On Apr. 2, 1937,[10] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the District of Columbia appropriation bill, a point of order was raised against the following provision:

The Clerk read as follows:

For general advertising, authorized and required by law, and for tax and school notices and notices of changes in regulations, $7,000: Provided, That this appropriation shall not be available for the payment of advertising in newspapers published outside of the District of Columbia, notwithstanding the requirement for such advertising provided by existing law.

MR. [VINCENT L.] PALMISANO [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order to the proviso beginning on line 11, page 13:

Provided, That this appropriation shall not be available for the payment of advertising in newspapers published outside of the District of Columbia, notwithstanding the requirement for such advertising provided by existing law.

I make the point of order that is legislation on an appropriation bill.

MR. [ROSS A.] COLLINS [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, the law provides that all purchases over $1,000 shall be advertised in newspapers outside the District of Columbia. The purpose of this amendment is to save the District a little money, and if the gentleman from Maryland does not want to do that, it suits me.

MR. PALMISANO: Mr. Chairman, it is not that the gentleman from Maryland does not want to save the District any money. This is a question of whether or not we are going to permit the Committee on Appropriations to come in here and change laws that are now on the statute books. If we are going to permit that in the case of the District of Columbia, we might as well wipe out all legislative committees in this House. That is the question involved.

THE CHAIRMAN:[11] The Chair inquires of the gentleman from Maryland whether his point of order is made to the proviso, beginning on line 11 and extending through line 14?

MR. PALMISANO: It is.

THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair is prepared to rule. The Chair is of opinion that especially the last part of the proviso, beginning with the word "notwithstanding" clearly waives the provisions of existing law, and therefore changes existing law and would be legislation on a general appropriation bill, which is prohibited by the rules of the House. The Chair, therefore, sustains the point of order.

§ 43. Federal Employment

Conditions of Employment—Restricting Employment to Citizens

§ 43.1 Provisions in a section of a general appropriation bill denying the use of funds to pay federal employees in a certain category, declaring in part that an affidavit

10. 81 CONG. REC. 3105, 3106, 75th Cong. 1st Sess.

11. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).

signed under that section shall be considered prima facie evidence of fulfilling requirements of the provision, and further imposing penalties for making a false affidavit were ruled out as legislation in violation of Rule XXI clause 2.

On Aug. 1, 1973,[12] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 9590), points of order were raised seriatim against the four provisos in the following paragraph:

The Clerk read as follows:

Sec. 602. Unless otherwise specified and during the current fiscal year, no part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used to pay the compensation of any officer or employee of the Government of the United States (including any agency the majority of the stock of which is owned by the Government of the United States) whose post of duty is in continental United States unless such person (1) is a citizen of the United States, (2) is a person in the service of the United States on the date of enactment of this Act, who, being eligible for citizenship, has filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States prior to such date, (3) is a person who owes allegiance to the United States, or (4) is an alien from Poland or the Baltic countries lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence: *Provided*, That for the purpose of this section, an affidavit signed by any such person shall be considered prima facie evidence that the requirements of this section with respect to his status have been complied with: *Provided further*, That any person making a false affidavit shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $4,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both: *Provided further*, That the above penal clause shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of existing law: *Provided further*, That any payment made to any officer or employee contrary to the provisions of this section shall be recoverable in action by the Federal Government. This section shall not apply to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines or to nationals of those countries allied with the United States in the current defense effort, or to temporary employment of translators, or to temporary employment in the field service (not to exceed sixty days) as a result of emergencies.

MR. [JOHN D.] DINGELL [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order as follows: Line 20, beginning with the word "*Provided*," at page 31 . . . The language continues to the word "*Provided*" at page 31, line 24, the word "with" and the colon.

The point of order is that this is violative of clause 2, rule XXI, as constituting legislative action in an appropriation bill.

THE CHAIRMAN:[13] Does the gentleman from Oklahoma desire to be heard?

MR. [TOM] STEED [of Oklahoma]: I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, this proviso has been in the bill for many years. This may

12. 119 CONG. REC. 27290, 27291, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.

13. Richard Bolling (Mo.).

impose a duty upon the person seeking, but it does not impose any additional duties on the Government side of it, and it is a strict limitation, it is a limitation in the sense that it requires only a type of qualification which is standard.

THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair is prepared to rule.

The language,

> an affidavit signed by such person shall be considered prima facie evidence . . .

Seems to the Chair clearly to be legislation, and the Chair sustains the point of order.

MR. DINGELL: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a further point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN: The gentleman from Michigan will state his point of order.

MR. DINGELL: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a point of order to page 31, line 24, beginning with "*Provided further*," down through the word "both" and the colon on page 32, line 2.

The point of order, Mr. Chairman, is that this is again legislation in an appropriation bill. I would point out to the Chair that we are creating a new crime by this legislation, which says:

> That any person making a false affidavit shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $4,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both:

Obviously this is a legislative effort by the Committee on Appropriations.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does the gentleman from Oklahoma desire to be heard on the point of order?

MR. STEED: Mr. Chairman, in view of the ruling of the Chair on the previous point of order, we concede this point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN: The point of order is conceded, and the point of order is sustained.

MR. DINGELL: Mr. Chairman, I raise the same point of order again as to rule XXI, clause 2, to the words, beginning on page 32, line 2:

> *Provided further*, That the above penal clause shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of existing law:

I cite again the earlier ruling of the Chair, and the point of order previously stated.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Steed) desire to be heard on the point of order?

MR. STEED: I do, Mr. Chairman. This is an entirely different proposition. This is a very obvious limitation.

THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair is ready to rule.

It would appear to the Chair that this proviso relates to the language that has already been stricken, and that the same ruling that applied to the stricken language would apply to it: therefore the Chair sustains the point of order.

MR. DINGELL: Mr. Chairman, I have a further point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN: The gentleman from Michigan will state his point of order.

MR. DINGELL: Mr. Chairman, skipping over to the next "*Provided further*," going down to the words, beginning on page 32, line 7:

> This section shall not apply to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines or to natives of those countries allied with the United States in the current defense effort, or to temporary employment of translators or to temporary employment in the

field service (not to exceed sixty days) as a result of emergencies.

Mr. Chairman, I make note of the fact that this again constitutes legislation in an appropriation bill. I point out that it imposes upon the Government agencies involved the duty to make findings as to the citizenship of persons involved. Obviously this is an additional burden which this legislative act would apply. It again refers, Mr. Chairman, to earlier language which has been stricken by points of order, and constitutes a hold on those provisions which have previously been stricken by points of order.

So, Mr. Chairman, I renew my point of order with regard to the language appearing on page 32, commencing on line 7, with the words, "This section" through the end of the paragraph in line 12.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does the gentleman from Oklahoma desire to be heard on the point of order?

MR. STEED: Mr. Chairman, we concede the point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN: The point of order is conceded and the point of order is sustained.

— *Exclusion of Persons Advocating Right to Strike*

§ 43.2 A provision in a general appropriation bill making it a felony for a person "who is a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government" to accept employment the salary or wages for which are paid from funds contained in such bill was held to be legislation and not in order.

On May 2, 1951,[14] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the Interior Department appropriation bill (H.R. 3790), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

Sec. 301. No part of any appropriation contained in this act, or of the funds available for expenditure by any corporation included in this act, shall be used to pay the salary or wages of any person who engages in a strike against the Government of the United States or who is a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States [and any such person who accepts] employment the salary or wages for which are paid from any appropriation or fund contained in this act shall be guilty of a felony. . . .

MR. [HENRY M.] JACKSON of Washington: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the entire section on the ground it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

THE CHAIRMAN:[15] The gentleman from Washington makes a point of order against the entire section on the ground it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

The Chair sustains the point of order.

14. 97 CONG. REC. 4741, 82d Cong. 1st Sess.

15. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).

— *Prohibition on Salary Until Security Clearance Certified*

§ 43.3 An amendment to an appropriation bill providing that no part of the appropriation shall be used to pay any person employed in the State Department subsequent to a certain date, until essential clearance as to loyalty has been certified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the appropriate security committee of the State Department, was held to be legislation on an appropriation bill.

On Mar. 27, 1946,[16] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the second Defense Department appropriation bill (H.R. 5890), a point of order was raised against the following amendment:

> MR. [RICHARD B.] WIGGLESWORTH [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
>
> The Clerk read as follows:
>
> Amendment offered by Mr. Wigglesworth: On page 23, line 16, after the figures "$133,456" strike out the period, insert a comma, and the following: "*Provided,*" That no part of any appropriation in this act shall be used to pay the salary or wage of any person appointed or transferred to the Department of State after September 1, 1945, until essential clearance as to loyalty has been certified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the appropriate security committee of the Department of State.". . .
>
> MR. [CLARENCE] CANNON of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, while the proposed amendment is in the form of a limitation, it is coupled with an affirmative direction which amounts to a change of law. For this reason, although presented in the guise of an exception to the rule, it is, in effect, legislation on an appropriation bill, and therefore subject to the point of order.
>
> THE CHAIRMAN:[17] The Chair is ready to rule.
>
> The amendment as drawn is in the form of a limitation but it does have in it positive language which gives it the effect of legislation on an appropriation bill. The Chair, therefore, sustains the point of order made by the gentleman from Missouri.

Granting Authority to Terminate Employment

§ 43.4 Language in a general appropriation bill providing that the Secretary of State may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any employee of the Department of State or of the Foreign Service whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, was held to be legislation on

16. 92 CONG. REC. 2695, 79th Cong. 2d Sess.

17. Edward J. Hart (N.J.).

an appropriation bill and not to be within the provisions of the Holman rule.

On Apr. 20, 1950,[18] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 7786), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

The Clerk read as follows:

Sec. 104. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Secretary of State may, in his absolute discretion, during the current fiscal year, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Department of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. . . .

MR. [VITO] MARCANTONIO [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, a point of order. The language of section 104 gives to the Secretary of State—and I quote from the section—"in his absolute discretion" power to terminate the employment of any employee. I do not believe we have ever had legislation in the entire history of this Nation which contained this language "absolute discretion.". . .

MR. [JOHN] TABER [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, in my opinion this will result in a saving. It is in accordance with the provisions of the Holman rule. When the power authorized in this language is exercised and the Secretary terminates the employment of any officer or employee in his absolute discretion that will result in a saving. That will save money and is in order.

THE CHAIRMAN:[19] . . . The gentleman from New York (Mr. Marcantonio) has made a point of order against the language appearing in section 104 on page 46 of the bill on the ground that it is legislation on an appropriation bill. The Chair has examined the language. The Chair invites attention to the fact that the language does confer definite authority and requires certain acts on the part of the Secretary of State. In response to the argument offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Taber) as to the application of the Holman rule it is clearly shown by the precedents and decisions of the House that the saving must be apparent and definite on its face in the language of the bill in order for the Holman rule to apply. Certainly an examination of the language in question clearly shows that any saving would be speculative. In view of the long line of precedents and decisions dealing with the question of legislation on an appropriation bill, which is clearly prohibited under the rules of the House, the Chair has no alternative other than to sustain the point of order.

"Right to Work" Amendment

§ 43.5 To a bill making appropriations to enable the Works Progress Administration to continue to provide employment, an amendment providing "that no person

18. 96 CONG. REC. 5480, 5481, 81st Cong. 2d Sess.

19. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).

shall be deprived of work . . . because he does not belong . . . to any organization" was held to be legislation and not in order.

On Feb. 12, 1941,[20] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a deficiency appropriation bill (H.R. 3204), a point of order was raised against the following amendment:

MR. [CLARE E.] HOFFMAN [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Hoffman: On page 3, line 5, after the figures, insert "*Provided*, That no person shall be deprived of work where work is provided because he does not belong, refuses to join, or pay dues to any organization.". . .

MR. [CLIFTON A.] WOODRUM of Virginia: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the amendment that it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

THE CHAIRMAN:[1] Does the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoffman) desire to be heard?

MR. HOFFMAN: Yes.

Mr. Chairman, this is a limitation, in fact, on the right of a certain group to prevent this money reaching those for whom it is appropriated, therefore it is proper.

THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair is ready to rule. . . .

Rule XXI of the House, referring to general appropriation bills, provides:

Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment thereto changing existing law be in order.

This being a supplementary appropriation bill, the amendment is not in order, and the Chair sustains the point of order.

Employment by Judiciary

§ 43.6 To a general appropriation bill including funds for the federal judiciary and placing a limitation on the total salaries which may be paid by any judge for clerk and secretarial hire, a provision specifying that without regard to such dollar limitations, "each circuit judge may appoint an additional law clerk at not to exceed grade (GS) 9" was ruled out as legislation, no authority being cited to the Chair.

On May 28, 1968,[2] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 17522), the following point of order was raised:

MR. [H.R.] GROSS [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the language on page 42, beginning on line 3, which reads as follows:

Provided further, That without regard to the aforementioned dollar

20. 87 CONG. REC. 920–24, 77th Cong. 1st Sess.

1. James M. Barnes (Ill.).

2. 114 CONG. REC. 15357, 15358, 90th Cong. 2d Sess.

limitations, each circuit judge may appoint an additional law clerk at not to exceed grade (GS) 9.

Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against this language on the ground that it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

MR. [JOHN J.] ROONEY of New York: Mr. Chairman, I maintain that this is authorized by law. The additional law clerk is most certainly authorized. The committee inserted this language in the bill so that they would not hire law clerks at higher grades that GS–9. It is in the bill to save money or to keep down the amount of money that would be required to pay these law clerks.

THE CHAIRMAN:[3] Before the Chair rules on the point of order, can the gentleman from New York cite to the Chair the authority the gentleman says is already existing? . . .

The Chair will state that if the additional clerk is authorized somewhere in law, this would be a limitation upon the grade at which the clerk could be appointed. What is sought to be found out is whether there is existing legislation.

MR. GROSS: I point out, Mr. Chairman, "without regard to the aforementioned dollar limitations," and so on and so forth. It is not a limitation.

MR. ROONEY of New York: Mr. Chairman, I am sure this is authorized. However, we will concede the point of order in the interest of saving time and bring it back to the House after the conference. This does not affect the amount of money for these law clerks.

THE CHAIRMAN: In view of that statement, the Chair sustains the point of order.

3. Wayne L. Hays (Ohio).

Establishing Salary Levels

§ 43.7 An amendment to an appropriation bill seeking to set levels for salaries of all officials and employees of the federal judiciary, not otherwise specifically provided for, was conceded and held to be legislation on an appropriation bill and not in order.

On May 15, 1947,[4] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 3311), a point of order was raised against the following amendment:

MR. [JOHN J.] ROONEY [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Rooney: On page 66, after line 17, insert a new paragraph to read as follows:

"Miscellaneous salaries: For salaries of all officials and employees of the Federal judiciary, not otherwise specifically provided for, $1,833,500: *Provided*, That the compensation of secretaries and law clerks of circuit and district judges (exclusive of any additional compensation under the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945 and any other acts of similar purport subsequently enacted) shall be fixed by the Director of the Administrative Office without regard to the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, except that the salary of a secretary shall conform with that of the main

4. 93 CONG. REC. 5385, 80th Cong. 1st Sess.

(CAF–4), senior (CAF–5) or principal (CAF–6) clerical grade, or assistant (CAF–7) or associate (CAF–8) administrative grade, as the appointing judge shall determine, and the salary of a law clerk shall conform with that of the junior (P–1), assistant (P–2), associate (P–3), full (P–4), or senior (P–5) professional grade, as the appointing judge shall determine, subject to review by the judicial council of the circuit if requested by the Director, such determination by the judge otherwise to be final: *Provided further,* That (exclusive of any additional compensation under the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945 and any other acts of similar purport subsequently enacted) the aggregate salaries paid to secretaries and law clerks appointed by one judge shall not exceed $6,500 per annum, except in the case of the senior circuit judge of each circuit and senior district judge of each district having five or more district judges, in which case the aggregate salaries shall not exceed $7,500."

MR. [KARL] STEFAN [of Nebraska]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Rooney] on the ground that it is legislation on an appropriation bill. . . .

THE CHAIRMAN:[5] Does the gentleman from New York [Mr. Rooney] desire to be heard on the point of order?

MR. ROONEY: No, Mr. Chairman; I must concede the point of order. There is no authorization in law for this expenditure, although it has been in this bill year after year for many years.

THE CHAIRMAN: The point of order is conceded. The point of order is sustained.

§ 43.8 Language in a general appropriation bill providing additional compensation for secretaries and law clerks to district and circuit judges was conceded and held to be legislation on an appropriation bill and not in order.

On Mar. 16, 1945,[6] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 2603), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

The Clerk read as follows:

Miscellaneous salaries: For salaries of all officials and employees of the Federal judiciary, not otherwise specifically provided for, $1,400,000: *Provided,* That the compensation of secretaries and law clerks of circuit and district judges (exclusive of any temporary additional compensation) shall be fixed by the Director of the Administrative Office without regard to the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, except that the salary of a secretary shall conform with that of the main (CAF–4), senior (CAF–5), or principal (CAF–6) clerical grade, or assistant (CAF–7), or associate (CAF–8) administrative grade, as the appointing judge shall determine, and the salary of a law clerk shall conform with that of the junior (P–1), assistant (P–2), associate (P–3), full (P–4), or senior (P–5) professional grade, as the appointing judge shall determine, subject to review by the judicial council of the circuit if requested by the Director, such determination by the judge otherwise to be final: . . .

MR. [EDWARD H.] REES of Kansas: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of

5. Carl T. Curtis (Nebr.).

6. 91 CONG. REC. 2376, 2377, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.

order against the language on page 83, line 11, beginning with the word "provided" down through the remainder of page 84, to and including the word "final", page 84, line 1, on the ground that it is legislation on an appropriation bill and not authorized by law.

MR. [MALCOLM C.] TARVER [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, to amplify the point of order raised by the gentleman from Kansas, I make the point of order against the entire paragraph that it is legislation on an appropriation bill. . . .

THE CHAIRMAN:[7] . . . The Chair is particularly interested in whether or not the paragraph is authorized by law.

MR. [LOUIS C.] RABAUT [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, we will have to concede the point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does the gentleman from Georgia insist on his point of order?

MR. TARVER: Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair is constrained to rule first upon the point of order made by the gentleman from Georgia, in view of the fact that it goes to the language of the entire paragraph. The Chair must hold that the language is subject to a point of order and, therefore, sustains the point of order made by the gentleman from Georgia.

Providing New Position

§ 43.9 In a bill appropriating funds for United States participation in the New York World's Fair, a provision for a "United States Commissioner" for the fair, to be appointed by the President at a rate not to exceed $19,500 per annum, was conceded to be legislation and was ruled out on a point of order.

On Apr. 2, 1962,[8] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a supplemental appropriation bill (H.R. 11038), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

The Clerk read as follows:

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

Participation in New York World's Fair

For expenses necessary to provide for United States participation in the New York World's Fair, as authorized by the provisions of the Act of September 21, 1961 (75 Stat. 527), including compensation of a United States Commissioner, who shall be appointed by the President, at a rate not to exceed $19,500 per annum, and services as authorized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (5 U.S.C. 55a), but at rates for individuals not to exceed $75 per diem, $17,000,000, to remain available until expended. . . .

MR. [H. R.] GROSS [of Iowa]: A point of order, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN:[9] The gentleman will state it.

MR. GROSS: I make a point of order against the following language beginning in line 16 and ending in line 18:

7. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).

8. 108 CONG. REC. 5932, 5933, 87th Cong. 2d Sess.

9. Oren Harris (Ark.).

Including compensation of a United States Commissioner, who shall be appointed by the President, at a rate not to exceed $19,500 per annum,

I make the point of order that this is legislation on an appropriation bill, and is so stated on page 9 of the report of the committee accompanying the bill.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does the gentleman from Texas wish to be heard on the point of order?

MR. [ALBERT] THOMAS [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, the point of order is good.

The agency states that this position would be considered in addition to the 10 persons authorized to be employed without regard to the provisions of the Classification Act.

The act itself sets up 10 positions. What makes it subject to a point of order is that the agency admits that it is not 1 of the 10 but is the 11th job and so it, as the 11th job, is subjected to a point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN: The gentleman concedes the point of order. The point of order is sustained.

Authorizing Employment of Specialists at Salary Levels To Be Authorized by the Department Head

§ 43.10 Language in an appropriation bill providing for employment in the Customs Division, Department of Justice, "of special attorneys and experts at such rates of compensation as may be authorized or approved by the Attorney General or his assistant," was conceded and held to be legislation conferring new authority on an executive official.

On Mar. 16, 1945,[10] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 2603), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

Salaries and expenses, Customs Division: For necessary expenses, including travel expenses, purchase and exchange of lawbooks and books of reference, and employment of special attorneys and experts at such rates of compensation as may be authorized or approved by the Attorney General or his Administrative Assistant, $146,000.

MR. [FRANCIS H.] CASE of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN:[11] The gentleman will state it.

MR. CASE of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the language beginning in line 10 on page 38 and continuing down into line 13, which reads as follows: "and employment of special attorneys and experts at such rates of compensation as may be authorized or approved by the Attorney General or his Administrative Assistant," on the ground that that is legislation in an appropriation bill.

MR. [LOUIS C.] RABAUT [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I concede the point of order.

10. 91 CONG. REC. 2353, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.

11. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).

THE CHAIRMAN: The point of order is sustained.

§ 43.11 Language in an appropriation bill providing for employment in the Lands Division, Department of Justice, of experts "at such rates of compensation as may be authorized or approved by the Attorney General" was conceded and held to be legislation.

On Mar. 16, 1945,[12] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 2603), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

> Salaries and expenses, Lands Division: For personal services in the District of Columbia and for other necessary expenses, including travel expenses, employment of experts at such rates of compensation as may be authorized or approved by the Attorney General, stenographic reporting services by contract, and notarial fees or like services, $3,400,000.
>
> MR. [JOHN] TABER [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the language beginning in line 17, including all of the language in that line and through the words "Attorney General" in line 18.
>
> THE CHAIRMAN:[13] Beginning with the word "at" in line 17, and ending with the word "General" in line 18?
>
> MR. TABER: That is correct; on the ground it is legislation on an appropriation bill.
>
> MR. [LOUIS C.] RABAUT [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, we concede the point of order.
>
> THE CHAIRMAN: The point of order is sustained.

Pay of Witnesses

§ 43.12 Language in an appropriation bill providing funds to be available as compensation and expenses of witnesses or informants as may be authorized or approved by the Attorney General "or his administrative assistant" was conceded and held to be legislation as a new delegation of authority.

On Mar. 16, 1945,[14] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 2603), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

> Fees of witnesses: For expenses, mileage, and per diems of witnesses and for per diems in lieu of subsistence, such payments to be made on the certification of the attorney for the United States and to be conclusive as provided by section 846, Revised Statutes (28 U.S.C. 577), $700,000: *Provided,* That not to exceed $25,000 of this amount shall be available for such

12. 91 CONG. REC. 2354, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. *Id.* at p. 2362.

13. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).

14. 91 CONG. REC. 2363, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.

compensation and expenses of witnesses or informants as may be authorized or approved by the Attorney General or his administrative assistant, which approval shall be conclusive: *Provided further,* That no part of the sum herein appropriated shall be used to pay any witness more than one attendance fee for any one calendar day, which fee shall not exceed $1.50 except in the District of Alaska: *Provided further,* That whenever an employee of the United States performs travel in order to appear as a witness on behalf of the United States in any case involving the activity in connection with which such person is employed, his travel expenses in connection therewith shall be payable from the appropriation otherwise available for the travel expenses of such employee.

MR. [ROBERT F.] JONES [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the language appearing on page 43, line 5, reading "or his administrative assistant" on the ground that it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

MR. [LOUIS C.] RABAUT [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, we concede the point of order. May I say that the appropriation for this item in 1936 was $2,100,000. The amount suggested in this bill for 1946 is $750,000. This will bring to the attention of the Committee the savings that have been attempted to be made by the Committee on Appropriations.

THE CHAIRMAN:[15] The point of order is sustained.

Authorizing Employment and Specifying Grade Level

§ 43.13 Language in a general appropriation bill providing for positions of employment in certain grades, in addition to the number authorized in existing law, was conceded and held to be legislation and not in order.

On May 11, 1959,[16] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the independent offices appropriation bill (H.R. 7040), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

For necessary expenses of the Civil Aeronautics Board, including contract stenographic reporting services; employment of temporary guards on a contract or fee basis; hire, operation, maintenance, and repair of aircraft; hire of passenger motor vehicles; and services as authorized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (5 U.S.C. 55a), at rates for individuals not to exceed $50 per diem; $6,925,000: *Provided,* That the Chairman is authorized without regard to any other provision of law, to place five General Schedule positions in the following grades: one in grade GS–18, one in grade GS–17, and three in grade GS–16, and such positions shall be in addition to positions previously allocated to this agency. . . .

MR. [H. R.] GROSS [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the language contained in the bill beginning on line 11 through line 16, page 4, as being legislation on an

15. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).

16. 105 CONG. REC. 7904, 7905, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. See also 104 CONG. REC. 9065, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., May 20, 1958.

appropriation bill. Mr. Chairman, it may well be that the Civil Aeronautics Board needs more super grades, but this is not the way to get it.

THE CHAIRMAN:[17] Does the gentleman from Texas desire to be heard on the point of order?

MR. [ALBERT] THOMAS [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I oppose the point of order. Let me make this explanation to my distinguished friend. You will recall that this language was put in the bill and thoroughly argued and debated last year. It was covered by a rule, you remember that, only it was for 10 of these jobs, and the Civil Service Commission, through some misunderstanding, only granted 5 of them. Now, the same language was in for FAA, and they were granted those 10. . . .

MR. GROSS: I must insist on my point of order in protection of the committee and in protection of the Civil Service Commission.

MR. THOMAS: I oppose the point of order because the paragraph was read.

THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair thinks the gentleman from Iowa was within his rights to make the point of order. He observed the gentleman standing when unanimous consent was granted to go back to the previous section.

MR. THOMAS: Well, the point of order is good, then. We admit it, then.

THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair sustains the point of order.

Providing Civil Service Rating for Officer

§ 43.14 A provision in the District of Columbia appropriation bill providing a GS–16 rating for the budget officer was conceded to be legislation and held not in order.

On Mar. 28, 1952,[18] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the District of Columbia appropriation bill (H.R. 7216), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

The Clerk read as follows:

Sec. 9. Appropriations in this act shall be available for personal services including under the executive office the budget officer in GS–16 and, when authorized by the Commissioners or by the purchasing officer and the auditor, acting for the Commissioners, printing and binding may be performed by the District of Columbia Division of Printing and Publications without reference to fiscal-year limitations.

MR. [JOHN] TABER [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the language in lines 18 and 19 on page 45, as follows: "including under the executive office the budget officer in GS–16 and," that it is legislation upon an appropriation bill and provides for paying a higher salary than the law under which the District of Columbia operates allows.

THE CHAIRMAN:[19] Does the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Bates) wish to be heard on the point of order?

MR. [JOE B.] BATES of Kentucky: We concede the point of order, Mr. Chairman.

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17. Frank N. Ikard (Tex.).

18. 98 CONG. REC. 3137, 82d Cong. 2d Sess.

19. Mike Mansfield (Mont.).

THE CHAIRMAN: The gentleman concedes the point of order. The point of order is sustained.

Exempting Certain Persons From Employment Statutes

§ 43.15 Language in an appropriation bill exempting persons appointed to part time employment as members of a civil service loyalty board from application of certain statutes was held to be legislation and not in order.

On Mar. 20, 1957,[20] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a general appropriation bill (H.R. 6070), the following point of order was raised:

MR. [H. R.] GROSS [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the language beginning at line 23, page 3, and running through line 4 on page 4 reading as follows:

Provided further, That nothing in sections 281 or 283 of title 18, United States Code, or in section 190 of the Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C. 99) shall be deemed to apply to any person because of appointment for part-time or intermittent service as a member of the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board in the Civil Service Commission as established by Executive Order 10422, dated January 9, 1953, as amended.

I make the point of order on the ground that this language constitutes legislation on an appropriation bill.

THE CHAIRMAN:[1] The Chair sustains the point of order.

Reduction of Personnel

§ 43.16 To a general appropriation bill, an amendment providing that in reducing personnel the determination as to which employees shall be retained shall be made by the head of the agency concerned was held to be legislation and not in order.

On June 28, 1952,[2] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a supplemental appropriation bill (H.R. 8370), a point of order was raised against the following amendment:

MR. [ABRAHAM A.] RIBICOFF [of Connecticut]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Ribicoff to the amendment offered by Mr. Jensen: After (b), No. 3, add a new paragraph as follows:

"4. That 90 days after the enactment of this act, the number of civilian employees who are United States citizens, receiving compensation or allowances from the administrative expense appropriations provided by this act, employed in the United States and overseas by or assigned

20. 103 CONG. REC. 4046, 85th Cong. 1st Sess.

1. Frank N. Ikard (Tex.).

2. 98 CONG. REC. 8503, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. No arguments were here raised as to possible application of the Holman rule, which is discussed in §§ 4 and 5, supra.

to the Mutual Security Agency . . . shall be in the aggregate at least 15 percent less than the number so employed or assigned on June 1, 1952 . . . *Provided further,* That after the Director has determined the reduction to be effected in each agency, the determination as to which individual employees shall be retained shall be made by the head of the agency concerned." . . .

THE CHAIRMAN:[3] Does the gentleman from Virginia make his point of order?

MR. [J. VAUGHAN] GARY [of Virginia]: Yes. Mr. Chairman, as I understand the amendment, it leaves the discharge of employees entirely to the Administrator, which contravenes existing laws with reference to veterans' preference and also the civil-service laws. It is legislation; it contravenes existing legislation. . . .

THE CHAIRMAN: The Chair is ready to rule. Part of the language of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut, after the proviso, reads:

> That after the Director has determined the reduction to be effected in each agency, the determination as to which individual employees shall be retained shall be made by the head of the agency concerned.

This portion of the amendment does, in the opinion of the Chair, alter the civil-service laws and laws relating to veterans' preferences, and therefore constitutes legislation on an appropriation bill. The point of order is sustained.

Establishing Level of Salary

§ 43.17 A provision in a general appropriation bill that an appropriation shall be available for compensation of the Director of Defense Mobilization at the rate of $22,500 per annum was conceded and held to be legislation and stricken by the point of order.

On June 28, 1952,[4] During consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a supplemental appropriation bill (H.R. 8370), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

The Clerk read as follows:

CHAPTER X

EMERGENCY AGENCIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

For expenses necessary for the Office of Defense Mobilization, including compensation of the Director of Defense Mobilization, at the rate of $22,500 per annum; printing and binding without regard to section 89 of the act of January 12, 1895, as amended (44 U.S.C. 213); hire of passenger-motor vehicles; reimbursement of the General Services Administration for security guard service; not to exceed $5,000 for emergency and extraordinary expenses, to be expended under the direction of the Director for such purposes as he deems proper, and his determination thereon shall be final and conclusive; and expenses of attendance at meetings concerned with the purposes of

3. Francis E. Walter (Pa.).

4. 98 CONG. REC. 8504, 82d Cong. 2d Sess.

this appropriation; $1,000,000: Provided, That contracts under this appropriation for temporary or intermittent services as authorized by section 15 of the act of August 2, 1946 (5 U.S.C. 55a), may be renewed annually.

MR. [GERALD R.] FORD [Jr., of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the language on page 37, line 9, which reads, 'at the rate of $22,500 per annum.' It is legislation on an appropriation bill.

MR. [JAMIE L.] WHITTEN [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, we concede the point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN:[5] The point of order is sustained.

Setting Salary of Commissioner of Public Buildings

§ 43.18 Language in the independent offices appropriation bill fixing the salary of the Commissioner of Public Buildings at $10,000 per annum was ruled out as legislation on an appropriation bill and not in order.

On Feb. 17, 1943,[6] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the independent offices appropriation bill (H.R. 1762), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

The Clerk read as follows:

General administrative expenses: For architectural, engineering, mechanical, administrative, clerical, and other personal services, including the salary of the Commissioner of Public Buildings at $10,000 per annum. . . .

MR. H. CARL ANDERSEN [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN:[7] The gentleman will state it.

MR. H. CARL ANDERSEN: I make a point of order, Mr. Chairman, against the language on page 17, line 15, beginning with the word "including" and ending with the word "annum" in line 16, the language reading "including the salary of the Commissioner of Public Buildings at $10,000 per annum," upon the ground that that particular wording is legislation upon an appropriation bill and is not authorized by law.

THE CHAIRMAN: The gentleman objects to the language beginning in line 15, after the word "services"?

MR. H. CARL ANDERSEN: After the word "services" and including the word "annum" in line 16.

MR. [CLIFTON A.] WOODRUM [of Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, the item had the unanimous support of the subcommittee, but it is subject to a point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN: The point of order is sustained.

Limitation on Average Salary

§ 43.19 To an appropriation bill, an amendment in the form of a limitation on the average salary in cases

5. Francis E. Walter (Pa.).
6. 89 CONG. REC. 1055, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.
7. William M. Whittington (Miss.).

"where separate agencies have been set up under the Defense Production Act or the Civilian Defense Act," was held to be legislation on an appropriation bill and not in order.

On Aug. 20, 1951,[8] During consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a supplemental appropriation bill (H.R. 5215), a point of order was raised against the following amendment:

MR. [BEN F.] JENSEN [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment which I send to the desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Jenson: Page 44, line 10, insert a new section as follows:

"None of the funds provided by this act shall be used to pay employees at an average rate in excess of that paid from the regular appropriations provided to the departments concerned in the regular 1952 appropriation bills. *Provided further,* That where separate agencies have been set up under the Defense Production Act or the Civilian Defense Act, such average salary shall not exceed $4,500 per annum.

MR. [CLARENCE] CANNON [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the amendment is legislation on an appropriation bill. It proposes to fix salaries and that is manifestly legislation and not in order.

MR. JENSEN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard on the point of order.

This amendment, Mr. Chairman, is purely and simply a limitation on the amount of money that may be paid to Federal employees. In the regular agencies of Government employees receive an average of about $3,700 per annum. This simply limits other employees to a minimum. I believe the amendment is germane because it does not increase the authority of any agency which has appropriations in this act.

THE CHAIRMAN:[9] The Chair is ready to rule.

In the opinion of the Chair that section of the amendment beginning after the word "further" and especially that part which seeks to set a maximum upon the salaries which may be paid is clearly not a limitation but is legislation, and, therefore, subject to a point of order.

Limit on Number of Employees

§ 43.20 An amendment to the Interior Department appropriation bill limiting the appropriation for administrative personal services of the Bureau of Reclamation and providing further that the total number of employees in the bureau holding certain appointments shall not exceed 3,500 at any one time during the current fiscal year, was held to be legislation on an appropriation bill and not in order.

8. 97 CONG. REC. 10409, 82d Cong. 1st Sess.

9. Edward J. Hart (N.J.).

On Mar. 30, 1949,[10] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the Interior Department appropriation bill (H.R. 3838), a point of order was raised against the following amendment:

MR. [BEN F.] JENSEN [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Jensen: On page 36, line 13, after "work" and before the period insert the following: "*Provided further,* That not to exceed $50,000,000 of appropriations available for expenditure by the Bureau of Reclamation during the current fiscal year shall be used for administrative personal services and other personal services; *Provided further,* That the total number of employees in the Bureau of Reclamation holding permanent, temporary, or other appointments in grades CAF–9 and P–3, or both, shall not exceed 3,500 at any one time during the current fiscal year."

MR. [HENRY M.] JACKSON of Washington: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the amendment that it is legislation on an appropriation bill. . . .

THE CHAIRMAN:[11] The Chair is prepared to rule.

The gentleman from Iowa offers an amendment, which the Clerk has reported, against which the gentleman from Washington makes a point of order on the ground that it contains legislation on an appropriation bill, in violation of the rules of the House.

The Chair has examined the amendment with some degree of care. The gentleman from Iowa points out that the amendment is only a limitation on an appropriation bill. The first proviso contained in the amendment probably meets the description given by the gentleman from Iowa. If the amendment contained only the first proviso, the Chair would be inclined to agree that it is a limitation on an appropriation bill. However, the Chair invites attention to the second proviso contained in the amendment, which does not make any reference to a limitation of funds but seeks to control the number of employees that may be used in a department, and also has reference to the Classification Act and other matters which the Chair thinks very clearly constitute legislation. Therefore, the Chair sustains the point of order.

Repealing Limit on Salaries and Expenses

§ 43.21 A provision in an appropriation bill repealing a legislative provision in a prior appropriation law that certain expenditures during the fiscal year 1939 by the National Bituminous Coal Commission "shall not exceed an amount equal to the aggregate receipts covered into the Treasury under the provisions of" a specified statute was conceded to be legislation on an appropriation bill and consequently was held not in order.

10. 95 CONG. REC. 3528, 3529, 81st Cong. 1st Sess.

11. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).

On Mar. 22, 1939,[12] During consideration in the Committee of the Whole of a deficiency appropriation bill (H.R. 5219), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

> The Clerk read as follows:
>
> The paragraph in the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act, fiscal year 1938, under the caption "National Bituminous Coal Commission," is hereby amended by striking out the following proviso: "*Provided*, That expenditures during the fiscal year 1939 under this head and under the head 'Salaries and expenses, office of the Consumers' Counsel, National Bituminous Coal Commission,' shall not exceed an amount equal to the aggregate receipts covered into the Treasury under the provisions of section 3 of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937."
>
> MR. [J. WILLIAM] DITTER [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the paragraph that it is legislation on an appropriation bill.
>
> MR. [CLIFTON A.] WOODRUM of Virginia: Mr. Chairman, I concede the point of order.
>
> THE CHAIRMAN:[13] The point of order of the gentleman from Pennsylvania is conceded by the gentleman from Virginia, and is therefore sustained.

Denial of Status to Aliens Not Holman Retrenchment

§ 43.22 Language in an appropriation bill providing "that no alien employed on the Canal Zone may secure United States civil-service status," was held to be legislation on an appropriation bill and not within the exception of the Holman rule.

On July 2, 1947,[14] During consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the War Department civil functions appropriation, a point of order was raised against a provision, as follows:

> MR. [VITO] MARCANTONIO [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the language on page 17, line 18, subdivision (7), "that no alien employed on the Canal Zone may secure United States civil-service status," is legislation on an appropriation bill in that it clearly changes existing law.
>
> The existing law, Mr. Chairman, is found in the treaty which was signed between the Republic of Panama and the Government of the United States. The treaty was ratified by the Senate of the United States in 1939. . . .
>
> In February of this year an Executive order was issued by the President modifying the civil-service rules. One portion of that Executive order distinctly permits Panamanians to take civil service examinations and be enrolled in the United States Civil Service. Consequently, this language against which I have raised a point of order forbids Panamanian citizens from securing civil-service status.

12. 84 CONG. REC. 3123, 76th Cong. 1st Sess.

13. William P. Cole, Jr. (Md.).

14. 93 CONG. REC. 8171, 8172, 80th Cong. 1st Sess.

Thus, it changes the law as set forth in the treaty and changes the law as set out in the Executive order. It is clearly legislation on an appropriation bill.

MR. [FRANCIS H.] CASE of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard on the point of order, the first part of that section reads as follows:

> No part of any appropriation contained in this act shall be used directly or indirectly, except for temporary employment in case of emergency, for the payment of any civilian for services rendered by him on the Canal Zone while occupying a skilled, technical, clerical, administrative, executive, or supervisory position unless such person is a citizen of the United States of America or of the Republic of Panama: *Provided, however—*

Then going to subdivision (7)—

> that no alien employed on the Canal Zone may secure United States civil-service status.

Under the Holman rule, even legislation on an appropriation bill is permitted if it succeeds in the reduction of an expenditure. If aliens are to be given United States civil-service status, it will increase the liability of the United States for the payment of civil-service retirement and other provisions of that sort. Consequently, it seems to me that in that sense the inclusion of this language is a protection of the Treasury of the United States and may be permissible under the Holman rule. Clause 7, of course, is directly related to the "provided, however," and the language of limitation in the first part of the section.

MR. [JOHN E.] RANKIN [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the Chairman's attention to the fact that an act of Congress takes precedence over a treaty or even an Executive order in the form of a treaty. So this language is clearly in order. Congress has the right to enact this legislation.

THE CHAIRMAN:[15] The Chair is ready to rule. So far as the remark just made by the gentleman from Mississippi is concerned, as the Chair remembers, it is in the last analysis an act of Congress, whether it be a treaty or whether it be a law. Therefore, that remark is not germane to the question now before the Committee.

As far as the statement of the gentleman from South Dakota [Mr. Case] is concerned, regarding the Holman rule, at most, this suggests that there might be a saving; there is the possibility of a saving. The Holman rule is very clear that legislation must in its language show an absolute saving. Therefore, that point would not be of any value in sustaining the position which the gentleman takes.

Section 7 provides that no alien employed on the Canal Zone may secure United States civil-service status. So far as the Chair has been advised, there is no law anywhere providing for that very thing, excepting this legislation found in an appropriation bill.

The Chair therefore sustains the point of order.

Defining Personal Liability of Federal Employees

§ 43.23 Language in the Agriculture Department appropriation bill providing that

15. Earl C. Michener (Mich.).

employees of the United States on whose certificate or approval loans are made shall not be liable for loss by fraud, if the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration determines that such employee has exercised reasonable care in the circumstances, was conceded to be legislation on an appropriation bill and held not in order.

On Apr. 19, 1943,[16] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the Agriculture Department appropriation bill (H.R. 2481), a point of order was raised against the following provision:

The Clerk read as follows:

Farmers' crop production and harvesting loans: For loans to farmers under the act of January 29, 1937 . . . *Provided*, That no employee of the United States on whose certificate or approval loans under said act of January 29, 1937, as amended, or other acts of the same general character, are or have been made, shall be held personally liable for any loss or deficiency occasioned by the fraud or misrepresentation of applicants or borrowers, if the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration shall determine that such employee has exercised reasonable care in the circumstances, and has complied with the regulations of the Farm Credit Administration in executing such certificate or giving such certificate or giving such approval. . . .

MR. [HAMPTON P.] FULMER [of South Carolina]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order.

THE CHAIRMAN:[17] The gentleman will state it.

MR. FULMER: I make the point of order against the language on page 87, beginning with line 1, down to and including line 16, that it is legislation on an appropriation bill not authorized by law.

MR. [MALCOLM C.] TARVER [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, the point of order is conceded.

THE CHAIRMAN: The point of order is sustained.

§ 44.—Congressional Salaries and Allowances

Congressional Salaries

§ 44.1 For a limiting amendment to a general appropriation bill, a substitute amendment increasing the salary of Members of Congress was conceded and held to be subject to a point of order.

On Apr. 22, 1953,[18] during consideration in the Committee of the Whole of the independent offices appropriation bill (H.R. 4663), a point of order was raised against a substitute for the following amendment:

Amendment offered by Mr. [John Bell] Williams of Mississippi: Page 49,

16. 89 CONG. REC. 3591, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.

17. William M. Whittington (Miss.).

18. 99 CONG. REC. 3608, 83d Cong. 1st Sess.