restraint is not
generally used in a given vehicle, or because they are unaware that the
tags are available. Additionally, simply providing the tags would not
assure that they were installed on the restraint properly or that the
tag was properly aligned when the restraint was set in the vehicle
seat.
We stated that technology like the tag-type Mercedes BabySmart
appears to provide a reliable method of preventing air bag deployments
when used properly. We also stated that while we do not believe that
these types of suppression systems alone will adequately meet the needs
of motor vehicle safety, we do believe that they remain an excellent
supplement to other systems.
After considering DaimlerChrysler's petition, we do not see any
reason to change our position. DaimlerChrysler and other vehicle
manufacturers are already allowed to use transponder-based, tagging
detection systems for child restraint systems; however, they cannot
certify to the suppression requirements based on these systems.
Instead, these types of suppression systems must be considered a
supplement to other systems that suppress the air bag even if a tag is
not present on a child restraint. This is because systems that rely on
tagging alone would not ensure safety for the numerous different child
restraints that are used by the general public, including older ones.
Such systems would also not ensure safety for young children who are
not in child restraints.
Finally, to the extent DaimlerChrysler would like us to require
tagging in addition to our current requirements, it has not shown a
safety need for such a requirement. While that company may be correct
that tag-type systems could offer greater reliability, assuming that
the correct tagged child restraint is also used, it has not shown any
safety problems with the non-tag-based sensing systems now under
development.
E. Requests for Revisions to Percentage Phase-in Requirements and
Proposal To Revise First-year Percentage
The Alliance petitioned that we revise the first year's phase-in
requirement from 35 percent to 10 percent of a manufacturer's
production. The petitioner stated that this change is necessitated by
the unanticipated technical challenges of making occupant sensing
technology work properly in reasonable foreseeable real world
conditions, and by the departure from the market of some major
suppliers.
The Alliance stated that the difficulties encountered in developing
robust occupant classification sensors resulted in two significant
manufacturers--Siemens and Bosch--deciding to discontinue the
development of promising technologies. The Alliance also stated that
one motor vehicle manufacturer invested in and prepared at least three
separate occupant classification programs that were scheduled to be
introduced into production before December 2000. However, none of the
programs made it into production due to various system failures with
the developing technologies.
The Alliance stated that, notwithstanding substantial good-faith
efforts to meet and exceed the 35 percent target in the first year, the
technical challenges with prototype occupant sensing technology have
required some Alliance members to shift compliance strategies.
According to the Alliance, this has often required them to start over
in testing and qualifying advanced air bag systems with much less lead
time to address and solve issues as they arise.
DaimlerChrysler petitioned us to revise the percentage phase-in
requirements from 35-65-100 percent to 10-40-100 percent for Phase I of
the new requirements. Thus, its request was the same as that of the
Alliance for the first year of the phase-in, but it also requested a
reduction in the percentage specified for the second year of the phase-
in. DaimlerChrysler stated that it was making this request in light of
uncertainty surrounding the status of the numerous outstanding
petitions to the May 2000 final rule, supplier capacity assurances and
the performance capability of current level of technology. According to
that company, lack of technology readiness and capacity for meeting the
advanced air bag requirements of Standard No. 208 have reduced the
production tooling lead-time to a precarious situation.
In considering the petitioners' requests to reduce the percentage
phase-in requirements for the first year or two of the phase-in, we
believe it is important to take account of both the need to ensure that
the industry provides advanced air bags as quickly as is reasonably
possible, yet also to avoid a situation in which the industry must put
new technologies into vehicles before they have been fully tested.
We recognize that the vehicle manufacturers have made significant
efforts to develop effective occupant sensing technology, as part of
their efforts to meet the requirements for advanced air bags, and that
some of these efforts have been unsuccessful. We have been made aware
of many of the details of these efforts in meetings with vehicle
manufacturers, but much of this has been confidential information. As
noted by the Alliance, however, two significant manufacturers, Siemens
and Bosch, decided to discontinue development of certain promising
occupant classification technologies. We also note the example cited by
the Alliance of one motor vehicle manufacturer investing in and
preparing at least three separate occupant classification programs that
were scheduled to be introduced into production before December 2000,
with none of the programs making it into
[[Page 59807]]
production due to various system failures with the developing
technologies.
While other efforts to develop effective occupant sensing
technology have been successful, the unsuccessful ones have diverted
scarce resources and placed many vehicle manufacturers at risk of not
being able to meet the 35 percent requirement for the first year of the
phase-in. Because each vehicle manufacturer has had its own plans to
meet the phase-in requirements, they are each affected differently. We
observe that one consequence of the longer-than-expected time it has
taken to develop effective occupant sensing technology is that
manufacturers are less likely to be able to earn significant credits
before the phase-in begins. Since the percentage requirements for this
phase-in increase quickly, i.e., from 35 percent the first year to 65
percent the second year to 100 percent the third year (credits may be
applied toward the 100 percent requirement for this year), the loss of
expected credits from the time before the phase-in begins has the
effect of requiring a greater percentage of models to be certified to
the advanced air bag requirements sooner, including ones that may pose
greater technical challenges.
Given the supplier and technical challenges that have been
demonstrated by the vehicle manufacturers, we believe some adjustment
to the first year percentage phase-in requirement is appropriate. We
have tentatively concluded that a reduction in the first year's phase-
in requirement from 35 percent to 20 percent of a manufacturer's
production strikes a reasonable balance between ensuring that the
industry provides advanced air bags as quickly as is reasonably
possible, while avoiding a situation in which the industry must put new
technologies into vehicles before they have been fully tested. We note
that, because of the credit provisions, different vehicle manufacturers
could, as a practical matter, use this additional flexibility for
different years of the phase-in, as needed. Thus, we believe
DaimlerChrysler's request for a reduction of the second year phase-in
percentage is unnecessary.
While the petitioners demonstrated unexpected supplier and
technical challenges, they did not demonstrate a need to reduce the
first year requirement to a percentage as low as the requested 10
percent. We are concerned that such a low percentage would not lead the
industry to provide advanced air bags as quickly as is reasonably
possible.
We are providing a comment period of 30 days on our proposal to
reduce the first year's phase-in requirement from 35 percent to 20
percent of a vehicle manufacturer's production. Given the immediacy of
the decisions the vehicle manufacturers need to make concerning the
vehicles that will be produced during the first production year, we
believe that it is important to resolve the percentage phase-in
requirement as soon as possible. For this reason, we believe a comment
period of 30 days, rather than a longer one, is in the public interest.
We also believe that a 30-day comment period is ample for interested
persons to prepare and submit comments on this issue.
IV. Petition for Rulemaking From Porsche Concerning the Alternative
Phase-in Available to Limited Line Manufacturers
A phase-in for new requirements generally permits vehicle
manufacturers flexibility to choose which of their vehicles will be the
first that they redesign to comply with those requirements. However, if
a manufacturer produces a very limited number of lines, e.g., one or
two, a phase-in would provide little, if any, flexibility.
Accordingly, as part of the advanced air bag final rule, we decided
to permit manufacturers that sell two or fewer carlines in the United
States at the beginning of the first year of each of the two phase-ins
(September 1, 2003 and September 1, 2007) the option of omitting the
first year of each phase-in if they achieve full compliance by
September 1, 2004, the beginning of the second year of the first phase-
in and September 1, 2008, the beginning of the second year of the
subsequent phase-in. This option is available only for limited line
manufacturers since it would otherwise be possible for the industry as
a whole to delay introducing any advanced air bags for a year. The
advanced air bag final rule also includes an exclusion from the phase-
in requirements for small volume manufacturers. This exclusion is
limited to manufacturers that produce or assemble not more than 5,000
vehicles for the U.S. market each year.
On August 19, 2002, we received a petition for rulemaking from
Porsche requesting changes in the special phase-in provisions available
to limited-line manufacturers. Specifically, Porsche requested that the
agency consider adding an additional definition of ``carline'' specific
to Standard No. 208 and providing manufacturers that sell two or fewer
carlines in the U.S. the flexibility to comply at the 100 percent level
starting with the third year of the phase-in.
According to Porsche, small limited-line manufacturers like Porsche
have and will continue to have difficulties attracting the attention of
technology suppliers because of the limited value associated with small
development contracts. That company stated that whether or not it
produces only 500, 5,000, or 10,000 vehicles on a worldwide basis, it
is, in today's world, an extremely small vehicle manufacturer relative
to others selling in the U.S. Porsche stated that it is one of the few
remaining independent vehicle manufacturers with no direct relationship
to any other vehicle manufacturer. It stated that, unlike various other
small manufacturers, it does not have a parent company willing to
assume its production as part of its fleet compliance schedule.
In light of our proposal to adjust the phase-in requirements
applicable to large manufacturers, we believe it is appropriate to
consider whether some further type of adjustment is needed for
companies like Porsche. Many of the difficulties cited by large-volume
manufacturers, such as the technical challenges being faced by the
vehicle manufacturers in meeting the new requirements and the fact that
two of the automotive suppliers have dropped plans to offer devices
that suppress the passenger air bag when a child is present, affect
small companies like Porsche.
We note that the specific concerns cited by Porsche relate more to
its small size than to the number of carlines it sells. While Porsche
is larger than the companies that are traditionally viewed as small
volume manufacturers, it is very small compared to the large
manufacturers.
We request comments on the need for relief for companies like
Porsche, the specific amendments it requested, and alternative ways of
providing relief. The agency could, for example, provide a new phase-in
option that combines relatively small volume (but volume higher than
that specified for exclusion from the phase-in) with small number of
carlines. It could also provide a new phase-in option, based solely on
relatively small volume (but volume higher than that specified for
exclusion from the phase-in). The agency requests that commenters
recommending relief address how the agency could ensure that any relief
provided is not overly broad. Depending on the comments, the agency may
provide some type of relief in the final rule.
[[Page 59808]]
V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
NHTSA has considered the impact of this proposed rule under
Executive Order 12866 and the Department of Transportation's regulatory
policies and procedures. This proposed rule was not reviewed under
Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review.'' This action
is not ``significant'' under the Department of Transportation's
regulatory policies and procedures.
This document proposes a reduction in the percentage of vehicles
that must comply with the advanced air bag requirements during the
first year of the phase-in, i.e., from September 1, 2003 through August
31, 2004, from 35 percent to 20 percent. However, the document does not
propose any changes in the requirements for vehicles equipped with
advanced air bags. Readers who are interested in the costs and benefits
of advanced air bags are referred to the agency's Final Economic
Assessment (FEA) for the May 2000 final rule. The estimated benefits
compared to pre-MY 1998 (pre-depowered air bags) in that rule for the
suppression technologies were estimated to be 93 fatalities and 151 AIS
3-5 injuries. These benefits can be considered to accrue over the 20-25
year lifetime of one model year's fleet. Reducing the phase-in schedule
for the MY 2004 fleet from 35 percent to 20 percent (a 15 percentage
point reduction), would result in the potential loss in benefits over
the lifetime of the MY 2004 fleet of 14 lives and 23 AIS 3-5 injuries.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
We have considered the effects of this rulemaking action under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). I certify that the
proposed amendment would not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. A Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
was prepared for the May 2000 final rule as part of the FEA. This
action would not have not have a significant economic impact on small
businesses because the only change it would make to the May 2000 final
rule is to reduce the percentage of vehicles that must comply with that
rule during the first year of the phase-in. Small organizations and
small governmental units would not be significantly affected since the
potential cost impacts associated with this proposed amendment should
only slightly affect the price of new motor vehicles.
C. National Environmental Policy Act
NHTSA has analyzed this proposed amendment for the purposes of the
National Environmental Policy Act and determined that it will not have
any significant impact on the quality of the human environment.
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
The agency has analyzed this rulemaking action in accordance with
the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 and has
determined that it does not have sufficient federalism implications to
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation
of a federalism summary impact statement. The proposed rule would have
no substantial effects on the States, or on the current Federal-State
relationship, or on the current distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various local officials.
E. Unfunded Mandate Reform Act
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to
result in the expenditure by State, local or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually
(adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). While the May 2000
final rule is likely to result in over $100 million of annual
expenditures by the private sector, the only effect of today's proposed
amendment would be to reduce the percentage of vehicles that must
comply with that rule during the first year of the phase-in.
Accordingly, this proposed rule would not mandate any expenditures by
State, local or tribal governments, or by the private sector.
F. Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice Reform)
The proposed rule does not have any retroactive effect. Under
section 49 U.S.C. 30103, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety
standard is in effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a safety
standard applicable to the same aspect of performance which is not
identical to the Federal standard, except to the extent that the state
requirement imposes a higher level of performance and applies only to
vehicles procured for the State's use. Section 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets
forth a procedure for judicial review of final rules establishing,
amending or revoking Federal motor vehicle safety standards. That
section does not require submission of a petition for reconsideration
or other administrative proceedings before parties may file suit in
court.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, a person is not required
to respond to a collection of information by a Federal agency unless
the collection displays a valid OMB control number. This document does
not propose any new information collection requirements.
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.
I. Plain Language
Executive Order 12866 requires Federal agencies to write all rules
in plain language. Application of the principles of plain language
includes consideration of the following questions:
--Has the agency organized the material to suit the public's needs?
--Are the requirements in the rule clearly stated?
--Does the rule contain technical language or jargon that is not clear?
--Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, use of
headings, paragraphing) make the rule easier to understand?
--Would more (but shorter) sections be better?
--Could the agency improve clarity by adding tables, lists, or
diagrams?
--What else could the agency do to make this rulemaking easier to
understand?
If you have any responses to these questions, please include them
in your comments on this NPRM.
VI. Submission of Comments
How Do I Prepare and Submit Comments?
Your comments must be written and in English. To ensure that your
comments are correctly filed in the Docket, please include the docket
number of this document in your comments.
Your comments must not be more than 15 pages long. (49 CFR 553.21).
We established this limit to encourage you to write your primary
comments in a concise fashion. However, you may
[[Page 59809]]
attach necessary additional documents to your comments. There is no
limit on the length of the attachments.
Please submit two copies of your comments, including the
attachments, to Docket Management at the address given above under
ADDRESSES.
How Can I Be Sure That My Comments Were Received?
If you wish Docket Management to notify you upon its receipt of
your comments, enclose a self-addressed, stamped postcard in the
envelope containing your comments. Upon receiving your comments, Docket
Management will return the postcard by mail.
How Do I Submit Confidential Business Information?
If you wish to submit any information under a claim of
confidentiality, you should submit three copies of your complete
submission, including the information you claim to be confidential
business information, to the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the address given
above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. In addition, you should
submit two copies, from which you have deleted the claimed confidential
business information, to Docket Management at the address given above
under ADDRESSES. When you send a comment containing information claimed
to be confidential business information, you should include a cover
letter setting forth the information specified in our confidential
business information regulation. (49 CFR part 512.)
Will the Agency Consider Late Comments?
We will consider all comments that Docket Management receives
before the close of business on the comment closing date indicated
above under DATES. To the extent possible, we will also consider
comments that Docket Management receives after that date. If Docket
Management receives a comment too late for us to consider it in
developing a final rule (assuming that one is issued), we will consider
that comment as an informal suggestion for future rulemaking action.
How Can I Read the Comments Submitted by Other People?
You may read the comments received by Docket Management at the
address given above under ADDRESSES. The hours of the Docket are
indicated above in the same location.
You may also see the comments on the Internet. To read the comments
on the Internet, take the following steps:
Go to the Docket Management System (DMS) Web page of the Department
of Transportation (http://dms.dot.gov/).
On that page, click on ``search.''
On the next page (http://dms.dot.gov/search/), type in the four-
digit docket number shown at the beginning of this document. Example:
If the docket number were ``NHTSA-1998-1234,'' you would type ``1234.''
After typing the docket number, click on ``search.''
On the next page, which contains docket summary information for the
docket you selected, click on the desired comments. You may download
the comments.
Please note that even after the comment closing date, we will
continue to file relevant information in the Docket as it becomes
available. Further, some people may submit late comments. Accordingly,
we recommend that you periodically check the Docket for new material.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571
Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Tires.
In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA proposes to amend 49 CFR
Chapter V as follows:
PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
1. The authority citation for Part 571 of Title 49 would continue
to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
2. Section 571.208 would be amended by revising S14.1.1.1 to read
as follows:
Sec. 571.208 Standard No. 208; Occupant crash protection.
* * * * *
S14.1.1.1 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2003, and
before September 1, 2004. Subject to S14.1.2(a), for vehicles
manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2003, and
before September 1, 2004, the amount of vehicles complying with
S14.5.1(a), S14.5.2, S15.1, S15.2, S17, S19, S21, S23, and S25, shall
be not less than 20 percent of:
(a) If the manufacturer has manufactured vehicles for sale in the
United States during both of the two production years prior to
September 1, 2003, the manufacturer's average annual production of
vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2001, and before
September 1, 2004, or
(b) The manufacturer's production on or after September 1, 2003,
and before September 1, 2004.
* * * * *
Issued: September 19, 2002.
Roger A. Saul,
Director, Office of Crashworthiness Standards.
[FR Doc. 02-24236 Filed 9-19-02; 3:57 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P