longer need to itemize under our marriage tax relief plan. We are bringing fairness, we are bringing simplicity, to the Tax Code.

Also, because we want to encourage individuals to save more for their retirement and future, save for education, the 90/10 plan not only eliminates the marriage tax penalty and saves Social Security, but it also rewards savings by allowing a single person to have their first $100 in savings interest tax exempt, and for a married couple the first $200. For a married couple they could have $10,000 in a savings account and essentially that interest they earn will be tax-free. That also simplifies our Tax Code, because 10 million couples will no longer need to itemize.

Mr. Speaker, the 90/10 plan saves Social Security. The 90/10 plan eliminates the marriage tax penalty for the majority of those suffer it, it helps Illinois farmers, it helps Illinois small business, it helps Illinois schools, it helps Illinois parents.

My hope is in the next week the Senate will take up this legislation, give it the same kind of bipartisan support it received here in the House, and I also hope the President will join with us to save Social Security and eliminate the marriage tax penalty.

THREE REASONS TO BE PROUD OF THE 20TH DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. SHIMKUS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to be from Illinois and the 20th district. Today I want to mention three reasons why.

The first integrated school in the Nation is about to be added to the National Register of Historic Places. The addition of Hamilton School in Otterville, Illinois, was recently announced by the Illinois Historic Preservation Agency. Behind the history of the school is a heartwarming story of unselfish brotherly love between a young black slave and his master.

Silas Hamilton, a white doctor, founded the Hamilton School. Not having any children of his own, he freed a six-year-old black slave, George Washington, and raised him as his own child. Two years later, in 1836, when he was old enough, Washington began attending classes at the formerly all-white school in Otterville and grew up to be a successful farmer in Jersey County. When Washington died, he left a fund to have a monument erected in Hamilton's memory on the lawn of the school.

Today, Washington and Hamilton are buried together; not as master and slave, but as friend and friend. The large stone crypt is visible from the window of the Hamilton School, and serves as a symbol of the friendship between a white and a black man, and the beginnings of American racial harmony.

Secondly, Mr. Speaker, while most rural post offices are seeing a decline in customers due to the resent technological advancements of e-mail, Internet and fax machines, the Texico Post Office's business just seems to keep growing.

The Texico Post Office will be celebrating its 100th year of service on Monday, the 5th of October. The celebration will include an open house, refreshments and a special commemorative postmark celebrating the 100th anniversary, which will be available for 30 days.

Fred Young has been the postmaster of the office for over 30 years and has seen a lot of changes during his tenure. ''There is a lot more paperwork involved, and there have been several rate changes. Also since I've been here our rural route delivery has doubled,'' said Mr. Young.

The Texico office is undoubtedly quieter than some of the bigger offices. The rural route only covers 75 miles. However, they are able to serve their patrons with just one rural carrier, Sondra Coldwell, her substitute, Marla Saupe, and the office's clerk, Terri Pemberton.

Even though the office is a bit smaller and quieter, it not something that Postmaster Young minds. Maintaining the tradition of good quality service for the patrons is Young's priority.

Mr. Speaker, in addition to sharing with the Members the information about Otterville and Texico, I want to take this time to make special mention of a loss to central Illinois of a woman that the State Journal-Register called a ''trailblazer'' who opened the doors for women.

Josephine Oblinger died last Sunday day at St. John's hospital in Springfield, Illinois. At 85, she left behind a legacy of good works that will likely never be duplicated. Her son Carl said, ''She just did the good things that needed to be done,'' and described her as his ''confidant for life.''

Josephine was a native of Chicago. She attended the University of Detroit Law School, graduating in 1943 Magna Cum Laude. The significance of that accomplishment is lost on many of us today, who forget that there was a time when women were neither expected or even allowed in some cases to pursue a career in the law. In fact, her son Carl remind us that even though she was the class valedictorian, she was not allowed to speak at the graduating ceremony solely because she was a woman.

In addition to the law, she was a teacher. She also was elected as Sangamon County Clerk, as an outstanding state representative, and President of the Illinois Federation of Teachers. In her later years, she never shied away from continuing to help those in need.

Yet, despite all that she has accomplished and all that she did for so many of us in central Illinois, her proudest accomplishment was her beloved son Carl. Since it is true that our greatest legacy is our children and the kind of people they turn out to be, I can tell you that her son Carl has honored his mother and his father in immeasurable terms.

My prayers go out to Carl and Marge along with thought, Josephine Oblinger made a difference in our lives, and so do the two of you.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. RIGGS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. RIGGS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

AN APPEAL FOR FAIRNESS IN AIRLINE COMPETITION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. OBERSTAR) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, rarely, probably only one or two other times in my 24 year service in this House, have I taken the time of this body to address the House during special orders, but I do so today to express my utter astonishment over a multi-million dollar advertising campaign by the major airlines, designed to discredit a proposal by the Department of Transportation to stop unfair competitive practices against new low-fare airlines.

The ads seek to arouse public opinion by totally mischaracterizing the Department's proposal. Unfortunately, consumer organizations and new entrant carriers do not have the resources to respond by purchasing a comparable amount of advertising.

Typical of the airline campaign is the Brian Olson ad which shows a picture of a disappointed young man under the headline ''Vacation Canceled—Due to Government Regulation.''

The text of the ad says:

> Brian Olson was looking forward to the family vacation. With so many cheap air fares available, his family was planning the trip of a lifetime, but proposed Department of Transportation regulations could keep Brian home. That's bad news for Mrs. Olson.
>
> The DOT has proposed new regulations that will eliminate many discounted air fares and raise air fares for leisure travel in a misguided effort to re-regulate the airline industry.

The DOT proposal described in the ad bears flow resemblance to DOT's actual proposal. Quite frankly, if the issues were not so important, the ad is so ridiculous as to be laughable. The actual DOT proposal does not contemplate any general limitations on discounted air fares. The proposal is not designed to raise air fares, it is designed to produce lower air fares by protecting the new low-fare service against unfair competition, the purposes of which are to drive the low-fare carrier out of the market and then raise fares to their prior level. The purpose of the DOT regulation is to give the so-called Brian Olson and his family more opportunities for a vacation at affordable air fares, rather than fewer or higher costs.

The DOT proposal only covers those markets in which low-fare service first becomes available because a new low-fare carrier enters the market. The policy is designed to prevent the established carrier in any given market from trying to drive the new carrier out with unfair anticompetitive practices which are described in the proposed rule as follows: The established carrier matches the fare and substantially increases capacity to the point where the established carrier is losing money on the route at issue. This type of so-called ‘‘competition’’ makes economic sense only if the established carrier expects to drive the new carrier out of the market and then recover its losses by raising air fares.

The DOT proposed policy declares that this type of competitive response is an unfair competitive practice prohibited by 49 U.S. Code 41712.

I want to make it very clear that every carrier has a right to defend its market, its route or its hub. Carriers do not have a right to do so by unfair competitive practices in which they flood a market with unprofitable service.

My years of experience in support of deregulation lead me to conclude that DOT’s proposed guidelines are directed at a serious problem that has to be corrected if we are to continue to enjoy the low-fare benefits of airline deregulation.

Further, the law and the legislative history of deregulation are clear that DOT has the necessary authority to issue guidelines to deal with the problem and that the type of guideline DOT has proposed is not re-regulation, but it is consistent with the principles of airline deregulation.

Attorneys General from 29 states, including Republican Attorneys General from New York, Virginia, Wyoming, Arkansas and Kansas, agree. They have written in support of the DOT guidelines saying:

> The proposal of the Department of Transportation is not an attempt to re-regulate the airline industry. It does not propose to dictate routes or prices. It only sets out guidelines for interpreting an existing statute, and it does so in a rational way which seeks to prevent competitive strategies designed to destroy competition, rather than compete.

Predatory practices are not a theoretical problem. DOT investigations and Congressional hearings have uncovered a number of instances in which major airlines have adopted money-losing strategies to drive out new entrants who have instituted low-fare service.

For example, during the time when I was Chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, in 1993, Reno Air entered the Minneapolis-Reno market. Northwest Airlines, which had dropped out of this market in 1991, apparently decided that any new Minneapolis competition was intolerable. Northwest reinstituted Minneapolis-Reno service, matching Reno’s low fares and capacity, understandable, acceptable behavior up to that point.

□ 1700

Northwest went further. The carrier also announced that it would inaugurate new low-fare service in several other markets served by Reno Air, including Reno to Los Angeles, to Seattle and to San Diego.

The Department of Transportation began an investigation of Northwest’s actions with a view toward instituting an enforcement case. Result: Northwest moderated its response. But the change came too late. Northwest had achieved its objective of driving Reno Air out of Minneapolis. After Reno left, Northwest raised its lowest refundable daytime fare in the Minneapolis-Reno market from $136 to $454.

Northwest followed a similar strategy against Spirit Airlines. When Spirit began offering a single daily round trip of low-fare service between Detroit and Boston, Northwest matched Spirit’s fares on every coach seat on the 11 daily flights it operated. Northwest’s average fare was reduced from $259 to $100. After about half a year, Spirit was driven out of the market. When Spirit left the market, Northwest raised its fare to an average of $267, $12 higher than its previous number, just about.

My distinguished Republican colleague, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GANSKE) cited the following example in a letter to the Wall Street Journal: ‘‘Predatory pricing does exist and can be a successful strategy for a major carrier. In 1995, Vanguard Airlines entered the Des Moines market. In response, the major carriers lowered fares from Des Moines to Chicago to $79. After driving Vanguard out of the market, the major carrier is now charging $800 for a business class round trip. I dare say that not only has predatory pricing driven out the competitor, but at $800 per round trip, the major airline long ago made up its losses. For comparison, a round trip fare from Omaha to Chicago is about $200.’’

That major carrier was United Airlines, I might add.

DOD cites 4 additional examples, without naming the carriers involved, and I will cite 2 of those cases. An established carrier responded to new low-fare service in a market by increasing its service from 41,000 seats in a quarter to 55,000 seats. The number of seats the established carrier offered at low fares below $75 increased from 11,000 to 47,000. The new entrant was selling 9,000 low-fare seats a quarter. As a result of this dumping of capacity, the established carrier’s revenue dropped from $7.6 million a quarter to $3.9 million in that same period of time.

Second example: An established carrier responded to a new low-fare entrant by increasing the number of seats it offered in the market from 44,000 in a quarter to 67,000. The number of seats offered at a low fare of $50 to $75 was increased from 1,300 to 50,000. The established carrier’s revenues decreased from $9 million a quarter to $5.6 million. When the new entrant was driven out of the market, the established carrier reduced total capacity from 67,000 seats a quarter to 36,000 seats. Mr. Speaker, 15,000 of those seats were at a fare of over $325. The result: Total revenues went back to $9 million.

Mr. Speaker, it is not surprising that Northwest Airlines has been a leader in the practice of driving out new entrants by lowering fares and dumping excess capacity. Michael Levine, now Northwest executive vice president for marketing and international, is the same Michael Levine who 10 years ago, when he was a law professor, conducted an in-depth study of airline marketing strategies. Mr. Levine concluded after an extensive analysis that a strategy of predatory pricing practices was frequently employed by major airlines and was likely to be effective. Levine found,

> Economists committed to a high degree of airline market contestability have historically maintained that predation is doomed to failure and is therefore unlikely, because capital assets involved in airline production are mobile.

Continuing quote,

> This contestability analysis is unfortunately inconsistent with much observed behavior since deregulation. Many new entrant airlines such as People Express, for example, in Newark, Minneapolis; Muse Air on its routes to Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana, and other points out of Love Field and Hobby; Pacific Express in the Los Angeles-San Francisco market and others, have been pressed and helped out of business through aggressive pricing by incumbent rivals.

Continuing to quote,

> New entrants are very vulnerable, both to predation and to aggressive price competition between holdover incumbents and new entrants. If circumstances, including the financial condition of the new entrant, warrants, the incumbent can flood the market with low-price seats, withdrawing them almost invisibly at peak times or as competitive conditions allow. Economies of scope and perhaps of scale in these tactics allow large incumbents to use them more effectively than the smaller, newer airlines. The economies of scope are easily seen. An incumbent who uses such tactics a few times quickly develops a reputation for fierce response to entry. The smaller the route on which the predatory war takes place as a percentage of the total operations of the airlines, the more staying power the airline will have as cash is lost in operations which do not cover incremental costs. In effect, the airline lends itself money out of accounting reserves to fight a war which drains cash. If the new entrant cannot find a source of capital which will accept the information that the temporary losses are a worthwhile investment, it will not be able to sustain losses for as long a time as will the large scale incumbent.

Source: Airline Competition, Competition in Deregulated Markets of the Yale Journal on Regulation, Spring, 1987.

Well, Mr. Levine followed this blueprint to a tee when he became executive in charge of pricing and marketing for Northwest Airlines. The benefits of service by low-fare carriers go far beyond the service they provided to their passengers. When a low-fare carrier is successful, major carriers are forced to reduce their fares and their passengers also benefit. The savings to travelers are truly astonishing.

A DOT analysis concluded that for the year 1995, low-fare competition saved more than 100 million travelers a total of $6.3 billion in air fares. DOT studies also show that many passengers and markets which are not served by low fare carriers do not receive the full benefits of deregulation. DOT studied fares in all markets under 750 miles and found that in markets served by low-fare carriers, fares had decreased by 41 percent, adjusted for inflation, since deregulation in 1978. But, for those markets not served by low-fare carriers, fares had increased by 23 percent, adjusted for inflation.

The DOT study showed that average fares in markets served by low-fare carriers were $70 to $90 lower than average fares in other markets. It is very instructive that the higher fares prevailed in all markets not served by low-fare carriers. Fares were high even in markets in which established carriers competed.

Conclusion: It is the low-fare carriers, not the major carriers, who drive prices down and benefit consumers.

DOT has given some specific examples of fare disparities related to whether a market is served by a low-fare carrier. For example, Chicago-Cincinnati, where United competes with a major carrier, Delta. The average fare is $259. In Chicago-Louisville, a market of comparable distance where United competes with a low-fare carrier, Southwest, the average fare is $72. And there are many more such case example studies.

It is clear that the traveling public has a lot to lose if low-fare carriers are driven out of the marketplace by unfair competitive practices.

In competing with established carriers, low-fare carriers face obstacles beyond price-cutting and capacity-dumping. Established carriers control slots, gates, and computer reservation systems which are essential to effective competition. Established carriers can also use frequent flyer programs and travel commission overrides as competitive weapons. I know of a number of cases in which major airlines offer extra frequent flyer miles and give travel agents added commissions for flights in markets in which the major carrier was faced with low fare competition.

Even more disturbing are recent trends toward industry concentration. As the number of established carriers is reduced, the surviving carriers will become even more formidable, new threats to new entrants. Furthermore, the reduction in the number of established carriers means less competition within this group, and that means that the need for competition from low-fare carriers will become even greater. When markets are controlled by established carriers, the tendency is for the carrier simply to follow each other's fare changes, with the result that fares are identical and passenger choice is limited.

Since the early 1980s, there has been a long-term trend toward industry concentration. In the past few months, there have been some proposals which threaten to escalate the process dramatically to the disadvantage of air travelers. During the 20 years of airline deregulation, competition was reduced by a wave of mergers in the late 1980s, and by the bankruptcies of many established carriers and new entrants. Although a few small carriers who started operation in the post-deregulation era have survived, the new competition does not come close to offsetting the loss of competition caused by mergers and bankruptcies.

Very recently there has been an even greater threat to competition: Global-straddling alliances. In the past few months, proposals have surfaced for alliances between Northwest, with 9 percent of the domestic market, and Continental, 8 percent of the market; between American, 17 percent of the domestic market, and USAirways, 8 percent; and between United Airlines, 17 percent of domestic market, and Delta, with 18 percent, although it now appears that this latter proposal may not be able to proceed because they do not seem to be able to come to agreement on a code share alliance, for the time being. In addition, there is an alliance already in place between America West with 4 percent of the domestic market and Continental at 8 percent.

If, as some have suggested, alliances are the equivalent of mergers, these recent proposals indicate a very disturbing trend toward an aviation sector worldwide consisting of 3 major carriers, which Secretary of Transportation Sam Skinner warned us about in the early 1990s during hearings that I chaired at that time. The General Accounting Office found that if all of the 3 alliances proposed a few months ago were implemented, competition could be reduced for about 100 million passengers a year.

Alliances between major carriers pose an especially serious threat to competition because many of these carriers are already in alliances with major foreign airlines, such as Northwest-KLM, United-Lufthansa-SAS-Air Canada, and Delta-Swiss Air-Sabena-Austrian-Virgin. America is now trying to develop alliances with British Air, TACA, Canadian, Quantas and Japan Airlines. Big powerful global-straddling carrier alliances, reducing competition and increasing fares for air travelers.

These alliances have enormous market power. They control slots at the major slot constrained airports of the world: O'Hare, Heathrow and Narita. They operate in countries with which we have restrictive bilaterals that limit competition: our bilaterals with the United Kingdom and Japan. They control the major computer reservation systems through which most airline travel is marketed. They control major networks of domestic feeder airlines and some new entrants.

Experience has shown that when a U.S. carrier enters an alliance with a foreign carrier, other U.S. carriers limit or terminate their service to the foreign carrier's home market. If major U.S. carriers are added to these already imposing alliances, there will be an irrevocable change in worldwide airline competition.

□ 1715

The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure has reported legislation to give the Department of Transportation an opportunity to review the proposed alliances between major carriers before they are implemented, very important legislation.

As Robert Crandall, former chairman and CEO of American Airlines said shortly before he retired, ''The Department can promote competition by preventing any further concentration in the domestic industry, and by undoing the collusive alliances it has created in the international marketplace. Doing so will offer the consumers more choices than they have today.''

Regardless of whether our committee's alliance legislation passes, the trend toward new alliances makes it even more important that DOT ensure that new entrants are not driven out of the business by unfair competitive practices.

The major airlines have tried to damn the DOT proposal by labeling it with the pejorative term ''reregulation.'' This is a gross mischaracterization. DOT is not proposing to add any new regulatory requirements. DOT is only implementing its statutory responsibility which predates the Deregulation Act of 1978 to prevent unfair competitive practices.

To understand what ''reregulation'' means, we first need to understand the meaning of ''deregulation.'' Before 1978, the airlines were fully regulated. They needed authority from the Civil Aeronautics Board to change the cities they served and the fares they charged.

In 1978, this regulatory regime was ended by the Airline Deregulation Act, which gave airlines the same freedom as other industries to establish their service and their fares. But deregulation did not mean that there would be no limits on airlines' business decisions. All American business is subject to controls to ensure that their products are safe and that consumers are not deceived among other protections.

Some of these controls affect pricing decisions. For example, under the antitrust laws, no American business is free to set its prices by an agreement with its competitors. All businesses in

America are prohibited from pricing practices which constitute unfair competitive practices violating the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws.

This prohibition is found in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, governing industry generally, and in former Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act, which is now 49 U.S.C. 41712, which applies specifically to airlines.

Since 1938 airlines have been exempt from Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and subject to a provision specifically prohibiting unfair competitive practices by airlines administered by CAB's predecessor, and then by CAB, and since 1985, by DOT. This is the prohibition on which DOT's guidelines are based, historically established in law for the benefit and protection of air travelers.

Congress has made it absolutely clear that we expect the U.S. Department of Transportation to prohibit unfair competitive practices by airlines. In 1984 when we passed legislation terminating the Civil Aeronautics Board and giving its remaining responsibilities to the U.S. Department of Transportation, we explained that, ''There is also a strong need to preserve the Board's authority under Section 411 to ensure fair competition in air transportation. Again, this is the same authority which the Federal Trade Commission exercises over other industries under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Although the airline industry has been deregulated, this does not mean that there are no limits to competitive practices. As in the case with all industry, carriers must not engage in practices which would destroy the framework under which fair competition operates.

Air carriers are prohibited, as are firms in other industries, from practices which are inconsistent with the antitrust laws or the somewhat broader prohibitions of Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act (corresponding to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act) against unfair competitive practices. Source, House Committee Report on CAB Sunset Act, H.R. 98–793, 98th Congress, Second Session.

I cite this to be perfectly precisely clear about the legal basis for the authority that the DOT seeks now to exercise.

The principal architect of deregulation, Dr. Alfred Kahn, has confirmed that the DOT proposal is not reregulation. Dr. Kahn said:

> The entry of these new low-fare carriers keeps the industry honest. I'm a strong advocate of competition and I don't want to go back to regulation. But you've got to distinguish legitimate competition from what is intended to drive competitors out and exploit consumers.

That is Alfred Kahn, as quoted in USA Today, April 6, 1998.

Dr. Kahn further says, ''When I hear 'vigorous competitive' responses to describe a situation in which, within a space of a year, fares started at $260, went down to $100 in two quarters, and then back up to $270, I want to retch,'' said Dr. Kahn in the hearing on Aviation Competition of the Subcommittee on Aviation, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, April 23, 1998.

Strong language from a man who knows what ''deregulation'' means and what ''fair competition'' is.

Two other issues need to be clarified. First, the prohibition against unfair competitive practices is related to but is broader than the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. As the court ruled in United Airlines against CAB, 766 F.2nd 1107, 7th Circuit, 1985, ''We know from many decisions under both this section, (Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act prohibiting unfair competitive practices),'' and its progenitor, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ''that the Board can forbid anticompetitive practices before they become serious enough to violate the Sherman Act.''

Secondly, DOT has authority to issue general rules determining that specific practices constitute unfair competitive practices. DOT is not limited to enforcing the prohibition against unfair practices through a case-by-case determination.

This was the issue in the 7th Circuit Court case of United Airlines against CAB, in which United Airlines challenged the CAB's authority to issue rules determining that various practices in the operation of computer reservation systems would be unfair competitive practices.

After analyzing the background of the reenactment of Section 411 in 1984, the court concluded,

> Congress, looking forward to the period after abolition of the Board, was very concerned to preserve in the Department of Transportation authority to enforce Section 411 . . . It is too late to inquire whether, as an original matter of interpretation of Sections 204(a) and 411, rulemaking can be used to prevent unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition. To hold that it cannot be so used would pull the rug out from under Congress's restructuring of airline regulation.

Wise words rightly said by the court.

There have been some proposals for legislation to stop the DOT rulemaking. I am pleased that the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure has rejected these proposals, and instead has reported legislation to ensure that the final guidelines will include a full analysis of relevant issues, and that Congress will have an opportunity to legislate before final guidelines become effective.

I agreed to this legislation as a compromise, making it clear that my support should not be construed as indicating doubts about DOT's proposal, but rather, as a means of moving the issue forward. The Secretary of Transportation has pledged to give serious open-minded consideration to all comments filed, and I am confident that final guidelines will reflect any legitimate problems which may be raised.

I believe the basic approach proposed by DOT is sound. It is inconsistent with deregulation for established airlines to respond to low fare competition by adopting pricing and scheduling policies which lose money, and then when the new entrant leaves the market, raising fares to prior levels.

I respect the rights of established airlines to oppose the DOT proposal, but I urge them to contest the proposal by responding to the real issue with real case studies and honest facts, rather than using their fictitious strawman claim of ''reregulation'' in their rush to ban all low-fare service.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Ms. KILPATRICK (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today after 3:30 p.m. on account of official business.

Ms. HARMAN (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today on account of illness in the family.

Mr. MARTINEZ (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today on account of personal business.

Mr. PITTS (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today after 1:00 p.m. on account of his son's wedding.

Mr. CALLAHAN (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for September 26 through October 2 on account of personal reasons associated with Hurricane Georges.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. OBERSTAR) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. CONYERS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SKAGGS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. NORTON, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WELLER) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. SCARBOROUGH, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. WELLER, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SHIMKUS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. RIGGS, for 5 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. OBERSTAR) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. HAMILTON in two instances.

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi.

Ms. DELAURO.

Mr. STARK.

Mr. TOWNS in two instances.

Mr. BENTSEN.

Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts.

Mr. MILLER of California.