[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 59 (Wednesday, March 28, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14543-14546]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-5591]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the Savannah River Site
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of Intent.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) intends to prepare a
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) to evaluate the
potential environmental impacts of plutonium disposition capabilities
that would be constructed and operated at the Savannah River Site (SRS)
near Aiken, South Carolina. DOE completed the Surplus Plutonium
Disposition (SPD) EIS (DOE/EIS-0283) in November 1999, and on January
11, 2000, published a Record of Decision (ROD) in the Federal Register
(65 FR 1608). DOE decided to dispose of approximately 17 metric tons of
plutonium surplus to the nation's defense needs using an immobilization
process and up to 33 metric tons by using the surplus plutonium as
feedstock in the fabrication of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to be irradiated
in commercial reactors. DOE selected the SRS as the site for all
surplus plutonium disposition facilities. Subsequently, DOE cancelled
the immobilization portion of its disposition strategy due to budgetary
constraints (ROD, 67 FR 19432, April 19, 2002). The selection of the
SRS as the location for disposition facilities for up to 50 metric tons
of surplus plutonium remains unchanged. Site preparation for the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility at the SRS began in November 2005.
The 2002 decision left DOE with about 13 metric tons of surplus
plutonium that does not have a defined path to disposition (about 4
metric tons of the 17 metric tons originally considered for
immobilization has been designated for programmatic use). DOE has been
investigating alternative disposition technologies and will now prepare
an SEIS for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the SRS (DOE/EIS-0283-S2)
to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of those alternatives.
DOE's preferred alternative is to construct and operate a vitrification
facility within an existing building at the SRS. This facility would
immobilize plutonium within a lanthanide borosilicate glass inside
stainless steel cans. The cans then would be placed within larger
canisters to be filled with vitrified high-level radioactive waste in
the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the SRS. The canisters
would be suitable for disposal in a geologic repository. DOE also would
prepare some of the surplus plutonium for disposal by processing it in
the H-Canyon at the SRS, then sending it to the high-level waste tanks
and DWPF. DOE seeks to take this action to reduce the threat of nuclear
weapons proliferation worldwide by disposing of surplus plutonium in
the United States in a safe and environmentally sound manner. The
preferred vitrification technology, along with processing in H-Canyon,
would fulfill this need for
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disposition of surplus plutonium materials that are not planned for
disposition via fabrication into MOX fuel.
DATES: DOE invites Federal agencies, state and local governments,
Native American tribes, industry, other organizations, and members of
the public to submit comments to assist in identifying environmental
issues and in determining the appropriate scope of the SEIS. The public
scoping period starts with the publication of this notice in the
Federal Register and will continue until May 29, 2007. Comments
received after this date will be considered to the extent practicable.
Also, DOE requests Federal, State, and local agencies that desire to be
designated as cooperating agencies on the SEIS to contact the NEPA
Document Manager at the addresses listed under ADDRESSES by the end of
the scoping period. DOE will hold two public scoping meetings:
April 17, 2007 (5:30 p.m.-10 p.m.) at Newberry Hall, 117
Newberry Street, SW., Aiken, SC.
April 19, 2007 (5:30 p.m.-10 p.m.) at the Columbia
Marriott Hotel, 1200 Hampton Street, Columbia, SC.
DOE officials will be available to answer questions about plutonium
disposition and the proposed alternatives at both locations beginning
at 5:30 p.m. DOE will provide a brief presentation on the SEIS, then,
beginning about 6:30 p.m., accept public comments on the scope of the
SEIS.
ADDRESSES: Comments or questions regarding the scoping process,
requests to be placed on the SEIS distribution list, and comments on
the scope of the SEIS should be addressed to Mr. Andrew R. Grainger,
NEPA Document Manager, Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box B,
Aiken, SC 29802; toll-free telephone 1-800-881-7292; fax 803-952-7065;
or e-mail [email protected].
For general information concerning the DOE NEPA process, contact:
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-
20), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20585-0103; telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message
at 1-800-472-2756; fax 202-586-7031; or send an e-mail to
[email protected]. This NOI will be available on the Internet at
http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
After the end of the Cold War, the United States declared 50 metric
tons of plutonium surplus to the defense needs of the nation. At that
time, plutonium materials were in various forms and various stages of
the material manufacturing and weapons fabrication processes and were
located at several weapons complex sites that DOE had operated in the
preceding decades. DOE began the process of placing these materials in
safe, stable configurations for storage until disposition strategies
could be developed and implemented.
In the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials
Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE/EIS-0229, December
1996), DOE evaluated six candidate sites for siting plutonium
disposition facilities and three categories of disposition technologies
that would convert surplus plutonium into a form that would meet the
Spent Fuel Standard.\1\ The three categories were: Deep Borehole
Category (two options); Immobilization Category (three options:
vitrification, ceramic immobilization, electrometallurgical treatment);
and Reactor Category (four options). DOE also analyzed a No Action
Alternative. DOE selected a dual-path strategy for disposition
involving immobilization of surplus plutonium in glass or ceramic
material for disposal in a geologic repository, and burning other
surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in existing domestic commercial
reactor(s) with subsequent disposal of the spent fuel in a geologic
repository (ROD, 62 FR 3014, January 21, 1997). DOE also decided that
an immobilization facility would be located at Hanford in Washington or
at the SRS.
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\1\ Under that standard, the surplus weapons-usable plutonium
should be made as inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as
the much larger and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in
spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.
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In November 1999, DOE issued the Surplus Plutonium Disposition EIS.
The SPD EIS tiered from the Storage and Disposition PEIS and included
an analysis of alternative technologies and sites to implement the
dual-path plutonium disposition strategy. In January 2000, DOE decided
to construct and operate a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the SRS to
use up to 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium to fabricate MOX fuel and
to construct and operate a new immobilization facility at the SRS
(referred to as the Plutonium Immobilization Plant) using the ceramic
can-in-canister technology allowing for the immobilization of
approximately 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium (ROD, 65 FR 1608,
January 11, 2000). Using this technology, DOE would immobilize
plutonium in a ceramic form, seal it in cans, and place the cans in
canisters filled with borosilicate glass containing intensely
radioactive high-level waste at the existing DWPF. DOE stated that the
can-in-canister approach would complement existing site missions, take
advantage of existing infrastructure and staff expertise, and enable
DOE to use an existing facility, DWPF.
In 2002, DOE cancelled the immobilization portion of the plutonium
disposition strategy (ROD, 67 FR 19432, April 19, 2002). The selection
of the SRS as the location for disposition facilities for up to 50
metric tons of surplus plutonium remains unchanged. In November 2005,
DOE began site preparation at SRS for the MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facility.
For purposes of this NEPA analysis, DOE will assume that the
surplus plutonium to be disposed of will include some of the plutonium
already stored at the SRS and some that DOE could move to the SRS from
other sites (e.g., Hanford in Washington, Los Alamos National
Laboratory in New Mexico, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California). DOE previously evaluated the transfer and storage of
surplus plutonium from other sites in the Storage and Disposition PEIS
and the SPD EIS. In addition, DOE will analyze the potential
environmental impacts of these proposed shipments to, and subsequent
storage in, the K-Area at the SRS in a supplement analysis (pursuant to
10 CFR 1021.314(c)). Upon completion of the supplement analysis, DOE
will determine whether to issue an Amended ROD or conduct additional
NEPA review, as appropriate. As explained in a prior ROD, ``in addition
to achieving the ultimate goal of permanent disposition of surplus
plutonium materials, DOE independently needs to improve the
configuration of the storage system for these materials, pending
disposition'' (67 FR 19433, April 19, 2002).
In addition to completing appropriate environmental reviews in
compliance with NEPA, prior to shipping surplus weapons-usable
plutonium to the SRS that would have been disposed of in the Plutonium
Immobilization Plant, DOE must comply with Section 3155, Disposition of
Defense Plutonium at the Savannah River Site, of Public Law 107-107,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Section
3155(d) of this law requires that DOE prepare a plan that identifies a
disposition path for such surplus plutonium.
Purpose and Need for Action
DOE's purpose and need for proposing this immobilization process
has not changed since the SPD EIS was prepared. DOE needs to reduce the
threat of nuclear weapons proliferation
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worldwide by disposing of surplus plutonium in the United States in a
safe and environmentally sound manner. As stated in the ROD for the SPD
EIS, DOE needs to ensure that plutonium produced for nuclear weapons
and declared surplus to national security needs, now and in the future,
is never again used for nuclear weapons. In addition, because of the
cancellation of the immobilization portion of the disposition strategy
in 2002, DOE is responsible for approximately 13 metric tons of
declared surplus plutonium that does not have a defined disposition
path. This situation needs to be addressed in light of DOE's ongoing
responsibility to ensure the safe disposition of surplus plutonium.
Potential Range of Alternatives
In September 2005, DOE approved the Mission Need for a Plutonium
Disposition Project at the SRS to address up to approximately 13 metric
tons of surplus plutonium without an identified disposition path. The
Mission Need is the first step in DOE's project management process, in
accordance with DOE Order 413.3A, Program and Project Management for
the Acquisition of Capital Assets.
DOE completed a technical review of alternative technologies in May
2006, which identified four potentially viable alternatives for
completing the disposition of surplus plutonium. Three of these four
alternatives will be evaluated in the SEIS.
A glass can-in-canister approach installed in K-Area at
the SRS. Plutonium would be vitrified within small cans, which would be
placed in a rack inside a DWPF canister and surrounded with vitrified
high-level waste. This alternative is similar to one evaluated in the
SPD EIS, except that the capability would be installed in an existing
rather than a new facility. Also, the currently proposed facility would
be designed to immobilize approximately 13 metric tons of surplus
plutonium rather than 17 metric tons as evaluated in the SPD EIS. (This
is DOE's Preferred Alternative.)
A ceramic can-in-canister approach installed in K-Area at
the SRS. Plutonium would be incorporated in a ceramic material and
placed in small cans, which would be placed in a rack inside a DWPF
canister and surrounded with vitrified high-level waste. This
alternative is similar to that initially selected by DOE following
analysis in the SPD EIS. As with the glass can-in-canister approach,
the two primary differences are that the SEIS will evaluate installing
the capability in an existing rather than a new facility, and the SEIS
will assume the disposition of approximately 13 metric tons of surplus
plutonium, rather than 17 metric tons.
Disposition using the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. This
alternative would rely on facilities to be constructed at the SRS for
disposition by using the surplus plutonium as feedstock in the
fabrication of MOX fuel to be irradiated in commercial reactors. DOE
anticipates that less than a third of the 13 metric tons of surplus
plutonium that are the subject of this SEIS would meet the
specifications for use as MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility feedstock.
Under each of the three alternatives, DOE would process some
surplus plutonium for disposal using the H-Canyon. Plutonium materials
would be dissolved, and the resulting plutonium-bearing solutions would
be sent to the SRS liquid radioactive waste tanks then to DWPF for
vitrification. DOE is evaluating the continued use of H-Canyon for
uranium processing in a separate NEPA document--a supplement analysis
scheduled for completion in 2007. Decisions regarding future operations
of H-Canyon have a bearing on the availability of the facility to
process surplus plutonium (i.e., processing for plutonium disposition
would occur while H-Canyon is operating primarily for uranium
processing).
The SEIS also will evaluate a No Action alternative of continued
storage of the surplus plutonium.
DOE has determined that the fourth alternative identified in the
May 2006 technical review is not reasonable, and thus, it will not be
evaluated in detail in the SEIS. This alternative involved disposing of
the entire 13 metric tons of surplus plutonium through H-Canyon and
DWPF. Disposing of the entire 13 metric tons of surplus plutonium by
using the H-Canyon facilities would result in extending operation of
those facilities many years beyond the estimated 2019 date for
completion of its currently approved mission of preparing spent nuclear
fuel and highly-enriched uranium materials for disposition, and would
also extend the planned operation of DWPF and the high-level waste
system. Furthermore, implementation of this alternative would require
security upgrades to make H-Canyon a Category I nuclear facility, which
is inconsistent with the Department's plans to enhance security and
reduce costs throughout the complex by reducing the number of such
facilities. The additional cost of these security upgrades and extended
operations are estimated to be several billion dollars.
Invitation to Comment
DOE invites Federal agencies, state and local governments, Native
American tribes, industry, other organizations, and members of the
public to provide comments on the proposed scope, alternatives, and
environmental issues to be analyzed in the Supplemental EIS for Surplus
Plutonium Disposition at the SRS. DOE will consider all such comments
and other relevant information in defining the scope and analyses for
the SEIS. Comments should be submitted as described under DATES and
ADDRESSES above.
Potential Environmental Issues for Analysis
DOE has tentatively identified the following environmental issues
for analysis in the Supplemental EIS for Surplus Plutonium Disposition
at the SRS. The list is presented to facilitate comment on the scope of
the SEIS and is not intended to be comprehensive nor to predetermine
the alternatives to be analyzed or their potential impacts.
Impacts to the general population and workers from
radiological and nonradiological releases.
Worker health and safety, including impacts from the use
of chemicals.
Long-term health and environmental impacts.
Impacts of emissions on air and water quality.
Impacts on ecological systems and threatened and
endangered species.
Impacts from waste management activities.
Impacts from the transportation of radioactive materials
and waste.
Impacts of postulated accidents and from terrorist actions
and sabotage.
Potential disproportionately high and adverse effects on
low-income and minority populations (environmental justice).
Short-term and long-term land use impacts.
NEPA Process
Following the scoping period announced in this Notice of Intent,
and after consideration of comments received during scoping, DOE will
prepare a Draft SEIS for Surplus Plutonium Disposition at the SRS. DOE
will announce the availability of the Draft SEIS in the Federal
Register and local media outlets. DOE plans to issue the Draft SEIS by
January 2008. Comments received on the Draft SEIS will be considered
and addressed in the Final SEIS, which DOE anticipates issuing by July
2008. DOE will issue a ROD no sooner than 30 days after
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publication by the Environmental Protection Agency of a Notice of
Availability of the Final SEIS.
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 21, 2007.
Eric J. Fygi,
Acting General Counsel.
[FR Doc. E7-5591 Filed 3-27-07; 8:45 am]
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