[Federal Register Volume 68, Number 220 (Friday, November 14, 2003)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64611-64614]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 03-28506]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program
AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Amended Record of Decision.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
Administration (DOE/NNSA) is amending its January 11, 2000 Record of
Decision (ROD) (65 FR 1608) to allow for the fabrication of mixed oxide
(MOX) fuel lead assemblies in France on a one-time basis. The January
2000 ROD stated that DOE would fabricate a limited number of lead
assemblies at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). However, because
of cost and schedule impacts and programmatic considerations, lead
assembly fabrication at LANL is no longer feasible.
The environmental impacts of fabricating lead assemblies in Europe
were first evaluated in the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable
Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(Storage and Disposition PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0229, December 1996). In
accordance with DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Implementing Procedures at Title 10, Sec. 1021.314(c), DOE/NNSA has
prepared a Supplement Analysis (SA) for the Fabrication of Mixed Oxide
Fuel Lead Assemblies in Europe (DOE/EIS-0229-SA3). This SA updates the
environmental impacts of fabricating lead assemblies in France using
plutonium oxide from LANL. The SA concludes that the proposed
fabrication of lead assemblies in France would not result in impacts
significantly different from or significantly greater than those
described in previous DOE NEPA documents. Therefore, DOE/NNSA will now
pursue the fabrication of up to four lead assemblies in France at the
existing Cadarache and MELOX facilities, using surplus plutonium from
LANL. The lead assemblies will be returned to the United States for
irradiation at Catawba Nuclear Station (Catawba)\1\ in South Carolina.
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\1\ Because the plants' refueling schedules determine the
availability for lead assembly use, Duke Power Company has submitted
a license amendment request to the NRC to allow irradiation of MOX
lead assemblies at Catawba. The SA also analyzes the use of the
McGuire Nuclear Station (McGuire) in North Carolina, which could be
used in lieu of Catawba, if a license amendment request were
submitted and approved.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information concerning the
fabrication of lead assemblies in France, the Supplement Analysis
entitled Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuel Lead Assemblies in Europe, or
this amended ROD, contact Hitesh Nigam, NEPA Compliance Officer, Office
of Fissile Materials Disposition, National Nuclear Security
Administration, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585; or
leave a message at 800-820-5134.
For further information concerning DOE's NEPA process, contact Ms.
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-
42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,
[[Page 64612]]
Washington, DC 20585, telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message at
800-472-2756. Additional information regarding the DOE NEPA process and
activities is also available on the Internet through the NEPA home page
at http://tis.eh.doe.gov/nepa.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Storage and Disposition PEIS evaluated the potential
environmental consequences of alternative strategies for the long-term
storage of weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium and the
disposition of weapons-usable plutonium that has been or may be
declared surplus to national security needs. As part of this
evaluation, the Storage and Disposition PEIS analyzed the environmental
impacts of fabricating lead assemblies (and some initial MOX batch
assemblies) in existing facilities in Europe in the event that it would
be necessary to begin production more quickly than could be
accomplished in the United States. The fabrication of lead assemblies
(small quantities of nuclear fuel used by a commercial nuclear power
plant to confirm that a new fuel design will perform safely and
predictably) involves the same basic process as full-scale fabrication
of MOX fuel and is required to support Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) licensing activities and fuel qualification efforts. The Storage
and Disposition PEIS evaluated transport of plutonium oxide from a
storage facility at an existing DOE site to a U.S. port (Sunny Point,
NC); port handling at the U.S. port; ocean transport to the European
ports of Barrows, United Kingdom, and Cherbourg, France; ocean
transport of MOX fuel back to the United States; and safe, secure
trailer (SST) transport of MOX fuel from the U.S. port to either an
existing commercial reactor site or a storage site in the United
States. The shipping schedule projected two shipments of plutonium
oxide per year and a maximum of four shipments of fresh (unirradiated)
MOX fuel assemblies per year. The Storage and Disposition PEIS also
discussed the potential effect of ocean transport on the global
commons.
Although the Storage and Disposition PEIS indicated that
fabrication in Europe, if it occurred at all, would only be an interim
measure, the PEIS analysis included not only the annual transportation
impacts of shipments to and from Europe, but also the overall
transportation impacts of performing all fuel fabrication work for the
entire 50-metric-ton surplus plutonium inventory in Europe. These
analyses indicate that total transportation fatalities resulting from
both radiological and nonradiological risk to the public and workers
for both routine and accident conditions associated with European MOX
fuel fabrication for the entire inventory would range from 1.69 to 4.62
fatalities, depending on the hypothetical one-way distance to be
traveled (i.e., 1,000 km to 4,000 km). Port handling impacts were also
analyzed in the PEIS. The analysis determined that annual accident
risks from exporting two shipments of plutonium oxide and importing
four shipments of MOX fuel would not result in any latent cancer
fatalities (LCFs) among workers or the general public. The analysis
also indicates that the probability that these shipments would be
involved in a maritime accident of sufficient severity to cause release
of radioactive materials resulting in catastrophic consequences would
be extremely small (on the order of 1.0 x 10-\7\ yr to 1.0 x
10-\8\ yr).
The ROD for the Storage and Disposition PEIS, issued on January 21,
1997 (62 FR 3014), outlined DOE's decision to pursue a hybrid
disposition strategy. This strategy allowed for both the immobilization
of some (and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium and the
fabrication of some of the surplus plutonium into MOX fuel to be
irradiated in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The ROD made no
decisions concerning lead assembly fabrication.
The environmental impacts of domestic fabrication of lead
assemblies were evaluated in detail as part of the MOX fuel fabrication
alternatives in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition EIS (SPD EIS) (DOE/
EIS-0283, November 1999), which tiered from the Storage and Disposition
PEIS. Specific facilities at five DOE sites were considered for this
effort, based on site capabilities existing at that time: The Hanford
Site in Washington, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory Argonne National Laboratory West (ANL-W) facilities in
Idaho, the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, LANL in New
Mexico, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. The
SPD EIS evaluated the environmental impacts of fabricating 10 fuel
assemblies, irradiating up to 8 of them at existing commercial reactors
(Catawba or McGuire), and performing post-irradiation examination at
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) or ANL-W. This analysis
included evaluation of transportation impacts.
The SPD EIS analyses indicate that environmental impacts from
modification and routine operation of lead assembly fabrication
facilities would be small; no LCFs would be expected in the general
population from the postulated bounding design basis accident; nor
would there be any traffic fatalities or LCFs expected from the
associated transportation.
Among other decisions made in the ROD for the SPD EIS issued on
January 11, 2000, DOE selected LANL as the site for lead assembly
fabrication, to be followed by irradiation in U.S. commercial reactors
and post-irradiation examination of selected fuel rods at ORNL.
II. Lead Assembly Fabrication in Europe
In May 2000, DOE determined that cost and schedule impacts and
other programmatic considerations precluded lead assembly fabrication
at LANL, and DOE discontinued related activities at LANL. DOE/NNSA is
now proposing to use U.S. surplus plutonium from LANL to fabricate up
to four lead assemblies in the existing Cadarache and MELOX facilities
in France, and return those lead assemblies to the United States for
irradiation. Consistent with decisions in the January 2000 ROD for the
SPD EIS, the lead assemblies would be irradiated at Catawba, after
which selected rods from lead assemblies would be transported to ORNL
for post-irradiation examination.
As part of this proposed action, up to 140 kg of plutonium oxide
from LANL would be transported by truck (one shipment consisting of
three SST/Safeguards Transport [SGTs]) \2\ to a U.S. military port. The
plutonium oxide would then be transferred to Pacific Nuclear Transport
Limited (PNTL) ships \3\ at the port and transported
[[Page 64613]]
across the Atlantic Ocean to Cherbourg, France (one shipment consisting
of a two-ship convoy). The plutonium oxide would then be transferred to
existing fabrication facilities in France (Cadarache and MELOX). After
fabrication, PNTL ships would transport the lead assemblies and
remaining archive and scrap material across the Atlantic Ocean back to
the same U.S. military port. The lead assemblies would be transferred
from the PNTL ships to SST/SGTs, and transported from the port to
Catawba (one shipment consisting of four SST/SGTs). Archive (MOX
pellets meeting fuel specifications) and scrap (out-of-specification
MOX fuel pellets and remains from the pellet-grinding process) material
would be transported from the port to LANL for storage (one shipment
consisting of two SST/SGTs). Once the MOX facility becomes operational,
these archive and scrap materials would be used as feed material during
pellet production for MOX fuel that would be irradiated in existing
U.S. commercial nuclear reactors.
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\2\ The SST/SGT is a specially designed component of an 18-wheel
tractor-trailer vehicle. Although the details of the vehicle
enhancements are classified, key characteristics are not, and
include: Enhanced structural supports and a highly reliable tie-down
system to protect cargo from impact; heightened thermal resistance
to protect the cargo in case of a fire; deterrents to protect
unauthorized removal of cargo; couriers who are armed Federal
officers that receive rigorous training and are closely monitored
through DOE's Personnel Assurance Program; an armored tractor to
protect the crew from attack, equipped with advanced communications
equipment; specially designed escort vehicles containing advanced
communications and additional couriers; 24-hour-a-day real-time
monitoring of the location and status of the vehicle; and stringent
maintenance standards.
\3\ The PNTL ships are vessels specially designed to carry
radioactive materials. Special safety features include: Double hulls
to withstand damage from a severe collision and remain afloat;
enhanced buoyancy to ensure the ship stays afloat and maintains a
stable attitude even in the most extreme circumstances; duplicate
navigation, communications, electrical and cooling systems; dual
propulsion systems; specialized fire fighting equipment; satellite
navigation and tracking; and highly experienced crew members.
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DOE would obtain an export license from the NRC to transport
plutonium oxide from the United States to France and would require a
Certificate of Competent Authority from the Department of
Transportation (based on the NRC review) for the two shipping
containers (FS47 and FS65) required for this project. DOE submitted the
export license application to the NRC in October 2003, which is
currently under review. The application for certification of the FS47
was submitted on August 2003 and the FS65 is scheduled to be filed in
December 2003.
III. NEPA Process for Amending ROD
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing
NEPA at 40 CFR 1502.9(c) require Federal agencies to prepare a
supplement to an EIS when an agency makes substantial changes in the
proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns or when
there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to
environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its
impacts. DOE NEPA Implementing Procedures at 10 CFR 1021.314(c) direct
that when it is unclear whether a supplement to an EIS is required, an
SA be prepared to assist in making that determination. DOE/NNSA has
recently prepared the Supplement Analysis for the Fabrication of Mixed
Oxide Fuel Lead Assemblies in Europe (DOE/EIS-0229-SA3) in accordance
with these CEQ and DOE Procedures. The conclusions of the SA are
summarized in Section IV of this amended ROD.
IV. Summary of Impacts
The SA focuses on the potential impacts (from both routine
operations and postulated accidents) of transportation of materials,
including cargo-handling activities at three alternative U.S. military
ports, and the effects on the global commons of ocean transport. This
is because the domestic activities proposed, other than those
associated with transportation, remain essentially unchanged compared
to the manner in which they were analyzed in the Storage and
Disposition PEIS and the SPD EIS.\4\ The ports evaluated in the SA are
Charleston Naval Weapons Station in South Carolina, and Yorktown Naval
Weapons Station and Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia.
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\4\ The only additional action needed for lead assembly
fabrication in France, beyond those evaluated in previous NEPA
documents, is the transport of archive and scrap materials to LANL
for storage.
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Based on the analyses in the SA, the proposed fabrication of lead
assemblies in France, specifically, overland transportation of
plutonium oxide from LANL to any of the three ports, ocean transport to
France, the return shipment of fresh MOX fuel lead assemblies to the
United States, and subsequent transport of the lead assemblies to
Catawba and archive and scrap materials to LANL, would not result in
impacts significantly different from or greater than those described in
either the Storage and Disposition PEIS or the SPD EIS. Where there are
differences in impacts, they are small changes to impacts that are
themselves small. Therefore, the activities evaluated do not represent
substantial changes in any proposed actions or result in any new
circumstances relevant to environmental concerns.
Impacts additional to or different from those previously evaluated
would result from transportation of materials to implement this
activity, such as movement of archive and scrap materials from the port
to LANL. Some of the origins and destinations, and hence the routes,
would be different than previously evaluated, and the shipping
containers, although also approved Type B packages, would be different.
However, there would be fewer shipments of material than previously
anticipated.
The risk to the maximally exposed individual from the postulated
severe truck accident involving shipment of plutonium oxide powder is
extremely low. The risk estimated in the SA, 1 x 10-8 latent
cancer fatality, is less than the risk estimated in the SPD EIS, 3.5 x
10-8 latent cancer fatality. Although more plutonium oxide
powder would be available for release from the accident in the SA in
the extremely unlikely event of a transportation accident involving a
breach of the Type B package, there are fewer shipments, so the
frequency of occurrence, hence overall risk, is lower.
Implementation of the proposed action would involve a very small
increase in the use of the port facilities, with no construction at or
modification of these facilities. Only three trucks (SST/SGTs) would
arrive at the port to deliver the plutonium oxide to the dock where two
PNTL ships, traveling in a two-ship convoy, would receive the cargo.
The lead assemblies, archive, and scrap material would be transported
back to the United States, also in a two-ship convoy, and would leave
the port in a total of six trucks. It is not expected that the minimal
additional transportation and cargo handling activities would result in
any impacts to the local environment.
The SA analyzes a severe accident that involves a collision between
the PNTL ship and another ship with an ensuing fire, resulting in the
release of plutonium oxide powder. The SA analyzed the identical
accident scenario for each of the three proposed U.S. ports, which
would result in a population accident risk of 1.2 x 10-7 LCF
for Charleston NWS, 1.1 x 10-7 LCF for Naval Station
Norfolk, and 3.5 x 10-8 LCF for Yorktown NWS. The resulting
individual LCF risk to the maximally exposed individual is 3.5 x
10-11 for Charleston NWS, 4.3 x 10-11 for NS
Norfolk, and 2.0 x 10-11 for Yorktown NWS. By way of
comparison, the Storage and Disposition PEIS reported an earlier DOE
study that estimated the likelihood of a maritime accident of
sufficient severity to cause significant release of radioactive
material to be in the range of 1.0 x 10-8 to 1.0 x
10-9 per port call.
The probability of an accident at sea involving the PNTL is very
unlikely because of the limited number of shipments (one two-ship
convoy each way) as well as the redundant modern navigation systems on
the ship. The probability of a significant release is further reduced
because of the ruggedness of the PNTL design and the Type B packages.
If plutonium oxide were released to waters of the global commons, the
Storage and Disposition PEIS reports that plutonium oxide would
dissolve very slowly, and would
[[Page 64614]]
combine with sediments rather than remaining dissolved in the ocean
water.
Archive and scrap materials meeting the stabilization criteria of
DOE Standard DOE-3013-2000 would be stored in two Type B shipping
packages. There is very little risk of either an inadvertent
criticality, or dispersion of plutonium in the event of an accident,
because the plutonium would be incorporated in a non-dispersible
ceramic material. The dose rate at 1 m from the packages would not
exceed 0.1 mrem/hr, which would result in only minimal personnel
exposure, and would not exceed the dose rate from storage of archive
and scrap materials as anticipated in the SPD EIS, which is estimated
to be 0.15 mrem/hr at 1 m.
Both the Storage & Disposition PEIS (at Section G.1.2.6) and the
SPD EIS (at Section L.6.5) acknowledged that a threat could be
presented by sabotage or terrorism, and concluded that adequate
safeguards are in place to meet such a threat. Although the likelihood
of an attempted act of sabotage or terrorism occurring is not precisely
knowable, the chance of success of any such attempt was judged to be
very low, particularly in light of the transport methods to be employed
by DOE in these shipments, which are designed specifically to afford
security against sabotage or terrorism, as well as safety in the event
of an accident. In preparing the SA, DOE again considered sabotage or
terrorism and determined that adequate safeguards remain in place to
meet such threats.
Based on these analyses, DOE/NNSA has determined that the potential
environmental impacts associated with lead assembly fabrication in
France are within the impacts evaluated in the Storage and Disposition
PEIS and the SPD EIS. Fabricating lead assemblies at existing MOX fuel
fabrication facilities in France would not constitute significant new
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and
bearing on the previously analyzed action or its impacts either in the
United States or affecting the global commons. Therefore, pursuant to
10 CFR 1021.314(c), no additional NEPA analysis is required by DOE/NNSA
in order to fabricate MOX fuel lead assemblies in France.
V. Response to Public Comments
DOE has received letters requesting that it prepare a supplemental
EIS on the fabrication of lead assemblies in Europe. These requests
convey concerns that public safety is put at risk by the proposal to
fabricate MOX fuel lead assemblies in Europe. In particular, concerns
have been expressed about the transportation of plutonium to and from
Europe and the safety of the facilities in France. One letter received
by DOE alleges that the proposal to fabricate lead assemblies in Europe
has not been analyzed in an EIS, and therefore that an SA is not an
appropriate document in which to analyze the proposal.
DOE disagrees with the last assertion. Fabrication of MOX fuel
assemblies in Europe was specifically analyzed in the Storage and
Disposition PEIS. In that evaluation, the transportation impacts of
fabricating the entire 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium in Europe
(as opposed to the current proposal to use up to 0.14 metric tons to
fabricate four lead assemblies) was analyzed. The Storage and
Disposition PEIS was issued for public review and comment in accordance
with NEPA requirements. DOE/NNSA believes that this afforded the public
ample opportunity to comment on fabrication of MOX fuel in Europe.
As the analysis presented in the SA makes clear, the potential
environmental impacts associated with lead assembly fabrication in
Europe are within the impacts evaluated in the Storage and Disposition
PEIS and the SPD EIS. In this analysis, particular attention has been
given to the impacts of transportation. As part of this analysis, the
SA evaluates impacts of activities that affect the global commons
outside the jurisdiction of any one nation. The SA does not address the
impacts of the proposal in France, however, because DOE believes that
it is neither required nor appropriate under NEPA to evaluate the
safety or environmental impacts of an activity within and under the
jurisdiction and control of another sovereign nation. Nevertheless, DOE
wishes to emphasize that the transportation activities and facilities
in France will be government-licensed and conducted and operated under
strict standards. Accordingly, DOE/NNSA has concluded that preparation
of a supplemental EIS is not needed.
VI. Amended Decision
DOE/NNSA will use U.S. surplus plutonium from LANL to fabricate up
to four mixed oxide fuel lead assemblies in France on a one-time basis.
The plutonium oxide will be transported overland from LANL to
Charleston NWS,\5\ and then shipped across the Atlantic Ocean to
Cherbourg, France. The plutonium oxide will be fabricated at existing
facilities in France (Cadarache and MELOX). After fabrication, lead
assemblies and archive and scrap materials will be returned to the
United States through Charleston NWS.
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\5\ However, if Charleston Naval Weapons Station is not
available to support the schedule, either Yorktown Naval Weapons
station or Naval Station Norfolk could be used for both the outbound
and return shipments, after appropriate notifications and agreements
have been made.
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Consistent with decisions in the January 2000 ROD for the SPD EIS,
these lead assemblies will be transported to Catawba \6\ for
irradiation, and selected rods from the irradiated lead assemblies will
be transported to ORNL for post-irradiation examination. Archive and
scrap materials will be stored at LANL. This decision will allow DOE to
fabricate lead assemblies on a schedule compatible with DOE's MOX fuel
fabrication schedule.
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\6\ The plants' refueling schedules determine availability for
lead assembly use. Duke Power Company submitted a license amendment
request to the NRC for Catawba. However, if needed, McGuire could
also be used, provided a license amendment request was submitted and
approved.
Issued in Washington, DC, this 7th day of November, 2003.
Charles S. Przybylek,
Chief Operating Officer, National Nuclear Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 03-28506 Filed 11-13-03; 8:45 am]
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