

widen steadily so that by the year 2007 there would be a \$26 billion shortfall in that year alone."

Those are very sobering statistics. Unfortunately, I think they are very accurate. I have long been very concerned that we in the Congress and the public have this sort of false sense of security that because every year I get my Medicare benefits and I still get the coverage I need, there really is not a problem; that the people who are talking about a problem are sort of like Chicken Little who ran around the country saying, "The sky is falling. The sky is falling." It never fell, and they didn't believe Chicken Little any longer. I think people don't believe Congress anymore. If you look at the headlines I talked about, I think they miss the point about Medicare which is much more immediate. It is around the corner, good news and bad news. Good news that Social Security is in pretty decent shape. We made 3 more years extra out of the program. But the bad news and the very legitimate concern we should have is that Medicare is predicted to go insolvent even earlier than before, 2 years earlier than we had previously predicted.

So I hope that more people will take a look at the trustees' report. It is a good report. It is a sobering report and one that every American, whether they are on Medicare or whether their parents are on Medicare or their grandparents are on Medicare, should take a look at and know that there must be a growing awareness among all people in our country that if we are going to continue to have the greatest system of health care for America's seniors, we have to start making decisions now and recommendations now if we are going to prevent what this report says is going to happen in the not too distant future.

The trustees' report noted—I will conclude with this:

More far-reaching measures will be needed to prevent the trust fund's depletion as the baby boom generation starts reaching age 65 and starts receiving their benefits. . . . In this regard, the work of the Bipartisan Commission will be of critical importance to the Administration, the Congress and the American public.

I could not agree more. I commend this very sobering report to all Americans, because it, indeed, is a wake-up call as to what this Congress needs to be seriously considering in the very short period of time we have left.

I yield the floor.

#### PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be laid aside.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2317

(Purpose: To establish a formal process within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the resolution of disputes among members and between members and non-members)

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Texas [Mrs. HUTCHISON] proposes an executive amendment numbered 2317.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in the resolution, insert the following:

#### NEGOTIATION WITH ALLIES REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROCESS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG OR BETWEEN ALLIES.

(A) Prior to the first deposit of any of the United States instruments of ratification of any of the Protocols, the United States representative at the North Atlantic Council will introduce at the NAC a proposal for consideration by all allies and aimed at establishing a process for dispute resolution among allies. The proposal shall be limited to addressing those disputes—

(i) between or among allies that are within the collective security purview of the NATO alliance and address territorial or other such disputes within the alliance's area of operations and responsibility, and;

(ii) in response to which at least one disputant has credibly threatened the use of military force.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, my amendment is very simple. It requires the U.S. Representative to NATO to make a proposal to our allies regarding the resolution of disputes that fall short of article V conflicts.

Before discussing what my amendment does, I would like to say what it does not do. It does not require that NATO adopt a dispute resolution process, although I think it should. It does not tell the President what his ambassador to NATO should propose, although I hope the administration will take the opportunity to provide meaningful leadership in this area. It does not treat new members of NATO any differently from current members. In fact, that is the premise of the amendment, that there be a dispute resolution process that applies to all members, current and prospective, so there are no surprises should a dispute arise.

I think it would show strong leadership to anticipate that there might be disputes in Europe where we have seen disputes of varying kinds over the course of history. But to have a dispute resolution process that is not looking at two particular countries and individual personalities, but rather to have a dispute resolution process so everyone knows what the ground rules are and everyone would comply with those,

having had a say in the way they are drawn up.

Why is this needed? Simply put, because the history of the 20th century demonstrates clearly that great conflicts can arise from small disputes. If we are going to expand NATO to include an ever-growing number of new countries, it is simply folly to pretend that no such disputes will ever occur within the alliance, or that they would not affect the alliance in its ability to stay together.

According to the Congressional Research Service assessment of a number of sources, there are at least 11 ongoing disputes in Europe that have a moderate or high potential for violence or escalation. Some of those are listed behind me.

For example, three involve Albania. While Albania is not being considered for membership in NATO today, many have said that it should be considered in the next wave of new members. So I think if we set something in place now, we are not saying that it would apply just to Albania; we are not making it personal. But what we are saying is "let's recognize the obvious. NATO currently has no process to peacefully resolve disputes, which will only grow in number as the alliance enlarges." We have had a conflict involving Greece and Turkey for most of the history of the alliance.

Opponents to my amendment would say that this proves that we don't need a dispute resolution process, because we can handle future conflicts the way we have handled the Greece-Turkey conflict. Mr. President, we have not handled the Greece-Turkey conflict. We have avoided handling it. In 1974, these two supposed NATO allies almost went to war over the island of Cyprus. That conflict continues today. Each country regularly threatens the other with war over sea and airspace violations, weapons proliferation, and the treatment of each other's compatriots in Cyprus.

If the best that my opponents can say of my amendment is to point to Greece and Turkey as proof that we don't need it, then there really can be no opposition to it at all. The fact is, the cold war imposed a discipline on the alliance that probably did keep such conflicts in check. That discipline is no longer in place. If we do not at least discuss a process by which NATO can peaceably resolve disputes, then the alliance will lose credibility as we turn a blind eye to a growing number of disputes similar to that of Greece and Turkey. Such a process might even have ended that conflict, permitting both of those countries to move on and focus on their own strengths and their own economies.

In a letter to the President last summer, I joined with nearly two dozen Senate colleagues to raise this and a number of other questions regarding NATO enlargement. We asked the President about the importance of border-dispute resolutions and should we

not be anticipating this so we could resolve them, not in the heat of a dispute, but in a vacuum of such disputes so we would be able to go forward in an objective way.

In his response to us, the President said, in effect, that NATO doesn't need a dispute resolution process because the European countries have themselves established a number of bilateral treaties regarding their borders. But we are changing the makeup of NATO. We can certainly anticipate what more members—many with long-standing disputes, ethnic disputes, border disputes—will do to the alliance. We must go in with our eyes wide open and prepare for some potential escalation of conflicts or new conflicts to arise as we add new and diverse members.

My amendment simply requires that before NATO expansion goes into effect, the U.S. Representative at NATO should open discussion about dispute resolution. My amendment restricts the issues that should be considered in such a proposal, and it certainly restricts it to territorial and security matters so as not to permit an agricultural crisis, for example, to trigger a NATO process.

My amendment further requires that any U.S. proposal be aimed at disputes in which at least one of the parties has threatened the use of military force. That is it. There is no reason to be concerned that this proposal is going to do something drastic. It is not directing any outcome, but it is saying we must raise this question. Let's talk about it when there is not the heat of a crisis.

Opponents to it, though, say that it will dilute U.S. influence in NATO. How could U.S. leadership be weakened by our representative in NATO raising a topic that the European countries themselves believe is so important that they have signed 12 treaties on the matter already? It is because of our leadership in NATO that this could happen in a way that I think would provide stability in the alliance, and I don't know why it would even be resisted.

Why would we be thinking of adding new members to this alliance if we didn't have enough confidence in our leadership to know that we could open for discussion such an issue and that it would be good for everyone to address? It seems to me that the argument about U.S. leadership being diluted is much more relevant to the question of whether there should be new members, rather than whether all members should acknowledge their potential border problems.

I have had conversations with foreign ministers and ambassadors from each of the three prospective NATO members. They have told me that as long as any dispute resolution process applies to all members evenly, then they support the idea.

I also spoke with former U.S. representatives to NATO and to other European capitals. They, too, have told me that NATO should discuss this mat-

ter. Former NATO Ambassador Bob Hunter has said that he thought this was a positive approach. President Reagan's Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Jack Matlock, said—and he is, I would say, a leading authority on European security—that, "NATO has no policy on how to deal with ethnic unrest, and they need it badly." This is a quote directly from Ambassador Matlock, who is a seasoned and career diplomat.

(Ms. COLLINS assumed the Chair.)

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Yesterday, we adopted an amendment that could be interpreted to endorse NATO's role in responding to ethnic or religious disputes. If it is legitimate that NATO be involved in ethnic or religious disputes, why would it not be equally legitimate that NATO discuss a process to avoid or resolve such disputes?

My amendment would initiate that discussion. I had much stronger language in an earlier amendment that I was considering, but I have talked to many Members of the other side, I have talked to many Ambassadors and people who have dealt with the security of Europe for a longer time than I have, and they felt that it was too strong to give directions. So I have pulled back that language. But I think to open the discussion, to open our eyes to the fact that any time we add members to an alliance, we should certainly expect that there would then be more potential for disagreements, I think that will be a responsible approach to our responsibility in the Senate.

I hope my colleagues will accept this amendment. It is one of the amendments that I think would strengthen the responsible role we play, it would strengthen U.S. leadership, and, most of all, Madam President, it would strengthen the NATO alliance to anticipate problems and have a process by which we could address them. What could be more responsible and more reasonable than that?

I do hope we can adopt this amendment. It will be one of the amendments that I think would help me be able to vote in good conscience for this resolution that is before us today.

Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that with respect to the Moynihan amendment regarding the EU, the Senate proceed to that amendment at 12 noon on Thursday and there be 1 hour for debate equally divided; that following the conclusion or yielding back of time, the amendment be laid aside and Sen-

ator WARNER be recognized to offer an amendment relating to a 3-year pause on which there will be 2 hours for debate equally divided; that following the conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to a vote on, or in relation to, the Moynihan amendment, to be followed by a vote on, or in relation to, the Warner amendment, following 2 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form prior to each vote.

Madam President, I point out that this has the consent of the Democratic leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2317

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, while my colleague from the Democratic side is getting prepared to respond to the Hutchison amendment, I will simply say that it is painful to me to not be on her side of an issue. I am one of Senator HUTCHISON's greatest fans, but I simply must oppose her amendment simply because NATO has for so long been a place where contending European countries have come together in a common purpose and not pursuing national agendas for their common defense. There are many places, many forums, in which dispute resolutions currently take place, and to turn NATO into something that is no longer a place for common defense but a place for nationalistic resolution I think would do a grave disservice, even an undoing of NATO, and dissipate its strength.

I plead with my colleagues, as appealing as this amendment sounds on the surface, I think it would be very hurtful to the future of Europe. I point out that whether or not you can point to Greece and Turkey, I suggest that NATO membership of those two countries has caused them not to come to greater blows in the recent past and I hope will yet be an influence for them not to come to blows in the future.

I think, clearly, NATO has served a historic purpose, in its informal way, of contributing to Prussian-French rapprochement and healing. The same can be said as between Britain and Spain, between Spain and Portugal. Many of the boundary disputes that have raged in Europe for centuries have begun to dissipate, in large part, because of NATO and because it brings all of these countries together in a common purpose and for the good of all of Europe.

Madam President, I thank you for the time and yield the floor to my colleague.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield for a colloquy?

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I will.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I wonder if the Senator from Oregon is aware that all we are doing is asking our NATO Ambassador to bring this up for discussion.

Isn't it a responsible thing to at least bring it up, start talking about what

would be in a border dispute resolution? And then if there was not a consensus, of course, it could be rejected. What could be wrong with just asking that it be brought up for discussion among our allies?

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. To my friend from Texas, I do not suppose in the abstract there is anything wrong with anything being discussed in NATO. But I would simply fear that we are changing its complexion, turning its focus away from a collective alliance for security and into a place for dispute resolutions.

I think, those European countries, as I have discussed this issue with them, they have said to me, well, this is the place we come together, not the place where we come to divide again. And I think they would quickly say, let us leave this to the United Nations, let us leave this to the European Union, let us leave it to other bodies where these kinds of resolutions can be sought.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I just say to my friend from Oregon, we left Bosnia to the United Nations. My friend from Oregon, we left Bosnia to the United Nations. If we had the ability to have something in place by which we could have had a process long before Dayton to discuss these issues and perhaps bring them to the table together for a resolution, I do not think we would be in a potentially unending commitment in Bosnia.

I just ask if a border dispute resolution process would not be part of collective security, if it would not help us prevent conflict rather than always reacting when things are already exploding before our eyes?

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. It is a point to be debated. I think it would be duplicative at best and at worst could be very harmful to the unity that NATO by its dynamics currently creates.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. BIDEN. I find myself once again in an uncomfortable position. I admire and like my friend from Texas. And maybe she is not, but I am looking for something to agree with her on, but this is not the one.

She has been, as she always is, persistent and effective in making her case. She and I have been sort of at this dispute about dispute resolutions privately and also in our official capacity of attending the observer group meetings. And so here it is on the floor.

I just rise today to strongly oppose the amendment because its prescription, I think, is both unnecessary for NATO as an organization and, quite frankly, harmful—harmful—to continued U.S. leadership to the alliance. Let me explain what I mean by that. And none of this will come as any surprise to my friend. I do not expect to change her mind at all, but I do want to make the case why I think this is a bad idea.

It is unnecessary because the North Atlantic Council, which is now known

as the NAC, the principal political organ of NATO, is by its very nature already a dispute resolution mechanism. That is the place we make decisions in NATO. All actions in the NAC—all of them—are taken by consensus, which comes, in almost every circumstance, after very lengthy formal and informal discussions among the 16 nations who are members of the NAC.

For example, all delegations to NATO are housed in the same headquarters building in Brussels. Every working day there is a wide variety of meetings among delegates and member countries. Some are briefings; some are informal group meetings; and some are one-on-ones. Every Tuesday, NATO ambassadors or so-called perm representatives meet in an informal luncheon, which is strictly an off-the-record luncheon. A lot is resolved there as well. The purpose of these luncheons is to work out tough questions out of the glare of the press and publicity and to be able to be brutally candid with one another.

In addition, the North Atlantic Council holds a weekly formal meeting which is on the record. By that time, issues in dispute, in almost every circumstance, have already been settled. As the alliance grew from 12 in 1949 to 16 in 1982, it has expanded its areas of common endeavor rather than retreated due to the inability of each to reach consensus decisions. Even during the divisive Bosnia debate, which has been referenced here, when one ally favored the Serb position and another the Muslim, the alliance still agreed to the largest historic commitment leading to the Dayton peace implementation force.

This amendment notes that the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide for a dispute resolution process by which members can resolve differences among themselves. As true as that statement is, it is also equally irrelevant. NATO has a remarkably good track record in resolving disputes among its members, or at least in preventing them from escalating into open conflict.

In fact, I think we ought to declare it the sense of the Congress that NATO is to be congratulated for having aided immeasurably in helping two of its members, France and Germany, to resolve their age-old antagonisms that caused two world wars in this century alone. That did not need a formal dispute mechanism. That was a consequence of the way the NATO negotiations take place now among its members.

I think it should be the sense of the Congress that NATO is to be congratulated, notwithstanding the comments of my friend from Texas, for having prevented two members, Greece and Turkey, from going to war on more than one occasion.

I am told my friend has indicated that that may have been the case in

the past, but no longer. The truth of the matter is, NATO is still deeply involved in preventing the disagreement over Cyprus and the Aegean, certain islands, the transfer of weapons. It is the real place where most of the resolution takes place, because those Greek generals and those Turkish generals and the Greek perm representative and the Turk perm representative, they pass each other in the corridor every day. They meet every day. They probably talk every day.

More recently, we ought to congratulate NATO for having integrated Germany so well with its neighbors so that the rest of Europe is now comfortable with a larger united Germany. Up until 12 years ago, there were as many people in the West as the East who were concerned about a united Germany. There was as much talk among parliamentarians in the East as the West about a united Germany—not a prospect in 1948, 1955, 1965, 1975, and I would argue even 1985 that anyone was rushing to embrace on the continent.

Why did it go off so smoothly? NATO. NATO. More importantly, we ought to congratulate NATO, under American leadership, for having resolved all these disputes while assembling the most awesome defensive military alliance in history, one that no foe has dared to attack for 49 years.

The only change to the NAC as a result of the enlargement that is about to take place with the addition of three new countries, the only change will be the addition of their three perm representatives, of their generals, of their people in the same building at the same meetings interfacing on the same questions.

Some may worry that they will carry their own hostilities with neighbors into the NAC. I would argue that not only is that not likely to happen, if past is prologue, they have put away those hostilities in order to be able to get into NATO.

NATO—just the prospect of membership to NATO has caused each of those countries, in varying degrees with varying degrees of disputes outstanding, to settle those border disputes, to settle those ethnic rivalries. I mentioned half a dozen times on the floor I doubt whether anyone on this floor would have predicted 2 years ago, let alone 20 years ago, that Romania would be accommodating a Hungarian minority or that Poland would have settled all of its border disputes.

A President whom I personally admire and politically disagreed with but my friend from Texas, I expect, politically and personally admired, Ronald Reagan, used to say, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." This "ain't" broke. Trying to fix something that "ain't" broke is likely to damage it, in my opinion.

Each of the three candidate countries has recently concluded a bilateral agreement with its neighbors resolving any outstanding issues that may lead

to conflict, Poland with Germany, Poland with Ukraine, Poland with Lithuania, Hungary with Slovakia, Hungary with Slovenia, Hungary with Romania, the Czech Republic with Germany, and now that they will be sitting at the same table, making the same profound decisions, dealing with the same issues, again, if past is prologue, there is little to no possibility that concerns of my friend are likely to come to fruition.

Maybe most importantly, in my view, it would be extremely hard for the U.S. leadership of the alliance to create a binding dispute resolution mechanism separate from the NAC, because that would mean relinquishing what I thought was of concern to my friend from Texas, as well as my friend from Virginia and my friend from New Hampshire, and all those who oppose enlargement.

What do they keep talking about? We are basically going to get ourselves entangled with more people. We will get involved in a more unwieldy operation. We are going to be in a position where actions are taken. The mere action of bringing them in will negatively impact their relationships with Russia. This is going to cause friction within Europe because now some countries are left out and some countries are left in, and it goes on and on and on. I respect their concerns.

But if you have those concerns, why would you now want to change the organization of which we are a member, where we can now veto anything NATO wants to do—anyone, anything. All we have to do in the NAC is say, "Sorry, no; we vote no, no," and it is done, finished, over. We lead the alliance.

Now I admit, we lead the alliance as a consequence of the size of our military, the nature of our equipment, our command and control, and our phenomenal economic power. I acknowledge that. But we politically lead the alliance, as well, not only for those reasons but because we have the ability to stop anything we want.

Now, I ask my friends in this body, why would we, a noncontinental power who is, in fact, a European power, why do we want now to sign up as we enlarge NATO—and I respectfully predict that we are going to enlarge NATO. The vote will be overwhelming. We will enlarge NATO, in my humble opinion. Now, why are we now going to say, look, we are going to have a new mechanism, a new mechanism, the equivalent of unilaterally giving up our most potent weapon politically; that is, this new mechanism will say, hey, you know, if most of the European countries want to do something we think is foolhardy and against our interests, we have to submit to a binding resolution. And if, in fact, the binding resolution results in a decision different from the one we have taken, then we have one of two choices. We either go along and consider it to be bad policy or we leave NATO—as I understand the resolution.

I think this would be the political equivalent to unilateral disarmament,

robbing ourselves of the final protection against any mischief, should it arise. I think this would inevitably erode American support for NATO itself as it comes to be perceived as a forum where America does not lead but where America's influence has been self-restrained.

Sandy Vershbow, our current U.S. Ambassador to NATO, recognizing this threat, called me from Brussels a couple weeks ago to express his strong opposition and fervent prayer, wanting me to assure him—which I could not do—don't worry, this will not pass. He thinks, our present Ambassador to NATO, any such mechanism would be totally counterproductive to American interests in NATO.

In remarks on this floor last month, the Senator from Texas likened her NATO dispute resolution mechanism to the National Labor Relations Board. Mr. President, NATO is not the NLRB. I know she didn't mean it is. She was making a comparison of how the mechanism would function. But NATO is an alliance that has protected the free world for 49 years. It has worked well the way it is presently constructed. The United States is a leader of that alliance, and it would be totally irrational, in my view, to squander that leadership by tampering with the North Atlantic Council.

We heard yesterday from Senator KYL, and from me, mainly from Senator KYL, about the strategic doctrine of NATO and what it would be in the future and what we were insisting on in this body. We can insist all we want. We can instruct the President to vote any way, tell our NATO Ambassador to vote any way he wanted, and if, in fact, we are outvoted, it wouldn't matter, like it does now. We vote no now, it ends—done, finished, over, no action. But if we submit to binding arbitration, what we say in this floor is diluted. So this also, in my view, dilutes our power, our responsibility as the body that is given the constitutional responsibility to, as was stated by Professor Corwin in another context, to struggle for the right to conduct American foreign policy.

I say to my friends who are worried about dispute resolutions and border disputes, right now I see my friend from Virginia is on the floor again. Amazing how we attract one another to the floor these days. My friend from Virginia, who knows a lot about NATO and the Armed Services Committee, has expressed concern about what NATO may get involved in in the future. I think he would be strongly opposed to this because right now if NATO countries decided to get involved in a border dispute in Europe that we did not want to be involved in, under this operation being suggested, we would have to go or leave NATO. We would not be given a choice. If we lose in binding arbitration, we participate in an operation we disagree with or practically leave NATO. That is a practical matter. The Senator knows he can only work by consensus.

I realize this is extremely well-intended, but I used to go to a Catholic grade school, as well as a Catholic high school, but the distinction was in the Catholic grade school the nuns taught me. I know this will come as a shock to all my colleagues. Occasionally, I would be kept after school for disciplinary reasons, and it wasn't because I spoke too much then, because I used to stutter very badly so I hardly spoke at all. Maybe that is why I speak as much now.

All kidding aside, I used to have to stay after school. I say to my friend from California, if you were a bad boy or a bad girl, in fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth grade, you would have to write something on the board 500 times.

And the one that I used to have to write the most, that Sister Michael Mary would most often choose for me to write—God rest her soul, as my mother would say—particularly because she would say I always had some rational excuses as to why I did what I did, she always used to make me write the following phrase 500 times on the blackboard: "The road to hell is paved with good intentions."

Well, this will not take us to hell, but this is a road to disaster that is paved with very good intentions. It is unnecessary, it is counterproductive.

One other thing. While I was off the floor temporarily, I am told by staff that the distinguished Senator from Texas said that when we had a meeting with the foreign ministers—"we" being Senator ROTH, Senator BIDEN, the Senator from Texas, and I don't know how many other Senators attended that meeting right downstairs in the room of the Appropriations Committee, their Capitol meeting room. We met with them at length, all of them that were here. The distinguished Senator asked them whether or not they thought a dispute resolution mechanism was a worthwhile thing. They all said yes, initially. And I said, "Please, will everybody hold up for just a moment." I said, "Let me explain to you"—and I ask the Senator, if she disagrees with the explanation, to say so—"what my distinguished friend from Texas means. That is a resolution mechanism, different than the NAC, that would be binding arbitration. Do you still agree?" Every single one of them said, "No; we do not agree." They said that with all of us present.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, on that point, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to.

Mr. WARNER. Essentially, all the distinguished Senator from Texas is asking is that we lay down the proposal, and if the NAC repeats the position that you just recited, that is the end of the purpose of the amendment. Therefore, I am wondering why we would preclude a simple act of a proposal being put before the NAC by the U.S. representative, not instructing the NAC as to what to do but simply to say, take it into consideration. It is a very simple, straightforward amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator pardon me for a moment to ask my staff a question?

Mr. WARNER. Sure.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I say to my friend that, to be honest with you, initially I was under the impression that this was to provide for this dispute resolution mechanism.

Mr. WARNER. I have clarified that point.

Mr. BIDEN. You have. Secondly, I was reminded by my staff that our present NATO Ambassador called me personally, and maybe others, asking that he not be put into a position of even having to introduce it, because he thought it was such a serious mistake to even raise that specter.

Now, it seems to me that if I were a member of the NAC presently, if I were France, I might like this dispute resolution mechanism. They have been trying very hard to take over your fleet, without supplying a ship. They have been trying very hard to take titular leadership of NATO—I will get a lot of letters on this. I see Senator ROTH's senior staff saying: There he goes again with the French.

Mr. WARNER. He is a Francophile of some stature.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes, and I am a quarter French heritage.

But my point is this. I think it is dangerous to even introduce this into the NAC. Why would we possibly say to anyone in NATO, now, that we want you to consider us being able to give up our right to dictate the outcome of any decision made by NATO that is in a positive sense? Why would we even want to do that? That would be a question to my friend from Virginia, other than responding to my other colleague. Why would we want to do that?

Mr. WARNER. First, I want to add a fact. I consulted with the distinguished Senator from Texas, and she said that she, in turn, has consulted with Ambassador Hunter, who preceded the Ambassador you just referred to, the incumbent—and, by the way, the incumbent, we all know, was associated with the Senate and was a staffer at one time. He has risen through the ranks and has now gotten due recognition and was given that very important post. He carries with him an extraordinary corporate knowledge of this institution and the general subject of NATO. So I think the appointment is a good one.

But Ambassador Hunter gave some technical advice in the preparation of the amendment. I read the language in paragraph 1 down there, "between and among allies . . ." and so on. I sought clarification of one or two words, and I was advised Ambassador Hunter was the source of some of that language. I am not suggesting that Hunter said this is the right thing to do, but at least he gave some technical advice.

The amendment is so straightforward. It simply says we will take—and many of us have grave concerns about the missions of NATO as they are now being formulated—and they, regrettably, will not be made known until a year hence, at the very time we

are asked to vote. I have dwelled on that point and will continue tomorrow.

The point is that I think the Senator is entitled to ask for the support of her colleagues, not to simply table it. If the NAC turns it down, so be it, because as this new definition of missions comes out, there could well be provisions—and I will not prejudge it—that deal with the ever-increasing number of ethnic, religious, and border disputes. Speaking for myself, I want NATO's participation, at the very minimum, in trying to resolve certainly by force of arms. So this seeks to have maybe some tribunal within NAC that listens to the parties and hears them out.

Madam President, as the wise Senator from Delaware knows, Greece and Turkey have had some very fundamental disagreements for many years. As a matter of fact, one person whom I respect, with a corporate knowledge, told me that the reason they were given NATO membership was to avoid a conflict between the two of them. I am not suggesting the credibility of that statement, but it was made. And NATO has, in many ways, arbitrated through the years, and continues to arbitrate in some measure, this longstanding dispute as it relates to Cyprus.

The point is, in that sense, NATO is arbitrating the very types of disputes that the Senator from Texas had in mind. I think it is within the purview of this very important deliberation we are having now to simply ask Senators to allow the amendment to be passed for the sole purpose of laying down a proposal.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, the Senator doesn't often confuse me. We very often agree, and when we disagree, I usually understand clearly why we disagree. Let me explain my confusion, and if the Senator wishes to respond, I would appreciate it. If not, I understand.

The Senator has been the most vocal and articulate opponent of NATO and/or the United States alone getting involved in what he believes to be intractable civil conflicts, border disputes, that have hundreds of years of history that precede them.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the Senator is correct. I remain of that view.

Mr. BIDEN. And I respect that. But what confuses me is, with the Senator's grave concern, why would he even want to give the NAC, or NATO, a possibility of taking away his power to influence those outcomes? He says that he is worried about—and I know him to be—the next strategic doctrine NATO may come out with.

Right now the way NATO is constructed organizationally is if they come out with a doctrine that we sign off on, or intend to sign off on, the distinguished Senator from Virginia can come to this floor, pass a resolution and/or an amendment to a piece of legislation instructing the President not to sign on, and he can make that prevail depending on the number of votes

available. If this were to be put before NATO, which would, by the way, imply at a minimum that the United States supported it, and the President doesn't, we do not support it. We wouldn't table something we don't support. People do not go around tabling things and asking for consideration that by implication they don't support. This administration does not support that. The last administration, to the best of my knowledge, does not support that.

But why would this Senator even put in play the possibility that his influence over whether or not we are involved in a border dispute is rendered null and void? For if this were tabled, and if NATO adopted this, we would be in the position of taking exception to getting involved in a border dispute quite possibly, and if the dispute mechanism resolution requiring binding arbitration were in effect, the Senator would have no, no, no impact over whether or not that occurred, other than passing a resolution suggesting we would throw off from NATO.

I don't understand, even though that is not likely to happen, why the Senator would even want to put himself in that possible position. The higher one is concerned with being involved in border disputes seems to me to increase in direct proportion the need for opposition to this amendment. Those who are willing to get involved in every border dispute who think we should be the policeman for all of Europe, central Europe, the former Soviet Union, that we should do whatever our European friends think should be done, they should be for this because it doesn't matter. It may very well be that we have a President who doesn't want to get involved in those disputes. But a majority of the members of NATO do, and they think that is good foreign policy.

But I am perplexed. The more one is concerned about border disputes, the less they should be willing to give an absolute veto power that we now have—absolute. There is no need to discuss it. There is no need to do anything. The President of the United States picks up the phone, the Secretary of State picks up the phone and says to our Ambassador to NATO, "Vote no." Done, over, gone, finished, no troops, no NATO. Why would you want to give up that lock? It is beyond me.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes. I yield the floor.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I would like to try to answer that because what we are trying to do is not have it come up to NAC but to have border disputes and a process that everyone has agreed to, and if anyone doesn't agree, including us, it wouldn't go into effect.

The Senator from Delaware quoted from my statement, but he forgot to say that I laid out the labor arbitration as just an example of what it

could look like. I was only trying to provide one option, one thought. The purpose is not to have border dispute resolutions come to NAC. It is to have an agreed-upon procedure at the lowest level so that every country would know what the ground rules are so that they could handle it at the lowest level and there wouldn't be an eruption at the highest level.

I say to the Senator from Delaware, who I admire very much, that all the United States Ambassador has to do is say, "I don't think this is a good idea," when he does start talking to the allies. It will go nowhere. Why would anyone be afraid to talk about this in anticipation of problems that could occur? There are 11 potential border disputes that have been identified by the Congressional Research Office as having a medium to high probability of escalation. It is, I think, an opportunity to keep a Bosnia from rising to the level it has. If we had a mechanism in place with the Croats, the Serbs and the Moslems could have gone to an arbitration process, or could have agreed on a process early on how they would like to settle the dispute in the former Yugoslavia.

All we are talking about is putting the idea on the table. We are not talking about a result. I don't know why we should fear a discussion. Why should we fear bringing this up just to see what our allies would like to do about potential border conflicts? NATO is not going to be the same. When you add new members, regardless of who they are, you have to anticipate that there may be a change in the alliance. When West Germany became a member it changed the alliance. When Spain became a member it changed the alliance. When France decided not to be a part of the military operation, it changed the alliance.

What I am trying to do with this amendment is provide leadership. If we have the veto, as the Senator from Delaware has said, we can veto. But why not bring it to the table for discussion?

Mr. BIDEN. I see my friend is rising to speak. Let me respond to the questions directed to me very briefly.

I recall my friend from Virginia—I keep referring to my friend from Virginia because he is on the Armed Services Committee. We have been here a long time. We have been back and forth to Brussels zillions of times. So I don't mean that to suggest he agrees with me.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, it is a term of endearment and it rests equally on both sides. I just regret that the Senator is of the wrong party. Other than that, he is doing good.

Mr. BIDEN. As my friend will remember, a man named Werner was a very dynamic leader of NATO, a German who was made the number one man in NATO. I recall being in Brussels. Don't hold me to the year. I think it was somewhere around 6 over 8 years ago. There was a lot of saber rattling

going on relative to Greece and Turkey.

I remember asking Werner about what this all meant. We were about to have a meeting. He was having a luncheon for me, as they do for any Senator who will go over and pay attention, and with the permanent reps and some of the military. He said to his assistant general so and so, and general so and so, one a Turk and one a Greek, "Call them in the office." They called them in the office. He basically said, "What is going on, fellows? What is the deal?" The Turkish and Greek military representatives of NATO sat there and in the privacy of that room discussed the politics in their own country; why they didn't see there was much of a problem, but you have to understand it is going nowhere.

If any formal mechanism is put in place, the ability of that Greek general and that Turkish general to walk into a room and totally off the record say, "We think this, we think that," and talk about it in front of a German, and an American, all members of NATO, that would evaporate. Now we will have set up a bureaucratic deal, no matter what it is, no matter how tenuous it is, now it is posture.

One of the things that we get done—and it will come as a shock to some people, but in the Chamber it will not come as a shock—is how do we most often on this floor resolve the disputes when we really get down to it at the last minute in a crunch on any important issue.

We go back to one of those two rooms. There is no press. There is no floor. There is no record. And I say, "OK, what's the deal? If I change this, can you do that?" Isn't that how we do it? That is how NATO does it. Now, if we were required by law, by our governments, by our parties, that the only time we could meet is if we say, "I will meet you at 3:30; we will meet in room S. 107, and we will have two people there, and I will formally table my concern," that is what worries me.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I know that is not what the Senator intends. What I am suggesting after 25 years of watching this thing, I think that is what will happen.

I will be happy to yield to my friend from Oregon.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. If I can answer the Senator's—

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, could I just respond to the Senator from Delaware quickly—and, of course, I would like to have the Senator from Oregon respond also—if I could just say that nothing that the Senator from Delaware has said would be prevented from happening. People could certainly go into a room and settle a dispute. What we are trying to do—

Mr. BIDEN. What is broken?

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Is have an option that they would be able to go way below the level of the North Atlantic Council, where they could go into a dis-

pute resolution process, something that would be devised by the council, and if somebody on the council didn't like it, it would never see the light of day.

What is the problem with opening the discussion?

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, it is done that way now. That is exactly what is done now. On Bosnia, what did we do?

Mrs. HUTCHISON. On Bosnia, what we did is take it to the whole council, and everybody got involved.

Mr. BIDEN. With all due respect, Madam President—

Mrs. HUTCHISON. That is why we are funding the commitment in Bosnia today, because in the United Nations—

Mr. BIDEN. With all due respect, what happened, whether the Senator agrees with the policy or not, the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, and their designees got on a plane, and they flew to Paris, and they flew to London, and they flew to Madrid, and they flew to Bonn, and they flew to Berlin, and they flew all over, and they met individually with the governments, not in Brussels.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. But now the United States of America is paying the lion's share and our troops are in harm's way in Bosnia, if the President has his way, in perpetuity. Is that the answer you want for every ethnic dispute that can occur for the next century in Europe?

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, if I may be recognized, with all due respect—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Whether or not—and we disagree in the policy. I have been on this floor for 4 years saying we should be involved. But whether or not we should, NATO has nothing to do with that. NATO troops ended up there, but not because the American President went to a NAC meeting or our Ambassador to NATO at a NAC meeting raised this issue. It is because there was a policy decision made by a President, supported by this Senator—he didn't do it because of me, but supported by this Senator—to try to persuade NATO to do that. Whether or not there was a dispute resolution mechanism in place in NATO that was formal or informal is irrelevant to that question. The President of the United States first picked up the phone and called Tony Blair. Then he called Chirac. Then he called—and the list went on. Then they ended up in NATO.

So I understand what the Senator is trying to deal with. To use an old expression, she in a sense is trying to fight the last war. We fought that war about Bosnia in the Chamber here. My team won; her team lost. But NATO enlargement and a dispute resolution mechanism have nothing to do with that decision.

I yield the floor.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. If the Senator will yield, as I understood the Senator



from Texas, her original idea was that we should say to the American Ambassador to NATO to raise it with the NAC and to present this idea, that they discuss a dispute resolution. And in that, I think you said it is even OK for the Ambassador to say, "I think that's a bad idea; I think we need to settle that right now. If this is a bad idea, let's say so." And I would hate to begin a debate with our European allies by saying we want to discuss what we think is a bad idea even though the Senate somehow thinks it is a good idea. It is either a good idea or it is a bad idea. That is why I would say no.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Let me just say to the Senator from Oregon—

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me say, if I could address that response very briefly—

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I hope he wouldn't put forth an idea that he thought was a bad idea.

What I hope is that he would lay out the issue for discussion, and if the result is not something that the United States thinks is the best result, after everyone has had a say in what kind of process it would be, of course, we would not lose our veto power. But I would certainly hope that he would not go in and say, "I am putting forward an idea that I think is a bad idea."

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I apologize. I thought I heard the Senator from Texas say that.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. It is a valid question.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I could join this distinguished group and respond to everybody, the Senator from Texas is asking for a very simple procedural act. And I agree with my colleague from Delaware; when an ambassador goes in with a proposal, it has to have the force and effect of not a bad idea but that we conscientiously think is correct.

Now, I remember Manfred Werner; we all do. What a magnificent person. He was NATO, and no one in this Chamber, particularly John Tower, the late John Tower, could express higher regard for Werner than yourself, myself, and others. But the point is, we don't know what NATO is going to look like after we accept 12 nations, going from 16 to 28, and bringing in a realm of geography.

We understand the Cyprus dispute. It is age old. We understand how two senior military officers assigned to NATO could come into Manfred Werner's office and sit down and informally discuss it. But I look upon a proliferation of problems of unknown—of unknown description, and it seems to me that perhaps we should address the potential for far more problems than ever envisioned as we begin to access country after country after country.

Therefore, I think it would be advisable to explore the possibility of having some procedure by which, hopefully, the use of arms could be avoided, or if arms were being used in a dispute, that somehow NATO, with a wrestful and forceful hand, could put it to rest.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, let me just say that I agree with my friend, the Senator from Virginia, that why wouldn't we put out every possible effort with every potential idea that could keep us from having an escalation that would require arms conflict, or would allow for armed conflict? Precisely for the reason that the Senator from Delaware has stated: Perhaps we do need another step in the process.

What if the two generals in the back room can't agree? Why not have a safety valve that would give another option when all else has failed? Why not go the extra mile? We are not trying to guarantee the result with my amendment; we are only trying to guarantee that there will be an effort, that we will try to come forward with a process that everyone would agree is a good process. If the United States thinks the end result is not a good one, it has the final ability to veto, as the Senator from Delaware has pointed out.

Why not try? What are we afraid of? That we would not be able to put this on the table for discussion, to see if a process can be agreed upon by all of our allies in a consensus, and, if so, have the opportunity for another layer at the very lowest levels before it escalates into a situation as we see in Bosnia today?

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I don't want to get anyone's hopes up or cause fear on anyone's part. I am not following in a recent line of departure from the Democratic side to the Republican side, but having reached the advanced age of 55, I cannot see from over there this chart, and that is why I am walking over.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. At the advanced age of 55, you are now sitting in STROM THURMOND's chair.

Mr. BIDEN. I think the Senator's point is very well made. I hope it brings me luck. He is one of my closest friends in the Senate. And as he pointed out in a Roll Call article he got framed for me and signed—it was an article featuring him and his aides—I am the only person in the Senate who could beat STROM THURMOND's record if I served in the Senate until I reached age 73, which I am sure my constituents will not let happen.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. The Senator is warming the chair.

Mr. BIDEN. I am not really warming the chair. I am serious. I could not see it. If I may beg the indulgence of my Republican colleagues, let me answer, because I think at least anything useful that could be said on my part has been said, with one exception, and I will say this and cease and desist.

As I read the amendment, on line 5 it says, "establishing a process of dispute resolution among allies."

Now, the Senator from Texas has pointed out—and she has been a very, very, very forceful leader in opposition to our present policy in Bosnia. I wish she were not as effective, because she and I disagree. But she raised Bosnia

again. I don't know how this dispute resolution mechanism of any nature would involve Bosnia at all. Serbia is not an ally, Bosnia is not an ally, Herzegovina is not an ally, Croatia is not an ally, Moldavia is not an ally.

Looking over here, Romania—Romania is listed in the potential border disputes, ethnic Romanians in Moldavia versus Russia. None of those parties, Moldavia, Russia or Romania, are our allies. Bulgaria-Serbia, Estonia-Russia, Latvia-Russia, Estonia-Russia, Croatia-Serbia, Macedonia-Albania, Moldavia-Russia, Yugoslavia-Serb-Bosnia, Serb-Croats, Serbs-Kosovo, Serbs-Macedonia, Albanians-Serbs, Hungarians—possibly; Serbs—Albanians-Kosovoans, Greeks-Albanians, Albanians-Macedonians.

None of those concerns, not a single solitary one, involves allies. They would not be covered by even the unstated illusory mechanism that might be created if we don't table this. My reason for being opposed to this is a little bit like what Senator John Pastore from the State of Rhode Island told me in 1973. I said, "I'm not sure about this, Senator"—a vote. And he said, "Let me give you a piece of advice, JOE." He talked with a gravelly voice. He said, "When in doubt, vote no."

I am in grave doubt, at a minimum. I cannot possibly see how what the Senator is suggesting in any way—I don't fully understand it. She is not proposing a particular mechanism. But I can't envision any mechanism that would have any impact on any of the things that are listed on that chart. Not a single one. Not a single one would fall within the definition of her resolution.

Bosnia would not fall within the definition of her resolution.

I know, ever since Ross Perot, all of us have gotten chart mania. You know, me, too. I have my charts back there. Maybe the chart was just wheeled out by mistake. But it, the chart, has no relevance to the resolution, none at all. I say as a Democrat on this side of the aisle now—I guess I should not be so flip about it. I do not mean to be. But all kidding aside, I really, truly, as they say—I don't get it. The examples the Senator from Virginia and Texas are worried about would not fall within the purview of this resolution even if such a dispute mechanism were arrived at. Nothing on the chart would fall within the purview of this resolution. I don't know what would that is not already working. And I don't know what is broken. I can't think of a single example—I would like to hear one—where NATO was unable to come up with a dispute resolution within the present structure. So that is why I oppose this. I will oppose it.

I have great respect for my friend from Texas. I mean that sincerely. But I strongly disagree with this and I will urge my colleagues to vote "No." I thank her for her indulgence.

I have been asked to yield to Senator CRAIG for a consent request, unanimous consent request. I yield the floor.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). The Senator from Idaho is recognized.

Mr. CRAIG. Let me thank my colleagues. I would like to offer up a unanimous consent request for the good of the order and the remainder of the afternoon.

I ask unanimous consent that the time between now and 5 p.m. be equally divided between the majority and the minority. I further ask unanimous consent that at the hour of 5 p.m., the Senate proceed to a vote on or in relation to the Hutchison amendment No. 2317, to be followed by a vote on or in relation to the Craig amendment No. 2316.

I finally ask consent that there be 2 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form prior to the second vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object, and I'm not sure I will object, I want to be certain that would mean the Senator from Delaware would—or one of us, the Senator from North Carolina—would control, I guess we would control 27 minutes, 27½ minutes, is that right, each? Is that correct? That is a question, parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CRAIG. I apologize to the Senator. Would he repeat that?

Mr. BIDEN. As I understand it, if we agree to this unanimous consent order, then there is 27 minutes on a side to dispose of the debate on the amendment of the Senator from Texas and the amendment of the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CRAIG. That is correct.

Mr. BIDEN. I don't believe that will leave enough time. The Senator from California has been patiently waiting here. She wants 15 minutes. You and I have not even engaged your amendment yet. Senator LEVIN wants 5 minutes. So I would, for the moment, object. But I am sure we can work something out.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. An objection is heard.

The Senator from Texas is recognized.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would like to suggest that I take 3 minutes to finish on my amendment and then everything else could be on Senator CRAIG's amendment for the rest of the afternoon.

Mrs. BOXER. I object to that because I wish to speak on the Hutchison amendment and I wish to have 15 minutes of time. I have been waiting around for hours. I might be able to get it down to 10 minutes.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. That's fine. I did not realize the Senator was on my

amendment. She certainly should have that right, after which then I will want to have some time reserved. So whatever can be worked out that gives her her time, and then I could close on my amendment at the appropriate time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I am willing to extend to 5:10, the time at which we would start the votes. I will say to the Senator from California, I certainly respect her right and her need to debate. I can't say how long the Senator from Delaware plans to speak on my amendment. I have said about all there is to say on my amendment, and within a few minutes I could say the bulk of it. I know the Senator from Missouri also wished to lay down an amendment, I believe. That would take a minimal amount of time. But it is important. We have Senators who have obligations by 5:20, and that is what we are trying to meet.

Mrs. BOXER. I say to my friend, believe me, I was trying to get this time earlier in the day. In the interests of comity I will take 10 minutes and speak fast. I must do that.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we have enough time within this time to debate and finish the amendment of the Senator from Texas. But the Senator from Idaho has a very, very important amendment. If I agree to this request, it leaves me a total of 4 minutes to respond to his amendment, and nothing has been said in opposition to his amendment yet. If the Senator from Missouri speaks, it will leave less time.

So I assume it's the leader's desire to have two votes by 5:10 or thereabouts. I don't know how we can do that.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me withdraw the unanimous consent request at this time. We are wasting valuable debate time. The debate can go forward. We will see if we can come up with an agreement a few minutes from now. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has the time.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, let me just propose a unanimous consent that the Senator from California be allowed 10 minutes on my amendment, after which I would have a maximum of 5 minutes and we would close my amendment, and then everything else could be negotiated on the amendment of Senator CRAIG.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, without objection, it is so ordered.

The distinguished Senator from California is finally recognized.

Mrs. BOXER. I thank you. Did the Senator want her 3 minutes at this time, or does she wish to take it after my remarks?

Mrs. HUTCHISON. After the Senator from California has finished her remarks, I will close on my amendment and then they can determine what they want to do with the rest of the time.

Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator from Texas.

Mr. President, I have listened carefully to this debate, and I think what the Hutchison amendment really gets to is what NATO is all about. Perhaps it comes down to how each of us sees NATO. Frankly, I see NATO as a military alliance that has been extremely successful, that has worked very well, and I don't want to see anything happen to NATO that would change the focus of what it really is.

As I listened to my friend, and I know she in her heart wants to have a mechanism to resolve the disputes that may erupt and are currently erupting, I understand her intention, but as I look at the amendment, I think what will happen is there will be a procedure set up for every group that has a gripe about another ethnic group to come to a forum, to present their case, and perhaps some of them will bring propaganda, that it could turn NATO into a little sideshow, into a world sideshow, a propaganda stage. I am very concerned about that. Again, I think the reason I am concerned is that I support NATO enlargement. I have been waiting to get some time to talk about why. I think this amendment would, in fact, take us off course of what we are trying to do.

It is important to say that just at the prospect of a country joining NATO there have been 10 major accords that have occurred. In other words, the fact that principles that we have laid down, and some of them are called Perry principles, named after William Perry, we said that if you want to join NATO, you have to have a commitment to democratic reform, you have to have a commitment to a free-market economy, you have to have good, neighborly relations—good, neighborly relations. And because NATO is going to be open to countries that follow these reforms, and others, it seems to me that is one of the best ways we have for resolving problems.

The agreement has been made between Poland and Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, and Germany and the Czech Republic. So while we come up with charts and ways to show the disputes, we also should celebrate the fact that because we have opened up NATO to countries, assuming they make certain reforms, among them good, neighborly relations, that that has been an incentive.

Mr. President, everyone approaches this issue from his or her own experiences. I am very strong on this NATO expansion, because I remember well back when I was a teenager watching the television reports of the Hungarian revolution being cut short by Soviet tanks. I think back to those years in 1956 watching freedom crushed and watching people's dreams crushed and thinking to myself, oh, my God, I wish we could do something but we really can't do anything because of the Iron Curtain, because of what was going on



in the world. I remember feeling so powerless.

I feel so proud that all these many years later I can do something positive, to say to that country and to other countries, "You will never have to go through that again." I feel good about that.

I don't want to see us get off our course, to change what the role of NATO is, to turn it into maybe a mini United Nations, to set up false hopes because, indeed, the Senator herself said it may well be that nothing comes of all of this. If nothing comes of all of this, why do we have to set up a whole new elaborate procedure? I think it is setting up false hopes. I think it is setting up a world stage for propaganda. I think it is setting up a situation where we are getting off what our mission in NATO ought to be about. To me, it is very, very, very serious.

I believe that expanding the NATO alliance to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and focusing on that and holding out hope for other nations to join and not changing the focus to these hot spots, if we stick to what NATO is, we are going to see greater peace and security throughout Eastern Europe, the same peace and security that we were able to provide Western Europe for the past 49 years.

It is important to note that no American soldier has had to fire a shot to defend one NATO ally, nor has a NATO member ever had to wage war to fulfill its security guarantees. This is an incredible record. NATO is a military alliance. It works. If you turn it into something else, you are playing a game with it, and the stakes are far too great, because a peaceful, secure Europe is necessary for a peaceful, secure America. We are inextricably linked. In two World Wars, American troops have fought and died.

The bottom line is, if we do believe that NATO has worked on the world stage—and the proof is there, never was a shot fired by this alliance—then we should not get off course and adopt amendments that are going to take us away from that goal.

I know some of my colleagues worry about the situation with Russia, but I do feel we are handling that. We have set up a way to have a dialog with Russia. I really believe whether you listen to our Secretary of State or former majority leader Senator Bob Dole, or Colin Powell, or veterans groups, they are all saying we should stick to our mission in that part of the world, which means a military alliance, not some dispute resolution organization that invites everybody onto a world stage.

Whether it is Henry Kissinger or Secretary Baker or Madeleine Albright, they all are saying the same things. And the President himself: "A new NATO can extend the blessings of freedom and security in the new century, we can bring Europe together not by the force of arms but by possibilities of peace, that is the promise of the moment and we must seize it."

I am worried this amendment, though extremely well intended, will take our eye off what we need to do in Europe, which is, yes, to add countries to the alliance that are willing to undertake free-market economy reforms, that are willing to reach out to their neighbors and solve disputes, that are willing to become truly democratic nations, that are willing to have civilian control over their military. These are the reforms.

If we turn away from the very simple goals of NATO and expand the mission and change the mission, it looks to me like, again, we are setting up a mini United Nations or something here.

What is it going to cost? Already there are complaints about the costs. What is it going to cost to do all this, and what are the procedures going to be? If it is a sham, if it is not going to come to anything, if, as the Senator from Texas says, our Ambassador could just call someone up and say, "Forget it, we're not interested"—imagine the news on that, imagine the press conferences held around the world by every ethnic group that says, "The U.S. stopped us from having a dispute resolution."

I worry about this amendment because I am such a strong supporter of NATO enlargement, and I want us to keep focused on what we have to do and think we are on the path. And as well intended as it may be, I think this takes us off the path.

Thank you very much. I thank the Senator from Texas for her generosity in giving me these 10 minutes.

Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.

Mr. CRAIG. For purposes of unanimous consent, Mr. President, let me try this again so we can notify our Members of a vote at 5 o'clock. I ask unanimous consent that the time between now and 5 o'clock be equally divided between the majority and minority. I further ask unanimous consent that at 5 p.m. the Senate proceed to vote on or in relation to the Hutchison amendment No. 2317. I further ask unanimous consent that at 4:25 Senator ASHCROFT be recognized to lay aside the pending amendment and he call up an amendment, for debate only, until 4:55, and at such time there be 5 minutes equally divided for closing remarks on the Hutchison amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, I would like to inquire of the Senator from Delaware whether he heard this unanimous consent agreement.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have. And it is my understanding—the reason I am not objecting is that there are no other Democrats looking to speak on the Hutchison amendment, and I wanted to reserve at the end of the time for purposes of explanation, our respective explanations, of the Hutchison amendment of at least a couple minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. May I get 5 minutes out of that?

Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object, I ask it be amended that we take 5 more minutes out so we have a total of—

Mr. LEVIN. For the Craig amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Oh, no.

Mr. CRAIG. The Craig amendment will not be debated until tomorrow.

Mr. BIDEN. We are only talking about a Hutchison amendment. I have no objection, as long as I understood it correctly. And I apologize. I was in the back of the room.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further objection? Does the Senator from Missouri have an objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I will close on my amendment then, except for the last reserved 2 minutes that Senator BIDEN will take, after which I will close.

Mr. President, I have now heard from the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from California that the 11 disputes which have been put together by the Congressional Research Service have no relation to what we are doing today. And yet the countries mentioned for inclusion in the next wave of NATO expansion are Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Romania. And Albania has also been mentioned.

It is relevant that we have ongoing disputes within the area that we will be considering for inclusion in NATO. Mr. President, it is a matter of preparing for the future. We are changing NATO. Every time a new member is included, it changes the alliance. We hope it will strengthen the alliance. We must look to what the future potential conflicts in the alliance would be. And the more you expand it, the more potentials for conflict there are.

Let me read to you the amendment that we passed yesterday. It defines "common threats" in NATO to include "conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes or the actions of undemocratic leaders." That is the definition of "common threats."

In the paragraph following the next paragraph, the capacity to respond to common threats is addressed. "NATO's continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats."

So, Mr. President, it could be that we are opening NATO and changing its very nature by the amendment that was passed yesterday. It could be that we are looking at involvement in ethnic and religious enmity and revival of historic disputes or the actions of undemocratic leaders in a future mission for NATO.

If we are going to change the nature of NATO in this way, my amendment is even more important. Why are we afraid to lead? Why are we afraid to put on the table a border dispute resolution process which everyone would have to agree to so that we will know what the process is before there is an

eruption that goes beyond our ability to contain it without military force?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time requested by the distinguished Senator has expired.

Mr. ASHCROFT. I will yield.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I will finish my comments in the last 5 minutes. I yield the floor.

Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Missouri is recognized.

#### EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2318

(Purpose: To require a Presidential certification that NATO is and will remain a defensive military alliance, and for other purposes)

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, thank you for this opportunity to comment on an important aspect of this great Nation's efforts to defend freedom generally, and in this specific instance, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Senate is being asked to give its stamp of approval to a new NATO, not only changing in membership, but changing in its scope and purpose. The focus of the change in NATO upon which we are being given this opportunity to vote is the expansion of the membership of NATO.

But I would submit that there is something far more important than simply this change in the numerics of NATO, simply this change in the number of nations that are members of the alliance. There is an alteration of NATO more profound than the expansion of its membership, and the Senate should not overlook this crucial aspect of the debate.

Let me just say that I believe NATO has been one of the most successful defense organizations in the history of mankind. NATO has been an agency to preserve the peace and has done that so successfully that we have not had to offer American lives on European soil in the second half of the 20th century. That is in stark contrast to the first half of the 20th century where hundreds of thousands of American soldiers fought for freedom and hundreds of thousands gave their last full measure of devotion in liberty's defense.

I think the success of NATO, though, is something that should be respected by preserving NATO and not changing the character of the alliance. And, to be frank, since the threat of the Soviet Union no longer exists, a number of officials associated with NATO have come to the conclusion that this laudable organization, this most successful of all alliances, should be devoted to new ends and new objectives.

I submit that if we allow, in this vote, the devotion of NATO's resources to new objectives and to new ideas, we will be undermining the very success and purpose for which NATO was constituted 50 years ago.

Let us just look at some of the statements of administration officials as they convey what they propose for the scope and mission of NATO in the fu-

ture. Here is William Perry, the immediate past former U.S. Secretary of Defense, who left office recently and was replaced in that office by one of our own, former Senator Cohen, now Secretary Cohen.

This is testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 1998. Of course, it was Secretary Perry who was a part of negotiating this expansion of NATO, which we will vote on in the Senate. Here is what Secretary Perry says:

The original mission of NATO—deterring an attack from the Soviet Union—is obviously no longer relevant. The original geographical area of NATO responsibility is no longer sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is no longer appropriate. . . the new missions—

This is important language—

new missions of NATO should be preventive defense—creating the conditions for peace in Europe. . . the geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world—

This is operative language here.

The geographic area of NATO should no longer be confined to the North Atlantic area.

If you will read article VI of the treaty, we get into a very clear specification of territory, and it is exacting. It talks about latitudes and longitudes and the like.

Here Secretary Perry reveals what the real agenda is, that we would create a new geographic area for NATO and it would be "anywhere in the world where aggression can threaten the security of NATO members. . ."

Secretary Albright has also urged that "an expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization must extend its geographic reach beyond the European continent and evolve"—key word, evolve—"into a force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa."

We are changing the mission of NATO from a mission which was designed to protect the territory of the member nations to being some kind of international policing operation.

With that in mind, it is my intention to send to the desk an amendment which would require that the President certify that actions by NATO are in keeping with the terms of the treaty itself. I send the amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Missouri [Mr. ASHCROFT], for himself, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. HELMS, Mr. WARNER, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, and Mr. BOND, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2318.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

In section 3(1), strike "(A) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.—" and all that follows through "interests of NATO members." at the end of paragraph (1)(A) and insert in lieu thereof the following new condition:

(2) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE.—

(A) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that—

(i) NATO is and will remain a defensive military alliance, and that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for the collective self-defense of NATO members against armed attack, continues to constitute the heart of that treaty; and

(ii) the United States will only support a military operation under the North Atlantic Treaty that is commenced on or after the date of adoption of this resolution of ratification—

(I) if the operation is intended for the purpose of collective self-defense in response to an armed attack on the territory of a NATO member; or

(II) in response to a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of a NATO member.

(B) CONSTRUCTION.—The Senate declares that nothing in the North Atlantic Treaty, the Strategic Concept of NATO, or any other document setting forth the fundamental purposes, objectives, or missions of NATO shall be construed as altering the constitutional authority of the Congress or the President.

(C) EXCLUSIONS FROM MEANING OF "NATO MILITARY OPERATION".—The term "NATO military operation" does not include any NATO training mission or exercise.

(3) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.—

Mr. ASHCROFT. I thank a number of individuals for their willingness to cosponsor the amendment, not the least of which is the individual inhabiting the Chair at this time, the Senator from Kansas, Senator ROBERTS, Senator HELMS, Senator WARNER, Senator HUTCHINSON, Senator FAIRCLOTH, and Senator BOND. I am pleased they would support this effort.

I indicate that this amendment, which is to reinforce the original intent of the treaty to protect the security, the political independence, and territorial integrity of these treaty nations, is what has been and will continue to be a part of our commitment in NATO, and that is reflected in the amendment.

We have the former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, saying there should be a global mission for NATO. We have Secretary Albright saying we should expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into a "force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa."

We have witnessed what happens when our soldiers are involved in so-called peacekeeping organizations and operations in Africa. Not too long ago in Somalia, 18 Americans died in a peacekeeping effort. Frankly, the tragedy in Somalia disrupted our foreign policy in Africa for years, and we lost 18 Americans in the process. We have little to show for it. As we noted just 2 weeks ago, one American, a part of a humanitarian team to Somalia, was taken hostage within this last month. We withdrew from Somalia, the warlords are back in business there, and we have not made the kind of progress we ought to make.

I think the first thing to say is that there was a purpose for NATO. It was

manifestly successful, the most successful military alliance ever, and it saved Americans from having to spend their lives in Europe in defense of freedom. The success of NATO is incontrovertible.

The second point I make, those now asking for an amendment to the treaty are asking to change it from what it was, a treaty to defend the territory of NATO nations, into a "global organization," according to William Perry and to become "a force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa," according to Secretary of State Albright.

Now, just to make it clear that these proposals are a dramatic change from the intention and character of NATO, let me just quote Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the time of NATO's establishment. "Let us not forget that this treaty is limited in scope." Doesn't sound very global. "Its main purpose is to maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area." Doesn't sound much like Middle East and central Africa. "We do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the entire globe."

Now it is not impossible to change a treaty, but if this treaty is to be changed it ought to be changed through the appropriate constitutional processes in which the Senate plays a central role in offering its advice and consent.

Tragically, the focus of all our attention is on three countries to be added to the NATO alliance. But it has not been on this new mission. It has not been on this attempt, this aspiration, to convert the treaty from one which defends the territory of NATO nations to a treaty which would, in fact, attempt to be a force for peace across the Middle East and into central Africa. This responsibility and this problem has not gone unnoticed.

In last week's New York Times, an editorial reads as follows: "The White House has provided no military rationale for expanding NATO eastward while Europe is at peace and democracy and free markets are taking root in Russia. Instead, the ratification resolution promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere in the world. That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military operations demands extensive debate."

That is the New York Times recognizing what so many in the Senate have failed to recognize, that we are not just dealing with this treaty in terms of three additional members. We are dealing with an intended expansion that would take NATO from a limited treaty designed to protect a specific territory into a global organization; if you will, a United Nations called NATO, with a standing army subject to deployment at the authorization of the NATO council around the world.

I think that deserves debate. I think it deserves our inspection. I think there are reasons why we should have real reservations with regard to the

transformation of a treaty before our eyes.

Now, some have argued that my amendment will impose new constraints on NATO not contained in the treaty. Let me make it clear that the amendment which I have sent to the desk merely asks that the President certify that any action taken under the treaty is in strict conformance with the limitations and language of the treaty itself.

Those who oppose this treaty are those who are opposed to living by the rules of the treaty. Let those who are willing to live within the limits of the treaty sign the rules and play the game. Let those who do not want to play by the rules object to this amendment and say we want the President to have latitude to go beyond the limits of this treaty, to send American forces, in conjunction with NATO forces, into central Africa, to send them into the Middle East in operations outside the scope of the treaty, to deploy American lives in settings where it is an international policing operation, in settings where it is not relevant or essential to the security interests of NATO.

Given the level of international trade that exists, it is pretty easy to understand that there would be those who would suggest that any country, anywhere, could be an interest of another country. If we are going to convert this treaty to a defense-of-interest treaty instead of a defense-of-territory treaty, we are fundamentally altering the scope of NATO.

Now, the parameters of the treaty have long been understood. I have just indicated that Senator Tom Connally understood the alliance was limited in scope. A focused and limited NATO was the alliance that was ratified. This expanded scope of NATO has never been subject to the Senate's advice and consent. Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson also defined the limits of the NATO treaty in a letter transmitting the treaty to President Truman, a great Missourian. Secretary Acheson acknowledges the parameters of the treaty and stated flatly that the North Atlantic Council will have "No powers other than to consider matters within the purview of the treaty."

If Acheson viewed the treaty as limitless in scope, why would he testify about the careful limits in various articles? The Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the treaty, took pains to show that NATO was not an old-fashioned military alliance. The report states, "In both intent and language it is purely defensive in nature. It comes into operation only against the Nation which by its own action has proved itself an international criminal by attacking a party to the treaty. If it can be called an alliance, it is an alliance only against war itself."

This was the intention. I don't think we are going to find central African states attacking NATO. I don't think we will find countries from central Africa launching a war machine against

the North Atlantic nations. But the Secretary of State wants to be able to deploy NATO forces there in her concept of a force for peace, and I translate that into deploying American troops. The President has sought and asserted his right to deploy American forces as Commander in Chief. This amendment does not seek to infringe on that right. It has to do with protecting American interests by maintaining the scope and integrity of NATO. I don't think we should try to convert the NATO alliance into something it was never intended to be.

With that in mind, there is a real contrast in terms of what the NATO concept of defense was in the past and what we are currently being told NATO ought to be. In NATO's strategic concepts of the past, collective defense was of paramount importance, a priority.

NATO defense planning is limited to the defense of the treaty area. . .

NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or authority except with respect to incidents which are covered by articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. . .

Article VI specifies the territory rather directly and comprehensively and tells you what we are really looking at when we are talking about NATO. Here is article VI of the treaty. This is how definite and specific it is:

For the purpose of article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the territory of Turkey, or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. . .

That doesn't sound like central Africa to me. It has the specificity and particularity of a carefully drafted treaty that was designed to protect territories, not to be another mini-U.N. with a standing army, the forces of which can be deployed anywhere around the world. The lives of Americans and the treasure of America should not be directed into international policing operations through a transformed NATO never approved by the American people. We should remain true to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The article goes on:

On the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories, or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the treaty entered into force, or the Mediterranean Sea, or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article VI clearly specifies that NATO is a defensive instrument, an alliance designed to protect the territory. To convert it into something else more or less than that is to involve ourselves in what I would have to say is "treaty creep." We have heard of "mission creep." We know what happened in Somalia as the mission expanded, which threatened the lives and safety of our soldiers. We lost lives because we undermined our preparedness;

we hadn't planned or designed the operation for that into which it evolved.

I suggest that if we allow NATO to creep into a wide variety of international policing operations that it wasn't designed for, it will undermine and hollow out NATO. We have seen what international deployments have done to our own military in terms of our preparedness, our maintenance, and our ability to have the fighting force ready that we need. I think it would be perilous indeed if we were to change the nature of this important defensive alliance and amend it in a way that would make it a global police operation instead of the defense of territory that it was designed to be.

So, Mr. President, I have submitted this amendment. I am delighted to have as a cosponsor of this amendment the Senator from Kansas, and I know he wants to make remarks. I have about 10 minutes remaining in my time.

Senator GRAMS would like to be listed also as an original cosponsor of this amendment. I am delighted, and I know the Senator from Kansas will welcome his cosponsorship as well. I thank the Senator from Kansas. I look forward to his remarks, which will exhaust the last 10 minutes of the time to which I have been allotted.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, can I inquire as to precisely the amount of time available?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten minutes.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I join my colleague from Missouri, Senator ASHCROFT; the Senator from Virginia, Senator WARNER; the Senator from North Carolina, Senator HELMS, and others, in calling for the adoption of our amendment to the resolution of ratification as reported by the Foreign Relations Committee and as amended by the Senate.

As the Senator pointed out, we seek to replace the broad language still in the resolution that expands the scope of NATO's purpose. We add in the amendment what we consider to be clarifying language that upholds, as the Senator has pointed out, NATO's fundamental military mission as explained in article V of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. We seek to ensure, particularly in light of the passage of the Kyl amendment, that NATO's purpose is still fundamentally one of collective self-defense.

Our amendment does not strike any of the Kyl amendment as passed by the Senate. Nor does our amendment restrict or alter the basic authority of the President to dispatch American forces whenever and wherever a genuine threat to America's national security does emerge. I will repeat that. Our amendment does not restrict or alter the basic authority of the President to dispatch American forces whenever and wherever a genuine threat to

America's vital national security does emerge.

I think that the debate we are having today on NATO has vast implications in regard to the future.

Will NATO continue to operate, as it has for more than 50 years, as a military organization for the collective self-defense of its members? Or will its mission be changed so that it becomes, as the Senator has pointed out, a multinational military police organization?

To transform NATO into what could be described as a "nuclear supercop" with authority to operate in all corners of the globe is unnecessary, and, quite frankly, I think it is dangerous.

As we enter the 21st century, it is critical that the original scope of the North Atlantic Treaty be preserved, for several reasons, all relating to America's vital national security and national defense. Now, NATO was established as a defensive military alliance whose strategic position today is, yes, significantly altered by the dissolution of the Soviet empire—we all know that—but whose fundamental military capability remains essential to deter military aggression stemming from regional, nationalist and totalitarian tendencies.

The Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms-and-others amendment seeks to prevent the decline of NATO into another outlet for "nation building" and "peacekeeping" deployments. There is nothing wrong with those deployments, except that many times they have no end game, no clear end purpose in terms of time, and they put American lives at risk for no vital U.S. national interest. I don't think NATO should be a mechanism of convenience through which any President can commit the United States to resolving long-time ethnic, religious, economic, and political conflicts worldwide. That is what the President said in Warsaw and in Bucharest in speeches—military matters no longer matter, and he mentioned these various concerns—ethnic, religious, economic, and political conflicts. It was never intended, nor is it designed and maintained, to be primarily a peacekeeping and humanitarian organization. Other organizations can do this; it is fine work, but it is not for NATO. The Senate needs to discourage any transformation of the most successful defensive military alliance in history into an international police force. Mr. President, I hope that the Senate has not hastened this regression with the adoption of any previous amendments. There is some disagreement on that.

A second valid reason for adopting our amendment is to define a definitive and consistent course for the future of American military involvement in Europe. Let me emphasize and stress that it is in our interests, and the world's vital interests, for the United States to remain constructively engaged in Europe.

However, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, it has been made

painfully clear to me that we cannot have additional military responsibilities internationally without funding them. To be perfectly frank, the current administration defense budgets, plainly put, are not adequate to meet the basic needs of modernization, maintenance, quality of life, and training needs. Yet, the administration ordered American forces to more than 100 countries worldwide. We already hear the report of a hollow military.

Should we vastly change the scope of NATO's military requirements and, by implication, our commitment to it at a time when our forces are strained by lack of resources? I don't think so. To do so, I fear, will further weaken our own force structure and place in danger the lives of our military men and women who are already being asked to do a tough job without the proper tools.

The Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms amendment provides a commonsense declaration of NATO's primary purpose that does not—I want to emphasize this does not—preclude the President of the United States from dispatching U.S. troops, equipment, or aid anywhere that he believes is necessary. It simply precludes the President from saying "We're doing these things as a member of NATO" if it is not in response to threats as described in article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.

I know there is going to be opposition to this amendment by claiming we are imposing limits on NATO military operations and also decisionmaking. That is not the case. Our amendment seeks to preserve the military nature of the alliance. Steering NATO away from missions not defensive or military in nature is not limiting military decisionmaking—rather it is upholding the original mission.

It also may be argued that the North Atlantic Treaty has worked well for 50 years and has appropriately never been changed or reinterpreted, and, I think the line goes, "We shouldn't open that Pandora's box now." I could not agree more.

Unfortunately, the Senate is being asked to pass a ratification resolution that does open Pandora's box. The New York Times, in a recent editorial, said this: "... the ratification resolution promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere in the world."

Some may claim that the Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms amendment takes away U.S. flexibility—the U.S. advantage in the NATO alliance in regard to convincing our allies to bear more of the burden of Europe's overall security. Further, some may claim that some allies could use this amendment as an excuse to abstain from missions where we want them involved.

I respectfully disagree on both accounts.

The first claim assumes our European allies cannot see for themselves their own legitimate security interests. The second assertion ignores recent

history. What was the greatest military contingency the United States faced in the last 25 years? What was the greatest immediate threat to our interests and those of our allies? I am talking about vital interests. It was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent war in the gulf.

The remarkable coalition of nations and forces put together by President Bush and Secretary Baker was completely out of NATO's purview. Yet, our allies joined the fight. Why? Because the threat was real, the threat was clear, and events overtook subtle differences. It is the nature of threat that determines the behavior of our allies, not the existence of provisions they may construe as loopholes in multilateral security agreements. Beside, if the mission is pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, allied participation is assured. If it is not, why should NATO be leading the charge?

Mr. President, the Ashcroft-Roberts-Warner-Helms amendment is an important effort to preserve the limited responsibility of a military alliance in which we have a tremendous stake, a tremendous stake historically and financially, and, most importantly, in terms of American lives. I ask my colleagues for their support.

I yield the floor.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2317

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question recurs on the HUTCHISON amendment. There are now 5 minutes equally divided on the amendment.

Who yields time?

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would appreciate the opportunity to close on my amendment. Whatever the opposition would like to say, I would like to yield and then be able to close.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I rise to encourage my colleagues to vote against the HUTCHISON amendment. I do it with reluctance because of my admiration of the Senator from Texas. But I believe her amendment, though much different than her original proposal, nevertheless remains a bad idea, because it essentially changes NATO from a system of collective defense to a dispute resolution. There are other forums for such resolutions, such as the OSCE. And these things should be resolved anywhere but NATO.

Second, I believe this amendment would undermine the authority of the North Atlantic Council. Its mission needs to remain on defense.

Third, NATO would become a catalyst, even a magnet, for alliance tensions and border disputes. It must not become that.

Finally, we should keep the focus on NATO on what unites Europe in NATO; and that is common defense, not on

what divides Europe, which are border disputes and ethnic hostilities.

With great respect for my colleague from Texas, I nevertheless rise in opposition to her amendment and ask my colleagues to oppose it.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, while I have great respect for the distinguished Senator from Texas, I strongly oppose this amendment and I urge my colleagues to oppose it.

Last month, when we first addressed this amendment, I stated the reasons for my opposition. In the intervening time, nothing has changed my perspectives. Indeed, my opposition has only hardened.

This opposition is based on four very clear and simple points:

First, the establishment of a formal dispute resolution mechanism within the Alliance would undercut the authority of the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance's supreme decision-making body.

Second, the proposal would change the focus of the Alliance from collective defense to dispute resolution. That would fundamentally transform the very culture of the Alliance, one that is now primarily derived from its mission of collective defense.

Third, the establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism would introduce into NATO a dangerous catalyst for inter-Alliance tensions. It would serve as a magnet for disputes that exacerbate tensions within the Alliance.

And fourth, by inviting and exacerbating tensions and disputes into the Alliance, this proposal would weaken the Alliance's ability to fulfill its core mission of collective defense.

When it comes to formal dispute resolution, we should look toward the United Nations or the OSCE—an international organization in Europe dedicated to preventing, mediating and bringing an end to disputes between countries. But, I don't think that we want to transform NATO, the most successful military alliance in history, into another OSCE.

I fear that this proposal implies that the NAC—and the Alliance—has failed in fostering cohesion among its European members over the last fifty years. I do not believe any of us would say that is true.

Let us not forget that in its current form, NATO has proven itself to be a remarkable forum through which differences between Allies have been mitigated and managed. The clearest example of this influence is the alliance's positive contributions to relations between Turkey and Greece. This success is very much due to the trust this fostered through the Alliance's focus on war-fighting. We must be careful to not undercut this success.

Yet that is exactly what this proposal would do. If the Alliance were to follow through on this proposal articulated by the good Senator from Texas, it would establish a new body possibly independent from the NAC. That is a major change to the Alliance. It will

create a process that in no small way will distract members of the Alliance from the core mission of collective defense. It will serve as an incentive for them to use the Alliance as a means to pursue a laundry list of other matters—many of a strictly national, and not Allied, concern.

That's how this proposal would invite tensions within the Alliance. That's how it would undercut its mission of collective defense. That mission requires cohesion and it requires focus. This amendment portends to undercut both.

Moreover, offering this amendment implies that the United States regards Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as unstable and more contentious than other members. I do not believe that is the sense of the Senate.

As well intentioned this amendment may be, it contradicts its own objectives and would severely damage the vital interests of the Alliance.

Therefore, I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, is the time that is equally divided now finished?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon still has 1 minute.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I yield the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 2½ minutes.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, it was said by the distinguished Senator from Oregon, for whom I also have great respect and I think he is doing a fine job in the Senate, but he said that we have other mechanisms for dispute resolutions. My problem with that is that the OSCE not only is a very different kind of organization in which we are 1 vote out of 50, but if a dispute resolution is not passed in the OSCE, we aren't pledging military involvement by the United States. The OSCE is a good organization, and I hope we can use it. What I am trying to do is to recognize that we are changing NATO as we add new members. When we added West Germany, it changed. We want NATO to be strengthened by the new members, and we know that new members are coming down the pike. In fact, members that are in dispute right now have been mentioned as potential new members of NATO. Why would we be afraid?

As my amendment says, to introduce to the North Atlantic Council a proposal for consideration by all allies aimed at establishing a process for dispute resolution—to keep our alliance strong, we must have a mechanism where disputes that we know are pending today by potential future members, or things we have not even thought might occur, if they do, why not have

a process that everyone has agreed is the way to hold this to a low level rather than raising to the high level of the North Atlantic Council?

Mr. President, we have seen border disputes in Europe erupt. We want to do everything. We want to go the extra mile to make sure we can resolve small things at a low level because small things can become big things. Then we would have troops at stake. Our security could be at stake. We want to lower the rhetoric.

That is what this amendment does. It does not guarantee the outcome of our proposal. It says we will lead. The United States will lead to try to make sure that we have a process before we need it, before personalities are involved where we can solve problems.

I hold up the New York Times of today: "Greek Cypriots To Get Missiles from Russians." "Turkey has warned that it may take military action to block the sale of S-300 missiles" going into that part of the world.

If we had talked about a process where we could be helpful in resolving disputes like this, wouldn't we be better off? Why would we fear talking and having a forum that would allow us to solve these problems before they escalate and our troops could be called in to military action? It is our responsibility to lead, and I am asking my colleagues to make sure we do.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Hutchison amendment No. 2317. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS) is necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ABRAHAM). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 37, nays 62, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 109 Ex.]

#### YEAS—37

Allard	Gramm	Roberts
Ashcroft	Gregg	Sessions
Bennett	Hatch	Shelby
Bond	Helms	Smith (NH)
Bumpers	Hutchinson	Snowe
Burns	Hutchison	Specter
Campbell	Inhofe	Stevens
Coats	Jeffords	Thomas
Conrad	Kempthorne	Thurmond
Craig	Kyl	Warner
Dorgan	McCain	Wyden
Enzi	Moynihhan	
Faircloth	Nickles	

#### NAYS—62

Abraham	Bingaman	Bryan
Akaka	Boxer	Byrd
Baucus	Breaux	Chafee
Biden	Brownback	Cleland

Cochran	Grassley	McConnell
Collins	Hagel	Mikulski
Coverdell	Harkin	Moseley-Braun
D'Amato	Inouye	Murkowski
Daschle	Johnson	Murray
DeWine	Kennedy	Reed
Dodd	Kerrey	Reid
Domenici	Kerry	Robb
Durbin	Kohl	Rockefeller
Feingold	Landrieu	Roth
Feinstein	Lautenberg	Santorum
Ford	Leahy	Sarbanes
Frist	Levin	Smith (OR)
Glenn	Lieberman	Thompson
Gorton	Lott	Torricelli
Graham	Lugar	Wellstone
Grams	Mack	

#### NOT VOTING—1

Hollings

The executive amendment (No. 2317) was rejected.

Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for up to 5 minutes as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. COCHRAN pertaining to the introduction of S. 2007 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.

#### EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2319

(Purpose: To set forth managers' amendments to the resolution of ratification)

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I ask unanimous consent that it be in order at this time to offer a managers' amendment on behalf of Senators HELMS and BIDEN. I further ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered agreed to and the motion to reconsider to be laid upon the table. I announce again that these are a series of amendments that have been cleared on both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will report the amendment by number.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Oregon [Mr. SMITH] for Mr. HELMS, for himself, and Mr. BIDEN, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2319.

(The text of the amendment is printed in today's RECORD under "Amendments Submitted.")

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. The managers' amendment which the Senator from Oregon has just offered addresses several of the amendments which have been offered by our colleagues. Let me very briefly highlight a few of them.

First, we have an amendment proposed by Senator BINGAMAN affirming the importance of the Partnership for Peace program.

Second, there is a provision offered by Senator HUTCHISON of Texas related to the strategic importance of NATO.

Third, there is an amendment offered by Senator SPECTER related to payments owed to the victims of Nazi Germany oppression.

Fourth, there is a requirement for a report on future rounds of enlargement. This amendment is a combination of amendments offered by our colleagues, Senators BINGAMAN, HARKIN, and JEFFORDS.

This is a very useful amendment, in my view, because it will require the executive branch to submit a detailed analysis related to the possible new members of NATO, including cost and military readiness issues before—before—a nation is invited to begin accession talks. This will, I hope, allow the Senate to have a better understanding of the ramifications of admitting new members in the future and thereby enable the Senate to fulfill its constitutional function of providing advice to the President in the negotiation of treaties.

Finally, Mr. President, there is an amendment related to intelligence issues which was proposed by the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator SHELBY and Senator KERREY of Nebraska.

I appreciate very much the cooperation of all our colleagues and urge the approval of the managers' amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous agreement, the amendment is agreed to.

The executive amendment (No. 2319) was agreed to.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I realize there is no unanimous consent agreement, but our colleague, Senator REED, has been here on the floor seeking to speak on NATO, and I yield for that purpose. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. President.

For the last several days, this Senate has been considering the expansion of NATO, which is a complicated issue that has profound consequences for the world we live in and for the future and security of the United States.

This decision which will shape the security structure of not just Europe, but the entire globe, for decades to come. It will also determine in large part whether new emerging democracies and free markets coming out of the shadow of totalitarianism will perish or flourish. It is not a decision that is without controversy, but it is a decision that I believe we must make in the affirmative, and I will support the expansion of NATO, the underlying legislation that we are debating today.

NATO was originally created because unstable conditions in Europe threatened not only the peace of Europe but the security of the United States. In the late 1940s, Europe was still in shambles after World War II. Economies were crumbling, political systems had endured great pressure, and factions arose. There was a very real threat, in fact, that many countries



would succumb to the blandishments of communism.

The possibility of a Communist victory in Europe was all too real. Communiques between the Soviet Union and the West had broken down. Berlin had been blockaded. Tension was at an all-time high. Communists were battling for control in Greece, France, and Italy; a Communist coup had already taken place in Czechoslovakia.

So when 12 countries came together to sign the North Atlantic Treaty Organization protocols, their goal was to protect the peace and stability of Europe and, indeed, the peace and stability of the world. The parties affirmed among themselves that their goal and their commitment was to ensure a peaceful and stable Europe, because within the context of that peace and stability they could begin to rebuild their economies and their democracies, and the strength of those democracies and those economies would truly preserve the peace.

As the Foreign Relations Committee stated in its report to the Senate in 1949, NATO would, "free the minds of men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery and progress."

In the last 50 years, the signatories' handiwork has borne itself out nobly, effectively, and efficiently. This assurance of peace and security was—and it is important to note—not limited to the original signatories to this treaty. In fact, Article X of the treaty allows for the admittance of new members to NATO. And since it was signed in 1949, NATO has expanded to include Turkey, Greece, Germany, and Spain.

In the 50 years since its inception, 50 years of progress and peace and stability in Europe, we have seen a remarkable revival in Western Europe. Their countries have been rebuilt. Their economies are thriving. Historical tensions between France and Germany have been channeled from hostility to cooperation. Although tensions still exist between some NATO partners, such as Greece and Turkey, NATO provides a forum and a place in which they can peacefully and amicably settle these disputes. It has been a resounding success. More importantly, NATO has stemmed the march of communism and contributed significantly to its collapse.

Because the true goal of NATO is for European peace and security—because it was not narrowly focused as any specific set of countries to the exclusion of others at its inception—I think it is appropriate that we consider the applications of those countries who are emerging from the shadow of the Soviet Union. I think it is, in fact, appropriate that we consider the countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic because they, too, need that sense of confidence, that sense of stability, that sense of peace that will allow them to build their economies and, perhaps

more importantly, build their democracies, so that they, too, can participate in the free assembly of nations in one of the proudest forums, NATO. NATO membership will also help these countries modernize their militaries and better defend themselves.

Now, I think most people would concede that this is an appropriate step in terms of the benefits I have listed. However, there are those who question this expansion, question it in terms of NATO having been conceived at a particular moment in history when a particular threat confronted Europe, the threat of an expansionist Soviet Union. Today, that has changed. The Soviet Union has collapsed, and, rightfully, people ask, "Where is the threat that would motivate and suggest the enlargement of NATO?"

Well, there are still threats to peace, still threats to Europe, still threats to the world community of free nations. In 1991, NATO recognized these changing conditions and authored a new strategic concept. This concept places more emphasis on crisis management, on peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. And it is appropriate and significant to know that these countries who seek admission today—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—are already participating with NATO in this new strategic approach.

These countries have contributed approximately 1,500 soldiers to our peacekeeping operations in Bosnia through the Partnership for Peace program. The U.S. offices have been very impressed with the cooperation, the professionalism, and skill of the Hungarians in their operations at our base in Tazsar, one of the major marshalling and staging points for our operations in Bosnia. All of these indicate that these countries are cooperating already, are seeking involvement, are seeking engagement, and I believe can benefit from association, integration, and participation in NATO.

Also, the expansion of NATO would help to quell the tensions that exist, the historical rivalries that exist, among these new areas emerging from Communist domination. As Secretary Cohen stated, we would "dampen nationalism and ethnic tensions by bringing new member states into NATO's security framework. The re-nationalization of defense, with a country obtaining weapons of mass destruction, 'arming itself against an enemy, real or perceived,' could be averted by enlargement."

This is an extremely valuable goal and objective. If we leave these countries to their own devices, they very well may feel threatened enough to rearm themselves, to begin an arms race within that region, that sensitive region between the old NATO boundary line and the lines of the Commonwealth of Independent States. That, I think, would be a real mistake.

There are signs already that the prospect of membership in NATO are beginning to provide very, very posi-

tive movements to resolve ancient and long-held tensions. For example, Hungary has entered into agreements with Slovakia and Romania, in 1995 and 1996 respectively, guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities. This is evidence that the prospect of NATO membership is already producing positive effects within these countries.

Again, of great significance is the fact that NATO membership for these countries would, I hope and believe, eliminate the need for them to build up arms independently against perceived threats. If we don't act to accept these countries, they very well could start an arms race in the area that would be detrimental to the peace not only of Europe, but of the world, and add to the tensions in the areas that are sensitive, those areas around the borders of Russia.

Having said all this, and having talked about the benefits that are, I think, obtainable through expansion of NATO, it would be, I think, incomplete to suggest that there are not factors which weigh on the other side. There are possible consequences that must be carefully watched with respect to the management of the enlargement of NATO.

There are, in fact, valid reservations that have been made with respect to this expansion. One of the major issues that has consistently been brought forward and presented to us is the possible adverse reaction of Russia. Russia is sensitive to the growth of NATO. They have seen for centuries the progress of military forces invading Russia through the plains of Poland. They are sensitive to this. Their sensitivity has been manifested in many different ways.

For example, the chairman of the upper House of Russia's Duma has said that START II won't be approved if NATO expands. In October of 1996, the Duma, in fact, passed a resolution opposing enlargement by a vote of 307-0.

Russian officials contend that the "Two plus Four" treaty which united Germany in 1991 prohibits the expansion of NATO. Although the treaty does not contain such language, there is suggestion by some of our diplomats that, in fact, there was a verbal commitment not to expand NATO.

All of these things manifest an opposition to NATO, but there are other signs indicating that Russia is prepared to accept this expansion, they are prepared to accept the integration of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For example, in May of 1997, in Paris, NATO allies and Russia signed a "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation." This Founding Act outlines the nature of the military presence in Eastern Europe upon expansion of NATO, and it also establishes a Permanent Joint Council between NATO and Russia to undertake consultations on matters of mutual interest.

Russia also continues to perform under the agreement, START I. In fact,

they are taking out and dismantling their nuclear platforms ahead of scheduled under START I.

Although we must be concerned with the reaction of Russia, I believe with respect to these three countries, Russia is prepared to accept expansion will not undermine our cooperative efforts to disarm the world and also be a force for cooperative peace in the world between the West and Russia.

Now, there are signposts ahead which we must be very careful of. The rapid integration, for example, of the Baltic States would send a profound sense of shock to Russia. Any further expansion beyond these three countries must be watched terribly carefully. I think we must be careful as we move forward not to rapidly and precipitously increase membership in NATO. To do so would, I think, undercut the benefits which we are obtaining through this limited expansion to these three countries.

Now, there is another issue which has been raised and which is also vitally important, and that is the cost of this expansion. We understand that numbers sometimes are in the eye of the beholder, and the cost figures that have been suggested for NATO expansion range across a very broad spectrum, from \$19 billion over 15 years to a mere \$1.5 billion over 10 years. Now, the CBO estimates are the most pessimistic. Their numbers for expansion would see total costs over 15 years for all of NATO expansion as roughly \$61 billion to \$125 billion, with our share about \$5 billion to \$19 billion.

The Rand Corporation has weighed in. They have estimated over 15 years a total cost of \$14 billion to \$110 billion. The administration's costs also show a wide variability. Again, NATO itself has projected probably the lowest cost, \$1.3 billion to \$1.5 billion.

All of this suggests that the issue of costs—and, more importantly, who pays for it—is vitally important to our considerations and is an issue we must continually watch and be very careful about. The bulk of these costs belong to those nations who are joining, but I think we have to question whether they have the economies to sustain such costs despite their best indications and willingness to do so.

Our allies also must be a source of burden sharing as we go forward, but many of their comments suggest that they have an unwillingness to do more than what they are obligated to do. President Chirac has stated that, "France has no intention of increasing its contribution to cover NATO enlargement." Even though all of the NATO countries accepted their NATO cost estimate, we recognize that estimate is most optimistic in terms of cost.

We must be very concerned about this. But at this juncture, I think that will be a factor that, in and of itself, should not prevent the expansion from going forward. We have to assume that costs will be incurred. We have to vig-

orously, through our efforts, ensure that they are fairly borne by all parties. We have to also do that in the context of our own national defense priorities and an increasingly tight defense budget. But I believe we can work through these issues and we can, in fact, ensure that the costs are not excessive and, in fact, they are fairly borne.

There is another set of issues that we face and that we should consider today, and that is the challenges of interoperability. The quality of NATO must be maintained. It is, today, the pre-eminent coalition force in the world. We have demonstrated that in Bosnia. But we are finding in these new entrants—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—armies that have aging Soviet equipment, armies that are heavy with high-ranking military officers without well-trained and, in many cases, noncommissioned officers.

Another factor is that these countries' pilots will typically fly only 40 to 60 hours in a year, whereas NATO requires at least 180. Communications is an issue. The language of NATO is English, yet reports are that many countries have not yet provided the kind of training and upgrading that is necessary so that their officers can speak English fluently and can participate effectively in NATO.

I think these obstacles can be overcome. NATO, in the past, has reached out and embraced new countries, many times embracing those countries that have equipment problems, that have different cultural and language bases than those in Western Europe. I think we can do it today. But, once again, we have to be very careful that we when do this, that we do it appropriately.

Let me just, once again, emphasize a point that is very important. Today's expansion—the acceptance and integration of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—I hope does not set off a rush to judgment with respect to other countries. These three countries have a history that is very closely related to Western Europe. These three countries have already shown their commitment to democracy, to free market economies. These three countries have much in common with the culture of Western Europe, which is at the core of the NATO experience.

So I strongly suggest that whatever we do with respect to expansion today, we do not presume to rush into further expansion tomorrow. Quick entry of more members will compound all of the problems I talked about—problems of costs, interoperability, the north-south relationship within NATO. Today I will support the integration of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, but I would be very wary of the integration of other countries into NATO.

In conclusion, I want to say that we have had a very thoughtful and principled debate on this issue. This is not an easy decision; it is a very important decision. Back in 1949, when the United States first joined NATO, it was also a

momentous occasion, one that was noted in the biography of President Harry Truman by David McCullough. Back then, he wrote that joining NATO "marked a radical departure with tradition—the first peacetime military alliance since the signing of the Constitution—but had such an agreement existed in 1914 and 1939, Truman was convinced, the world would have been spared two terrible wars."

The past 50 years have proven President Truman right. NATO has allowed democracy and free markets to thrive, has allowed peace to be maintained within Europe, and that peace has inspired others within the former Soviet Union. Today we have another opportunity. I hope that the expansion of NATO, the entry of these three new countries into NATO, will provide the same stability, the same peace, well into the 21st century.

Today, if we do in fact move forward and vote for the expansion, we take on a very solemn and important obligation, and that is to make this expansion work for peace and stability of the world, to ensure that we have not only the plan but the resources to ensure that NATO continues to be a force for peace in Europe and around the world. I believe we can do that. I believe we must do that.

I yield the floor.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, when I gave thought to what I wanted to say today, the words and deeds of two great Americans came to my mind—the words belong to Abraham Lincoln—the deeds were my father's.

In many respects, this debate was launched a half century ago in Europe. There, on the battlefields in Germany and France, Italy and Belgium, American soldiers fought and died to secure our future—our freedom. My father was one of those men. Standing shoulder to shoulder with friends, with fellow countrymen, he saw many fall in combat—never to rise again—never to return to their families—never to worship in their churches—to play an afternoon game of baseball with their sons and daughters.

My dad was proud to serve his country as a platoon guide—he was proud of the soldiers who became life-long friends, bound together over time by their common mission.

Decades before Staff Sergeant McConnell shipped out to the Rhineland, American heroism was memorialized in Lincoln's Address at Gettysburg. President Lincoln's words echoed across Europe's plains of courage and glory.

We cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us . . . a new birth of freedom.

Freedom.

That is the purpose President Lincoln defined for our nation—the noble calling my father served—the mission we must finish here today.

The debate this week centers on the wisdom of America, once again, expanding her horizons—adding to her security family—advancing freedom.

To reach this point, the Senate and Administration have struggled, often in open conflict, to redefine the terms of our relationship with Europe, and more particularly, Russia. These deliberations are as much about American responsibilities and interests, as they are about Russia's role and ambitions.

The commitment of my father and his fellow soldiers laid the moral foundation of this debate. The politics of Europe's future followed later and, to me, seemed joined in 1993. The Wall had fallen yet more thousands of Russian troops occupied the Baltic nations. Ever sensitive to Russian concerns, the Administration was reluctant to press Moscow to withdraw. Understandably, the Baltic nations were deeply concerned that they would never be free from Russia's imperial grasp. Against strong Administration opposition, the Senate voted 89-8 to condition aid to Russia on achieving an agreement for a withdrawal timetable. Remarkably, within weeks, negotiators produced a concrete plan for action.

This was my first direct experience with Russia's approach to the region. I think it is fair to say I learned a lesson Henry Kissinger sums up well—"It is, in fact, ambiguity about dividing lines not their existence, and ambivalence about Western reactions, not their certainty that tempt nationalists and militarists."

Sadly, fuzzy thinking, grey-beige lines and Moscow myopia continued to dog the Administration's European policy throughout 1993, 1994, and into 1995. No where was this mistaken course more apparent than the Administration's firm and abiding opposition to establishing a road map or criteria for admission to NATO. Senior officials engaged in a simple shell game arguing Eastern and Central European nations were not qualified to meet the standards to join NATO's ranks, yet they refused to define those standards. I recall a particularly frustrating session when Secretary Christopher appeared before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and I questioned him on this point. I asked him what exactly an applicant must do to join NATO? He claimed it was all spelled out in the NATO charter. "Where?" I pressed. "Right there," he demurred.

Of course, there were no specific terms for admission nor had any been imposed on other recent entrants. This game, which bent to Russian demands not to expand NATO, continued, eventually taking on new shape with the introduction of the Partnership for Peace. Dismissed by leaders in Poland as "treachery" and a "second Yalta," the Partnership drew no admissions

distinction between the historical victims of Russian aggression and the aggressor—everyone was welcome to join!

The President's team explained that this approach avoided establishing new blocs in Europe and would erase all dividing lines. What it erased was any sense of comfort in Central Europe about U.S. resolve, responsibility or commitment to stand up an ever ambitious Kremlin as it widened control over what Moscow deemed its "sphere of influence".

Administration briefers and papers systematically dodged the serious security issues related to expanding NATO. In preparing for a 1994 Treaty summit, Administration talking points declared, "We do not believe the summit should set a specific timetable or criteria for membership (in NATO) or identify preferred candidates . . . The (Partnership for Peace) will not give the Poles, Czechs or Hungarians all they want, but we think they will recognize it is an important step forward on NATO's part. At the same time it should not create problems in Russia."

The explanation was dismissed by a characteristically blunt Lech Walesa as "a tragedy".

July of 1994 was the real low point in the drive to expand NATO. It is marked in my mind by two events: the Senate defeated 53-44 an amendment I offered on admissions standards and the President traveled to Europe.

The amendment hardly seemed controversial—it was a reporting requirement asking the President to define specific military, political and economic standards for admission to NATO and then provide an assessment of what it would take to guarantee that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Baltic nations were capable of fulfilling military interoperability and other NATO responsibilities.

The Administration's overwhelming opposition was given a voice by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, who warned that this reporting requirement singled out certain countries and "draws dangerous new lines in Europe."

Just about this time, President Clinton left for Poland. Ever eloquent, he tried to reassure the Polish Assembly that the U.S. "would not allow the Iron Curtain to be replaced by the veil of indifference." His comments prompted the Chairman of their Foreign Affairs Committee to observe his speech was "beautiful, but did little to satisfy our security expectations." Walesa publicly lamented the fact that the Administration did not seem to understand Poland's "history and geography cautioned not to take this moment for granted."

What turned this debate around? When exactly did the Administration stop taking Central European security for granted?

I can pinpoint the moment—the month—when I saw and heard the change.

On February 9, 1995, Deputy Secretary Talbott appeared before the For-

eign Operations Subcommittee and spoke in vague generalities about American "hopes and expectations" for European security. I asked point blank, "Is it correct that there is no timetable and no criteria" for admission to NATO? His response was simple, "That is correct."

In March, with the arrival of Richard Holbrooke as the new Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, the policy changed. In a little noticed appearance before the Subcommittee, Holbrooke announced a major departure in American policy. He said, "Expanding NATO eastward is our highest priority . . . if NATO is a 16 car train, with a car for each member, the U.S. is clearly the engine."

This was the clearest definition of American purpose and leadership I had heard since President Clinton's election, and then Secretary Holbrooke went further. During the hearing, I asked and he answered six questions bearing on the standards for NATO eligibility including the relevance of democratic institutions, civilian control of the military, the size and NATO compatibility of the armed forces, and a nation's financial and infrastructure requirements. Getting straightforward answers was ground breaking!

From that moment forward, I found cooperation and support for funding and program initiatives which strengthened the military capabilities of potential entrants. In 1996, 1997, and 1998 the Subcommittee was able to set aside funds for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and then Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia to improve military training, equipment and capabilities with a view to accelerating their timetable for admission.

Mr. President, I could argue that Mr. Holbrooke's assignment to the European Bureau marked a key transition point in the NATO debate. However, there were many other factors which contributed to turning the tide. A shift in control of the Senate, our disastrous policy in Bosnia, Russia's role in destabilizing Georgia and abominable conduct in Chechnya—among many factors focused attention on the urgent need to revitalize U.S. leadership in a stronger Atlantic security alliance.

1995 marked the point when the Administration seemed to grasp a very basic concept articulated by Henry Kissinger—"an alliance depends on drawing lines around a specified territory that members undertake to defend. Basing European and Atlantic security on a no-man's land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period."

This Treaty reflects the fact that we have finally reached a point, with bipartisan agreement, where we draw new, bright lines in Europe. The vote this week affirms our commitment to protect our partners and our principles with an iron clad military guarantee.

Now is not the time for ambiguity. Today, is not the occasion to equivocate, qualify or confuse the message we

send to friends, allies and potential foe. Expanding our horizons and enlarging NATO safeguards our interests as it strengthens the sense of security in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the next class of entrants.

Shortly before the Madrid summit, leaders across Europe were asked about the importance and implications of expansion. Their answers offer a commanding vision of American interests in NATO's future.

Czech President Vaclav Havel offered a compelling view:

Membership is the best tool for a collective European defense, and for the defense of democratic values of states under the rule of law . . . Members will now work together to face a spectrum of threats, including local and regional conflicts.

The Chairman of Lithuania's Parliament strengthens the case for expansion:

NATO's declared open door policy . . . and firm stand on the principle that the Baltic countries have an unrestricted sovereign right to their own choice will only aid the emerging new Russia in living up to its obligations of normal European behavior.

Romania's President's goes further:

The process for preparing for NATO enlargement has led in less than four years to a broad and profound stability and solidarity in Central Europe.

Both he and Mr. Havel acknowledge that the enlargement process stimulated resolution of age-old border and ethnic policy disputes.

Poland's President's made a final point:

Enjoying traditionally close ties with the United States and being at the same time a profoundly Europe oriented society, Poland will contribute to the alliance's cohesion. As for the military dimension, the alliance will gain reliable and modernizing armed forces. We shall continue our active policy aimed at ensuring Central Europe remains a zone of stable and harmonious relations.

Central Europe's leaders have summed up with clarity and conviction the strategic political, economic, and security justification both for NATO and its expansion. They make clear that the importance of our decision this week will only increase over time.

While I am convinced of the arguments in favor of expansion, there is one concern raised by some of my colleagues which I wish to address—that is the doubt about providing security guarantees to new members.

I know there are Senators who would prefer to narrowly define the terms of participation of new members or limit our contribution or commitment to their defense. Unfortunately, such determinations would create a caste system—dismissing new or future members to second class citizen status. This would be a terrible mistake and undermine an alliance forged and strengthened by its tradition of common purpose, common defense, in short, a commitment to equality.

NATO's strength and credibility would be compromised by any decision to qualify new members with ambiguous standing. There should be no side-

deals, doubts or questions raised about the deployment of weapons or troops on a new member's soil. This Treaty must be implemented with the firm understanding that new members are full partners entitled to full protection and expected to bear full responsibility. We cannot create damaging divisions within the alliance by imposing restrictions on the nature of participation.

Only instability and uncertainty would result from creating such a double standard for defense. Only Democracy's opponents would gain ground. Only those who have long maligned closing the gap between East and West—who yearn for the days of despots and communists kings—would win.

We should not cast votes which serve to encourage Zhirinovskiy's storm troopers. Our call is to stand by the champions of free market principles—to stand up for the voices which appeal for democracy's day.

I'm sure there may still be a senator or two unconvinced that American lives should be laid down to defend Budapest or Prague. Let me remind those colleagues of remarks made by Margaret Thatcher when she called Great Britain to the defense of the Falklands. She said, "To those—not many—who speak lightly of a few islanders beyond the seas and who ask the question, 'Are they worth fighting for?' Let me say this: right and wrong are not measured by a head count of those to whom that wrong has been done. That would not be principle but expediency. The Falklanders are not strangers. They are our own people."

With more than 23 million Americans of Central and East European descent, Prime Minister Thatcher's insight and the analogy reach across our nation into every community.

NATO exists to defend principle not expediency.

I know some of my colleagues feel we are rushing to judgment. For those friends and colleagues, I call attention to the fact that I believe this debate has gone on at least five years—it has taken a long time and much effort to bring the Administration to this important decision.

The cause is important—the reasoning sound. Our vote to expand NATO's European frontier strengthens the pillars of democracy and free market principles, stimulates dispute resolution, balances and restrains Russian ambitions, reduces military tensions, and adds new security capabilities.

In short, we take one step closer to finishing the mission President Lincoln called upon our nation to faithfully serve.

Freedom.

I know my father and his friends would have been proud to defend our choice, our invitation to Poland, to Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, every one of us has memories of historical events that stay with us forever. Those

times in history that are so momentous, they strike at our heart and leave a lasting imprint for all our years.

I think back to the fall of 1956, when the people of Hungary bravely renounced the shackles of tyranny, only to have their dreams of freedom and democracy brutally suppressed. I will never forget sitting around the television with my family, watching the TV footage of this major challenge to Soviet rule be crushed by tanks. Those were dark days for Hungary, as they were for Poland, the Czech Republic, and all nations behind the Iron Curtain.

The memory of those times makes me appreciate to my core how wonderful it is that the countries of the former Soviet Union are now free and that three of them have the opportunity to join the peaceful community of nations that make up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To me, the post-Cold War Era will be truly over when all the nations of Europe—west and east—join in an alliance that will in and of itself indicate a Europe at peace.

Mr. President, I support NATO expansion, and do so for one primary reason: I truly believe that expanding the NATO alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will lead to greater peace and security throughout Eastern Europe—the same peace and security that American leadership was able to provide Western Europe for the past 49 years. In that time, no American soldier has had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally, nor has NATO ever had to wage war to fulfill its security guarantees.

A peaceful, secure Europe is necessary for a peaceful, secure America. We are inextricably linked. In two World Wars, American troops have fought and died as a result of instability in Europe. Through collective defense, an enlarged NATO will help reduce the chance of another major European conflict.

The formation of NATO in 1949 has enabled Europe to flourish into the prosperous region it is today. I believe history will show that the transformation of a war-ravaged Europe in the first half of the twentieth century to the safe and secure Europe we have seen in the second half of the century is among the most remarkable achievements of our time. I believe NATO can bring that same stability to the former Warsaw Pact nations.

What is also remarkable are the recent achievements of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. These nations have made great strides to reform their economic and political systems to conform with international norms and to provide greater freedom for its citizens. These nations have placed their armed forces under civilian control and have resolved historical disputes that have threatened the region. In all, ten major accords have settled ethnic and border disputes throughout Eastern Europe. These include agreements between Poland and Lithuania, Poland

and the Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, Germany and the Czech Republic.

During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's thorough debate on the NATO issue, Colonel Herbert Harman, the National Commander of the Reserve Officers Association, stated that, "over time, the defensive nature of NATO will become clear to all parties, and with it, the realization that NATO threatens no one." I agree. NATO is strictly a defensive alliance. It does not aim to pose a military threat to Russia or any other nation. I know some of my colleagues do not see it this way, but Russia is making moves toward democracy and those have been recognized by the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Founding Act, signed in May 1997, created the Permanent Joint Council, a useful forum where NATO and Russia can consult on security issues of mutual interest. This will help facilitate a trusting and constructive relationship between NATO and Russia. Last fall, Ambassador Thomas Pickering put it best when he said, "it is in the security interest of the United States, NATO, and the States of Central Europe to have constructive relations with Moscow, and to integrate a peaceful Russia into the world community." I would also point out that NATO has an open door policy to other nations wishing to join NATO, including Russia, as long as NATO members determine it would promote European security and the strategic interests of the Alliance.

Mr. President, there is a long list of high-ranking officials and organizations who support NATO expansion. These include every living former Secretary of State, the former Majority Leader Senator Dole, former National Security Adviser Colin Powell, several veterans groups—including the American Legion—and many, many others. Let us hear the thoughts of some of these distinguished people on NATO expansion.

Secretary Henry Kissinger says that NATO enlargement "represents above all an overriding American political interest." Secretary James Baker claims, "The Cold War's legacy of great power confrontation in Europe will be truly ended only when it is replaced by a collaborative structure between former antagonists. The expansion of NATO should be seen in this light." Our current Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, states that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, "will not just be consumers of security by the United States but producers of a more secure Europe; and also because the United States has interests in Europe, producers of security for the United States." Senator Dole maintains, "The enlargement of NATO will strengthen security, freedom, and peace in Europe. It will secure the gains of democracy in Central Europe."

Once again, I support expanding NATO to include the nations of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and

want to thank both the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for all their hard work on this historic issue. Let me end with the words of President Clinton, who said, "A new NATO can extend the blessings of freedom and security in a new century . . . we can bring Europe together—not by force of arms, but by possibilities of peace. That is the promise of this moment. And we must seize it."

#### UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, on behalf of the leader, that the following amendments, declarations, and conditions be the only remaining in order, other than the pending amendment, and following the disposition of the listed issues, the Senate proceed to vote on the committee reported amendment, as amended, to be followed by adoption of the resolution of ratification, all without further action or debate, following 90 minutes of debate equally divided.

The list of amendments, declarations and conditions is as follows: An amendment by Senators WARNER and MOYNIHAN mandating a 3-year moratorium, under a 2-hour agreement, with an up-or-down vote; Senator MOYNIHAN's amendment that defers membership until members of EU, under a 1-hour agreement; Senator STEVENS' amendment on cost; Senator STEVENS' amendment on caps; Senator INHOFE's amendment on submission of the Kyoto Protocol; Senator ROBERT SMITH's amendment on Bosnia; Senator CONRAD, tactical nuclear weapons; Senator NICKLES, strategic concept of NATO; Senator BINGAMAN, Baltics; Senator BINGAMAN, strategic concepts; Senator HARKIN, costs; Senator HARKIN, arms control; Senator BIDEN, relevant amendment; and Senator HELMS, relevant amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, after extensive study, discussions, and deliberation, I have decided to vote against ratifying the treaty to expand NATO. Since my college days, when I wrote my senior thesis on U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, I have supported a strong U.S. role in international affairs. I oppose NATO expansion now because it does not fulfill NATO's basic purpose in countering the U.S.S.R. military threat that existed from 1945 to 1991 but, instead, creates a new potential threat from Russia.

As a frequent participant in the North Atlantic Assembly meetings since the spring 1981 session in Venice, I have always felt that the United States consistently paid more than its fair share of the NATO burden. Our national interests were so substantial in countering the Soviet threat in Western Europe that it was worthwhile not to withdraw because other nations did not do their part in burden sharing.

As noted in my votes and previous floor statements, I do not believe our vital national interests justify the extent of our contribution in Bosnia. In my judgment, that is a matter where European nations should have taken charge. It is always hard to say when century-old hostilities in the Balkans may threaten the peace, but the issue is sufficiently a European obligation that I do not think the United States should again be pulling the "laboring oar"—that is, doing more than our share.

The inclusion in NATO of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is the unmistakable start of bringing in more nations than the United States should be obligated to defend. It is getting us deeper into potential quicksand, like Bosnia. Perhaps even more important, including those countries poses more of a risk of a Russian military action against them than assurances of their national security. There is the obvious risk that Russia, with a deteriorating army, may choose to use its enormous nuclear arsenal.

The representations that Russian President Boris Yeltsin does not object to NATO enlargement do not answer the threat that Russia might retaliate under a new leader. President Yeltsin's government is unstable. His health may be even worse. Radical Russian elements have already used NATO expansion as a potential argument to take over the Russian Presidency. Final action on expansion of NATO may give them the political weapon to succeed. So instead of strengthening NATO, the expansion may subject NATO to attack with the possible focus on its newest members.

In 1949, the United States and its allies in Europe literally joined forces to define the post-World War II world. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established with a clear mission: collective defense of its members. NATO became the centerpiece of the U.S. policy of collective security and defined our military commitment to our allies in Europe. Throughout the Cold War, NATO protected U.S. interests and U.S. allies in Europe by providing a framework through which to overcome the political instabilities in post war Europe. NATO started out as a military alliance of 12 members and eventually expanded to a military alliance of 16 members. Turkey and Greece have been members since 1952, Germany since 1955, and Spain since 1982.

Then, in 1989, the political landscape in Europe changed. The Berlin Wall fell. The Cold War was over. The Warsaw Pact disbanded. In 1990, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disintegrated. In its stead, across central and eastern Europe and in Russia itself, fledgling governments began the transition to democracy and market-oriented economies. The original goal of NATO had been fulfilled.

Immediately after the fall of communism, NATO began to reevaluate its role and purpose. NATO has redefined

its organization to focus not only on collective defense, but also on "promoting stability throughout Europe through cooperation and by developing the means for collective crisis management and peacekeeping." Furthermore, what started out as a military organization of first 12 then 16 nations is now holding out the possibility of membership for at least 12 new members and even more if the Administration's rhetoric comes to fruition.

My former colleagues Senator Howard Baker and Senator Sam Nunn, along with former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye from the Council on Foreign Relations wrote in February that the Administration's premise that NATO should be open to many additional members "is a prescription for destroying the alliance" which will antagonize Russia. In their words, NATO expansion is "an ill-defined invitation for new members unrelated to either military threats or military capabilities."

I agree with their interpretation that an expanded NATO is unrelated to current military threats and capabilities. I question U.S. participation in an organization increasingly devoted to "crisis management and peacekeeping." While NATO was originally designed to counter the threat of communism, it will increasingly be called upon to counter new threats facing the region: particularly civil unrest and ethnic conflict in Eastern and Central Europe. Membership in NATO involves a serious commitment to defend other members if attacked. As NATO expands, the United States may well be obligating itself to become involved in a potentially great number of conflicts that are strictly European in nature and not a direct threat to vital U.S. national security interests. I do not believe the United States should commit to involvement in ethnic and civil hotspots throughout Europe, but should reserve the option to decide on such involvement on a case by case basis.

Furthermore, NATO reports from the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid state that the end of the Cold War has provided the opportunity to "build an improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area without recreating dividing lines." This line of reasoning is unsound. If NATO is in fact to remain a primarily military alliance, how can including new members not recreate dividing lines? It is likely that the new dividing lines will antagonize Russia.

Last year, in an open letter to the President, 50 former Senators, cabinet secretaries and ambassadors, as well as arms control advisors and foreign policy experts, called for postponement of NATO expansion until other security options are explored. In their letter, they expressed concerns about drawing "a new line of division in Europe, between the 'ins' and the 'outs' of NATO," which would actually work to increase regional instability and decrease the security of those not included.

George Kennan, most noted for the policy of containment of Russian expansive tendencies, who later disclaimed the view that containment meant stationing military forces around Soviet borders, wrote in the New York Times last year that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era." He went on to ask:

Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the cold war, should East-West relations become centered on the question of who would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom in some fanciful, totally unforeseeable and most improbable future military conflict?

Kennan pointed out that the Russians are not impressed with American assurances that NATO expansion does not reflect hostile intentions. In fact, he notes, the Russians "would continue to regard it as a rebuff by the West and would likely look elsewhere for guarantees of a secure future." What comes to mind is forcing Russia to move even closer to China or Iran.

Michael Brown, then senior fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, cautioned early on in 1994, when NATO was first addressing the question of new members, that "NATO expansion should be tied to strategic circumstances: If Russia takes steps to threaten Central Europe militarily, NATO should offer membership to as many states in the region as possible." Otherwise, Brown pointed out, correctly I think, that "Russian aggression would be encouraged, not discouraged by NATO expansion."

Potential Russian presidential candidates are already preparing themselves for the next Russian presidential election in 2000 and NATO expansion is already on the platform. Alexander Lebed, a likely top contender for the Russian presidency, wrote in an opinion piece last year that NATO expansion is drawing Russia into "a process of mutual provocations." He cautioned that "a reversion to old ways threatens the system of agreements which until recently had provided stability in Europe."

One year later, the Russians remain quite clear on how they view NATO expansion. Russia's ambassador to the United States, Yuli Vorontsov, commented in the March 10, 1998 Washington Post on what he calls the "authentic Russian view" of NATO expansion.

In his article, Ambassador Vorontsov advises that "Russia's attitude toward NATO enlargement has been and remains unequivocally negative. The signing of the Russia-NATO Founding Act does not alter that attitude in any manner." He goes on to say, "If enlargement goes forward, there are no guarantees that everything positive we have developed in the relationship between Russia and leading Western countries will not be put in severe jeopardy."

The most telling Russian reaction to date has been the Russian Duma's delayed vote on ratification of the

START II treaty. Lebed contends that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and other arms control treaties could all be reconsidered.

In my college senior thesis, I was very much impressed by the famous words of Winston Churchill, which he gave in a 1939 London radio broadcast when he was first lord of the admiralty. Commenting on his inability to forecast the action of Russia, Churchill described Russia as " \* \* \* a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." But perhaps more telling is the oft-forgotten phrase following. Churchill went on to say that " \* \* \* perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." NATO expansion is clearly not in the Russian national interest, and the West can expect Russia to react accordingly.

I believe that the United States and Russia must maintain a real balance of power if we are going to coexist as peaceful nations. Clearly, if NATO is to remain a strictly military alliance, expanding NATO to the east means tilting the balance of power toward the west. If the desire is to create greater economic and political cooperation among Western and Central European nations, there are already existing organizations such as the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and others to take up this task.

Many claim that there is now a security vacuum in Central Europe that NATO expansion can address. On the contrary, I believe NATO expansion is creating just such a vacuum. It is implausible to think that Russia would send conventional troops into Central Europe any time soon.

While it is probable that there are lingering fears of Russian aggression in the countries of Central Europe, Russia's current Army capabilities make such an advance next to impossible. Furthermore, the West would never tolerate a repeat of past Russian aggression in these countries.

On the other hand, it is plausible to think that Russia will revisit the status of its relations with the Baltic nations, Ukraine and Belarus. Oddly enough, these may be the countries most likely to be adversely affected by NATO expansion and the very nations not to be included in the first round of new members. We must also not forget Russian military involvement in Georgia and in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. How will NATO expansion influence Russian military action in the Caucasus?

In 1992, I presented remarks at the North Atlantic Assembly meeting in the Netherlands while I was part of a Senate delegation visiting the Assembly, commenting then that there was an unease among the American people over the cost of U.S. foreign relations obligations. That is not to say that the predominant U.S. view would ever return to the isolationist ideology of the



1930s, but the question I posed then was: What is fair and equitable? As a longtime member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I believe many Americans still feel the same unease when it comes to U.S. contributions to areas clearly outside our vital national interests.

Again in 1993, after returning from the next North Atlantic Assembly meeting, in remarks on the Senate floor, I commented on the debate under way in NATO at the time on inviting new members to join the alliance. There were signs at the time that NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly were looking more toward economic matters than defense matters. Furthermore, when we talked to the Director of the Center for Strategic Stability, he made the point that the Russians were very concerned about an expanding alliance. The concern then was what would happen with respect to Russia being isolated. I do not believe this question has been adequately addressed.

Last January, I made remarks on the Senate floor concerning my participation in the 1996 North Atlantic Assembly meeting. I noted that NATO has been perhaps the most successful international collective security arrangement in the world's history, ultimately achieving its once thought unattainable goal of containing and outlasting the empire of the former Soviet Union through a vigilant deterrence rather than actual conflict. It was this successful because it was more than a mutual defense pact. It is the coming together, across the Atlantic, of the power of the ideas of freedom and democracy. However, I pointed out that NATO's very success in achieving its original aim is the basis of the present quandary of the alliance. I asked then, and I repeat now: In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union there are many reasons—including our responsibility to wisely spend American taxpayers' dollars—why we must ask what is NATO for now, what countries should be a part of the Alliance, and what roles and burdens should be played and borne by the different members of the North Atlantic community?

In the year since I gave these remarks, there has been much discussion and debate on NATO expansion, here in the Senate and in the media. I believe the situation now in Bosnia gives us reason to pause and reflect on these questions before we commit the United States to even more security obligations in Eastern and Central Europe.

During my visit last December to Bosnia, I asked our troops to estimate how long we would need to stay there to avoid the resumption of bloodshed which would happen if they left on Congress' schedule. The answer was a "generation," given the intensity and longevity of the religious and ethnic tensions in the region. There is no doubt about the dire consequences if fighting resumes among the Muslims,

Serbs and Croats. The entire region would be destabilized. Certainly, the current situation in Kosovo is cause for great alarm. Russia has come out on the side of the Serbs against the United States and Europe. In the short term, the ability of the West to work with Russia will aid in the resolution of this issue. This picture changes in the long-term. Albania, Kosovo's neighbor to the south, is on the long list of countries proposed for NATO membership.

There is significant question as to how far can U.S. military resources be stretched on the current \$268 billion defense budget. The top military brass in Bosnia had no answer to my question on priorities in deciding how to spend among Bosnia, Korea, Iran, Iraq and the world's other hot spots.

Now we add to this the additional costs of NATO expansion. Although the Administration says the total cost of expansion will be \$27 to \$35 billion—the U.S. portion being \$1.5–\$2 billion over 10 years—other estimates for the cost of NATO expansion range as high as \$125 billion. There are many unanswered questions about the cost of NATO expansion.

We have good reason to conclude that the estimates of the administration as usual, are deceptively low.

If we use Bosnia as an example, how much more are we willing to spend in Europe than the Europeans themselves? Doing our part does not mean doing more than other major European nations. This is not the Cold War where the United States squared off against the USSR and our dominant role in NATO protected our vital national interests. Obviously, Bosnian stability is of much greater concern to the European nations than it is to the U.S. although you wouldn't know it from the contributions in Bosnia today. This also does not mean that the United States cannot play an important strategic role in the region, for the United States has played a successful leading role in the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

The United States will always play a role in peace and security in Europe. We all applaud the great success of the new countries of Eastern and Central Europe on their transition to democracy and free-market economies. However, as we move into the 21st century, I believe this is not the time for NATO expansion.

We would be moving away from the basic premise that NATO was expanded to protect Western Europe from Soviet attack. We would be looking at a Russia now, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which is not stable. We are trying to build up our relationships with Russia. Certainly this would be very counterproductive.

As I noted earlier, I recall very well in my studies at the University of Pennsylvania noting in my college thesis on United States-U.S.S.R. relations the description of Winston Churchill that Russian foreign policy was a mystery surrounded by a puzzle wrapped in

an enigma. It is puzzling as to what the Russian will do next. They are enigmatic.

While we are on the path which has a reasonable possibility of leading to peace and stability, the inclusion of new NATO members I do believe would be counterproductive.

For these reasons, I oppose the expansion of NATO at this time.

I intend to vote against the ratification of this treaty.

I thank the Chair.

I yield the floor.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that I have listened rather attentively to the debate the past 3 days. It has all been heartfelt. A lot of it has been very thoughtful. I think it has been instructive for the Senate to hear this debate.

I spent a lot of time reading a lot of articles, doing a lot of research and trying to reach a conclusion that I felt not only was correct, but one that I would feel very comfortable with not just today but in future years.

I have heard a lot of people say the average man on the street in Russia does not really care about NATO expansion. I agree with that. He or she doesn't care about it right now, just as the American people are not zeroed in on partial-birth abortion right now. But you wait until October and November comes and all those 30-second spots start appearing on television, and those awful, barbaric films are shown just before the election, and you will find that virtually everybody in America cares about that issue. And when the election in Russia is held in the year 2000, you can rest assured the hard-liners are going to have a picnic.

Mr. President, I have read a number of times that we should not let the Russian hard-liners dictate our foreign policy. I agree with that. By the same token, I do not think we ought to gratuitously allow the Russian hard-liners to dictate internal policy in Russia as well as foreign policy to come.

I am one who believes that peace on the Eurasian Continent and probably in the world is dependent on our engaging Russia over the next several years. I do not denigrate any of the arguments for ratification. I think a lot of the arguments are very compelling for expanding NATO. But when I weigh what I believe will be the cost sometime in the future compared to the benefits, I believe the cost is likely to far outweigh the benefits.

What do we get out of it? Not NATO but the United States. How are we enriched? How is our security aided by taking in these three countries? If, as I believe at some point the hard-liners in Russia are going to have a field day with this, just as there are people in this body and in the United States who cannot give up on the cold war, I think we are going to pay a heavy price.

Nobody should cling to the naive belief that a lot of this expansion is not dictated by the hard-liners in this country. We have our own. We have

people who after 50 years of fearing the great Russian bear and communism and the Soviet Union have a very difficult time turning loose that philosophy.

I hear it said that we gave our word to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and we must follow through on our word. I hear it said that they have suffered enough. And God knows, we can all relate to that. We all know what Eastern Europe endured under the foot of communism and the U.S.S.R. for 45 years after World War II. Not only are we sympathetic, in my opinion, without the expansion of NATO, the United States and our allies in Europe would come to the rescue of any of these countries if they were threatened. But we should bear in mind also in that connection that it was not Russia, it was not the Soviet Union that invaded Czechoslovakia, that invaded Poland and Hungary.

We hear all of these soothing assurances from proponents of enlargement that NATO is a defensive alliance; we have no aggressive intentions. I believe that. Of course, that is true. But I am not Russia. I ask the Members of this body, if the shoe were on the other foot how would they feel? Incidentally, I might say that one of the most powerful speeches I have ever heard made on the Senate floor was about 30 seconds long during the Panama Canal Treaty debate. That was by far the most volatile political issue to confront this body since I have been in the Senate. Everybody that was going to vote for it—and it had 67 votes—was trying to cleanse their skirts with their constituents back home. And Henry Bellmon, a wonderful Republican Senator from Oklahoma, stood at his desk at about where the Senator from Indiana is seated right now and said: "I have agonized about this for 6 weeks. The President's called me. The Secretary of State's called me, and people on the other side have called me. Mr. President, I have decided that I think we ought to treat the Panamanians the way we would want to be treated, and therefore I am going to vote for the treaties." He shortly thereafter announced he would not run again because he knew he could not possibly be reelected in Oklahoma with that vote. You talk about a profile in courage. That is probably the most dramatic illustration of it I have seen since I have been in the Senate.

And so I ask you this: If this treaty were being executed by Russia, Mexico and Canada, and Russia was saying not to worry, don't worry about us lining up with Mexico and Canada on your border, we have no aggressive intentions, how would that go over?

Mr. President, we cannot deny what this treaty is all about. It is to hem Russia in. The Russians are not stupid.

Look at some of the declarations in the resolution itself. Paragraph (2)(A)(i). It says:

Notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe and the dissolu-

tion of the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies face threats to their stability and territorial integrity including [listen to this] the potential for the emergence of a hegemonic power in Europe.

That is No. 1. "The potential for the emergence of a hegemonic power in Europe."

Now, the Russians would never guess who we were referring to with that. Further:

The invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or their destabilization arising from external subversion, would threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United States national security interests.

Who would invade Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic? The Russians would never guess who we were referring to in this resolution.

Listen to this:

Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability in Central Europe, deter potential aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and its NATO allies.

Question: Who do you think the potential aggressor is?

Or, perhaps the Russians will never see or know about a letter I received in my office last week from Mr. Bruce Jackson, president of the United States Committee to Expand NATO. Here is what he said:

Dear Senator:

I am forwarding a copy of Charles Krauthammer's opinion piece which appeared on April 17 in the Washington Post while the Senate was in recess. While I cannot say that every member of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO shares Dr. Krauthammer's views on Russia, we are in complete agreement with his conclusion:

NATO expansion is simply a return to—a ratification of normality . . . It is the easiest U.S. foreign policy call of the decade.

If you need any additional information, call me.

This is the Committee to Expand NATO, saying we agree with virtually everything Dr. Krauthammer said in his article in the Washington Post. And what did Dr. Krauthammer say? Listen to this headline. This is the headline of the Krauthammer article that that committee says they agree with totally. "Is NATO expansion directed against Russia? Of course it is."

What would our response be if we were in Russia's shoes? Their conventional forces are in shambles, their economy is a basket case, their people are demoralized and they are experiencing the fifth consecutive year of economic negative growth. The most dangerous thing in the world is for a bully to jump on somebody who is weak. You know what I have always said? I think government has a role in our lives. I think government has a role in protecting the weak from the bully. I am not saying the United States is a bully. But I am saying, when we expand NATO at a time when Russia is on their hunkers and everybody knows it—mostly the Russians—what would our response be? We have assured Russia orally we will not put nuclear weapons in Poland, Hungary,

and the Czech Republic. But we have refused to put that in writing. You think of that.

Again, I am going to come back to the broken promise of all broken promises in just a moment. But here we are telling Russia that we will not put nuclear weapons in the three countries that we are taking into NATO, "So you have nothing to fear." But we don't want to put it in writing. And yesterday the U.S. Senate, by a vote of 90 to 9, said the very foundation of NATO requires a nuclear presence in Europe and those three countries were not excluded in that amendment.

The Russians would have to be naive beyond all imagination to believe that Dr. Krauthammer wasn't saying it exactly right. NATO enlargement is designed to hem Russia in.

Mr. President, the last time Russia took our word for something was in 1990. It was in a meeting during a meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev, and the promise was very simple, according to Jack Matlock, who was our Ambassador to Russia at the time. When the Soviet empire was falling apart and the Germans were clamoring to reunify the west and east, we promised Mikhail Gorbachev that if he would not interfere with the reunification of Germany, we would never move NATO 1 foot further east toward Russia. I have no documentation to prove that, but I called Jack Matlock, who knows what happened, and asked him. He assured me in roughly a 30-minute conversation, over and over and over, that not only did the United States promise Russia we would not move any further—wouldn't move NATO any further east toward Russia, Helmut Kohl later joined in the promise. I am not saying that Gorbachev had that much option. I am saying we made the promise. Again, an oral promise.

Let me go back to the rationale some people use for saying we have to go through with this. It is because we promised the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary that we would do it. How about our promises to Russia that we would not?

So, what are we doing to Russia? We are forcing them to rely more and more heavily on nuclear weapons. And the more you rely on nuclear weapons, the lower the hair trigger for nuclear war. Why are they depending on nuclear weapons? It is cheaper. They can maintain a nuclear force at a fraction of the cost of maintaining a conventional force in case NATO did attack them.

Are we safer with the Russians depending on nuclear weapons? Of course we are not. That is another big negative to this whole thing. And the Duma says they are not going to ratify START II. Maybe they will. I hear arguments on both sides of that. But I can tell you this, START II is extremely important to the security of the world and it is extremely important to the security of the United States. But the Duma has not ratified

it. They have talked about it for almost 2 years now and they have not ratified it.

So, what does that mean? It means we have to maintain our nuclear forces on a high state of readiness, at an extra cost of several billion dollars a year. There has been a lot of talk about who is going to pay for all of the new weaponry for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Nobody has mentioned the fact that instead of destroying weapons, as we would under START II, we may very well not only keep them but keep them on a high state of readiness, and it is already costing us several billion dollars a year to maintain the extra nuclear forces.

What are our friends in Russia saying? Mr. President, I feel this may be the most salient point I can make in the debate on why I do not intend to vote for the expansion of NATO. What are our friends—who we are depending on to democratize and bring sanity to the Soviet Union and bring that poor, bedraggled nation into the 20th century—what are they saying?

Victor Chernomyrdin, everybody thought he was a rational, moderate person. Vice President GORE is genuinely fond of him and met with him many times. What does he think about this? Here is what he said:

We will never agree that the expansion of NATO is needed now, since its doctrine of confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and Russia, has not essentially changed.

That is one of our good friends. Then: The Russian Federation National Security Blueprint which was signed by Boris Yeltsin:

The prospect of NATO expansion to the east is unacceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security.

What did the State Duma, the principal legislative body in Russia, say 3 months ago? This wasn't way back in the past, it was January 23 this year. They passed a resolution saying:

Given the weakening of Russia's defense capacity, NATO enlargement means the appearance of the most serious military threat to our country since 1954.

And here is Yuli Vorontsov, Ambassador to the United States:

I would say that movement of NATO forces close to the Russian borders is generally being considered by all political forces in Russia as a threat. You can ask anybody there. Do not just ask Communists; we know what they will say. Ask liberals, ask democrats, ask young and ask old. Nobody in Russia is applauding this move, because everybody is afraid it is going to be a military threat.

That is what our friends in Russia say. What they say is, "You're cutting our legs off right under us. We want to be friends. We want Russia to move into the 21st century, and we want peace on the Eurasian continent. So what in the name of God are you doing threatening us with this expansion?"

Bill Clinton made one of the most poignant statements he has ever made in his life back in 1992 when he was running for President. April 1992—listen to this beautiful statement:

What does a democratic Russia mean to Americans? Lower defense spending, a reduced nuclear threat, a diminished risk of environmental disasters, fewer arms exports and less proliferation, access to Russia's vast resources through peaceful commerce, and the creation of a major new market for American goods and services.

That is what President Clinton said in a beautiful statement in 1992 when he was candidate Clinton.

What does Admiral Bill Crowe say? And Admiral Crowe, incidentally, favors the expansion of NATO, but he wrote some beautiful words about it. Listen to it. I think everybody in this body and everybody whoever knew him has a profound respect for Bill Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently Ambassador to the Court of St. James. He said:

Put bluntly, the outcome of events in Russia can directly affect the future of the free world. The epic journey of that great nation is far from over . . . If the Russian people ultimately return to some form of autocracy, it would be a genuine disaster, not only for them but for us as well. In essence, I would judge that Russia is our number one foreign policy challenge, and it would be folly to treat it otherwise.

Yet we are engaging in precisely what he said—folly. What did Jack Matlock, who was our Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time, say?

In making a major effort to bring more members into NATO when countries who wish to join face no military threat, the administration undermines its ability to protect the United States and its allies from potential nuclear leakage from Russia.

He goes on to say:

Russia may have no choice other than to accept an enlarged NATO, but in the ensuing atmosphere of political estrangement, close cooperation in nuclear matters, never easy, will become even more difficult. It will also be much harder to maintain the momentum of weapons destruction if it appears to Russian military planners that they must maintain a nuclear option in order to balance an expanding NATO.

Mr. President, did you know that we have spent billions of dollars in Russia helping them dismantle their nuclear weapons? That is what we call Nunn-Lugar money around here. It is the best money we have ever spent. I promise you, Mr. President, I promise you that the Russians are going to ultimately say, "Get out. We thought you were serious about dismantling our nuclear weapons and dismantling yours, but if you are going to treat us this way and show this kind of bad faith toward our good faith in dismantling our nuclear weapons and letting you do it, it is over."

Our former colleague Sam Nunn who was the most revered person on military matters I ever served with—and believe you me, Sam Nunn and I had plenty of disagreements—is opposed to NATO expansion. Here is what Sam Nunn said:

I believe it is essential for the Clinton administration and our allies to start laying the groundwork now for a "soft landing" for U.S.-Russian relations in the wake of NATO enlargement. Unless this is accomplished soon, there will be a significant deteriora-

tion in U.S.-Russian and allied-Russian relations, and a political climate may emerge in Russia which erodes the ability and the willingness of Russian leaders to make rational decisions on critical foreign policy matters.

Even those Russians who are most inclined to seek compromise and who see no military threat in the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO would find the expansion of NATO into the geopolitical space claimed by the former Soviet Union intolerable.

Of course they find it intolerable.

Mr. President, I do not speak out of fear of Russia. I do not speak out of denigration of my colleagues who think this is absolutely the right thing to do. It is no secret that President Clinton and I have been close friends for 25 years, and I have, I think, the best record in the Senate of supporting his legislation. Maybe one other Senator has a better record than I have. But I think he would be the first person to understand my strong feelings that this is a mistake.

When I about this subject, I think of all throughout history, from Napoleon to Hitler, who have underestimated Russia. And I can tell you we are underestimating Russia, we are assuming that she is always going to be an economic basket case, that she will never be able to build her conventional forces and that she will always accept our soothing assurances that our intentions are defensive and not offensive.

One of the best books I ever read in my life, Mr. President, is called "The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam," by Barbara Tuchman. No young person should be allowed to graduate from high school and certainly not from college without reading Barbara Tuchman's "The March of Folly."

Bill Lind, who most of the people in this body know, an expert on military affairs of some note, widely respected, wrote an article about NATO enlargement not long ago, and he refers to this magnificent book, "The March of Folly." He said:

It is folly to humiliate a Great Power during an historical moment of weakness. It is folly to reignite a cold war within the West—and Russia is rightfully part of the West—as the world moves into an era of conflicts among cultures. It is folly to risk pushing a weak Russian government further toward loss of legitimacy, when its replacement may be a variety of non-state entities ranging from mafias through religious groupings, some of which would inevitably possess remnants of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

Bill Lind goes on to say:

In her glorious book, "The March of Folly," Barbara Tuchman writes: "A phenomenon noticeable throughout history regardless of place or period is the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own interests. Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity. In this sphere, wisdom, which may be defined as the exercise of judgment acting on experience, common sense and available information, is less operative and more frustrated than it should be. Why do holders of high office so often act contrary to the way reason points and enlightened self-interest suggests?"

Mr. President, Barbara Tuchman's definition of "the march of folly" was

when nations take action, and there is a small minority of people saying, "If you do this, you're going to be sorry," and it turns out the warning was not heeded. Nations went ahead headlong, and the march of folly continued to the considerable detriment of the nation that did not listen.

Admiral Yamamoto told the Japanese warlords, "I've been to the United States. I will participate in the attack on Pearl Harbor. I will serve my Emperor and do the best I can. But you are foolish if you think you're going to conquer the United States. I've been there. I've seen their industrial might."

In World War I, the commander of all the German U-boats said, "I cannot sink the amount of shipping you tell me I have to sink in order to defeat the United States." Yet they went headlong and paid no attention to him.

Even when the Greeks attacked the Trojan fortress, and placed the Trojan horse outside the gates, one person, Laocoon said, "Don't let that horse in here. What have the Greeks ever done for us? It is a trick." But he was a solitary voice, so the Trojans brought the wooden horse into the city. The rest is history. Fifty-five of the best Greek soldiers piled out of the horse and took the Trojan fortress.

There are not too many dissenters in this debate. I am one of them and I hope to God I am wrong. I can tell you that in my opinion we are going against our enlightened self-interest and continuing the march of folly.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, there has been significant, considerable debate on this issue over the past several days, and then several days before that before the Easter recess. Many of the arguments have been made, discussions have been had, and debate has been engaged in regarding the merits and demerits of NATO expansion.

I think it is important to put a little bit of historical perspective to this and then I would also like to bring a little bit of perspective as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, because, after all, NATO is a military alliance. It is designed for military purposes primarily. And it is important that we look at the military capacity and capability of the three nations that are being discussed as potential members of NATO.

So I would like to bring that portion of the discussion to the debate so that Members are aware of some of the facts and considerations relative to that portion of the NATO debate.

First, the historical perspective.

This June will mark the 50th anniversary of the start of the Berlin Blockade. Fifty years ago, the United States had passed the Vandenberg Resolution which laid the groundwork for U.S. participation in regional and other cooperative defense alliances.

This resolution served to show American support for the commitment European nations had undertaken in the Brussels treaty the previous year to defend against external threats. The resolution marked a formal recognition that the United States had to become constructively engaged in European and world affairs if it were to be successful in influencing and supporting the broader adoption of democratic principles in the world-market economy.

We had, with tragic consequences, retreated from world affairs earlier in this century, only to pay considerable costs in terms of not only monetary costs but, more importantly, in terms of lives because we were drawn into those affairs as a matter of necessity.

Two successive World Wars demonstrated unequivocally Europe's importance to our own national interests, and the Members of this body, in 1948, were determined that the United States not be forced to catch up to world events again.

Growing concern at the time about the intentions of the Soviet Union were, of course, pivotal to the debate regarding the formation of the alliance. After World War II, Soviet troops remained in Germany and the other Central/Eastern European countries that the Soviets occupied during the war.

During the course of the Berlin Blockade, in the midst of that not inconsiderable crisis, the United States engaged Canada and the Brussels treaty powers in discussions that culminated in the establishment of NATO in 1949. Interestingly enough, Mr. President, the reaction then in this body, and in other corridors that were discussing the feasibility of this reaction to both the Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic talks, was decidedly vociferous.

Eminent scholars and statesmen—George Kennan among them—decried the U.S. decision to pursue this alliance with Britain, Canada, France, and other nations. Kennan, who was the original advocate of containment, described the proposed alliance as provocative and potentially destabilizing. Interestingly enough, that is what much of the debate about the addition of three formerly Soviet Warsaw Pact nations, now Central European nations that have gained independence—much of the debate is centered on that very issue.

Then, as now, the debate covered a broad spectrum of other issues, including policy, proposed missions, membership, political as well as military aims, and U.S. military aid to Europe. The resultant treaty signed in Washington, DC, on April 4, 1949, committed the parties to: peaceful resolution of disputes; the active promotion of stability and well-being; continuous military vigilance; joint consultation; and devotion to the common defense.

During the Senate consideration of the treaty, two major issues were dis-

cussed: The meaning of the article V commitment, that is, the mutual assistance portion of the treaty; and specific military aid proposed by the administration to assist Europe.

It is interesting to note that treaty mentions no specific external threat which the alliance was being formed to counter, just as this resolution mentions no specific external threat.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson affirmed that the treaty was not aimed at any country but was proposed to prevent aggression. "If we want peace," he said, "we must be prepared to wage peace, with all of our thought, energy, and courage." At the time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was careful to assert that the treaty's article V commitment would not remove the constitutional power of Congress to declare war. The Senate subsequently approved the Washington treaty by a vote of 87-8.

It is interesting to note, that while some say, "All right. That was fine for the time being, but why expand?" there have been three membership extensions to four other nations over subsequent years—in 1952 to Greece and Turkey, in 1955 to Germany, and in 1982 to Spain.

Today, after nearly 50 years of outstanding success, NATO no longer seems controversial in and of itself. It is widely viewed as the most successful military alliance in history. It was successful in its goal of deterring aggression in Europe. And through a robust commitment to military strength, NATO's existence also brought enhanced stability to Europe, enabling its members to prosper economically.

Today's debate centers on the addition of three former Eastern bloc nations to NATO and whether somehow this will dilute NATO and its collective commitment to the principles outlined in the treaty. It also talks about whether or not such inclusion and addition of nations will be provocative to Russia and will be destabilizing.

There are many issues that have and need to be discussed before we vote on NATO and its future. But we must keep in mind that while this debate over what type of missions NATO undertakes in the future is important, it is not, in my opinion, the central consideration of adding new members.

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were on the forefront of Soviet hegemony during the cold war. For almost 50 years, their people lived under the totalitarianism of a Communist regime. With the fall of the Soviet Union, freedom came at last. They moved forward quickly to transform their economies to the free-market system, to hold democratic elections, and establish the rule of law. There is a compelling reason, moral reason I would submit, to extend NATO membership to these countries. But it is more than that. Because we must remember that NATO is first and foremost a military alliance.

These nations are able and willing to contribute to the common defense of Europe as they desire the security link of being a part of NATO. That is essential to our consideration—the answer to that question, Are these nations able, are they willing, to contribute to the common defense of Europe, and do they desire to be part of a 50-year established security link? The 1949 European nations themselves must answer this question.

Though an expansion of the Soviet Union played a key role in NATO's origins, it was the history of warfare in Europe which spurred the North Atlantic nations to action. Again, as Dean Acheson testified in 1949, "NATO is not to counter any particular threat but rather all aggression. The treaty itself states its purpose as safeguarding freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. NATO is designed and said to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area, and a collective defense allowance to preserve peace and security."

"The treaty itself," he said, "invites any other European states in a position to further the principles of this treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to the treaty." Let me repeat that: "The treaty itself invites any other European states in a position to further the principles of this treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area"—invites them to become part of the alliance.

These nations, which have been under the suppression and oppression of communism nearly 50 years now, are simply asking us to comply with the terms of the treaty by allowing them, since they are now capable of becoming part of this mutual security alliance and this stabilizing future. It is, in effect, an open-door policy to other nations of Europe who share the goal of defense and are willing to contribute to the security environment.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, for 50 years under the domination of the Soviet Union, have made the long journey to freedom and the beginnings of prosperity. These nations, always a part of Europe, have been artificially separated from their historic and cultural roots behind an Iron Curtain that had no place in Europe yet divided European nations for nearly 50 years. They now have an opportunity to once again become an integral part of Europe. How can we now deny them the right to belong to a European security alliance? It seems to me a fairly strong imperative that the nations that were previously divided from the rest of Europe now be invited to become a part of an organization dedicated to the survival of Europe.

Why these three countries? They each have a clear case to demonstrate their commitment to the goals of NATO. In addition, their recent history shows the strength of their new democ-

racies and the openness which generally follows free elections, civilian oversight of the military intelligence, rule of law, market economies—most important, since NATO was never intended to be a free ride. These nations are willing and able to contribute to their own self-defense. Already they have begun the restructuring required to make their militaries compatible with NATO's.

Continued commitment to this goal will be needed, obviously, over the next decade or more, but for now they are moving substantially in the right direction. The principle of immediate changes—reducing the size of their armies, modernizing their forces, achieving interoperability as it relates to NATO command, control, and communications—is well under way. Poland has already presented a 15-year plan to reduce its forces overhauling the officer corps structure and introducing professional noncommissioned officers. Airfields, ports, and depots are being readied to conduct operations with NATO, and they have conducted many joint operations under the Partnership for Peace program and other programs.

Poland has established a national military center for language education. It spends, interestingly enough, 2.4 percent of its gross domestic product on defense and intends to maintain this level or increase this level of support. Interestingly enough, Mr. President, that is more than half what the current NATO nations spend as a percentage of GDP. Belgium spends 1.7 percent; Britain, 3.1; Germany, 2.0; the United States, 3.1; as examples of the commitment of nations that spend either less than, equal to, or substantially more than Poland, but clearly they are in the top 50 percent.

The Czech Republic has begun modernizing its forces. They plan to increase their defense spending by one-tenth of 1 percent of GDP a year for 3 years, bringing spending to \$1.2 billion for defense in 2001.

Hungary is committed to increase defense spending by one-tenth of 1 percent of GDP over 5 years, a substantial amount of money, bringing it from the current 1.4 to 1.8 percent. They have already succeeded in reducing the number of troops from 100,000 to 489,000 and set up a joint peacekeeping battalion in Romania.

I recently was made aware of testimony given by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Franklin Kramer before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Some of his testimony has been classified, some of it unclassified. I am going to quote from the unclassified portion of his testimony in which he concludes, "I am fully confident that with the reforms and strategies currently being implemented in all three countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will both be reliable allies and net producers of security to the North Atlantic alliance." Net producers.

In analyzing their contributions, Mr. Kramer details a whole number of cat-

egories in which these commitments have been made. He talks about the interoperability through Partnership for Peace and cites in 1997 alone Poland participated in 22 Partnership for Peace exercises in which the United States also took part. The highlight of these events was "Brave Eagle," one of the most complex exercises to date, which Poland hosted. Poland also participated in hundreds of bilateral and multilateral exercises, seminars, and other activities with other partners and NATO allies, all of which have contributed to increase their interoperability. The Poles have emphasized military training and tactical exercises in their Partnership for Peace participation.

I met with members of the Defense Establishment and the Intelligence Establishment recently in my office. Much of what was presented was classified. I can confidently speak to the fact that very significant activity has taken place within these three nations. Poland, in particular, has very significant contributions to make to the NATO alliance on an immediate basis, and Hungary and the Czech Republic also have significant contributions to make. Hungary has participated in 17 multilateral Partnership for Peace exercises just in the last year. The Czechs have participated in 18 of those exercises.

In addition to that, all three countries have participated in the Partnership for Peace planning and review process in which NATO has established 41 specific interoperability objectives. These include C3/SAR, ground refuelings of aircraft, commonality of airfield procedures, use of NATO communications procedures and terminology, aircraft IFF systems, logistic support, interoperability of communications equipment and of air navigation aids. Poland committed to obtain all 41 of these interoperabilities by 1999, Hungary pledged to reach 38, and the Czech Republic promised to meet 31—a very significant commitment.

A number of other areas were analyzed, including military reforms and modernization. Each of these nations has ambitious plans in place to bring about reforms in command, control, communications, air defense, traffic control, logistics, infrastructure, personnel reform, reduction in forces, increase in quality of training. I could detail those, but those were provided and I think they are significant.

Their core capabilities and increase operability plans for personnel, for training and NATO doctrine, and for interoperability have all been significant.

Mr. President, there is good reason to believe that the three countries that we are discussing, in terms of inclusion in NATO, have already made substantial progress and have committed to further substantial progress in the necessary areas of bringing together the fit that will make their inclusion in NATO significant.

Mr. President, let me examine some of the issues that have been raised in opposition to adding new members to NATO.

Several academicians and former diplomats have raised the specter of the United States and its NATO allies bogged down in some internal or ethnic dispute involving one or more of the new members. In doing so, they ignore the experience of 50 years in which NATO members, some of whom have experienced their own civil unrest, and some of whom have experienced conflicts with their own NATO partners, have ignored the fact these relations have improved their respective democratic institutions, and that they have grown steadily more stable and more productive. NATO, rather than fostering instability, has provided a forum for the resolution of conflicts among its members. Turkey and Greece are probably the prime example. The prospect of NATO membership has hastened the resolution of disputes between Hungary and Romania and the Czech Republic and Germany. There are numerous examples of reconciliations and resolutions of conflict that have taken place just in the anticipation of becoming part of NATO.

A second objection has been directed toward the NATO directive to collectively and individually develop and maintain the capacity to resist an armed attack; that is, that the costs connected with admitting new members are uncertain and could be substantially more than NATO's estimate of \$1.5 billion over 10 years as the U.S. share. Detractors using this argument tend to follow it in virtually the same breath with the statement that the principal threat has gone away. On the one hand, they say the threat has gone away, and they are saying, therefore, we don't need to be concerned about future security arrangements; and on the other hand, they say they are concerned about the potential of future conflict, and, therefore, that will drive the costs up.

Well, let's accept the premise for a moment that there is no specific threat. The NATO common costs of accepting these new members is dependent upon that threat—if the threat is substantial, then the costs will likely be substantial as well. In contrast, a reduced threat will almost certainly mean a minimal expenditure. Current plans call for the latter. Prospective members are expected to obtain compatible command and control systems, maintain air defense and ground forces appropriate to their nation's security needs, and maintain one squadron of modern tactical aircraft. In addition, they are to provide sufficient facilities infrastructure to support the rapid deployment of NATO forces into their respective nations in the event of a crisis. Obviously, if a substantive threat should arise, then the number and mix of required forces could increase, and maybe substantially. But just as clear is that we would want to meet those

increased requirements to counter the increased threat, and we would want to be ahead of the game by having built the communications and air defense infrastructures during a time of relative peace and stability.

Having said that, the anticipation is that the threat will be decreased, that more stability will result and, therefore, lower costs.

I am also troubled by those who raise the specter of the article V commitment. We have all heard this said in many different ways, most unfortunately as, "Who wants to die for Poland?" "Who wants to die for Hungary or the Czech Republic?" This is particularly offensive when you consider Hitler's and Stalin's largely unopposed subjugation of Central Europe—including Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary—particularly Czechoslovakia—in the early days of World War II. The fact is that I have no doubt of the resolve of America and her NATO allies to take appropriate steps if any NATO member is under attack; nor do I doubt the serious and earnest intent of the three nations seeking to join us in NATO to do the same.

As for the supposed difficulty in obtaining consensus, it is hard to see that this could be the case. How can U.S. leadership be sufficient to acquire consensus on vital issues when the members total 16 but not sufficient when the members total 19? From my perspective, the difficulty will vary according to the circumstance, not the absolute number of members. I think an agreement that gives one nation—who is not a member of NATO—the opportunity to bully and threaten NATO members in NATO headquarters ought to be of far greater concern.

Finally, there is the consideration of others' attitudes about NATO expansion and the potential influence upon other matters of importance to the United States. As many of my colleagues are aware, many well-regarded scholars and celebrities have raised concerns over Russia's reaction to expansion. They insist that Russia's good will is imperative and should come before other considerations, particularly the expansion of NATO membership. An oft-cited example is the Russian Duma's failure to ratify START II, allegedly because of NATO expansion. Frankly, the Duma has been dragging its feet on START II for 3 years, not because of the NATO expansion question, but primarily due to the cost of implementing the treaty rather than NATO itself. The same argument, used in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention, was put to rest when the Duma moved forward and ratified it, after individuals said, "If we ratify this treaty, the Russians will walk away." That does not seem to support a clear connection between the decision on NATO expansion and START II ratification.

Let's be frank, Mr. President, Russia is going to pursue activities that benefit her national interest as she per-

ceives them, just as the United States pursues those interests that benefit our national interest as we perceive them, and this treaty is not going to change that fact.

Fifty years ago a similar debate was taking place as it relates to Russia and the creation of NATO. Stalin blockaded Berlin both to express displeasure at an attempt to roll back the Marshall Plan and related initiatives, as well as to convince the United States that its role in Europe was ill-advised. The United States and its allies held to their position and signed the Washington treaty in April of 1949. One month later, the Soviet Union lifted the blockade. We must do what we think is right, independent of what the debate is in the Russian Duma. That is not to say that we are uninterested in Russia and what Russian leaders think and its citizens think. Quite the contrary. It is essential that we remain engaged with Russia—politically, economically, and in relation to security concerns. We must work to achieve our mutual interests but continue to support the transformation of this nation to a strong and healthy democratic system. Our relationship with Russia, however, does not mean ignoring the desires of Central and Eastern European nations simply because we find some Russian resistance. NATO is a defensive alliance, not an offensive alliance. We must state that. That is its history. Russia knows that. We know that. NATO knows that. This has been reaffirmed—this fundamental aspect of the treaty. Russia has nothing to fear from NATO as it currently exists, nor from NATO with its new members. We must continue to reassure them, to work with them and bring them fully into the West's orbit. It is important that both the United States and Russia realize that both can benefit from this new relationship.

NATO remains in America's strategic interests as long as Europe remains in our interest. Likewise, the addition of new members to this treaty is also in our interest. When we expand membership to like-minded nations, we extend the security of Europe and the stabilizing influence of the alliance itself. We may not have any one single threat at this time, but the world remains an insecure and unstable place. The continuity of an expanded NATO will assure that this successful military alliance will continue to play a stabilizing role in Europe and help ensure our preparedness to take on future threats. I believe that the American people are deserving of a temperate and deliberate debate on the merits of the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. This has been a worthwhile discussion, a necessary debate, one of the critical functions of the U.S. Senate.

As many of you now know, I have supported these countries' accession to NATO, not out of an interest of righting wrongs but in recognition of their geopolitical importance and their



progress as democratic states determined to join with other NATO members in preserving the peace that NATO has won in Europe. This debate, this vote, will affirm the importance of these nations to NATO's continued mission.

Mr. President, I look forward to a successful vote and to a formal accession in Washington next spring.

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period of morning business for 5 minutes to allow the Senate to consider a few items that have been cleared by both sides. I further ask that following my closing remarks, the Senate then resume consideration of the NATO treaty to allow Senator CONRAD to offer an amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAMS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today marks the first anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of poison gas. The achievement of that Convention and of U.S. ratification were signal accomplishments of the Bush and Clinton Administrations.

I am pleased to report that, after a year in force, the Chemical Weapons Convention has begun to pay significant dividends for our national security. Those dividends would be even greater if both Houses of Congress would pass legislation to implement the Convention, so that the United States could come into compliance with it.

When the United States finally ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, just days before it entered into force, we joined roughly 90 other states. In the days and months that followed, several important countries followed our lead. Among the 107 countries that now have joined the Convention are Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran. Over 60 more nations have signed the Convention, and some of those are in the final stages of ratification.

I want to emphasize those five particular countries that have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention since we did. Many opponents of ratification said that Russia and China would never join, that we would be limiting our own options while other major powers refrained from the obligation to do without chemical weapons. Both Russia and China have joined, however, and China has admitted—for the first time—that it has had a chemical weapons program.

India and Pakistan have also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and

that is something of a triumph. South Asia is probably the area where the risk of nuclear war is highest today. Both countries are generally assessed as nuclear-capable. Pakistan recently tested a missile that could target nearly any site in India, and India is talking about reviving a missile that could strike all of Pakistan. Yet both those countries ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and India admitted—again, for the first time—to having a chemical weapons program.

Before the Convention entered into force, the United States and Russia were the only two admitted chemical weapons possessors. To date, however, six more countries—including South Korea, as well as China and India—have complied with the Convention's requirements to declare their chemical weapons and existing or former chemical weapons facilities.

The chemical weapons that India has declared will be destroyed. The chemical weapons facilities that China, South Korea and other countries have declared will be destroyed, unless the Council of States Parties approves conversion of those facilities under stringent safeguards. These are achievements that we could not guarantee a year and four days ago, when Senate consent to ratification was debated and approved. But we have them today, and I hope there will be more such admissions, declarations, and destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons facilities in the years to come.

In the past year, the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Warfare (the international inspectorate for the Convention) has conducted nearly 200 inspections. Roughly three-fourths of those inspections—including 25 in Russia—have been at chemical weapons production, storage, and destruction facilities.

About a third of the inspections have been in the United States—with no problems in protecting sensitive U.S. information. The United States is the only country currently destroying its chemical weapons, and the Technical Secretariat must monitor these facilities continually during destruction operations. As other countries begin to destroy their chemical weapons stocks, their inspection numbers will increase accordingly.

Few among the treaty's critics or proponents expected this much progress so soon. There is still a long way to go. But in just one year, the Convention has clearly begun to prove its utility as a tool to reduce the threat of chemical weapons.

What remains to be done? One crucial step is for the United States to come into compliance with the Convention. We have yet to enact implementing legislation pursuant to the Convention. Until we do so, our country will remain a violator of the Convention.

Why is that? The Convention requires us to make violations of it a crime; we have yet to do that. The Con-

vention also requires declarations regarding certain chemical production. We have submitted that declaration only regarding government facilities, because we lack legislation to require commercial reporting and to protect the confidential information in those reports from disclosure through the Freedom of Information Act. Finally, we still need a regime to govern international inspections of private U.S. facilities.

Aside from the dishonor that we bring upon ourselves by failing to comply with a treaty that we have ratified, why should we care? We should care because our failure to enact implementing legislation harms the national security. It makes it difficult to encourage compliance by other countries, or to request a challenge inspection if another country's declarations omit a suspected chemical weapons facility.

In addition, other countries are using our delay to draw attention away from their own misdeeds. Last month, a Russian general was interviewed by *Izvestiya*. The general made an utterly specious claim that the Sverdlovsk anthrax disaster was due to natural causes—a claim that even Russian officials have long since abandoned—and he even recycled the old lie that the United States invented AIDS. But how did the article end? Why, with a recital of the U.S. failure to enact implementing legislation! That's truly outrageous, but that will continue until we come into compliance.

The fault does not lie with this body, Mr. President. The Senate passed S. 610 on May 23 of last year. It then languished in the House for six months, before being attached to an unrelated measure. One way or another, we must enact this legislation.

The implementing legislation is not perfect. I noted last year that it harms U.S. interests if we bar the analysis of U.S. samples outside this country or give the President the right to invoke a national security exemption from inspections. The immediate need, however, is to enact a bill and bring our country into compliance with this important and useful Convention.

We have come far with the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is already proving its worth. But there is still this overdue work to accomplish—not for the sake of others, but to further our own national security. We can do it, and we should do it now.

#### THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Tuesday, April 28, 1998, the federal debt stood at \$5,512,793,625,127.26 (Five trillion, five hundred twelve billion, seven hundred ninety-three million, six hundred twenty-five thousand, one hundred twenty-seven dollars and twenty-six cents).

One year ago, April 28, 1997, the federal debt stood at \$5,347,125,000,000 (Five trillion, three hundred forty-seven billion, one hundred twenty-five million).