

their network equipment, facilities, and services to continue to permit law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance in the face of changing network technology. This requirement, however, is subject to certain specified conditions such as the reimbursement of the industry's cost of implementation of CALEA and the reasonable achievability of the proposed changes to carrier networks.

Congress intended that the FBI, which has been delegated the responsibility of implementing CALEA on behalf of the Attorney General, have only a consultative role in the implementation of CALEA. Congress also intended that the telecommunications industry develop the technical standards necessary to permit carriers to implement the needed changes in their networks. The carriers are required to permit law enforcement to continue to receive call content or call identifying information, pursuant to an appropriate court order or other lawful authorization.

The FBI, however, has gone far beyond its consultative role in the implementation of CALEA. The FBI has insisted that the industry's technical standards include requirements for capabilities that go beyond the scope or intent of CALEA. The capabilities proposed to be included by the FBI are costly, technically difficult to deploy or technically infeasible, and raise significant legal and privacy concerns.

The FBI is now threatening enforcement actions and the denial of appropriate cost reimbursement to the industry if its proposed capabilities are not deployed by the industry. In sum, these actions—the delays in the issuance of technical standards and the required government notice of electronic surveillance capacity—have caused the implementation of CALEA to be seriously behind schedule.

The bill I am introducing will merely clarify the intent of Congress when it enacted CALEA almost four years ago. It provides for definitions of terms necessary to clarify that Congress intended that the telecommunications carriers' existing network technology be "grandfathered" or deemed in compliance with CALEA, unless the costs of retrofitting such technology are borne by the government. Further, my bill provides for the extension of dates of compliance for the telecommunications industry which recognize the reality of the delays that the industry has faced in its implementation of CALEA. My bill will not add any additional costs to the government over and above the \$500 million originally authorized in CALEA. However, the delays occasioned by the FBI could very well add to the government's costs of this important legislation in the future. I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY ACT OF 1998

HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, with the end of the cold war and the break-up of the Soviet Union, nuclear nonproliferation efforts continue to be a priority for United States. Many events have taken place which have strengthened nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The cornerstone

of international nuclear nonproliferation, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), completed its 25-year lifespan in 1995 and was made permanent. The former Soviet states, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus have joined the NPT as non-weapons states and agreed to remove all nuclear materials from their territories.

Although the international community has taken positive steps toward nonproliferation goals, new developments require scrutiny of current U.S. nonproliferation policy. Safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, the India-Pakistan arms race, North Korea's violations of the NPT, continuing suspicions about Iran's nuclear activities, and the availability of weapons-usable materials and technologies are leading reasons for concern.

The breakup of the Soviet Union left an undetermined amount of nuclear materials scattered throughout the former Soviet territories. Large quantities of nuclear weapons, weapons materials, and technology in the former Soviet Union are all potential proliferation problems. There are terrifying reports that nuclear materials have been illegally stolen and transferred from Russia to rogue states. The sluggish economic conditions in Russia have provoked Russian nuclear and missile experts in accepting employment offers in rogue nations. And Russia isn't the only region of concern for the United States.

Since the end of the cold war, North Korea has diverted plutonium to a secret bomb program, threatened to withdraw from the NPT and blocked inspections. North Korea currently has enough plutonium to build one or two bombs, but refuses to disclose the extent of its nuclear activities. Neither India nor Pakistan are a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—nor have they signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Pakistan has acknowledged the capability to build at least one nuclear reactor while some experts believe it has enough enriched uranium for 10–15 weapons. Both India and Pakistan have combat aircraft that, with modifications, would be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The U.S. continues to suspect Iran of using its civilian nuclear program as a pretense to establish the technical basis for a nuclear weapons option.

Today, I am introducing legislation that will set forth a blueprint for accomplishing critical nonproliferation objectives. The bill, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1998, establishes fourteen policy goals for the United States to pursue on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. The arms control objectives are less important now for their own sake than for preventing nonproliferation. A comprehensive test ban, a global ban on the production of fissile material, verified dismantlement of United States and Russian nuclear weapons are measures that will help build international support for tough nonproliferation agreements, could cap the nuclear weapons programs of the threshold nuclear weapons states, and could reduce the chances of future theft or diversion of nuclear material from the former Soviet Union.

Additionally, the United States must continue to support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nonproliferation safeguards, tighten nuclear export controls in the United States and elsewhere, and increase the role of the U.N. Security council in enforcing

international nonproliferation agreements. As we have recently experienced, these measures will help prevent terrorist leaders like Saddam Hussein from building a secret nuclear weapons program.

Finally, the United States must make it clear that it will make no first use of nuclear weapons, that our nuclear weapons will only be used to deter nuclear attack. We should seek to have the other permanent members of the UN Security Council—who are also the other nuclear weapons states—adopt such a 'no first use' policy and to pledge to assist any country which is party to the NPT and against which first-use of nuclear weapons is made. These positive and negative security assurances can help build crucial support among developing nations to sign onto the NPT. One the other hand, if the United States begins targeting third world countries with nuclear weapons, as some in the Pentagon might propose, it would give added rationale for those countries to build their own nuclear deterrents.

Now, more than ever, the United States must set a firm standard in the nonproliferation arena. U.S. credibility and leadership in nonproliferation suffers when Washington subordinates nonproliferation to economic or other political considerations. None of the objectives in this bill will, on its own, stop proliferation. But by adopting a comprehensive nonproliferation policy, the United States can accomplish its overall goal of ending the further spread of nuclear weapons capability, rolling back proliferation where it has occurred, and preventing the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES DURING FISCAL YEAR 1997

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to my colleagues' attention information submitted pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act with respect to U.S. foreign military sales during Fiscal Year 1997.

The first table details worldwide government-to-government foreign military sales [FMS] during fiscal year 1997 for defense articles and services and for construction sales. Total FMS sales for fiscal year 1997 totaled \$8.809 billion. This is a decrease from \$10.469 billion in fiscal year 1996.

The second table details licenses/approvals for the export of commercially sold defense articles and services for fiscal year 1997. Licenses/approvals totaled \$11.013 billion, a decrease from \$14.558 billion in fiscal year 1996.

The tables follow:

TOTAL VALUE OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES SOLD TO EACH COUNTRY/PURCHASER AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 UNDER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

[Dollars in thousands]¹

Countries	Accepted— Fy 1997
Foreign military sales	
Albania	\$759
Antigua & Barbuda	262
Argentina	18,981
Australia	287,524
Austria	27,187
Bahamas	51

TOTAL VALUE OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES SOLD TO EACH COUNTRY/PURCHASER AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 UNDER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES—Continued

[Dollars in thousands]¹

Countries	Accepted— Fy 1997
Bahrain	54,049
Bangladesh	1,592
Barbados	139
Belgium	122,049
Belize	327
Bolivia	3
Bolivia—Intl Narc	8,638
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2,103
Botswana	439
Brazil	24,962
Brunei	69
Bulgaria	4,332
Cambodia	1,246
Canada	103,253
Chad	36
Chile	2,322
Colombia	74,487
Costa Rica	175
Czech Republic	2,268
Denmark	32,558
Dominican Republic	187
Ecuador	4,158
Ecuador—Intl Narc	1,812
Egypt	1,065,593
El Salvador	4,869
Eritrea	1,934
Estonia	999
Ethiopia	1,120
Finland	291
France	102,163
Germany	325,754
Greece	224,467
Grenada	353
Guinea-Bissau	121
Guyana	70
Haiti	877
Honduras	910
Hungary	6,905
India	299
Indonesia	793
Israel	524,988
Italy	41,194
Ivory Coast	187
Jamaica	50
Japan	346,758
Jordan	18,253
Kenya	779
Korea (Seoul)	853,987
Kuwait	48,116
Laos	1,070
Latvia	1,417
Lebanon	21,960
Lithuania	1,175
Luxembourg	4,326
Macedonia (FYROM)	2,057
Malaysia	11,481
Mexico	27,663
Morocco	3,466
Nacisa	602
Namibia	286
Namsa-General + Nike	7,358
Namsa-Hawk	1,956
Namsa-Weapons	4,438
Napmo	2,184
Nato	1,839
Nato AEW+C (O+S)	38,299
Nato EFA (NEFMA)	1,505
Netherlands	225,314
New Zealand	24,271
NHPLO	200
Norway	64,494
OAS HQ	601
Oman	11,541
Org of African Unity	250
Pakistan	101
Paraguay	31
Peru	285
Peru—Intl Narc	100
Poland	4,893
Portugal	19,241
Rep of Philippines	20,055
Romania	331
Saudi Arabia	742,372
Senegal	1,965
Seychelles	62
Shape	2,100
Singapore	192,230
Slovakia	2,003
Slovenia	216
South Africa	154
Spain	828,768
Sri Lanka	74
St. Kitts and Nevis	187
St. Vincent + Gren.	66
Sweden	6,194
Switzerland	13,413
Taiwan	353,737
Thailand	187,413
Trinidad—Tobago	185
Tunisia	15,235
Turkey	339,597
Uganda	3,872
UNDHA	945

TOTAL VALUE OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES SOLD TO EACH COUNTRY/PURCHASER AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 UNDER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES—Continued

[Dollars in thousands]¹

Countries	Accepted— Fy 1997
United Arab Emirates	5,586
United Kingdom	558,949
Uruguay	1,078
Venezuela	59,421
Zimbabwe	91
Classified totals ²	609,749
Subtotal	8,778,248
Construction sales	
Bolivia—Intl Narc	\$485
Cambodia	49
Colombia	500
Egypt	21,356
El Salvador	1,834
Eritrea	544
Ethiopia	388
Germany	1,405
Morocco	3,476
Singapore	266
Subtotal	30,303
Total	8,808,551

¹ Totals may not add due to rounding.² See the classified annex to the CPD.

LICENSES/APPROVALS FOR THE EXPORT OF COMMERCIALLY SOLD DEFENSE ARTICLES/SERVICES SEPTEMBER 30, 1997

[Dollars in thousands]

Countries	Cumulative
Algeria	\$57,938
Andorra	39
Angola	11,618
Antigua	1
Argentina	198,780
Aruba	62
Australia	416,030
Austria	36,413
Azerbaijan	6
The Bahamas	9
Bahrain	8,917
Bangladesh	2,568
Barbados	96
Belarus	12
Belgium	131,132
Belize	95
Bermuda	68
Bolivia	1,666
Bosnia Herzegovina	32,714
Botswana	3,013
Brazil	191,334
British Virgin Islands	4
Brunei	21,076
Bulgaria	459
Burkina Faso	2
Cambodia	29
Canada	8,649
Cayman Islands	7
Chad	2
Chile	32,564
China	2,068
Colombia	39,077
Costa Rica	1,653
Cote D'Ivoire	67
Croatia	121
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	6,378
Denmark	83,987
Dominican Republic	7,319
Ecuador	7,540
Egypt	82,210
El Salvador	8,244
Eritrea	900
Estonia	15
Finland	106,389
France	180,906
French Guiana	5,538
French Polynesia	2
Gabon	23
Georgia	3
Germany	511,772
Ghana	4,383
Greece	36,270
Greenland	23
Grenada	68
Guatemala	2,211
Guinea-Bissau	2
Guyana	108
Haiti	61
Honduras	3,696
Hong Kong	2,147
Hungary	474
Iceland	4,788

LICENSES/APPROVALS FOR THE EXPORT OF COMMERCIALLY SOLD DEFENSE ARTICLES/SERVICES SEPTEMBER 30, 1997—Continued

[Dollars in thousands]

Countries	Cumulative
India	29,867
Indonesia	66,190
Ireland	9,163
Israel	714,187
Italy	172,344
Jamaica	335
Japan	2,121,893
Jordan	4,293
Kazakhstan	3,286
Kenya	617
Kiribati	1,516
Republic of Korea	423,749
Kuwait	14,972
Kyrgyzstan	9
Laos	650
Latvia	9
Lebanon	825
Liechtenstein	2
Lithuania	400
Luxembourg	5,190
Macau	77
Macedonia	263
Malaysia	90,922
Mali	1
Malta	1
Mauritius	59
Mexico	22,153
Monaco	21
Mongolia	6
Montserrat	3
Morocco	15,798
Namibia	298
Nepal	4,140
Netherlands	350,197
Netherlands Antilles	136
New Caledonia	93,528
New Zealand	107,675
Nicaragua	80
Niger	1
Norway	141,653
Oman	2,528
Pakistan	53,046
Panama	11,941
Papua New Guinea	421
Paraguay	42
Peru	5,367
Philippines	72,219
Poland	2,188
Portugal	47,569
Qatar	3,081
Reunion	20
Romania	43,125
Russia	23,809
Saudi Arabia	115,583
Seychelles	11
Singapore	163,713
Slovakia	2,149
Slovenia	2,603
Solomon Islands	760
South Africa	10,865
Spain	202,297
Sri Lanka	2,210
St. Kitts & Nevis-Angu	5
St. Lucia	44
St. Vincent & Genadines	4
Suriname	139
Sweden	396,139
Switzerland	173,103
Taiwan ¹	261,098
Tanzania, United Republic	597
Thailand	122,172
Trinidad & Tobago	809
Tunisia	2,038
Turkey	257,150
Turks & Caicos Islands	1
Uganda	4
Ukraine	77
United Arab Emirates	17,409
United Kingdom	1,193,778
United Nations	82
Uruguay	14,723
Uzbekistan	6
Various Countries	72,368
Venezuela	342,929
Vietnam	5
Yemen	5,159
Zambia	808
Zimbabwe	122
Classified totals ²	736,042
Worldwide total	11,012,618

¹ Taiwan first quarter modified due to error found in calculations used to generate data.² See classified annex to CPD.

Note.—Details may not add due to rounding. This information was prepared and submitted by the Office of Defense Trade Controls, State Department.