

objection, referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

This report is submitted pursuant to 1705(e)(6) of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. 6004(e)(6) (the "CDA"), as amended by section 102(g) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Public Law 104-114 (March 12, 1996), 110 Stat. 785, 22 U.S.C. 6021-91 (the "LIBERTAD Act"), which requires that I report to the Congress on a semiannual basis detailing payments made to Cuba by any United States person as a result of the provision of telecommunications services authorized by this subsection.

The CDA, which provides that telecommunications services are permitted between the United States and Cuba, specifically authorizes the President to provide for payments to Cuba by license. The CDA states that licenses may be issued for full or partial settlement of telecommunications services with Cuba, but may not require any withdrawal from a blocked account. Following enactment of the CDA on October 23, 1992, a number of U.S. telecommunications companies successfully negotiated agreements to provide telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba consistent with policy guidelines developed by the Department of State and the Federal Communications Commission.

Subsequent to enactment of the CDA, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (the "CACR"), to provide for specific licensing on a case-by-case basis for certain transactions incident to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications between the United States and Cuba, 31 C.F.R. 515.542(c), including settlement of charges under traffic agreements.

The OFAC has issued eight licenses authorizing transactions incident to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications between the United States and Cuba since the enactment of the CDA. None of these licenses permits payments to the Government of Cuba from a blocked account. For the period July 1 through December 31, 1997, OFAC-licensed U.S. carriers reported payments to the Government of Cuba in settlement of charges under telecommunications traffic agreements as follows:

AT&T Corporation (formally, American Telephone and Telegraph Company)	\$11,991,715
AT&T de Puerto Rico	298,916
Global One (formerly, Sprint Incorporated)	3,180,886
IDB WorldCom Services, Inc. (formerly, IDB Communications, Inc.)	4,128,371
MCI International, Inc. (formerly, MCI Communications Corporation)	4,893,699
Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc.	105,848
WilTel, Inc. (formerly, WilTel Underseas Cable, Inc.)	5,608,751

WorldCom, Inc. (formerly, LDDS Communications, Inc.)	2,887,684
	\$33,095,870

I shall continue to report semiannually on telecommunications payments to the Government of Cuba from United States persons.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 4, 1998.

CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 105-222)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed notice, stating that the national emergency declared with respect to Iran on March 15, 1995, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) is to continue in effect beyond March 15, 1998, to the *Federal Register* for publication. This emergency is separate from that declared on November 14, 1979, in connection with the Iranian hostage crisis and therefore requires separate renewal of emergency authorities.

The factors that led me to declare a national emergency with respect to Iran on March 15, 1995, have not been resolved. The actions and policies of the Government of Iran, including support for international terrorism, its efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process, and its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, continue to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. Accordingly, I have determined that it is necessary to maintain in force the broad programs I have authorized pursuant to the March 15, 1995, declaration of emergency.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 4, 1998.

CONTINUATION OF NEED FOR U.S. ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 105-223)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message

from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

I hereby certify that the continued presence of U.S. armed forces, after June 30, 1998, in Bosnia and Herzegovina is required in order to meet the national security interests of the United States, and that it is the policy of the United States that U.S. armed forces will not serve as, or be used as, civil police in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This certification is presented pursuant to section 1203 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Public Law 105-85, and section 8132 of the National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal year 1998, Public Law 105-56. The information required under these sections is in the report that accompanies this certification. The supplemental appropriations request required under these sections is being forwarded under separate cover.

America has major national interests in peace in Bosnia. We have learned from hard experience in this turbulent century that America's security and Europe's stability are intimately linked. The Bosnian war saw the worst fighting—and the most profound humanitarian disaster—on that continent since the end of the Second World War. The conflict could easily have spread through the region, endangering old Allies and new democracies alike. A larger conflict would have cast doubt on the viability of the NATO alliance itself and crippled prospects for our larger goal of a democratic, undivided, and peaceful Europe.

The Dayton framework is the key to changing the conditions that made Bosnia a fuse in a regional powder keg. It is decisively in American interests to see Dayton implemented as rapidly as feasible, so that peace becomes self-sustaining. U.S. leadership is as essential to sustaining progress as it has been to ending the war and laying the foundation for peace.

I expect the size of the overall NATO force in Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain similar to that of the current SFOR. However, the U.S. contribution would decline by about 20 percent, as our Allies and partners continue to shoulder an increasing share of the burden.

Although I do not propose a fixed end-date for this presence, it is by no means open-ended. Instead, the goal of the military presence is to establish the conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. To achieve this goal, we have established concrete and achievable

benchmarks, such as the reform of police and media, the elimination of illegal pre-Dayton institutions, the conduct of elections according to democratic norms, elimination of cross-entity barriers to commerce, and a framework for the phased and orderly return of refugees. NATO and U.S. forces will be reduced progressively as achievement of these benchmarks improves conditions, enabling the international community to rely largely on traditional diplomacy, international civil personnel, economic incentives and disincentives, confidence-building measures, and negotiation to continue implementing the Dayton Accords over the longer term.

In fact, great strides already have been made towards fulfilling these aims, especially in the last ten months since the United States re-energized the Dayton process. Since Dayton, a stable military environment has been created; over 300,000 troops returned to civilian life and 6,600 heavy weapons have been destroyed. Public security is improving through the restructuring, retraining and reintegration of local police. Democratic elections have been held at all levels of government and hard-line nationalists—especially in the Republika Srpska—are increasingly marginalized. Independent media and political pluralism are expanding. Over 400,000 refugees and displaced persons have returned home—110,000 in 1997. One third of the publicly-indicted war criminals have been taken into custody.

Progress has been particularly dramatic since the installation of a pro-Dayton, pro-democracy Government in Republika Srpska in December. Already, the capital of Republika Srpska has been moved from Pale to Banja Luka; media are being restructured along domestic lines; civil police are generally cooperating with the reform process; war criminals are surrendering; and Republika Srpska is working directly with counterparts in the Federation to prepare key cities in both entities for major returns of refugees and displaced persons.

At the same time, long-standing obstacles to inter-entity cooperation also are being broken down: a common flag now flies over Bosnia institutions, a common currency is being printed, a common automobile license plate is being manufactured, and mail is being delivered and trains are running across the inter-entity boundary line.

Although progress has been tangible, many of these achievements still are reversible and a robust international military presence still is required at the present time to sustain the progress. I am convinced that the NATO-led force—and U.S. participation in it—can be progressively reduced as conditions continue to improve, until the implementation process is capable of sustaining itself without a major international military presence.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 3, 1998.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 856, the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BONILLA). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

AUTHORIZING THE CLERK TO MAKE CORRECTIONS IN ENGROSSMENT OF H.R. 856, UNITED STATES-PUERTO RICO POLITICAL STATUS ACT

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in the engrossment of the bill, H.R. 856, the Clerk be authorized to make technical and conforming changes as may be necessary to reflect the action of the House just taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR MEMBER TO BE CONSIDERED AS FIRST SPONSOR OF H.R. 1232

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that I may hereafter be considered as the first sponsor of H.R. 1232, a bill originally introduced by Representative Bono of California, for the purposes of adding co-sponsors and requesting reprints pursuant to clause 4 of rule XXII.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

APPOINTMENT OF INDIVIDUALS TO AMTRAK REFORM COUNCIL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, and pursuant to the provisions of section 203(b)(1) of Public Law 105-134, the Chair announces the Speaker's appointment of the following individuals on the part of the House to the Amtrak Reform Council for a term of 5 years:

Mrs. Christine Todd Whitman of New Jersey;

Mr. Bruce Chapman of Washington; and

Mr. Christopher Gleason of Pennsylvania.

There was no objection.

SOCIAL SECURITY

(Mr. SMITH of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, continuing the discussion on do we really have a surplus, yesterday the Congressional Budget Office estimated

that this year we would have a surplus of \$8 billion. However, this year we are borrowing about \$90 billion from the Social Security trust fund, so we are hoodwinking the American people, pretending there is a surplus.

We have come a long way. We have cut down overspending by over \$200 billion over the last 3 years, but it is not a surplus. We still have a long way to go, and it is important that we put Social Security first. Anybody that would like a copy of this survey, please let me know. I will include this for the RECORD.

In this survey, the voters profoundly dislike using Social Security surpluses to subsidize the remainder of the Federal Government. Ninety-three percent want Congress to balance the budget without using the Social Security deposits.

Let us still stay on track. Let us get a more efficient, more constructive government that is going to serve the needs of government at a lesser tax rate and more efficiently and not use the surplus to mask the deficit.

We have asked questions about Social Security on three national surveys this year.

The primary observations are:

Voters profoundly dislike using the Social Security surpluses to subsidize the remainder of the federal government. 93% want Congress to balance the budget without using SS deposits.

Voters overwhelmingly reject "raiding" of the Trust Fund. 74% approve of a new federal law prohibiting Congress and the President from raiding the Social Security Trust Fund to cover deficit spending.

Voters are inclined to believe that the federal government is using Social Security Trust Fund surpluses to mask the size of the deficit.

The President's credibility on Social Security is not secure.

Voters would rather use the overall budget surplus to shore up Social Security than to cut taxes, pay down debt or spend on federal programs.

Younger voters don't believe they'll get Social Security when they retire, and Republicans are especially dubious.

Voters do not consider the Social Security system to be basically sound.

Personal Savings Accounts is the preferred approach to strengthen Social Security.

	ALL	GOP	DEMS	IND
Personal Savings Accounts	43	52	34	47
Eliminate benefits/rich	18	13	22	21
Raise retirement age	10	11	11	9
Raise payroll taxes	6	4	8	4
Reduce benefits for everyone	3	3	4	3

Voters are strongly in favor (six to one) of allowing those under 40 to privately invest a portion of their payroll taxes for their future retirement.

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SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PITTS). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LIPINSKI) is recognized for 5 minutes.