

first Nazi aggression and then communist oppression. How much it means to their peoples to be joining an organization that is dedicated to safeguarding their freedom, common heritage and civilizations.

Mr. President, I and those of my generation remember when the Red Army moved in and crushed the Hungarian freedom fighters in 1956. Many Hungarian refugees fled to my home state and were present when we greeted Cardinal Mindszenty in Detroit after his release from the United States Embassy in Budapest in 1971, where he had spent more than 15 years. More recently, we watched with admiration as the Solidarity-led movement of Lech Walesa guided Poland to democracy. Many Polish-American families and indeed all of us took great pride in Solidarity's success in helping to bring down the Soviet Empire. In Czechoslovakia, former dissident playwright Vaclav Havel, who was named President in December 1989, guided first Czechoslovakia and then, after the split, the Czech Republic with a steady hand ever since. My wife Barbara and I were visiting Prague after Vaclav Havel had been elected but before he assumed the office of the presidency. We recall with admiration and draw inspiration from the memory of the people of Prague massing to ensure that the election results were upheld and how they escorted Vaclav Havel to the castle where he would assume his office. Some of the most powerful blows that eventually demolished the Berlin wall were struck by the brave people of these three nations. They laid their lives on the line to bring down the Soviet empire and to promote democratic values. I am confident that they, having experienced tyranny first hand, can be counted on to do what is necessary to protect freedom recently regained.

Mr. President, President Havel put it this way:

Our wish to become a NATO member grows out of a desire to shoulder some responsibility for the general state of affairs on our continent. We don't want to take without giving. We want an active role in the defense of European peace and democracy. Too often, we have had direct experience of where indifference to the fate of others can lead, and we are determined not to succumb to that kind of indifference ourselves.

Mr. President, if we reject the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the NATO Alliance, we will be effectively dimming the flame of liberty that sustained these courageous peoples through decades of first Nazi and then communist darkness.

CONCLUSION

Mr. President, I intend to vote for the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO membership.

The enlargement of NATO does not violate any treaty between the United States or any NATO country and Russia, does not pose a threat to Russia and will not contribute to a reversal of Russia's course towards democratization and a market economy.

The accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic does contribute to European stability, and does promote the spread of democratic values and will fulfill the democratic yearnings of their peoples.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I am going to note the absence of a quorum for the purpose of the Presiding Officer having an opportunity to speak to this issue.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRAIG). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, the situation in Bosnia and the continued participation of U.S. soldiers in the NATO operations is an issue about which many Senators have very strong opinions.

I agree with my colleague from Idaho that the decision to keep U.S. troops there is one that the administration did not adequately discuss with the Congress. The past actions of the administration on this question, promising twice that American soldiers would come home by a date certain and twice breaking that promise, rightly gives the Senate reason to wonder if the administration is serious about its commitment to withdraw U.S. soldiers from Bosnia.

However, I want to be clear about what this amendment does. Simply, it punishes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These are three countries that have all met the criteria for NATO membership and have chosen the path of democracy and freedom after 50 years of Communist domination. I remind my colleagues that the troops from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are, as we speak, standing side by side with American soldiers serving in Bosnia. Earlier this year, all three countries publicly stated that they were willing to commit troops if the U.S. showdown with Iraq led to military action. I am convinced that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be among our strongest allies in NATO, and preventing them now from fulfilling this role simply does not serve American interests.

I support a vigorous debate on the merits of U.S. participation in the NATO force which is keeping peace in Bosnia, but I do not believe that the resolution of ratification to enlarge NATO is the appropriate place for this debate.

I think Senator CRAIG's concern that NATO should not be reformulated into a peacekeeping organization is right on target. NATO is the most effective collective defense alliance in history, and

to maintain its critical article V capabilities we cannot allow the NATO mission to drift towards peacekeeping and nation building. The amendment offered by Senator KYL, however, on Tuesday, approved by a 90 to 9 vote, clearly states the U.S. view of what the mission of NATO should be and what it should not be. However, I cannot support delaying action on NATO enlargement until Congress has authorized the U.S. troop presence in Bosnia.

My colleagues well know, in December of 1995, the Senate approved the Dole-McCain resolution on the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia by a vote of 69 to 30. Since then, the Senate has, on at least two occasions, approved appropriations to support U.S. troops in Bosnia. I understand that many Senators do not want U.S. forces in Bosnia, but the Senate has had the opportunity to speak on this issue and we will again in the future. Now is simply not the time, and the expansion of NATO ought not to be the vehicle. So I urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment of my friend from Idaho.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I just turned to my staff and I said, "I'm going to wait to deliver my statement until Senator CRAIG is on the floor," not realizing Senator CRAIG was presiding. I am delighted he is here.

(Mr. SMITH of Oregon assumed the Chair.)

Mr. BIDEN. Let me state my opposition and why I oppose the Craig amendment.

I find this debate over the last several weeks to be, in a sense, fascinating—fascinating in this regard. The Members of the Senate who express the greatest concern about the ability of Russia to veto any action NATO takes, the Senators who—with the exception of the Presiding Officer now, who expressed that concern himself—the Senators who have been most vocal about a NATO-Russian accord are now on the floor being the most vocal about their concern about how Russia is going to greet our expanding NATO or voting to expand NATO. So that is one thing I find somewhat anomalous.

Yesterday, I found it somewhat strange that those who did not want us entangled in border wars in Europe, as they phrased it, or ethnic conflicts in Europe, were the very people who wanted to give up our veto power to be involved in those. That is, right now, under the organizational structure of NATO, if all 15 NATO nations say we should go in and settle this dispute here in Europe and we say no, that is it, we don't go. I found it somewhat anomalous that they were, yesterday, prepared to say: Look, let's have this new dispute resolution mechanism which forced us, whatever iteration it would have come out in, to give up our veto power over that.

Now, today, Senator CRAIG, who has been one of the most outspoken opponents, to his credit, to the former Soviet Union, concerned about Russian interference in American affairs—I may be mistaken, but I think he has a very healthy skepticism about any aid to Russia—is now on the floor. He, I think—I know unintentionally, at least in my view—is on the floor unintentionally giving Russia another veto power.

Mr. President, to reiterate, the amendment of Senator CRAIG would delay U.S. approval of the accession of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to NATO until Congress passes specific authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia. This amendment should be rejected because it mixes two vital questions of national security that deserve to be debated and decided, each on its own merits.

On Bosnia, the U.S. has led successful IFOR and SFOR missions there composed primarily, but by no means exclusively, of NATO forces. The Senate will continue to address the question of whether and how we should continue our participation in the Bosnia mission just as we did during the emergency supplemental budget appropriation adopted prior to the Spring Recess.

Today, we face an entirely different question: should we vote to bring three worthy countries into NATO as new allies?

If we are using contributions to the Bosnia mission as a criterion for NATO membership, then all three of the applicants before us are highly qualified.

Hungary provided a 400-500 troop engineer battalion for IFOR, and a 200-250 troop group to SFOR, as well as a staging area for some 80,000 American troops on rotation through Bosnia at one of its air bases.

The Czech Republic has been one of the largest per capita contributors with an 870-person mechanized battalion for IFOR, and a 620-person battalion for SFOR.

Poland, with troops already deployed in half a dozen U.N. peacekeeping missions, contributed a 400-troop airborne infantry battalion to SFOR.

All three nations provided these assets well before they were formally invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, demonstrating early their willingness to share this burden with us.

The Senate should reject this amendment. Let us decide these two important questions as they should be—separately, with due consideration for the merits of each case.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I will vote in favor of the Craig amendment that would require specific congressional authorization for the deployment of troops to Bosnia.

However, I would like to make clear that I am supporting this amendment for reasons that I think differ slightly from the intentions of its author, the distinguished Senator from Idaho.

As my colleagues in this Chamber know well, I have always had serious

questions about U.S. involvement in this mission. I was the only Democrat to vote against the deployment of U.S. troops back in 1995, in large part because I did not believe the United States would be able to complete the mission in the time projected and for the price tag that was originally estimated.

Now—more than two years later—I think I have been proven right, and I take no pleasure in it.

But, regardless of my objections to the mission, I have always felt it is vitally important that when large-scale deployment of U.S. troops is involved, it is necessary to have specific congressional authorization for it. And I have tried on several occasions to move the Congress to enact such authorization. In that light, I view the Craig amendment as another such attempt.

Unlike Senator CRAIG, however, I support the expansion of NATO and do not feel this amendment is inconsistent with that support.

Unlike Senator CRAIG, I am not necessarily opposed to the involvement of NATO in peacekeeping missions.

There may be times in the future when it would be appropriate for NATO to become involved in peacekeeping missions when conflicts threaten the security of NATO members.

But I do agree with Senator CRAIG that if and when these situations arise, if the deployment of U.S. troops is proposed, it will be necessary to get specific Congressional authorization for such deployment.

It is for this reason that I support Senator CRAIG's amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the time available to the opponents of the amendment has expired. The proponent, the Senator from Idaho, has 7 more minutes.

The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Oklahoma.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. President, I would just like to make a couple of comments, a couple of observations, one along the line of connections. Some people have said there should not be a connection between what is happening in Bosnia and the proposal to expand NATO to the three countries; and, second, as chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, how this impacts—how Bosnia has impacted our state of readiness.

I think in the first case, as we stood on this floor in November of 1995 and we talked about where we were going to go and how we were going to stop the deployment of troops into Bosnia, where we had no security interests, I was somewhat in the leadership of that losing battle—but we only lost it by three votes.

I think if you could single out one thing that had a major impact that persuaded those three more people or

four more Senators to vote in favor of allowing our troops to be sent to Bosnia, it would be our commitment and our obligation to NATO. There was not a discussion on this floor where NATO wasn't brought out and it was said, we have to do this to protect the credibility of NATO; to protect our status with NATO and our leadership in that part of the world, it is going to be necessary to send our troops into Bosnia.

We know what happened after that. We know they went over with the idea they were going to be back in 12 months. We were told the total cost would be \$1.2 billion. Now our troops, 2½ years later, are still over there, with no end in sight. Our direct costs have exceeded \$9 billion, and I suggest that it is actually more than double that, because if you take the cost of the operations in the 21 TACCOM in Germany, take the cost of the 86th Airlift in Ramstein—all of them dedicating almost their entire operation to supporting the operation in Bosnia—then the cost is much, much greater. So there is a relationship between NATO and our troops in Bosnia.

I see this as something that is very critical, because so long as we are supporting the Bosnia operation, we are not in a position to be able to logistically support any type of a ground operation anywhere else in that theater.

Let's keep in mind that theater area does include the Middle East. It was not long ago when it was pretty well publicized that we might have to do surgical airstrikes on Iraq. They are talking about that again today. While the general public is deceived into thinking that we can do this without sending in ground troops, they are wrong. There is not anyone that I know of, who has a background in the military, who would tell you that you can go in and accomplish something from the air without ultimately sending in ground troops. We are not in a position, as a result of Bosnia, to support ground troops anywhere else in that theater.

If there is any doubt in anyone's mind, all they have to do is call the commanding officer of 21 TACCOM in Germany, and they will tell them there is not the capacity to send one truck to logistically support an operation anywhere else in the theater. It is not that they are 100 percent occupied by Bosnia, they are 115 percent occupied with their support of Bosnia. So that has had a dramatic effect on our state of readiness.

Second, we are using our troops at such a high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO that we are not in a position to retain these people. And the cost of this is incredible. Mr. President, it costs \$6 million to put a guy in the cockpit of an F-16. These people are leaving. Our retention rate has now dropped below 28 percent. That is unprecedented, and that is exactly what has been happening.

So I do applaud the Senator from Idaho for bringing this up and making

an issue out of this, because there is a definite connection. I think it is perfectly reasonable for us to have to give some type of approval, on an annual basis, for our troops being someplace where there are no national security risks at stake.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I rise in support, strong support, of the Craig amendment and commend the Senator for offering it. It is a very reasonable amendment that simply says, prior to the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, that there must be enacted a law containing specific authorization for the continued deployment of troops in Bosnia. I don't know how—if Congress wants to exercise its responsibility—I don't know how anyone could object to the amendment. Surely, if the comments that I have heard on and off the floor over the past couple of years regarding the issue of troops in Bosnia are any indication, this vote ought to be overwhelming in support of the Craig amendment. I certainly don't think anyone has any right to complain ever again if they are not going to vote to at least have the opportunity to say that we ought to have a vote here in the Senate to put forces in Bosnia.

I hope those who have been doing all of this complaining over the past couple of years will vote for the Craig amendment so that we can get a vote by the Congress to authorize the extension of having troops in Bosnia as part of the ratification process.

When the Congress first considered the President's plan to send troops to Bosnia in 1995, the administration placed clear limits on the duration of that commitment. On every single occasion that I can think of, that I know of, administration officials stated that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia for 1 year—1 year. That was 3 years ago. They are still there.

Secretary Perry said on December 1, 1995:

We believe the mission can be accomplished in 1 year. So we have based our plan on that time line. This schedule is realistic, because the specific military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first 6 months and, therefore, its role will be to maintain the climate of stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We expect these civil functions will be successfully initiated in 1 year. But even if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison.

That is what Secretary Perry said on December 1, 1995. He used the term "indefinite garrison." And 3½ years later, we are still in Bosnia with no end in sight, no plan to get out, and here is the opportunity for Congress, certainly the U.S. Senate in this case, to speak up.

I hope the Senate will speak responsibly here and agree with the Craig amendment.

Let me give you some more testimony. Secretary of State Holbrooke on December 6, 1995:

The military tasks in Bosnia are doable within 12 months. There isn't any question.

That is a quote—

The deeper question is whether the non-military functions can be done in 12 months. That's the real question. But it's not NATO or U.S. force responsibility to do that. It's us on the civilian side working with the Europeans. It's going to be very tough. Should the military stick around until every refugee has gone home, until everything else in the civilian annexes has been done? No. That is not their mission.

That was Secretary Holbrooke on December 6, 1995, and yet troops remain. There are still troops there sitting in the middle of a war zone between warring factions. Yes, holding the peace, but the commitment that was made to the American people and to this Congress by this administration in 1995 was that we were not going to keep them there beyond 12 months, and he said there isn't any question about that, we don't need to keep them there.

Nothing has changed. There is nothing different today than there was 3 years ago regarding that kind of comment. He says the deeper question is whether nonmilitary functions can be done in 12 months. That is the question. But the military is still there, and they are using the military to try to accomplish nonmilitary functions, which in and of itself is a real problem.

Many of us who closely studied the conflict in Bosnia saw this, frankly, as an unrealistic comment. We didn't believe—I certainly didn't believe and I know many of my colleagues didn't believe—that this made sense. There was no way that you could make that kind of a military commitment and allow this whole situation to become resolved in less than 12 months. But, what choice did the American people have but to take the President and the Secretary of State and others at their word? That is what we did, we took them at their word. What do we have for it?

I was disappointed, but not surprised, when right after the 1996 elections, the President said that we are going to continue this military commitment for an additional 18 months, until June of 1998. I happen to be a veteran of the Vietnam war. This has a familiar ring to it, a very familiar ring to it. I can remember the McNamara charts and the one more battle and, "In just another year or two, we'll wrap this up." Mr. President, 58,000 lives and about 13 years later, we got out of Vietnam.

That could happen here. This is an extremely sensitive area that has a lot of problems that could escalate in a hurry.

Last December, the President said that he acknowledged that our commitment to Bosnia is open-ended, but he is still talking about clear and achievable goals. If you have an open-ended policy, you don't have clear and achievable goals. They are two direct opposites. There is no clear and achievable goal. There is an open-ended policy, and as long as it is open-ended, we are just going to give a blank check to

the administration to stay in Bosnia and do what? To nation build, is that what our troops are there for?

This policy must come to a vote in this Congress. We have to act responsibly, otherwise, another Vietnam could occur. After people are killed or injured or maimed, it is too late to debate it. It is too late for those people. We need to be debating it now, and the Craig amendment is simply asking for a vote in the affirmative if we are going to continue the policy and continue to keep troops in Bosnia. I don't know what the policy is. The policy to me is just open-ended. Just keep them there, keep them there, keep them there; make another promise, another promise, another promise.

The administration has had a free ride in Bosnia now for 2 years. It is wrong, to put it very bluntly, for this Government to conduct its foreign policy without the participation of Congress and the public. For the life of me, I don't understand how anyone could oppose the Craig amendment.

The American people need to understand what is at stake and either agree to the commitment or not. We represent the American people, supposedly. The President has stated what he wants to do and he said why. He said, "I want an open-ended policy in Bosnia, and I want to do it because I feel like I have a clear and achievable goal." He hasn't said what it is, just to keep the peace.

War has been going on in Bosnia for a thousand years. I am not sure just how long we have to hold American military forces there. Under this open-ended policy, maybe it is another thousand years. I don't know. But Congress has to act. The President gave his reasons, and now the American people ought to hear Congress' debate on this proposal, and that is what this amendment is about. This is no longer a Presidential use of force based on his judgment of an immediate threat. It is nation building in Bosnia. That is what we are talking about. It is now a deliberate foreign policy, and it must be approved and funded by Congress or not.

Mr. President, how much time is remaining in the debate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time has expired.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter to me from President Clinton dated April 20, 1998, in which he said:

To ensure that NATO functions as effectively in the next century as it has in this one, we must preserve its ability to respond quickly, flexibly and decisively to whatever threats may arise.

It is the "whatever threats may arise" that bothers me in this debate, Mr. President.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, April 20, 1998.

Hon. ROBERT C. SMITH,
Chairman, Select Committee on Ethics,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter on United States and NATO involvement in Bosnia. You raise important questions about our mission and the impact of our military operations in Bosnia on U.S. security interests around the world.

Since you wrote your letter, I have forwarded to Congress my certification and report regarding our mission in Bosnia. This document includes detailed answers to the range of issues you raise in your letter and I am enclosing a copy for your review.

I strongly believe that our mission in Bosnia is critically important to the security of Europe. We are making increasing progress in implementing the Dayton agreement and establishing conditions under which Bosnians can live together in peace. In the past six months, we have seen rising returns of refugees, reform and restructuring of police and media, emerging anti-corruption efforts, capture or surrender of more than a dozen war criminals and improved cooperation among the parties. Most significant is the recent installation of a pro-Dayton government in Republika Srpska. SFOR's support for civilian implementation was essential to achieving this result.

We must succeed in Bosnia if we are to prevent instability from spreading to other volatile parts of the region such as Kosovo and Macedonia. Broader instability could threaten the vital interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, and endanger the overall security and stability of Southeast Europe. Success in Bosnia also reinforces the credibility of American leadership in Europe and demonstrates the capability of NATO to respond with its Partnership for Peace partners to the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

The Bosnia mission also underscores NATO's value in protecting the security and interests of its members, but it does not signal a departure from the Alliance's enduring purposes, as described by the Washington Treaty of 1949. Its primary mission is, and will remain, the collective defense of Alliance territory. However, as we have seen in Bosnia, it is sometimes necessary for NATO to act beyond its immediate borders in order to safeguard its members. To ensure that NATO functions as effectively in the next century as it has in this one, we must preserve its ability to respond quickly, flexibly and decisively to whatever threats may arise.

Again, thank you for your letter. I am pleased that we have had the opportunity for an extensive dialogue with members of Congress on the continuation of our mission in Bosnia. We will continue to work with you and other members of Congress in the cause of peace in this important mission.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. SNOWE). The Craig amendment will now be temporarily laid aside.

Under the previous order, the hour of 12 noon having arrived, the Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN, is recognized to offer an amendment on which there shall be 1 hour of debate.

The Senator from New York.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2321

(Purpose: To express a condition regarding the relationship between NATO membership and European Union membership)

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I send to the desk an amendment for my-

self and Mr. WARNER and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New York [Mr. MOYNIHAN] for himself and Mr. WARNER, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2321.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of section 3 of the resolution (relating to conditions), add the following:

() DEFERRAL OF RATIFICATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT UNTIL ADMISSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE EUROPEAN UNION.—

(A) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have each acceded to membership in the European Union and have each engaged in initial voting participation in an official action of the European Union.

(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this paragraph may be construed as an expression by the Senate of an intent to accept as a new NATO member any country other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic if that country becomes a member of the European Union after the date of adoption of this resolution.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. In the brief period that I will be speaking, I would like to concentrate on the central issue: the dangers of nuclear war in the years ahead.

Earlier, in an address to the 150th anniversary gathering of the Associated Press, I cited a comment made last autumn by Richard Holbrooke, the American diplomat, now temporarily in private life.

Richard Holbrooke, who negotiated the Dayton agreement regarding the former Yugoslavia, commented that "almost a decade has gone by since the Berlin Wall fell and, instead of reaching out to Central Europe, the European Union turned toward a bizarre search for a common currency. So NATO enlargement had to fill the void." As if this were an accidental policy that derives from the unwillingness of our European friends—some of them our NATO allies—to engage in the more serious work of bringing the once more independent republics of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the European Union, a common market from which their economic development can grow, that being clearly the single most pressing concern they have in the aftermath of the half century of a Stalinist economy imposed upon them with the same results for them—not quite so bad, but bad enough—that Russia itself experienced.

The disaster of this era for the Russians cannot be exaggerated. I say to my dear friend from Delaware, who has been so generous in letting us speak on these matters, Murray Feshbach has recently established that the life expectancy of Russian men dropped from 62 years in 1989 to 57 years in 1996.

There is no historical equivalent. A century ago, a 16-year-old Russian male had a 54 percent chance of surviving to age 60. Two percent less than had he been born a century ago. Such has been the implosion of Soviet society—in every respect, including the nuclear one.

Now, earlier on in a statement, I remarked, and I will take the liberty of remarking once again, that the origins of NATO seem very distant to most Members of the Senate. That age seems like another era. And in a sense it was another era. But there are a few witnesses from that era who are still active and who still speak.

George Kennan, who conceived the whole idea of containment, of which NATO was an expression and perhaps the most important one, George Kennan has said NATO expansion, in the aftermath of the defeat of the Soviet Union, he says, would be "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold war era." "The most fateful error."

Paul Nitze, who was the principal author of NSC-68, the national security directive written in 1950, which established the American policy of containment, recently wrote to me to say, "In the present security environment, NATO expansion is not only unnecessary, it is gratuitous. If we want a Europe whole and free, we are not likely to get it by making NATO fat and feeble."

In my remarks to the Associated Press, I simply said that expanding NATO at this time, and particularly should we move up to include the Baltic States, which we are pledged to support, would put us at risk of getting into a nuclear war with Russia: wholly unanticipated, for which we are not prepared, about which we are not thinking.

Professor Michael Mandelbaum, at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said "that is not hyperbole." That is what we are dealing with here. And the reason, NATO expansion is viewed throughout elements of the Russian political system as a hostile act. Some think of it as a hostile act they could live with; some think it is a hostile act they will have to defend against; and they have said if they have to defend their territory, they will do so with nuclear weapons; it is all they have left.

Their Army has all been disintegrated—not entirely, but they remark in a December 17 National Security memorandum signed by Mr. Yeltsin, that stretches of their borders are undefended. Their Navy is rusting in a seaport, nominally part of the Ukraine.

They have nuclear weapons. After all we have gone through to achieve rational nuclear postures: a no-first-use policy, graduated response to threats, only resorting to strategic nuclear weapons at the very last moment when no other options are available—that is gone. We are back to the hair trigger that we knew when I was a young person in this Government, in this city,

when we could imagine having use air-raid shelters. We could imagine it, because we could remember the Second World War.

I was called back into the Navy in 1951, briefly, as it turned out, but found myself in Bremerhaven, in the submarine pens there that the Nazis had built. The British finally got a bomb through one, but never did during the war. We were sent on an expedition to Berlin. We had the practice of sending American officers on trains through Soviet-occupied Germany to establish the fact that we had the right to do so. I arrived in Berlin, and it wasn't there. Just ruined rubble; early in the morning, a few men stumbling out of a few bars, lost to the world.

We knew what war meant, and we can imagine what nuclear war means. We just had dropped two bombs on Japan. From the time of President Eisenhower, we have been negotiating ways to control atomic weapons—and we had success. Those early arms control agreements, apart from the agreement President KENNEDY reached on atmospheric nuclear testing, those early agreements typically just ratified the increases in nuclear weapons that each side wanted, but we got the START agreement and we reduced our nuclear arsenals.

The START Treaty, negotiated with the Soviet Union, was signed by four entirely different countries, because by the time it was finished the Soviet Union had disappeared. Russia has not yet ratified START II. The idea of START III, to reduced deployed nuclear weapons ever further, hasn't even begun. They haven't ratified START II, not least because of NATO expansion. I don't claim to know what the actual decisions in the Duma are, but that is what one hears, and one can imagine it.

Tomorrow there will be a report by the Physicians for Social Responsibility, an American group, principally, that has won a Nobel Prize on the issue of preventing nuclear warfare. They will publish a report in the New England Journal of Medicine which says that the danger of nuclear attack continues and may even be thought to escalate. The New York Times reports this in the terms we have been speaking about on this floor, the exact same terms, with no idea that was coming.

It says, "Russia's Disarray Brings a Nuclear Risk to the U.S., Study Says." The Physicians write, "Although many people believe that the threat of a nuclear attack largely disappeared with the end of the cold war there is considerable evidence to the contrary. Each side routinely maintains thousands of nuclear warheads on high alert. Furthermore, to compensate for its weakened conventional forces, Russia has abandoned its no-first use policy."

Madam President, that is all I and my friend from Virginia has said on this floor this week of debate and when the expansion of NATO was debated a month ago. Suddenly we have it in an

article in the New England Journal of Medicine, saying to those who think this threat is behind us. Indeed, it is ahead of us, and we must be very careful, so careful, about what we do. That is why so many of us, starting with the great men—Kennan and Nitze—who conceived the strategy for the cold war, which we won, are saying, "Don't do this."

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the article from the New England Journal of Medicine and the New York Times.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 30, 1998]
RUSSIA'S DISARRAY BRINGS A NUCLEAR RISK TO THE U.S., STUDY SAYS
(By Tim Weiner)

WASHINGTON, April 29.—Russia's deteriorating control of its nuclear weapons is increasing the danger of an accidental or unauthorized attack on the United States, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning group warned today.

A dozen missiles fired from a Russian nuclear submarine would kill nearly seven million Americans instantly, and millions more would die from radiation, according to a study conducted under the auspices of Physicians for Social Responsibility, which won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work in nuclear weapons in 1985. The study is to be published tomorrow in The New England Journal of Medicine.

Thousands of Russian and American nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alerts, despite the end of the cold war, and Russia formally abandoned its longstanding policy that it would never be the first nation to use those weapons four years ago, the study noted.

Repeated assurances from President Clinton that the two nations are no longer aiming their nuclear weapons at one another are "a gross misrepresentation of reality," said Bruce Blair, an author of the study and a former Strategic Air Command nuclear weapons officer. In fact, the study said, Russian missiles launched without specific targets would automatically aim themselves at their cold war targets: American cities and military installations like the Pentagon.

Nor are these weapons necessarily in safe hands. Russia's once-elite nuclear weapons commands are suffering housing and food shortages, low pay, budget cuts, deteriorating discipline, desertions and suicides. Such problems are not unique. The study says that about 40,000 American military personnel were removed from nuclear-weapons responsibilities from 1975 to 1990 for alcohol, drug or psychiatric problems.

Neither nation has abandoned its cold war doctrine of launching its missiles after receiving warning that the other side is attacking. Each nation gives itself 15 minutes to decide that the attack is real; both nations have experienced major false alarms over the last two decades.

The study considered what would happen if the captain and crew of a Russian submarine decided to carry out an attack without authorization, or went mad and fired off their arsenal. This, Mr. Blair said, would require "a conspiracy of some magnitude" between a captain and three or four officers.

The missiles could also be fired after a false alarm or an unauthorized order from a political or military leader in Moscow. Once launched, they would reach their targets across the United States in 15 to 30 minutes.

The blast and shock of the fireball from each of the exploding warheads would kill

nearly everyone within three miles instantly; people living in a swath up to 40 miles long and 3 miles wide would receive a lethal dose of radiation within hours, the study said. It assumed that one-quarter of the missiles would malfunction, and that 12 missiles would reach their targets in eight American cities in the middle of the night.

In New York City, more than three million people would die immediately; in San Francisco, 739,000; in Washington, 728,000—in all, some 6,838,000 deaths within hours of the attack, the study said, which would "dwarf all prior accidents in history." A near-complete breakdown of systems delivering food, water, electricity and medicine would follow and millions more Americans would die as a consequence, the study said.

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ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR—A POST-COLD WAR ASSESSMENT

(By Lachlan Farrow, M.D., Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D., Ira Helfand, M.D., George Lewis, Ph.D., Theodore Postol, Ph.D., Victor Sibel, M.D., Barry S. Levy, M.D., Herbert Abrams, M.D., and Christine Cassel, M.D.)

ABSTRACT

Background.—In the 1980s, many medical organizations identified the prevention of nuclear war as one of the medical profession's most important goals. An assessment of the current danger is warranted given the radically changed context of the post-Cold War era.

Methods.—We reviewed the recent literature on the status of nuclear arsenals and the risk of nuclear war. We then estimated the likely medical effects of a scenario identified by leading experts as posing a serious danger: an accidental launch of nuclear weapons. We assessed possible measures to reduce the risk of such an event.

Results.—U.S. and Russian nuclear-weapons systems remain on high alert. This fact, combined with the aging of Russian technical systems, has recently increased the risk of an accidental nuclear attack. As a conservative estimate, an accidental intermediate-sized launch of weapons from a single Russian submarine would result in the deaths of 6,838,000 persons from firestorms in eight U.S. cities. Millions of other people would probably be exposed to potentially lethal radiation from fallout. An agreement to remove all nuclear missiles from high-level alert status and eliminate the capability of a rapid launch would put an end to this threat.

Conclusions.—The risk of an accidental nuclear attack has increased in recent years, threatening a public health disaster of unprecedented scale. Physicians and medical organizations should work actively to help build support for the policy changes that would prevent such a disaster. (N Engl J Med 1998; 338:1326–31.)

During the Cold War, physicians and others described the potential medical consequences of thermonuclear war and concluded that health care personnel and facilities would be unable to provide effective care to the vast number of victims of a nuclear attack. In 1987, a report by the World Health Organization concluded, "The only approach to the treatment of health effects of nuclear warfare is primary prevention, that is, the prevention of nuclear war." Many physicians and medical organizations have argued that the prevention of nuclear war should be one of the medical profession's most important goals.

CONTINUED DANGER OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK

Although many people believe that the threat of a nuclear attack largely disappeared with the end of the Cold War, there

is considerable evidence to the contrary. The United States and Russia no longer confront the daily danger of a deliberate, massive nuclear attack, but both nations continue to operate nuclear forces as though this danger still existed. Each side routinely maintains thousands of nuclear warheads on high alert. Furthermore, to compensate for its weakened conventional armed forces, Russia has abandoned its "no first use" policy.

Even though both countries declared in 1994 that they would not aim strategic missiles at each other, not even one second has been added to the time required to launch a nuclear attack: providing actual targeting (or retargeting) instructions is simply a component of normal launch procedures. The default targets of U.S. land-based missiles are now the oceans, but Russian missiles launched without specific targeting commands automatically revert to previously programmed military targets.

There have been numerous "broken arrows" (major nuclear-weapons accidents) in the past, including at least five instances of U.S. missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear devices flying over or crashing in or near the territories of other nations. From 1975 to 1990, 66,000 military personnel involved in the operational aspects of U.S. nuclear forces were removed from their positions. Of these 66,000, 41 percent were removed because of alcohol or other drug abuse and 20 percent because of psychiatric problems. General George Lee Butler, who as commander of the U.S. Strategic Command from 1991 to 1994 was responsible for all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, recently reported that he had "investigated a dismaying array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces."

Any nuclear arsenal is susceptible to accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized use. This is true both in countries declared to possess nuclear weapons (the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China) and in other countries widely believed to possess nuclear weapons (Israel, India, and Pakistan). The combination of the massive size of the Russian nuclear arsenal (almost 6000 strategic warheads) and growing problems in Russian control systems makes Russia the focus of greatest current concern.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's nuclear command system has steadily deteriorated. Aging nuclear communications and computer networks are malfunctioning more frequently, and deficient early-warning satellites and ground radar are more prone to reporting false alarms. The saga of the Mir space station bears witness to the problems of aging Russian technical systems. In addition, budget cuts have reduced the training of nuclear commanders and thus their proficiency in operating nuclear weapons safely. Elite nuclear units suffer pay arrears and housing and food shortages, which contribute to low morale and disaffection. New offices have recently been established at Strategic Rocket Forces bases to address the problem of suicide (and unpublished data).

Safeguards against a nuclear attack will be further degraded if the Russian government implements its current plan to distribute both the unlock codes and conditional launch authority down the chain of command. Indeed, a recent report by the Central Intelligence Agency, which was leaked to the press, warned that some Russian submarine crews may already be capable of authorizing a launch. As then Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov warned last year, "No one today can guarantee the reliability of our control systems. . . . Russia might soon reach the threshold beyond which its rockets and nuclear systems cannot be controlled."

A particular danger stems from the reliance by both Russia and the United States

on the strategy of "launch on warning"—the launching of strategic missiles after a missile attack by the enemy has been detected but before the missiles actually arrive. Each country's procedures allow a total response time of only 15 minutes: a few minutes for detecting an enemy attack, another several minutes for top-level decision making, and a couple of minutes to disseminate the authorization to launch a response.

Possible scenarios of an accidental or otherwise unauthorized nuclear attack range from the launch of a single missile due to a technical malfunction to the launch of a massive salvo due to a false warning. A strictly mechanical or electrical event as the cause of an accidental launch, such as a stray spark during missile maintenance, ranks low on the scale of plausibility. Analysts also worry about whether computer defects in the year 2000 may compromise the control of strategic missiles in Russia, but the extent of this danger is not known.

Several authorities consider a launch based on a false warning to be the most plausible scenario of an accidental attack. This danger is not merely theoretical. Serious false alarms occurred in the U.S. system in 1979 and 1980, when human error and computer-chip failures resulted in indications of a massive Soviet missile strike. On January 25, 1995, a warning related to a U.S. scientific rocket launched from Norway led to the activation, for the first time in the nuclear era, of the "nuclear suitcases" carried by the top Russian leaders and initiated an emergency nuclear-decision-making conference involving the leaders and their top nuclear advisors. It took about eight minutes to conclude that the launch was not part of a surprise nuclear strike by Western submarines—less than four minutes before the deadline for ordering a nuclear response under standard Russian launch-on-warning protocols.

A missile launch activated by false warning is thus possible in both U.S. and Russian arsenals. For the reasons noted above, an accidental Russian launch is currently considered the greater risk. Several specific scenarios have been considered by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of the Department of Defense. We have chosen to analyze a scenario that falls in the middle range of the danger posed by an accidental attack: the launch against the United States of the weapons on board a single Russian Delta-IV ballistic-missile submarine, for two reasons. First the safeguards against the unauthorized launch of Russian submarine-based missiles are weaker than those against either silo-based or mobile land-based rockets, because the Russian general staff cannot continuously monitor the status of the crew and missiles or use electronic links to override unauthorized launches by the crews. Second, the Delta-IV is and will remain the mainstay of the Russian strategic submarine fleet.

Delta-IV submarine carry 16 missiles. Each missile is armed with four 100-kt warheads and has a range of 8300 km, which is sufficient to reach almost any part of the continental United States from typical launch stations in the Barents Sea. These missiles are believed to be aimed at "soft" targets, usually in or near American cities, whereas the more accurate silo-based missiles would attack U.S. military installations. Although a number of targeting strategies are possible for any particular Delta-IV, it is plausible that two of its missiles are assigned to attack war-supporting targets in each of eight U.S. urban areas. If 4 of the 16 missiles failed to reach their destinations because of malfunctions before or after the launch, then 12 missiles carrying a total of 48 warheads would reach their targets.

POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

We assume that eight U.S. urban areas are hit: four with four warheads and four with eight warheads. We also assume that the targets have been selected according to standard military priorities: industrial, financial, and transportation sites and other components of the infrastructure that are essential for supporting or recovering from war. Since low-altitude bursts are required to ensure the destruction of structures such as docks, concrete runways, steel-reinforced buildings, and underground facilities, most if not all detonations will cause substantial early fallout.

Physical Effects

Under our model, the numbers of immediate deaths are determined primarily by the area of the "superfires" that would result from a thermonuclear explosion over a city. Fires would ignite across the exposed area to roughly 10 or more calories of radiant heat per square centimeter, coalescing into a giant firestorm with hurricane-force winds and average air temperatures above the boiling point of water. Within this area, the combined effects of superheated wind, toxic smoke, and combustion gases would result in a death rate approaching 100 percent.

For each 100-kt warhead, the radius of the circle of nearly 100 percent short-term lethality would be 4.3 km (2.7 miles), the range within which 10 cal per square centimeter is delivered to the earth's surface from the hot fireball under weather conditions in which the visibility is 8 km (5 miles), which is low for almost all weather conditions. We used Census CD to calculate the residential population within these areas according to 1990 U.S. Census data, adjusting for areas where circles from different warheads overlapped. In many urban areas, the daytime population, and therefore the casualties, would be much higher.

Fallout

The cloud of radioactive dust produced by low-altitude bursts would be deposited as fallout downwind of the target area. The exact areas of fallout would not be predictable, because they would depend on wind direction and speed, but there would be large zones of potentially lethal radiation exposure. With average wind speeds of 24 to 48 km per hour (15 to 30 miles per hour), a 100-kt low-altitude detonation would result in a radiation zone 30 to 60 km (20 to 40 miles) long and 3 to 5 km (2 to 3 miles) wide in which exposed and unprotected persons would receive a lethal total dose of 600 rad within six hours. With radioactive contamination of food and water supplies, the breakdown of refrigeration and sanitation systems, radiation-induced immune suppression, and crowding in relief facilities, epidemics of infectious diseases would be likely.

Deaths

Table 1 shows the estimates of early deaths for each cluster of targets in or near the eight major urban areas, with a total of 6,838,000 initial deaths. Given the many indeterminate variables (e.g., the altitude of each warhead's detonation, the direction of the wind, the population density in the fallout zone, the effectiveness of evacuation procedures, and the availability of shelter and relief supplies), a reliable estimate of the total number of subsequent deaths from fallout and other sequelae of the attack is not possible. With 48 explosions probably resulting in thousands of square miles of lethal fallout around urban areas where there are thousands of persons per square mile, it is plausible that these secondary deaths would outnumber the immediate deaths caused by the firestorms.

Medical Care in the Aftermath

Earlier assessments have documented in detail the problems of caring for the injured survivors of a nuclear attack: the need for care would completely overwhelm the available health care resources. Most of the major medical centers in each urban area lie within the zone of total destruction. The number of patients with severe burns and other critical injuries would far exceed the available resources of all critical care facilities nationwide, including the country's 1708 beds in burn-care units (most of which are already occupied). The danger of intense radiation exposure would make it very difficult for emergency personnel even to enter the affected areas. The nearly complete destruction of local and regional transportation, communications, and energy networks would make it almost impossible to transport the severely injured to medical facilities outside the affected area. After the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, which resulted in a much lower number of casualties (6500 people died and 34,900 were injured) and which had few of the complicating factors that would accompany a nuclear attack, there were long delays before outside medical assistance arrived.

FROM DANGER TO PREVENTION

Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable. The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.

TABLE 1. PREDICTED IMMEDIATE DEATHS FROM FIRESTORMS AFTER NUCLEAR DETONATIONS IN EIGHT U.S. CITIES.

City ¹	No. of Warheads	No. of Deaths
Atlanta	8	428,000
Boston	4	609,000
Chicago	4	425,000
New York	8	3,193,000
Pittsburgh	4	375,000
San Francisco Bay area	8	739,000
Seattle	4	341,000
Washington, D.C.	8	728,000
Total	48	6,838,000

¹ The specific targets are as follows: Atlanta—Peachtree Airport, Dobbins Air Force Base, Fort Gillem, Fort McPherson, Fulton County Airport, Georgia Institute of Technology, Hartsfield Airport, and the state capitol; Boston—Logan Airport, Commonwealth Pier, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Harvard University; Chicago—Argonne National Laboratory, City Hall, Midway Airport, and O'Hare Airport; New York—Columbia University, the George Washington Bridge, Kennedy Airport, LaGuardia Airport, the Merchant Marine Academy, Newark Airport, the Queensboro Bridge, and Wall Street; Pittsburgh—Carnegie Mellon University, Fort Duquesne Bridge, Fort Pitt Bridge, Pittsburgh Airport, and the U.S. Steel plant; San Francisco Bay area—Alameda Naval Air Station, the Bay Bridge, Golden Gate Bridge, Moffett Field, Oakland Airport, San Francisco Airport, San Jose Airport, and Stanford University; Seattle—Boeing Field, Seattle Center, Seattle-Tacoma Airport, and the University of Washington; and Washington, D.C.—the White House, the Capitol Building, the Pentagon, Ronald Reagan National Airport, College Park Airport, Andrews Air Force Base, the Defense Mapping Agency, and Central Intelligence Agency headquarters.

Limitations of Ballistic-Missile Defense

There are two broad categories of efforts to avert the massive devastation that would follow the accidental launch of nuclear weapons: interception of the launched missile in a way that prevents detonation over a populated area and prevention of the launch itself. Intercepting a launched ballistic missile might appear to be an attractive option, since it could be implemented unilaterally by a country. To this end, construction of a U.S. ballistic-missile defense system has been suggested. Unfortunately, the technology for ballistic-missile defense is unproved, and even its most optimistic advocates predict that it cannot be fully protec-

tive. Furthermore, the estimated costs would range from \$4 billion to \$13 billion for a single-site system to \$31 billion to \$60 billion for a multiple-site system. In either case, the system would not be operational for many years.

A Bilateral Agreement to Eliminate High-Level Alert Status

Since ballistic-missile defense offers no solution at all in the short term and at best an expensive and incomplete solution in the long term, what can the United States as well as other nations do to reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear attack substantially and quickly? The United States should make it the most urgent national public health priority to seek a permanent, verified agreement with Russia to take all nuclear missiles off high alert and remove the capability of a rapid launch. This approach is much less expensive and more reliable than ballistic-missile defense and can be implemented in short order. In various forms, such an agreement has been urged by the National Academy of Sciences, the Canberra Commission, General Butler and his military colleagues throughout the world, and other experts, such as Sam Nunn, former chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, and Stansfield Turner, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and an interagency working group are completing a detailed study of de-alerting options that will be presented to Defense Secretary William Cohen.

Major improvements in nuclear stability can be achieved rapidly. In the wake of the 1991 attempted coup in Moscow, Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev moved quickly to enhance nuclear safety and stability by taking thousands of strategic weapons off high alert almost overnight. Today, there are specific steps that the United States can take almost immediately, since they require only the authority of a presidential directive. These steps include putting in storage the warheads of the MX missiles, which will be retired under Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II in any case, and the warheads of the four Trident submarines that will be retired under START III; placing the remaining U.S. ballistic-missile submarines on low alert so that it would take at least 24 hours to prepare them to launch their missiles; disabling all Minuteman III missiles by pinning their safety switches open (as was done with the Minuteman II missiles under President Bush's 1991 directive); and allowing Russia to verify these actions with the on-site inspections allowed under START I. Similar measures should be taken by the Russians. These steps—all readily reversible if warranted by future developments or if a permanent bilateral agreement is not reached—would eliminate today's dangerous launch-on-warning systems, making the U.S. and Russian populations immediately safer. Both nations should then energetically promote a universal norm against maintaining nuclear weapons on high alert.

The Role of Physicians

In awarding the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize to International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Nobel Committee underscored the "considerable service to mankind" that physicians have performed by "spreading authoritative information and by creating an awareness of the catastrophic consequences of atomic warfare. This in turn contributes to an increase in the pressure of public opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to a redefining of priorities. . . ." No group is as well situated as physicians to help policy makers and the public fully appreciate the magnitude of the disaster that can ensue if changes in the alert status of all nuclear weapons are not instituted.

The only way to make certain that an accidental (or any other) nuclear attack never occurs is through the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the air-tight international control of all fissile materials that can be used in nuclear weapons. In 1995, the World Court stated that the abolition of nuclear weapons is a binding legal obligation of the United States, Russia, and all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, under Article 6. Preferring the term "prohibition" to "abolition," the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences concluded in its 1997 report, "The potential benefits of comprehensive nuclear disarmament are so attractive relative to the attendant risks—and the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War . . . are so compelling—that . . . increased attention is now warranted to studying and fostering the conditions that would have to be met to make prohibition desirable and feasible."

Leading U.S. medical organizations, including the American College of Physicians and the American Public Health Association, have already joined Physicians for Social Responsibility, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and over 1000 other nongovernmental organizations in 75 nations to support Abolition 2000, which calls for a signed agreement by the year 2000 committing all countries to the permanent elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. The American Medical Association has recently endorsed the abolition of nuclear weapons, as have the Canberra Commission, military leaders throughout the world, major religious organizations, and over 100 current and recent heads of state and other senior political leaders. Some supporters of the abolition of nuclear weapons have specifically called for immediate steps to eliminate the high-level alert status of such weapons, as urgent interim measures. All parties should cooperate to ensure that these measures are implemented rapidly.

CONCLUSIONS

The time, place, and circumstances of a specific accident are no more predictable for nuclear weapons than for other accidents. Nonetheless, as long as there is a finite, nonzero, annual probability that an accidental launch will occur, then given sufficient time, the probability of such a launch approaches certainty. Until the abolition of nuclear weapons reduces the annual probability to zero, our immediate goal must be to reduce the probability of a nuclear accident to as low a level as possible. Given the massive casualties that would result from such an accident, achieving this must be among the most urgent of all global public health priorities.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I conclude by saying, I just happened 20 minutes ago to be speaking to our revered former majority leader, Howard Baker, who was in the Capitol to testify before the Finance Committee. I said I was coming over to offer this amendment. He and Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft, and Alton Frye have said, "Don't do this." He said with respect to Russian nuclear weapons; they have them, but they don't know how many they have and they don't know who controls them. The whole situation of command and control is very limited and weak and uncertain.

Not many years ago, after the end of the cold war, Norway put up a rocket

for purposes of research which put the Russian on nuclear alert. They had 15 minutes to decide whether to go to launch on warning. It was that close. We were that close to nuclear war. We will be closer in the aftermath of NATO expansion.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. I will yield to my colleague, who has somewhere to go, but I want to ask the Senator from New York a question. Is he aware that the point he is making about a hair trigger—that is, that the Russians have moved to a doctrine of not eschewing the doctrine of first use, that they are now saying they may have to rely on the first use of nuclear weapons? Is he aware that that doctrine which was changed in 1992 had nothing to do with the expansion of NATO?

In 1992, when the Russian military realized that they, in fact, had imploded when they were incapable of defending their borders, they did exactly what NATO did when we concluded we did not have the conventional force capacity to stop an all-out attack in Europe and indicated that we would use nuclear weapons if, in fact, we were attacked.

I ask my friend—I am fascinated by his rendition, and I share his concern about the hair trigger. But is he suggesting the decision in 1992 where Russia declared that it would not any longer abide by its previous policy of no first use of nuclear weapons—is he aware that was long before the contemplation of expansion of NATO?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Is the Senator aware of how little time I have to respond? He put that question on his time?

Mr. BIDEN. I put that question on my time, and then I will yield.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes, I do. I am very much aware of that. But I am also aware, on December 17, in the context of NATO expansion, a formal document was put out saying, “we may not have much else but we do have nuclear weapons.”

Mr. BIDEN. On my own time, if I might say, that is a little bit like my wife deciding that she is no longer going to cook dinner because she is receiving her Ph.D. and is taking too much time in class, and then 6 months later, after having made that decision, when I, in fact, do something she does not like, she says to me, “I want to formally tell you I haven’t been cooking dinner, but I want you to know the reason I am not cooking dinner now is because you were late coming home tonight because you didn’t call me from Washington and we missed going to that play.”

That is what it is like. It has nothing to do—she didn’t cook me dinner before for reasons unrelated to me coming home late, but if she wants to make a point that I missed a play, she may very well reiterate, bring out of an old bag something that is already being used.

That is what the Russians have done, and Mr. Kennan, a revered figure we both know—you know him better than I—believes this is dangerous. Paul Nitze thinks it is dangerous for totally different reasons. Kennan thinks it is dangerous because he thinks it will exacerbate the prospects of any democracy occurring in Russia. Nitze thinks it is dangerous because he is worried that NATO will get fat and flabby now and not be available as a significant military force, were things to go back in Russia.

I think it is comparing—with all due respect to my learned friend—apples and oranges.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might, on the time of the Senator from New York—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Oregon yield time?

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I will take the time jointly of my colleague from New York. I am privileged to be a cosponsor of this amendment. Of course, I will grant the Senator the opportunity to speak, and then I will follow the Senator from Oregon.

The point is, to Senator BIDEN’s comment on the issue of the nuclear weapons. The Senator from New York and I are not rattling the nuclear saber and trying to utilize fear as a point. There is a very logical argument as it relates just to the Baltics, that that is part of the equation if indeed they are admitted, and indeed NATO has to become a part of the defense system. But let’s put that to one side. What the Senator from New York was trying to say, and did say very eloquently, is that since 1992 the Russian military, across the board, with the exception of their nuclear arsenals, has suffered severe degradation. How well we all know, their officer corps has no housing, their military enlisted no pay, and they haven’t put a surface ship of any significant numbers to sea in a long time. The one system that threatens the United States, and always will, is the strategic nuclear system.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, as the Senator knows, they are routinely dismantling that system under Nunn-Lugar, in the face of expansion of NATO. I find that fascinating, and I also find it fascinating that they overwhelmingly ratified the CWC in the Duma. And as recently as two weeks ago, the number two man in the Kremlin is here telling us—excuse me, the foreign minister is here in the United States saying, by the way, by the end of the summer we are going to ratify START II. I don’t fail to share the concerns of my friends about the nuclear hair trigger.

My point is, as we are talking about expanding NATO, what they have been doing is exactly the opposite of what is being implied here. They have continued to move forward on arms control agreement, they have continued to destroy their nuclear arsenal, they have continued to go along with the CFE arms agreement and other treaties and

destroyed their conventional weapons, saying they will no longer abide by the doctrine of no first use, which occurred in 1992 when they realized that all they had left was their nuclear arsenal. That is my point.

It is non sequitur to suggest that the reason why we should be concerned is we are expanding NATO. That has nothing to do with it. There is not a shred of evidence of that. Now, there may very well be a hardening of positions in the domestic political situation in Russia. It may very well be that the browns and the reds get a little more muscle and the nationalists gain some. I don’t think so, but I acknowledge that it may be. But their nuclear doctrine is unrelated, put in place 5 years before NATO was a glint in the eye of President Clinton.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I say to my good friend that he is quite right in his recitation. There has been an active number of steps taken by Russia. We are still in question as to whether the Duma is going to move and approve the pending arms control. I do not yield that point. In an hour or so, I will be addressing the moratorium of 3 years. Russia has more or less accepted the fact that, in all likelihood, these 3 nations will come in. But I say to my colleague, they may draw the line with those 3. That is why I am going to ask this body to consider very carefully a time period in which to assess the impact of the 3 before we move forward with further consideration. We will wait an hour or so to address that.

I take strong disagreement with the fact that the Russians are going along with everything we are doing.

Mr. BIDEN. That is why the Senator should vote against his first amendment and for the second amendment.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I find it very humbling to be among these giants as a newcomer to this body. I feel something like the student questioning the wisdom of his professor because when it comes to names like PAT MOYNIHAN, JOHN WARNER, and Sam Nunn, these are men whom I admire and whom I have read about for years in history books.

Yet, I rise to oppose this amendment for reasons that I think are very, very important. I wonder as we consider the feelings of the Russians—and I am not saying those considerations are illegitimate, but what are the feelings of the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians? Do they have no right to qualify to self-determination to be a part of the western alliance? I have had officials from all of those countries tell me that if they had to choose between the EU or NATO membership, they would take membership in NATO; whether right or wrong, they are afraid of Russia. I believe they have a right to qualify to be a part of the west. And, yes, strong

economies are so important; but, frankly, they recognize that security precedes strong economic growth.

Madam President, the European Union may be many things, but it is certainly not a substitute for U.S. leadership in Europe. The EU has proved time and again that it is incapable of acting together on matters of foreign and security policy. Its military arm, the Western European Union, refuses to take action when European interests are threatened and, instead, turns to NATO or individual member states to address problems on the continent of Europe.

The political vision of the European Union extends no further than its trade interests, shown most recently by its rush to reengage the regime in Iran and its refusal to jeopardize commercial contacts by even mentioning the civil rights record of the Chinese government.

In contrast, for 50 years, NATO has been the defender of freedom and democracy and has shown that it is willing to make the necessary sacrifices to assure the success of these valued principles. In its membership, NATO includes two countries that will apparently never be in the European Union—the United States and Canada. It includes Norway, which rejected EU membership in a public referendum, and it includes Turkey, whose application to the EU has been repeatedly rebuffed.

How ironic it would be if we pass an amendment here that says before these countries can be in NATO, they must be in the EU, but, by the way, Turkey, which is a member of NATO, apparently will never be a member of the EU. Austria, Finland, and Sweden are all members of the EU, with continued neutrality policies. It is not just the different missions of NATO and the EU that made denying NATO enlargement to EU membership untenable, but the different membership of the two organizations lead it to take varying positions on issues of importance to both.

Further, the economies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are growing faster than almost all of the countries of the European Union. Consider some recent statistics that demonstrate the disparity between these 3 countries and the current EU members. In 1997, Italy's estimated economic growth rate was 1.5 percent, Germany's was 2.2 percent, France's was 2.4 percent. Meanwhile, Poland's growth rate was an astounding 7 percent. Hungary's economy grew by a healthy 4 percent. Growth in the Czech Republic was less impressive in 1997, due to severe flooding in that country, but their economy is expected to rebound in 1998. The European Union's regulation, taxes, subsidies, and labor laws could very well hurt the economic development and growth potential of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The pursuit of membership in the EU should be a careful decision made by countries in Central and Eastern Europe and should

not be a requirement for NATO membership. Even if these countries elect to seek EU membership, the European Union has made it clear that it will take years for them to conform their legislation to the multitude of EU laws and regulations.

In short, the amendment of my friend from New York is a delaying tactic that runs counter to U.S. security interests. Therefore, I oppose any effort to link NATO enlargement to membership in the European Union, and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Madam President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I want to follow along. The Senator from Oregon touched on the historical context of how nations are admitted into NATO, and there was some thought that Turkey—regrettably they are not a member of the EU, but we must remember that at the time Turkey was admitted it was really at the height of the cold war. NATO made the decision that it was imperative. In 1952, Europe was facing the pinnacle of that tragic period, and Turkey brought with them an enormous military strength which was proven.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. On the southern flank.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the Senator is absolutely right. On the southern flank. It was in NATO's interest at that time to admit Turkey. Turkey, of course, throughout their participation in NATO, has been in the forefront of strength on the southern flank as it is today. It is my hope—indeed, my expectation—that someday the EU will have a realization of that contribution and consider their membership. But I don't think this argument that NATO has admitted nations without EU membership carries any weight in the face of the historical context in which Turkey was admitted.

I wish to engage my colleague from New York. I am privileged to be a co-sponsor.

The struggle today of the three nations that we are considering for membership is not a military one. There is no threat. The administration candidly admits that. I think the Senator from Delaware would admit that there is no significant military threat. Russia today, in terms of its land forces, engaged them in the battle of Chechnya. That dragged on for an almost interminable period. It really ended by virtually exhaustion of both sides militarily as opposed to a military victory. Certainly they don't have the forces to mount any aggression in the context of a land attack on the three nations the subject of which we are discussing today. The military put it aside. It is an economic struggle all through the former Warsaw Pact to have their democracies, to have their participation in a free market system.

Along comes the conferring of NATO membership, presumably, on these

three nations. Immediately, in my judgment, that gives them a very significant advantage over the others who are waiting for admission into NATO and the world market. It is not unlike the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. You put your money in our bank. It is guaranteed by the Federal Government. They can advertise in the world market. We are now a member of NATO. You build your plant here. Invest your dollars in our countries. It is a lot safer than it would be in, say, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, or other areas of the world. It is going to give them an enormous advantage economically over those nations patiently waiting in line. I think it will breed friction. That friction could, indeed, involve confrontation, hopefully not with the use of arms.

But I ask my distinguished colleague if he agrees with that thought.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, with a measure of trepidation I hear the former Secretary of the Navy refer to me as a distinguished colleague, I certainly am honored to be with him in this debate, I say that I completely agree. Just the fact of NATO's guarantee of the borders of these three countries gives them an advantage over the rest of Eastern Europe. That is formidable, among other things.

Could I just take a moment to agree that the idea that Turkey can't get into the EU is appalling. When we were fighting in Korea in the first real war of the cold war, the Turks were there.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I remember it well because their units were alongside the Marines.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. That the Senator from Virginia was in.

Mr. WARNER. I was in the air part. I went up to the division, and I remember the Turkish units, and they were superb fighters.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I couldn't agree more. The EU should be extending membership to Turkey, in my view. Why not? When Europe was in ruins we went to rescue them by creating NATO. Now, by God, it would be not too much to hope that their precious Common Agricultural Policy might be adjusted to include Poland, if it costs them a little. It would cost them a great deal more if instability returns to Europe.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question on my time?

Mr. WARNER. Yes. Of course.

Mr. BIDEN. Does this mean that Turkey has to get out of NATO now?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. No.

Mr. BIDEN. Good. I thank you.

Mr. WARNER. We thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware for bringing up that point.

But, if I may further engage my friend and colleague, if I had to list my concerns in this debate on this amendment and the others today, cost always comes back and rings in my ear, as well as the security of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States, who in years forward

will be a part of our NATO force. But let's go to cost.

I have said it before. The distinguished Senator from Iowa has said it. There is a blank check involved in these votes today. EU membership would be a way to evaluate the economic ability of these three countries to meet their financial obligations to NATO. Should those financial obligations fall short, Madam President, guess who is going to pick it up. The United States of America, in participation with nations and other countries, by virtue of the EU giving their imprimatur on these countries will be further assurance that they will have economic productivity and the like to generate the dollars to meet their requirements to pay the bill to upgrade their militaries, militaries which today are largely equipped with old Soviet equipment, which has to be replaced if you are to have interoperability with the NATO forces. All of that is going to be a very, very hefty bill. I would like to see the EU pronounce their economic viability as nations, which gives us a certain amount of assurance in return that the American taxpayer will not be picking up a greater and greater portion of their obligation to modernize their forces.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, it must be that I am a little slow on the uptake here, because it seems to me that my friends are making my case. Let me explain what I mean by that, and they can correct me.

First of all, in the Foreign Relations Committee, I recall when we had this vote—and I say it again—in Europe, farm—f-a-r-m—policy always trumps foreign policy. Both have made my point. They acknowledge that. There is no possibility that Europe is going to do the right thing. They have not thus far. The reason, in my view, we must stay as a European power is that they have continued to demonstrate their immaturity over the past, and not much has changed in 50 years in terms of the willingness of anyone to lead.

If we acknowledge that farm—f-a-r-m—policy always trumps foreign policy in Europe—I challenge anyone to give me an example where it has not—then I ask you: Is this not a red herring? Join EU first before you can get into NATO.

The second point I will make: No one knows the history of this nation and Europe on this floor better than my friend from New York. As I said before, and I mean this sincerely, I am always uncomfortable when I am on the opposite side of an argument with my friend from New York.

Let me review very, very briefly the history of NATO and its founding, and the relationship between the economic health of a nation being invited in, and the ability or the willingness of the United States and other NATO members to invite that nation in.

From a policy perspective, NATO membership and EU membership—that is what this amendment is about, EU membership first before NATO—it is supposed to, and has been suggested by my two friends who are the sponsors of this amendment, somehow put the cart before the horse, that is, military alliance before economic unity, economic growth, economic security.

I quote from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report of 1949, the document that was brought to the floor of the Senate urging us to sign the Washington treaty. It said:

This treaty is designed to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relationships, to strengthen free institutions of the parties, and promote better understanding of the principles upon which they are founded, to promote the conditions of stability and well-being, and to encourage economic collaboration. It should facilitate long-term economic recovery through replacing the sense of insecurity by one of confidence in the future.

That was the original purpose. The original purpose was to promote economic stability. Nobody said then nor has—and I will quote Acheson and a few others in a moment. Nobody has said then or at any moment in our history since that time that, by the way, a condition of joining NATO must be economic integration first, should be economic integration first, must be a demonstration of a strong economy first. No one has ever said that, including George Kennan. George Kennan argued and thought this would promote economic stability as well as military security.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will my friend yield for a quick question?

Mr. BIDEN. I would be delighted to yield.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Does it occur to him that that passage in the Foreign Relations report referred to economic cooperation between France and Germany, the Schuman Plan?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes, it clearly did.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. That finally led to the iron and steel community.

Mr. BIDEN. It clearly did.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. In time to be the European Union?

Mr. BIDEN. It clearly did. But they needed military security—

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. BIDEN. To be able to ensure their economic stability. There is no question it referred to that. And there is no question that Acheson, referring to the relationship in 1952, said so in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee when he urged Greek and Turkish membership by first recalling that the two nations already joined us in an associate status with NATO, as do the countries we are talking about now, and Acheson emphasized that “the positive action rested not on their military contributions to the alliance but on their advances in democracy, rule of law, western orientation and the likelihood that NATO membership would deepen this.”

The only point I am trying to make is the obvious one we keep forgetting.

My colleagues who oppose expansion and wish to slow it or change it or alter it come to the floor and argue that this was uniquely a military alliance; its soul purpose was to make sure the Fulda Gap was not wide open for Warsaw Pact units to come pouring through.

That was its essential purpose. It is still its essential purpose. But it was not its only purpose in the beginning, in the middle, in the end. And so I would suggest that we tend to intentionally confuse our colleagues and the public when we say that we raise all these questions about the economic stability. The economic stability of the countries in question coming in is relevant in terms of whether they can pay their freight. That is an important question.

But this notion of winners and losers, now, I would ask the rhetorical question, if in fact by bringing the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary into NATO, that would in fact seriously disadvantage Romania, Slovenia, and all the other countries in question, does anyone ever stop to ask themselves the question, why is Romania ardently for Hungary's membership? Is it because they like being put at an economic disadvantage? Is it because they think this is a good idea; it will spur the competitive juices of our people? Is that why? If this is going to be so debilitating because there is going to be losers, that this is a zero sum game, why are they all for it? Not for it tepidly, not for it on the margins, but for it with an enthusiasm to the degree they send their Foreign Ministers to this country to importune me and many others. Please.

Now, obviously, they want to get in. They want to get in in the future. They have no promise of getting in. They have the hope of getting in. But the idea that we are going to debilitate, we are going to worsen, we are going to put at a serious disadvantage the economy of our other friends seems either to suggest that our other friends are too stupid to know what their own economic interests are—and they clearly are not, in my view—or it is not debilitating to their economies.

Madam President, it seems to me if you want to take a further look at this, in 1955, the Foreign Relations Committee report welcomed West Germany as “not only a major step toward the elimination of intra-European strife but in a broader sense these agreements provide the foundation for close cooperation and integration among European allies. The committee was impressed with particularly Secretary Dulles' statement on the psychological impact of this association, the increased effectiveness of the sense of duty, and the cohesion which will be brought about in Western Europe by Germany's participation in the Western European Union as well as NATO.”

Again, to make the point. Spain, in 1982, bears the closest resemblance to the current applicants. Spain, having

returned to democracy only 5 years earlier, believed NATO membership would consolidate Spanish democracy and assist at a lesser cost, as the Poles believe, the process of military modernization it had to undertake regardless of membership. And aside from geography, Spain was judged to offer little in the way of military assets useful to the alliance in 1982 prior to the completion of its modernization. Spain did not enter the EU until 1986, 4 years after, 4 years after NATO.

Madam President, historically, the economic component of the impact on the relationship with NATO of a new member state has been considered from 1949 on, and every time since, and it has been viewed consistently as better for the economies of the countries that have been unable to gain these larger economic relationships to join NATO first. That has been a stated purpose of bringing them in as well as the military component. Historically, membership in NATO has preceded membership in the European Common Market, or any economic grouping, in every instance.

Reserving the remainder of my time by saying this—when I finish this one comment. Why in the Lord's name would we, unless we just were simply flat against expanding NATO—which I understand. If this is designed as a killer amendment, it is a good strategy, but the logic of it I am lost in trying to comprehend. I find no logic to it, other than it being a killer amendment. You might as well attach an antiabortion amendment to the treaty. That would kill it. I don't want to give anybody any ideas. In this place, it may generate some ideas, but not by any of the Members on the floor.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Hyperbole. Hyperbole.

Mr. BIDEN. But—it is hyperbole that I am engaging in now, it was just pointed out by my friend from New York. But let me tell you what is not hyperbole. There is no historical precedent for this. There is no logical rationale as to why this would, in fact, facilitate NATO membership down the road, because we all know farm policy will prevail over foreign policy.

And lastly, I respectfully suggest that it bears no relationship, no relationship whatsoever, to anything anyone in the past has thought was necessary to strengthen NATO—none, zero, none, historically, politically, economically, socially, in any way. It may be a good idea, and I have been battling the Europeans, in my capacity as the chairman of or the ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee, for years, to “do the right thing. Do the right thing. Let your brothers in.”

Let me point out, if tomorrow you went to the Russians and said, “I have a deal for you; here is what we are going to do: All those European countries or former satellite states will become part of the EU and you will never be a member of the EU; or they will

not be members of the EU, but they will be members of NATO, which you may be able to do; you choose”—there is not an economist, there is not a democrat, in Russia who would choose the former over the latter, in my humble opinion, not a one.

So the fear—if you are worried about Russia being isolated, then isolate Russia economically from the rest of Europe as a condition before they can enter, anyone can enter, NATO.

The Europeans may grow beyond that and show their largess and bring in Russian farmers and all that wheat—all that wheat, as we give them the technological capability and the transportation infrastructure to be able to transport it to Europe. You watch. You watch. I am willing to bet any of you anything you would like, the likelihood of the EU being economically generous, extending any largess to the East, is zero, as distinguished from this defensive military alliance that provides political security for Russia on her border and diminishes the realistic prospect that any demagoguing nationalist will be able to inflame people enough to think that they could, in fact, realize any dead dreams.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, first I ask the Parliamentarian to advise the Senate with regard to the balance of the remaining time, if the Chair would address that issue, please?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opposition has 2 minutes remaining, and the Senator has 3 minutes 44 seconds.

Mr. WARNER. Of course, I urge the proponent of the pending amendment to proceed with the remainder of his time. Then we have the distinguished Senator from New Jersey, who has been patiently waiting. At the appropriate moment, if the Chair will advise the Senator from Virginia, I will introduce my amendment, which then begins a 2-hour time equally divided. I am certain the leadership entrusted to us the management of these two amendments in such a way that we stay on schedule, because the Senate has a very heavy load with regard to this treaty for the remainder of the day. I personally said to the leadership—and I will stand by it—we will do everything we can to see that this vote, final vote on this treaty, is cast tonight in a timely way, hopefully earlier than later, to accommodate a number of Members.

I yield the floor at the moment. The distinguished Senator from New York is seeking recognition.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, may I express my gratitude to the Senator from Delaware for his thoughtful comments. Might I simply respond that the behavior of the Western Europeans and the European Union has been self-interested. But perhaps, after half a

century of our defending them, having in the first instance liberated them, we might hope for a more open view.

For half a century, half the defense expenditure of the United States has gone to NATO. I believe that is correct—half. We have had American troops on the Rhine since 1944. That, Madam President, is the stuff of Roman Legions. But out of that commitment which we have made—an unparalleled act of generosity and self-interest, but informed self-interest and extraordinary generosity—has grown a vibrant and wealthy European community. On Saturday, many of its members will form a common currency. It is not too much to ask them to do themselves and Europe the favor of extending membership to these newly independent nations. I can imagine that they will if we make the effort. We are the ones who first came along with the proposal to expand NATO and therefore expand American force. Isn't a half-century enough? I would have thought it was. I would not give up hope that we might see some enlightened self-interest in Brussels. There is really reason to hope for that.

When the Senator from Delaware mentioned the economic divisions of the Washington treaty as reported by the Foreign Relations Committee, they were talking about the Schuman Plan, an unheard of plan to have France and Germany unite in a common market—common production of iron and steel and the coal that goes with it. The disputes over Alsace-Lorraine, which they fought over for all those years, might come to an end. It did. And it could happen again.

I thank the Chair. I very much appreciate the courtesy that has been shown to Senator WARNER and myself. I see Senator TORRICELLI is on the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 30 seconds. Madam President, the Treaty of Rome wasn't until the mid-1950s, and it was unheard of in 1949, as the Schuman Plan was. The only point I am making is, any cooperation in Europe was one of the purposes of NATO; it was to encourage that cooperation. But what they had in mind in May of 1949 may have been only the Schuman Plan and/or something else. The EU wasn't even around until the mid-1950s. That wasn't even thought of either.

So the whole notion was that economic cooperation in Europe produced stability, enhanced democracy, and, in turn, allowed for military security. It is still the case.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 30 seconds of the time has expired. The Senator has all the remaining time.

Mr. BIDEN. I beg your pardon?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute 20 seconds.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield to my friend from Texas the remainder of time on this amendment, if I may yield him a total of 5 minutes, whatever that takes off of

the WARNER amendment—if I am able to do that?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire). Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Texas is recognized.

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, whenever the Senator from New York and the Senator from Virginia offer an amendment, we know it is well reasoned and we know it is well intended and so I think, as a result, we are always correct in being cautious in opposing such an amendment.

But I am opposed to this amendment because, while I think their argument is well reasoned as far as it goes—it is certainly well intended—I think it is an amendment which does not belong in this legislation and which is fundamentally destructive.

If our colleagues want to encourage the European Union to expand and to grant membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, I am for that. I think that EU membership expansion to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should occur, I strongly support it, and if we were voting on that issue, and that issue alone, I would vote for this amendment.

I remind my colleagues that NATO membership today is not made up of countries that are solely members of the European economic community. Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Canada and the United States are not members of the European Union. I, for one, would support American membership in the European Union, but I don't think they are going to let us join.

Might I say that while we are encouraging the European Union to expand its membership, we ought to start with Turkey. It is absolutely outrageous that the opposition of one country is preventing Turkey from having an opportunity to be part of the European economic community when Turkey has been an anchor of NATO for 46 years, when Turkey did as much as any other country to keep Ivan back from the gate, when Turkey provides the largest land army of any European NATO nation. These contributions ultimately helped check the Soviet expansion and through the power of ideas and freedom tore down the Berlin Wall, liberated Eastern Europe, and freed more people than any victory in any war in the history of mankind.

If our objective is to start urging the European Union to expand its membership as a precondition for membership in NATO, let's begin by urging them to expand their membership to nations which are already part of NATO and which contributed greatly to winning the cold war.

I think this is an arbitrary distinction that does not belong in this bill. If we want to do something to encourage the European Union to expand, I am in favor of that. I would certainly vote for a resolution urging them to expand, to take in Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic, but I think we ought to begin with Turkey.

But that is not what is before us today. What is before us today is a fundamental decision as to whether we are going to let an arbitrarily drawn line, a line drawn by Stalin in Europe through the Iron Curtain at the end of World War II, stand as a permanent division of Europe in terms of military alliance.

I am not oblivious to concerns that have been raised about the cost of expanding NATO. I am not oblivious to other concerns with regard to Russia and to its response, but in the end, I am sway by the argument that we should not allow communism, which is now on the ash heap of history, to determine the composition of our military alliance in Europe. Therefore, I intend to vote to expand NATO, but I do not believe that that expansion should be conditioned on membership in the European Union.

Let me also remind my colleagues that Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden are members of the European Union, but they are not members of NATO.

This is a clear-cut choice. I think this amendment is the wrong thing to do, and I urge my colleagues to oppose it.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, it would be a great mistake to condition the future of the NATO, a transatlantic military alliance of unparalleled success led by the United States, to actions and decisions of the European Union. The EU is a strictly European political-economic organization of which the United States is not a member and has no say. For this reason, it is with great regret that I stand in opposition to my good friend, the Senator from New York, and urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.

EU enlargement is highly desirable on its own merits. Indeed, the Resolution of Ratification specifically states it is the policy of the United States to encourage EU enlargement.

However, as worthy as EU enlargement is, it should not be formally linked to NATO enlargement. Nor should EU membership serve as a condition for NATO aspirants. Let me emphasize three basic reasons:

First, this amendment is inconsistent with the Washington Treaty. Article 10 of the Treaty states that membership in NATO is open to, and I quote, "any European State in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."

The North Atlantic Treaty makes no mention of the European Union. Moreover, several NATO member states are not EU members, including the United States, Canada, Turkey, Iceland and Norway. Are they any less effective members of the Alliance because they are not part of the EU? The answer is unambiguously NO.

And what if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic decide, as Norway

has—a founding member of NATO—that membership in the European Union is not in their interests? I point this out to highlight that this amendment establishes an arbitrary standard that is not necessarily a reflection of a NATO aspirant's state of economic and political well-being.

Second, Mr. President, by conditioning NATO membership on attainment of EU membership, this amendment would strip the Alliance of control over its own future—specifically its decisions over future membership—and transfer it over the European Union. The EU is not a transatlantic organization. It has no effective security or defense capability or policy for that matter. Let us not forget, it was a complete failure in the effort to end to the conflict in Bosnia. Do we really want the EU to have such significant influence over NATO?

And, let us not over look the fact that this amendment could well suspend NATO enlargement indefinitely. EU enlargement is far from certain. It is far from clear when the EU will extend its membership to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. It could be a decade, if not more for all we know. There are still significant political forces and economic interests within the EU deeply opposed to EU enlargement.

Third, this amendment would undercut U.S. leadership of NATO by relegating the United States—and the United States Senate for that matter—to a second class tier of Alliance members. Why? because NATO members who are not in the European Union would be denied the same voice and authority over the future of the Alliance that this amendment would reserve for those NATO countries that are members of the European Union.

In one fell swoop, this amendment would: impose an unprecedented restriction upon the Washington Treaty; transfer key decisions over NATO's future to the EU, an European institution that lacks an effective security policy; demote the United States to a new second-class tier of Alliance members; and, thereby weaken U.S. leadership of NATO.

I am sure that these are not the intentions behind this amendment, but they would clearly be the consequences. My colleagues, we have no choice but to vote this amendment down.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, from a strictly American foreign policy viewpoint, requiring EU membership first is sheer folly. Why would we want to place such a key element of our national security decisionmaking in the hands of the European Union—an organization to which we do not belong?

Already we are seeing the EU members disagreeing over how quickly those invited should be allowed in.

To give the EU, in effect, a veto over NATO membership, might encourage the creation of an EU caucus within NATO, limiting the United States'

ability to advance our diplomatic and military goals in the committees of the Alliance.

Moreover, advocates of this amendment have misunderstood the importance of NATO membership prior to EU membership, both from a policy and historical context.

From a policy perspective, NATO membership in advance of EU membership will provide the security these countries need to continue their economic reforms and help to ensure a climate of confidence essential for continued foreign investment and economic integration.

From a historical perspective, in all its reports on all three rounds of NATO enlargements that took place from 1952 to 1982, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee cited European economic development and integration as one key benefit of expanding NATO's zone of stability.

I would like to briefly quote from these Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports:

1949 Report establishing NATO:

The treaty is designed to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations, to strengthen the free institutions of the parties and promote better understanding of the principles upon which they are founded, to promote conditions of stability and well-being, and to encourage economic collaboration. It should facilitate long-term economic recovery through replacing the sense of insecurity by one of confidence in the future.

The Committee believes that the [1949] North Atlantic Pact, by providing the means for cooperation in matters of common security and national defense, creates a favorable climate for further steps toward progressively closer European integration * * *

In 1952, Secretary of State Acheson, in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, urged NATO membership for Greece and Turkey first by recalling that these two nations already enjoyed an associate status with NATO's activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was in response to Athens' and Ankara's formal request—their belief that associate status was inadequate to their national defense needs—that they were favorably considered for NATO membership. Acheson emphasized that positive action rested not only on their military contributions to the Alliance, but on their advances in democracy, rule of law, and Western orientation, and the likelihood that NATO membership would deepen this.

It should be noted that Greece did not enter the European Union until nearly twenty years after its accession to NATO. Turkish membership in the EU remains a contentious, unresolved issue. Are we supposed to kick Turkey out of NATO because it doesn't belong to the EU?

The 1955 Foreign Relations Committee report welcomed West German accession:

* * * not only as a major step toward the elimination of intra-European strife but in a broader sense, these agreements provide the foundation for close cooperation and integra-

tion among European allies . . . The Committee was impressed in particular with Secretary Dulles' statement on the psychological impact of this association—the increased effectiveness and the sense of unity and cohesion which will be brought about in Western Europe by German participation in NATO and the Western European Union.

Of all the examples, the last one—Spanish accession to NATO in 1982—bears the closest resemblance to that of the current applicants.

Spain, having returned to democracy only five years earlier, believed that NATO membership would help consolidate Spanish democracy and assist, at lesser cost, a process of military modernization it had to undertake regardless of membership.

Aside from its geography, Spain was judged to offer little in the way of military assets useful to the Alliance in 1982 prior to the completion of its modernization.

Nevertheless, in favorably reporting Spanish accession to NATO to the full Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee recorded a brief exchange between then-Chairman Charles Percy and then-State Department European Bureau Chief Larry Eagleburger explaining why Spanish accession to NATO was so important to broad U.S. national security interests. Because this exchange is so similar to our situation today, I would like to quote from it. Chairman Percy noted:

At a time when NATO's cohesiveness and viability is being critically questioned in the press, I find Spain's NATO membership application a reaffirmation of the fundamental principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a group of sovereign nations sharing common values and aspirations and committed to working together despite differences to guarantee the security, prosperity, and defense of Western democracy.

Assistant Secretary Eagleburger replied:

* * * in terms of that question of Spanish democracy, it is terribly important that we do everything we can to tie Spain to Western institutions, to have those people be able to deal with Western parliamentarians who also have a commitment to democracy * * * Every tie we can create between Spain and Western Europe and the United States, institutional tie, in fact, I think, strengthens the whole process of democracy in Spain.

Spain did not enter the EU until 1986, four years after accession to NATO.

Historically, membership in NATO has preceded membership in European common market or economic integration groupings.

It is much easier to develop habits of cooperation in common defense as a precursor to the much more complex negotiations leading to economic integration.

If we wait for the EU to act, we may be waiting for a long time. For example according to recent polls, the Austrian public opposes EU membership for four of the five recent EU invitees.

Finally, recent history has shown that, in European capitals, when presented with a choice between farm policy and foreign policy, farm policy always wins.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, I oppose the Moynihan amendment and urge my colleagues to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized to offer an amendment if he chooses to do so.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2322

(Purpose: To express a condition regarding the further enlargement of NATO)

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf of myself and the distinguished senior Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN. We are joined by Mr. BINGAMAN, Mrs. HUTCHISON and Mr. DORGAN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Virginia [Mr. WARNER], for himself, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mrs. HUTCHISON and Mr. DORGAN, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2322.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 2 of the resolution, insert the following:

() UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING FURTHER ENLARGEMENT OF NATO.—Prior to the date of deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that it is the policy of the United States not to encourage, participate in, or agree to any further enlargement of NATO for a period of at least three years beginning on the earliest date by which Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment by the senior Senator from New York and myself and on my amendment in which I am joined by the senior Senator from New York, the two amendments which are before the Senate at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request on both amendments? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I point out in the beginning that this amendment does not affect the decision with respect to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, nor does this amendment concede what I believe is the right thing to do in voting against the admission of those countries. But this amendment is sent to the desk simply because, in recognition of the reality, through conversations personally between myself and many, many Members of this Chamber, indeed, with the President and the Secretary of State and many others, the likelihood that the resolution of ratification will be approved.

Given that reality, I think it is imperative that this body have before it an amendment, which has just been

sent to the desk, which indicates there will be a pause, so to speak, a strategic pause of 3 years only before our country, our President, whoever will be President at that point in time, can agree to accession of additional countries.

Mr. President, I established in my opening statement my strong allegiance to NATO in the past, and now and forevermore that I am privileged to be a Member of this body. I said the importance of America to have a voice, and how this treaty for 49 years has surpassed the expectations of all and remains the most important military document apart from our own Constitution in many ways, and that is why I ask for these 3 years. I will recite the reasons, one, two and three.

Should not another President duly elected by the people of the United States have a voice in further modifications by virtue of further accession of additional nations to this alliance?

If the Good Lord gives me the strength and the breath in the consideration of that next Presidential election, I will do everything within my power to make sure that is an issue that is debated among those candidates seeking that high office. Regrettably, in the last election very little attention was given to national security policy. But the world is rapidly changing. The world is becoming a more dangerous place. Indeed, in the next election I will do my part, as I am sure others will likewise, to see that the security policy of our Nation and the free nations of the world will be a subject of discussion in that election.

I think the next President should be given the opportunity to assess the merits and such disadvantages as may arise by virtue of the accession of three more nations before we leap forward under pressure, which will be unrelenting. That pressure will begin the day 1 year from now when these three nations will be accessed. That pressure will begin the day after. The bugles will sound. The march will begin to bring in other nations perhaps numbering as many as nine.

I say to my colleagues, should not the next President be given the opportunity to study the record, make an assessment, and then give his advice or her advice, as the case may be, to the people of the United States?

That is my first reason for asking for reasonable delay of but 3 years. This amendment will avoid that stampede. This amendment in fairness will say to the other nations it is not only to the advantage of the NATO countries but, indeed, it is to the advantage of the other nations to let this experiment ferment for a period to determine the purity, or the lack thereof, of the decision.

Then I turn to a second reason. That is the cost. Whether it is \$1.5 billion over the next 2 years or \$125 billion, there will be no piece of evidence before this body which has sound credibility as to the cost associated with accession of these three nations.

This afternoon we will have further amendments on the question of cost. But we are dealing from an unknown. NATO is studying the question of cost, and is studying the question of the degree to which these nations must rebuild and modernize their military. But those studies will not be available until later this summer. Yet our vote will be taken before the sun falls on this day on two very vital pieces of information, totally lacking. We have, therefore, a blank check. We do not know the cost now. We will not know for months even the opinion of the NATO Council, which is really the organization that can best evaluate these costs. But there is credible evidence on both sides. The range of costs go from \$1.5 billion over 2 years to \$125 billion.

I want to touch a sensitive nerve among my distinguished colleagues. Those listening and those advising Members might just take their pencil and put a little asterisk by this point.

America is in its 14th year of decline of funding to the U.S. Armed Forces of the United States, a collective decision by a series of Presidents. This is not a political argument. We have irrefutable evidence that our Armed Forces today are behind in their modernization program. They are stretched too thin. They are over committed worldwide. We see that in the retention rates. There is all sorts of mounting evidence that we are asking our military to do the same as they have boldly and bravely for years with less and less—less in dollars, less time at home with their families, and with fewer and fewer pieces of equipment.

Shipbuilding: A handful of combat ships every year in the budget. We are rapidly approaching a Navy that could be well below the 300-plus, a few ships of today, in the year 2000. We, a maritime nation faced with that small Navy. Dollars from the American taxpayer profits have been, are being, and will be committed to these three nations.

We have been contributing money regularly to the establishment and refurbishment of their military at the same time we are denying to our military what, in my opinion, are the necessary dollars to perform their mission. We will be taking those dollars and putting them through NATO into other nations, the three that are our subject, for their military, to help them come up so that they have the capability to take on a full partnership commensurate with their size in the NATO alliance. Think about it. You are taking from your military and giving to another military.

Now, as a part of the consideration of this year's military authorization bill, there will be discussion, indeed, there could be legislation, about a future base closure. That should ring a bell—a future round of base closures in the United States. That should get the attention of some Members.

Secretary of Defense Cohen has made an admirable and, in my judgment, a

credible appeal to the Congress of the United States to address that question and address it now. If we do not, he has little alternative but to literally starve a base, turn off the current, transfer the people, and leave the buildings standing unattended because he is properly exercising his judgment that the dollars are needed for modernization, the dollars are needed for the ever-rising number of commitments beyond our shores rather than keeping in place a base that no longer contributes to our overall national security.

Tough decision. What do you say, colleagues, when you go home to defend a base closing in your State, as you will do and as you are duty bound to, and at the same time we are contributing money to build new bases in these three countries, and unless my amendment passes I daresay in other countries in a very short period of time.

They have to modernize more so than the United States. They have to take their old infrastructure which was designed for Soviet military tactics, take their old tanks and artillery pieces which are, by and large, old Soviet weaponry and modernize so they have interoperability as a nation with NATO.

That is a further drain on the American taxpayer at the very time when in your State the next round of base closures may have a potential impact. And you will be fairly asked by your constituents: do you mean to tell me they are closing our beloved hometown base that has been here defending America all these years and you are helping to build bases abroad? Do you not have a conflict?

Those are questions that are fairly to be asked in the not too distant future if we allow a stampede of three now and three in the next 18 months and three thereafter, up to as many as 28 nations potentially to join NATO.

We are also asked to approve this measure without full knowledge as to the strategic concept of what NATO is and is not going to do in the years to come. We are operating under a 1991 doctrine today. Listen to the Secretary of State, as the distinguished Senator from Missouri pointed out yesterday, who desires to expand the missions of NATO far beyond the borders of their nations, to be involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There may be some merit. But should we not fully have in mind before we begin to add country after country what is to be the mission of NATO?

Ironically, it is not until 1 year from this month, April, at the summit at which these three nations will be admitted when NATO will finalize the doctrine for the future. Yet, we are asked to vote today to change the bases of this treaty by virtue of new membership not knowing the risks that will face the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces as well as the other NATO nations. I ask you, is that the way to do business? Not in my

judgment. And that is why I say if three are a reality, then we should stop and study a reasonable period of time. Let another President, let the American people in the context of the next election, let the American people at that time have a careful examination of what NATO brings forth a year from today as to the new mission and adoption. Those are just reasonable requests. And time, and time alone, can establish the record on which those important decisions can be made. Three years, in my judgment, is not an unreasonable period of time.

Lastly, I refer to Russia, not in the sense that I fear Russia, not in the sense that Russia—and I have said this consistently—should have any veto power as to any decision which is in the security interests of the United States of America. The Founding Act was established, I think, as a quid pro quo for the accession of these three nations. Russia signed on. But there is mounting evidence that you cross over and begin another three, and particularly when you get to the Balkans, all the arguments which we have heard in favor of voting yea tonight will fall. I believe this Chamber will resonate with deep concern as reflected by the instabilities in Russia that could exist in the year 2000 when they are moving on possibly to another political structure, another President. There is a great deal of uncertainty in Russia today—economically, politically, and militarily—in their struggle to survive as a fledgling democracy, as they struggle to survive in a free-market world, and I think the next President should be given the opportunity to make an assessment as to the measure of threat posed by Russia in the context of any further accession of new nations to this most valuable of all treaties. Time and time alone can achieve that purpose.

So they should not have a veto. We do not act out of fear. But we act out of reality, that that is the only nation that possesses weaponry which poses a direct threat to the United States of America; namely, their strategic forces. You cannot be unmindful of that fact.

Therefore, I think a period of 3 years is appropriate to allow another President, to allow the studies to be performed, to allow the American people to better understand the value of this NATO alliance and what should be done for the future, and, therefore, I respectfully ask my colleagues to consider to vote in favor of the Warner-Moynihan amendment for a 3-year moratorium.

Mr. President, other Senators have been waiting patiently. I wish to continue my remarks and will do so momentarily. I know the distinguished Senator from New Jersey has been here for some time. Therefore, I yield him 10 minutes off the time under the control of the Senator from Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Virginia and, indeed, the Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN, in each of their amendments and speak to them today.

It is, I think, worth noting that the decision before this Senate is neither new nor without the apprehension that should come with historic experience.

On March 31, 1939, Neville Chamberlain rose in the British Parliament and announced unambiguously, unequivocally, the British will defend the Polish frontier with the threat of war. To be certain, it was a war that inevitably was going to be fought and should have been fought. But what is instructive about the experience, as Winston Churchill later noted, "Here was a decision at last taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground."

More than a generation later, the Senate has a chance to ask all the questions that were not asked in the British Parliament on that day, because before this Senate is the most solemn question that the representatives of any free people can ever ask.

We are pledging the good name of this country to go to war, to consume the lives of our sons and our daughters for the defense of another people. That does not mean it is a pledge that sometimes should not be made. Maybe it should be made in this instance. But there are questions that should be raised that are the foundation of the amendments offered by the Senator from Virginia, Senator WARNER, and the Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN.

Those questions are, in my judgment, whether or not, having made this pledge, the United States and our NATO allies genuinely have the military capability, in our resources, to fulfill the obligation, whether or not the United States and our NATO allies have the political will to lend credibility to this pledge, and whether or not this promise of defense enhances or detracts from the general security of the United States and the NATO alliance.

Let me begin, Mr. President, by addressing the question of the military feasibility of this most expansive American pledge to defend other nations since the NATO alliance itself and the Japanese-American security agreement. Indeed, this expansion of our security guarantee is based on an unspoken but a very real sense of a change in historic realities in this Chamber. It is based on the belief that Russia is weakened, an historic opportunity has arisen, and that the views of Russia are either no longer relevant or that she is without choice in this question.

Mr. President, the current state of affairs with regard to the military and economic power of Russia is an aberration. Russia has been a great power for more than 1,000 years; and it will be a great power again. Its affairs are part of the calculus of American security and cannot be discounted.

It is a nation of nearly 150 million people with over 6.5 million square miles of territory. It possesses 40 percent of the world's natural gas reserves and rivals any power on Earth as a source of natural resources, including petroleum. Russia is a technological leader. It is a major industrial power. And it continues, in spite of its current economic difficulties, as the only source of military technology, production and power that potentially rivals the United States.

So, Mr. President, there may be many things uncertain about the future, but this much is certain: Russia will continue in the future to be a great power. And yet while it may not be spoken on this floor, this calculation of immediately extending the American security umbrella to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary is based on the calculation that at some point Russia might be a threat to their frontiers, and we will provide for its defense.

Mr. President, I know us as Americans to be an ambitious people and a confident people. But this is an extraordinary guarantee the people of the United States are extending to these three new democracies in Eastern Europe.

No nation in history has been able to defend against the territorial ambitions of Russia when she was an imperial or in an imperialistic mode. It is worth noting, from Napoleon to the Third Reich, people have miscalculated on their abilities to deal with Russian ambitions in Eastern Europe.

Russia was challenged in the borders of Poland by the Third Reich and 162 divisions of the Wehrmacht. We are an ambitious people, Mr. President. The U.S. Army today, 4,000 miles from our borders, has three divisions.

What military means is it by which we are going to give credibility to this pledge? Not next year, not 10 years, not at some point in the future, but the day this treaty is signed. Three divisions, half a world away on the borders of Russia herself?

There is, Mr. President, another irony to this military pledge related to the comments of the Senator from Texas, Mr. GRAMM, in noting that in some ways the current borders of NATO are a relic of the Iron Curtain of Josef Stalin. Well, now, Mr. President, we are to draw a new line. And it may have its benefactors and its beneficiaries. But what of those nations not inside this new line? The great lesson of Yalta was that those nations that fell on the other side of the line were lost to a Stalinist equation and calculation that they were now in a new sphere of influence.

This Senate is faced with a question of tomorrow, next month, this year, drawing a new line in Europe that may bring Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary in, but leaves the Baltics and Romania and the Ukraine out. How would a future adversary, not in a democratic Russia but in a possible

successor Government, interpret this new sphere of influence? Not as a check on ambitions but as an invitation to ambitions?

Equally important, I believe, Mr. President, from my first, and in this instance, military review of this instance, is that we are entering ourselves again into a military calculation that for 50 years we have wanted to escape. Because if we are to make this pledge of defending these three new democracies, and we do so with three divisions of the U.S. Army and no indigenous military capability whatsoever, we are entering into, again, something which we feared and have so fought to escape. The only means of defending these governments is through atomic weapons. We are pledging unmistakably a nuclear exchange to defend the Polish frontier from possible future invasion. It is where we were during the cold war with New York for Berlin, Chicago for Paris, San Francisco for Rome.

It is easy to make the pledge, Mr. President. The question is whether to do so without military resources is responsible. It is not simply that our own resources are insufficient. My friend, the Senator from Delaware, has drawn a parallel between this expansion and the initial NATO treaty or expansions in other instances. In this instance, we are not joining in mutual defense with the British army or the Germans or the French; we are pledging to defend Poland, whose armed forces consist of 1,700 Soviet tanks designed for the 1950s and 1960s, a Hungarian air force which will contribute to its own security 50 aging Soviet MIG fighters, and the Czech air force whose pilots fly an average of 40 hours a year in training for their own self-defense.

The Senate can make this judgment. You can decide to extend the American security umbrella all over Eastern Europe, even though there are insufficient American forces to contribute to their defense, and rely on indigenous forces. But at least make the decision based on the reality that there are no indigenous forces. It is a military pledge without military capability.

Second is the issue of whether or not there is the political will in the United States and in Western Europe to give this promise meaning. The NATO treaty is the most successful military alliance in history. At a time when the Soviet Union had overwhelming military means, it was the foundation of the defense of Western Europe, but it was not based on the fact that the United States signed a treaty. It was based on historic and economic realities. Through two world wars the American people had demonstrated they were prepared to defend one Europe because they believed that the security of Western Europe and the United States were inseparable. Our quality of life, our security, our economic future could not be distinguished from Great Britain, France, in the first instance, Italy and Germany and other member states at other times.

In a free society, the President of the United States may sign a treaty pledging to defend Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, but if the economic realities are not such that the American people believe that our futures are indistinguishable, it is a dangerous promise because it is a hollow pledge.

The reality is today that there may be a time when each of these republics have sufficient economic intercourse with the United States and Western Europe that we believe they are part of the Western alliance by economic and cultural and historic definition and this pledge has meaning. But no one can argue—indeed, this is the foundation of the rationale of the amendment by Senators MOYNIHAN and WARNER—no one can argue that that reality is true today.

Total economic intercourse with the Czech Republic today is .09 percent of American exports.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes has expired.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Will the Senator yield 10 additional minutes?

Mr. WARNER. I grant another minute and a half.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Is that all the time the Senator has?

Mr. WARNER. The Senator has other time under his control, but there are a number of Senators who wish to speak. Perhaps, if there is more time in the course of this debate, I am certain both sides would be happy to have the contribution of the Senator.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I thank the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. President, no one can argue that we have reached that state of economic dependency at the moment. That is the rationale of the delay, to allow these bonds to form and to give this pledge meaning.

Finally, the foundation of American security in this generation and as far as the eye can see is the Russian-American relationship. Any judgment we make which enhances Russian democracy enhances American security. Most fundamental to this debate is the fact that Eastern Europe and the NATO alliance's first line of defense is the Russian ballot box. If Russia is democratic and capitalistic and free, Eastern Europe is secure. If it is not, no force on Earth is going to defend the Ukraine, the Baltics, or even these republics.

I believe strongly this pledge and this NATO expansion will be enhanced by both of these amendments. I accept the reality that NATO is going to be expanded, but I believe it is a more responsible judgment if we address these questions, allow for this delay. I believe it would lead to a better expansion of NATO, and we would be pleased and proud that we made these exceptions.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Before the Senator from New Jersey leaves the floor, I want to briefly make two points. I find his ar-

gument absolutely fascinating that economic dependence or integration with the United States is a prerequisite for NATO membership. I wonder if he could explain to me what that dependence was we had with Norway or that dependence we have with Denmark or Portugal or Spain?

As each came in, as each of these nations came in, if there is a notion that there is a prerequisite of an economic dependency—we have more invested in Poland, more in Poland now than we did at the time of these countries coming in.

Mr. TORRICELLI. If the Senator will yield, I would be glad to address each of those.

Mr. BIDEN. Let me make a second point.

Mr. WARNER. Could the time be allocated?

Mr. BIDEN. I make a point, I have the floor.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I appreciate that, but the Senator asked a question that deserves to be answered.

Mr. BIDEN. I also find this notion, and it is repeated in different ways but never in a more articulate fashion than just done by my friend from New Jersey, no force on Earth will be able to defend Poland or the Baltics, and he may have mentioned another country, Ukraine, if Russia is not a democracy.

One of the secondary reasons why people want to expand NATO is because we fundamentally reject that notion, but fundamentally reject the notion that if things "go south," to use the colloquial expression, in Russia, that someone will be there to never let it happen to Poland again, just like we defended Germany, just like we defended Turkey, just like we defended Norway.

Now, I am going to, at a later point, speak at length about this iron ring notion my friend from Virginia and my friend from New York talk about and point out that there has been a border shared between Norway and Russia that is one of the most heavily fortified places in the world, and during the period when the Soviet Union was at its zenith, we made a judgment as a people that we would defend Norway.

Now, I know my friend is not suggesting this, but is anyone implying that peace and stability in Europe is any less at issue if Poland, after having received their independence, were now or again to be invaded as compared to Norway? What are we saying here? And the notion, will we use nuclear weapons to defend Warsaw, do you think anybody in our respective constituency is going to say, yes, let's use them to defend Turkey, Ankara?

I respectfully suggest that we can use rhetorical devices to make a point, but that they are able to be used in more than one instance. Maybe you are not going to get a consensus to use the requirement, the nuclear protection in NATO, the consultation provision where we are required to go to the mutual defense, I believe article V—and

we always used to hear, when the Soviet Union existed, how many Americans are prepared to trade Bonn for Washington, Bonn for New York City. Well, now to say how many people will be prepared to defend Warsaw, I suggest you might get more people to say they are prepared to defend Warsaw than they are prepared to defend Ankara or Oslo. That is my guess, because there are a heck of a lot more Polish Americans than there are Turkish Americans. I don't think it is a useful, in terms of what our national policy should be, particularly useful point to make because it could be made about every capital in Europe, I suspect, if it were put to the American people today.

But the real question to be put to the American people is—I think they answer affirmatively on it—is peace and stability in Europe in our national interest, and it is one of those things that we either pay now or pay later, because Americans have good memories. They understand that every time chaos has reigned in Europe, we have been dragged in this century. And so I suggest further that to denigrate the forces of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, who were equally, or better situated than Spain and Portugal were when they came in, in terms of forces, or to suggest the only way to defend Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is nuclear weapons is simply militarily not accurate. And so I think what we are really debating here—and I will say it again—and I don't think people really want to speak to it directly—and what this is really about is whether we should have NATO, period—not whether we should expand it, but whether we should have it now. Because if a test as to whether or not we are going to admit Poland is whether or not we are going to use nuclear weapons—and it is not an option because there is no serious problem about conventional forces overrunning Poland today—none—you could scramble enough jets, bombers, fighters out of Germany to get to the Polish border without having to have them in Poland at all, to withstand any reasonable conventional capability that is available to the Russians or anyone else right now. But the question is: Would we defend Warsaw? If we don't believe that resoundingly the American people would say that, then we should not let Poland in.

I think really what you are saying is that you have to ask the honest question to the folks in Salem, New Jersey, across the river from Delaware, and up in Trenton, and further up in Newark: Are you willing to go to war to save Oslo? I would be willing to make my friend a bet, and let my vote depend on it, that if he got more people to say, yes, we are willing to go to war to defend Oslo, then I will vote against admitting Poland. But my guess is, if you ask any capital in any city in any European country—say possibly London—are you willing to go to war to defend Oslo, I am not sure you would get

much of a different answer, no matter where you asked. So if that is the question—and the Presiding Officer knows this issue well—aren't we really asking: Do we want NATO, period? If that is the case, why doesn't someone introduce an amendment, straight up, and stop all this foolishness—I take that back. I withdraw that statement. I don't mean that. Stop all the tangential attacks on expansion and get right to what this is about—introduce an amendment saying that we no longer need NATO. We can save a lot of money. We spend well over \$120 billion a year on the deal—nothing to do with expansion.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in the course of working out with the distinguished majority and minority leaders, and others, a time agreement for the amendment of the Senator from Virginia, it had been my hope to have an up-or-down vote. Last night, in the course of deliberations on time agreement, that was stated, but there may be some feeling—if I could get the attention of the Senator from Delaware, I hope that we can have an up-or-down vote on my amendment. That would be my hope.

Mr. BIDEN. That was my assumption all along, to have an up-or-down vote.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. I say to my distinguished colleague from Delaware, believe me, there has been no stronger supporter of NATO, I say with humility, than the Senator from Virginia throughout my 19th year in the Senate. I am sure that colleagues' comments were serious, but with a note of jest.

NATO is so vital to the United States of America. It gives us the legitimate presence with our military in Europe. It gives us the legitimacy of a strong voice in Europe. Indeed, this country has responded, with others, in two major wars to preserve the integrity of Europe.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. WARNER. Just one sentence and I will yield. There has been a historical—over a 100 years—inability of the major nations of Europe to live in peace with one another. Indeed that is the principal purpose of NATO—the U.S. presence, both with military there, with a strong voice so as to ensure the tranquility this treaty has preserved for 49 years. It has exceeded every expectation of the drafters of the treaty and those who promoted and supported it in these 49 years. It is a magnificent document. I have fought hard with others to preserve the integrity of that document. Does the Senator wish to say a word?

Mr. BIDEN. If I can ask a question on my time. Does the Senator think—and he is a strong supporter of NATO, and if he thought I was implying that he wasn't, I was not. There are others who believe very strongly that it is no longer as relevant. You and I think it is.

Let me ask you, do you think this is a relevant question, a threshold question? Would the American people defend Warsaw? Do you think if that question were not answered in the affirmative, that that should be the test as to whether a nation should come in or not, or whether one should stay in, or we should stay in NATO or not?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on my time, the very short answer to that is that the American people will defend, under article V, the integrity of all the existing members. Should it be the wisdom of this body that if three additional members are admitted, article V becomes the very heart of the action that will be taken by this distinguished body before the close of this day.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his answer. The Senator from New Jersey raised a point with me. I raised three questions and several rhetorical questions about his comments. He pointed out that because I didn't want to use my time, I did not yield to him, and he did not think he had an opportunity to respond, and he wishes to respond. I am delighted to yield him a couple of minutes on my time at the appropriate time. I don't want to interfere with my friend's comments to respond to the issues I raised.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, like the Senator from Virginia, my remarks are not based on a belief that the cause and reasons for NATO have expired. Quite the contrary. My concern is that whatever we do in the expansion of NATO has real credibility. I raise the military question of whether or not the Polish frontier is defensible with this pledge, simply because of this: It never has been.

There is not a historical basis by which the ambitions of an imperial Russia has ever been checked, nor will we. I, too, believe that Poland should be defended.

I will vote for NATO expansion, but under the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from New York, they are suggesting a strategy whereby the political and economic bounds be given meaning, or there be time. It is not an honest assessment of the situation of the people of Poland to tell them that three American divisions with no indigenous forces are going to be positioned to defend them against a revitalized, or ambitious future Russia. It is not an accurate situation.

If this is worth doing, it is worth doing with real resources based on a real assessment of costs, based on bonds that have meaning, not over a period of time. It is based on that realistic military situation that I join with the Senator from Virginia. I, too, like the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Virginia, believe the United States will stand by its credibility and its pledges in each of these instances. But it is one thing to do it; it

is another thing to do it contrary to historic experience, or military reality.

I thank the Senator from Delaware for yielding me the time so I could clarify my views.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will make a geographic point. The Polish border, I am guessing, is about 200 miles from the Russian border, if you do not count Kaliningrad where there are not Russian divisions, et cetera. If you were to take a look—my friend says that if in fact this threat, any threat, to Poland from Russia, a NATO commitment to defend would not be credible because of three American divisions. The fact of the matter is Poland is on the Russian border. From the Russian border to the far border of Poland to Belarus is essentially the same distance from the main body of Russia to Poland. The number of American NATO and other divisions that sit in Germany are by a factor of 25 more credible than any force Russia now or in the near term could use to threaten Poland. So the idea we do not have the physical capability, which I understand is the point being made, the physical capability of defending Poland once the pledge is made is in fact, I think, inaccurate.

I yield the floor.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes from the time controlled by the Senator from Delaware.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.

If I may, I would like to take the liberty of speaking both on the previous amendment, which would have required these three nations to obtain membership in the European Union before ultimately becoming members of NATO, and this amendment as well. I think they both spring from a common core, certainly have a common effect, and the effect would be to move the goalposts, to change the rules of the NATO accession game as defined in article X of the NATO treaty, to frustrate the hopes of the people of these three nations and the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe who lived for four decades under the tyranny of Soviet communism, to say to them now that they want to voluntarily assume their place in the NATO community and more broadly in the community of free nations that we are not ready. OK, there was plenty of time in the late forties after the Second World War for Stalin and others to carve up Europe and take you in involuntarily, but now that the cold war is over, no, we didn't learn the lesson. We are going to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. We are going to snatch the defeat of principle and security, freedom and democracy from the jaws of our victory in the cold war.

The first amendment says to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, you have come this far, we have a whole procedure that we have developed. You have democratized your country. Go back a little bit. You had the courage to rise up against a powerful central government which subjugated you, which did not give you political freedom or religious freedom or economic opportunity, and you have achieved your independence and your freedom. You are developing a market economy and democracy and have met all the standards that have traditionally been associated with access to NATO under article X—oh, no, now you have to go to the European Union and be accepted there.

As I said the other day, on the first day of this debate, to ask these nations to now obtain membership in the European Union before they do in NATO is not only unfair—in the sense that it moves the goalposts, it changes the rules of the game, it applies to them a standard not applied to other NATO members, four of whom are not now members of the European Union—but it puts them in a very, very difficult position. It says to them that all the effort they made is not going to be justified, and it has an effect that is extremely unfair and inequitable. It puts the cart before the horse. It says that commerce should precede the principles of freedom and security, when those principles are what the cold war was all about. It puts the cart of commerce before the sturdy horses of democracy and security. It puts the cart of the European Union before the horses of NATO. And that is not the order that is appropriate. That is why I oppose that first amendment and hope my colleagues will as well.

Of course, both of these amendments, including this one now that asks for a 3-year moratorium, I think spring—as some of the proponents of the amendment have said—from a concern about the effect on Russia. Our Secretary of State printed an op-ed piece in the New York Times Wednesday, April 29, yesterday—Madeleine Albright. It is a brilliant piece, eloquent, right to the point. Headline: “Stop Worrying About Russia.”

The most fundamental argument the critics have put forward is that the admission of even a single new ally from Central Europe will harm our relations with Russia.

Secretary Albright says:

My first response is to wonder why some people cannot discuss the future of Central Europe without immediately changing the subject to Russia. Central Europe has more than 20 countries, and 200 million people, with its own history, its own problems and its own contributions to make to our alliance. Most of these countries do not even border Russia. But their security is and always has been vital to the future of Europe as a whole.

Mr. President, I heard my friend and colleague from New Jersey say something I find very unsettling, arguing for the pause, arguing for the earlier amendment about European Union

membership first; wondering whether we were true to our pledge, as part of NATO accession under article V, to defend member states. We wouldn't make the pledge if we were not sincere about it. Of course we are prepared to defend these nations if necessary.

I found the references to Chamberlain in the 1930s particularly—I say this respectfully—inappropriate. If there was any sincerity behind the pledge that Chamberlain made in 1939 to defend Poland from the Nazis, as was stated, the history of the 1940s might well have been different. The lessons are clear. The best way to secure peace is to remain strong. And that is what this is all about, access to NATO, a military alliance in defense of a principle.

The Senator from New Jersey said imperial Russia has never been defeated. Who is talking about imperial Russia? We, who are supporting the extension of NATO, believe there is a new Russia. We don't see an imperial Russia. We believe that these new countries, adding 200,000 troops to NATO forces, will help us meet common threats from ethnic division, international conflict, in some of the emerging democracies. We have seen it in Bosnia. We see it in Kosovo today. And it will help us meet the common threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, coming particularly from the south of the NATO region but perhaps from elsewhere.

Let me go to this amendment requiring a pause, a 3-year pause. The Senator from Virginia says we ought to let some future President decide this. There is a process under article X. There is nothing inevitable about it. We are not on automatic pilot. No other nation is automatically going to be admitted to NATO. There is a process. NATO members will consider it, presidents—administrations will decide, and then always the Senate will have the option of ratifying or not ratifying accession of anyone else to this great treaty in defense of a principle. So why the pause? Presumably to reassure Russia again. But what are the effects of that? The effects of that are destructive in three regards.

First, on the other nations of Central Europe who may dream of membership in NATO, and, on the basis of which dreams, they are acting in exactly the way we would have them act to develop their democracies and market economies. Again, I refer to the New York Times, this time Sunday, April 26.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD after my remarks an article by Jane Perlez.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. LIEBERMAN. That article makes very clear that the goal of access to NATO, in this case of the article in particular regard to the three countries we are considering today—

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—has moved those countries. The promise of inclusion in NATO has helped the cause of moderate government, the reporter says, during a tough period of economic and political transition. I quote Marek Matraszek, Warsaw director of the CEC Government Relations, a political consulting firm, who says:

The promise of NATO has defused destabilizing forces from the left and right. * * * If NATO had not been offered, Poland could have been in a disastrous situation, externally and internally.

If we now slam the door closed on the dreams of every other nation in Central and Eastern Europe to join this family of freedom, this military alliance, I fear that we will set back the onward march of freedom and a market economy for which we fought the cold war.

Second, it will reduce the ability of NATO and the dream and goal of NATO membership to resolve conflicts that now exist among various nations in Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarians and the Romanians, because of their desire to join NATO, settled age-old problems. Poland and Lithuania began talks about concerns they had for the same reason, to put themselves in the same position. The nations in that region have not lost sight of the reaction of NATO to the movement within Slovakia toward a less open, less free government—which is to say that Slovakia has dropped down in the chain of those who are being considered for NATO membership.

Finally, a third consequence of imposing this pause.

Mr. President, I note you moving toward the gavel, and I ask simply for an additional minute, if I may, from the time of the Senator from Delaware.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.

The final loss from imposing an arbitrary 3-year pause where none is necessary because no action is required will be on us, on the United States, on our credibility, on what we stand for, on the principles that the rest of the world now, most of it, want to emulate and aspire to.

If we say to these other nations of Central and Eastern Europe, "Forget about it, we are more worried about Russia, we are more worried about a renaissance of imperialist Russia, we are more worried about affecting the feelings of people who may be aggressive than we are about honoring your dream and effort to achieve freedom and democracy and security," then we will have abandoned our principles, our first principles as a country. When we do that, we lose our strength, because ultimately those principles underlie the power of America in the world community.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to defeat these two amendments and to put ourselves on the right side of history.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, April 26, 1998]
WITH PROMISES, PROMISES, NATO MOVES THE EAST

(By Jane Perlez)

In the United States, the question of whether to expand NATO eastward has been debated only in fits and starts, and then most passionately on the issues of how the Russians feel about it and whether it might cost too much.

But another question figures in the debate too: What effect has the lure of NATO membership had on the way the proposed new members—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—govern themselves and behave toward their neighbors after nearly half a century under Communism?

No one of these questions alone will decide the debate, which the Senate is scheduled to resume on Monday. Opponents of the Clinton Administration's proposal to expand NATO will doubtless emphasize the questions of money, Russia, and how many other new members this precedent will open the door to.

Still, it is on the question of how the prospective members are behaving that some of the hardest evidence is in, and it adds up to this:

AGREEMENT ON A GOAL

While all three have a way to go on meeting Western standards of democratic rule and stable market economies, no issue has dominated the internal political behavior of the three Central European countries as much as the aspiration to belong to the Western security alliance.

In all three prospective new members, former Communists and anti-Communists alike have agreed on NATO membership as a national goal, and as a result all have tried with varying degrees of sincerity to meet the alliance's broad requirements of democratic rule and free enterprise.

In other words, the promise of inclusion in NATO has helped the cause of moderate government during a tough period of economic and political transition. And there is little doubt, analysts say, that trying to lay the political groundwork to satisfy NATO has left Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic better positioned for sustained economic growth.

Such growth, in turn, could also help these countries join the European Union—another goal they share, and one they are pursuing in negotiations that opened in Brussels last month and that promise to be tough.

One lesson clearly taken to heart by Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary was the elimination of Slovakia from the list of potential NATO members after its Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, became increasingly authoritarian. Similarly, the European Union has cited Slovakia's lack of democratic progress as a reason for its inclusion from the first round of the economic union's eastward expansion.

The new American Ambassador to Poland, Daniel Fried, who helped formulate the arguments for expanding NATO when he worked at the National Security Council before coming to Warsaw last fall, likes to point to the way the three countries have behaved toward each other. "When Poland and Hungary became more confident of their NATO membership," he said, "they increased their outreach to their neighbors—Hungary to Romania, and Poland to Lithuania."

A decade ago, when the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe was evaporating, one worry for NATO was that old national resentments would resurface in the form of border dis-

putes and mistreatment of minorities, creating instability in the region. So when NATO decided it might enlarge, it made it clear that aspirants to membership had to avoid that kind of thing.

Now Hungary and Romania have signed a treaty guaranteeing each other's borders and respecting the right of the large Hungarian minority in Romania. And tense relations between Poland and Lithuania have improved to the point that they have created a joint peacekeeping battalion.

Another benchmark set down by NATO, and in particular by the Pentagon, was that the military in new members had to be subordinate to civilian control. This was a prickly subject in Poland, where former President Lech Walesa wanted to keep broad authority in the hands of his generals. Only since the defeat of Mr. Walesa in elections in 1995 and the adoption of a new Constitution calling for subordination of the general staff to the Minister of Defense has the strong political influence of the Polish military brass diminished.

CHANGES IN THE BRASS

Last year, to the relief of the Pentagon, President Kwasniewski fired Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki, a Walesa appointee, who had shown open contempt for the civilians at the defense ministry.

Now Henry Szumski, a younger general who has United Nations field experience, is at the top, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, an ardent proponent of civilian control of the military, is defense minister. NATO specialists say they are satisfied that the Polish military is on the right track, but another challenge remains: to clear out many of the Communist-era holdovers in the military intelligence service.

In another example of changing attitudes, the Hungarian Government passed over Soviet-trained generals for the post of chief of the general staff and reached down to the third level of the military hierarchy for Lieut. Gen. Ferenc Vegh, and English-speaking graduate of the United States Army War College. Now 7 of the top 10 generals in Hungary are Western trained.

Last month, the Czechs appointed a new chief of the general staff, Jiri Sedivy, 45, who stands out for his experience as a battalion commander in Bosnia and for his choice of military heroes: Eisenhower, Patton and Schwarzkopf.

Along with elevating military officers who think like those in the West, the three countries have been encouraged by NATO to get serious about parliamentary oversight committees. On this point, they still have a long way to go; the defense committee in the lower house of Poland's Parliament has no staff, and the enthusiastic members of Hungary's parliamentary defense committee have little background in military affairs.

No one would argue that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are mature democracies with classic capitalist economies. Progress toward the rule of law and the protection of minority rights is far from perfect. In all three countries, the judicial systems are fragile and financial corruption widespread. There are still huge disparities in terms of wealth between the European Union and its prospective new eastern members.

But Marek Matraszek, the Warsaw director of CEC Government Relations, a political consulting firm that has worked on NATO related issues, believes that without the prospect of membership in NATO, Poland might easily have fallen under the sway of nationalist and populist politicians. Now it seems reasonable to believe that Poland, a land with 40 million people and a bounding economy growing at six percent a year, may reach its goal of being a middle-size Western European power within the next decade.

"The promise of NATO has defused destabilizing forces from the left and right." Mr. Matraszek said. "If NATO had not been offered, Poland could have been in a disastrous situation, externally and internally."

Ms. MIKULSKI addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of Oregon). The Senator from Maryland.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I seek recognition.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. How much time does the Senator need?

Ms. MIKULSKI. Seven minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from Maryland.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 26 minutes remaining in opposition.

Mr. BIDEN. I am sure all 7 minutes will be worth yielding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Warner amendment to freeze NATO membership and, if time permits, to also comment on the Moynihan amendment regarding the necessity for EU membership for these countries before being included in NATO.

It is very difficult—like you when you spoke earlier and said you had great admiration for both the Senator from New York and the Senator from Virginia as I do, we have such constructive relationships, and I admire their grasp on policy and their desire to move ahead on constructive foreign policy.

As well-intentioned as the Warner proposal is, its acceptance would be inconsistent with the NATO treaty itself. It would unnecessarily limit U.S. flexibility in pursuing further enlargement should the United States of America determine that such enlargement would be in its national interest. It would also undercut the tremendous gains for peace accomplished over the last decade in Central Europe, including the historic reconciliation now underway between Russia and the West.

Article X of the Washington treaty, which was the alliance's founding charter nearly 50 years ago, states that membership is open to "any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."

NATO has been an unprecedented success in deterring conflict and promoting peace and stability. Toward these ends, NATO has been expanded three times in the past. To remain relevant and successful in the future, NATO must keep its doors open to those European democracies ready to bear the responsibilities, as well as the burdens, of membership.

NATO enlargement is a policy deeply rooted in this principle, often driven by moral imperatives, but equally important strategic self-interest and objective criteria concerning military readi-

ness and political and economic reform.

It is not easy to become a NATO member. This is not like signing up for an American Express card. New NATO members must meet stringent military base criteria. They must also demonstrate a commitment to resolve ethnic disputes and territorial disputes by peaceful means. In fact, the prospect of NATO membership has led newly free countries in Europe to settle border disputes.

Potential NATO members must also show a commitment to promote stability and well-being by promoting economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility. They must establish democratic and civilian control of their military, a transparent military budget and be fit for duty, as well as using diplomacy as its first tool of dispute resolution.

You have to do that in order to even be considered. So, therefore, I oppose the Warner amendment because it would freeze or reduce U.S. flexibility within the alliance and, at the same time, close the door that article X gave as a message of optimism and hope.

The Warner amendment would repudiate article X and its message of optimism and hope, which is what a freeze on enlargement would do. It would be seen by reformist countries of Central Europe as a door being shut. Do we really want to send such a disillusioning message to those other countries that are working for democracy, economic reform and civilian control of their military?

Article X of the Washington treaty was a source of hope to Central Europe during Soviet oppression. The prospect of NATO membership remains an important incentive for democratic and economic reform. It has already motivated the reconciliations between Germany and the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland, Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, and Italy and Slovenia, among others. The civil and military agreements between these countries have helped to consolidate peace and stability in Central Europe, and these things must be protected and not undercut.

Third, a mandated pause would create a new dividing line in Europe. If Central European countries not invited into NATO conclude that the process of enlargement has not only been stalled but stopped, a key incentive behind their current participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, a military partnership, would be eliminated. A key achievement of this program is the coordination that it now fosters between their defense planning and force structure development. Thus, a freeze on enlargement would impede, if not reverse, this remarkable development of European security around an alliance-determined agenda. This is what NATO is all about.

Fourth, an arbitrary freeze on NATO enlargement would harm Russia's historic reconciliation with NATO and the

United States. A freeze would appear to give Moscow a veto over NATO enlargement. It certainly would be interpreted as a victory for the hard-liners by those who still advocate a Russian sphere of influence over its neighbors, those who wish to see that Russia could deny the entry into NATO of these three democracies.

Worse, it could lead others to draw the conclusion that they will never ever have a chance to join NATO and never ever get out of the Russian sphere of influence. A freeze would undercut the basic principles that all of Europe's states have a right to choose their own security arrangements—a principle that must be one of the cornerstones of Russia's relationships with the United States and NATO membership.

Mr. President, the resolution of ratification passed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 16 to 2, and on that day that it voted, March 3, 1998, it explicitly addressed the concerns of those accusing the alliance of moving too fast on enlargement. It states:

The United States will not support the admission of, or the invitation for admission of, any new NATO member, unless . . . (I) the President consults with the Senate consistent with article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States . . . and (II) the prospective members can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership, and its inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the United States.

That is what the committee voted on, that we just would not have an open door but it would be an open door according to article X of the treaty we already adopted.

Mr. President, I encourage my colleagues, no matter how well-intentioned—no matter how well-intentioned the Warner amendment is, I think it would absolutely undercut peace and stability.

Mr. President, also in terms of the Moynihan amendment, I want to associate myself with your remarks in which you said we could not be part of NATO under that, Canada could not, Turkey could not. And if we then would adopt the Moynihan amendment, should we then consider an amendment that would remove from NATO any members that are now part of EU?

What would that mean? It would take us out. It would take Canada out. It would take Turkey out. I do not think it is logical.

I know there are many concerns about Russia. I know my time is limited and others wish to speak on this amendment. Later on this afternoon I will give my thoughts on Russia. I wish to maintain a constructive relationship with Russia, but I do not think this is the time nor the place to then give in to the Russian hard-liners but to focus on the new Russia, which I believe is not an imperial Russia.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Virginia, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to accommodate the Senate on the schedule that Mr. SMITH and I are working on, from the standpoint of the proponents of my amendment, following Mr. DORGAN, it would be desirable to have the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. WELLSTONE, follow for a period of 5 minutes, and then Mr. SMITH would care for about 3 or 4 minutes. Now, there is time within which the opposition, of course, will want to intervene, and we certainly will go back and forth on this.

We also wish to accommodate the senior Senator from Alaska. He has two amendments, is that correct, I say to the Senator?

Mr. STEVENS. That is correct.

Mr. WARNER. The time that the Senator from Alaska desires under his control would be how much?

Mr. STEVENS. Well, 30 minutes. I am willing to have a time agreement on the amendments. It was my understanding, Mr. President, one of them would be accepted. That may have changed in the last few minutes. But in any event, I do not need more than 20 minutes myself to explain my two amendments.

Mr. WARNER. Fine.

Mr. President, I would suggest that the votes, then, on the two Warner amendments and the one on Senator CRAIG's from last night be deferred until the Senator from Alaska has had an opportunity to address his two amendments, and such time as whatever opposition there may be required, and then we vote on the five amendments in sequence thereafter, with the normal time allocated to the first vote and for 10 minutes allocated to each of the other four votes, with a total of five. I would suggest that request, on my behalf, be considered by the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee and others before it is finalized, but that is a suggestion.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. WARNER. The suggestion I made, I say to my colleague, is that the senior Senator from Alaska wishes perhaps 20 minutes on his two amendments, and such time as you have, the votes scheduled for 3 p.m. be deferred until his amendments are discussed by the senior Senator and yourself, and then we take five consecutive votes, with the normal time allocated to the first vote, and 10 minutes to each vote thereafter.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Let me say that, first of all, I do not know what the Stevens amendment is, so I do not want to agree to a time agreement. He is a very formidable adversary on these issues, and I am not about to agree to a time agreement on what I do not know, No. 1.

Mr. STEVENS. Could I respond to that?

Mr. BIDEN. Surely.

Mr. STEVENS. The amendments have been submitted. It is my under-

standing that one of them was cleared on both sides. That may have changed within the last 30 minutes. The second one will be modified, as requested by the Secretary of Defense and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have modified that at their request to make the portion dealing with reduction in the U.S. contribution to NATO to be a sense of the Senate rather than mandatory. But there is a mandatory cap in that amendment. And it will be controversial, I do admit.

Why do I need unanimous consent? I will wait my turn.

Mr. BIDEN. No. I am not trying to be an obstructionist at all. No. 1, I am told by my staff—A, I don't know about the amendment, notwithstanding it has been filed. I have been concentrating on other things. No. 2, I am told by my staff—and they may be incorrect; staff as well as Senators often are—the fact is that I am told that Senator HELMS has not signed off on any amendment yet.

Mr. STEVENS. I am not asking for people to sign off on the amendment. I am only asking for time to debate it and have a vote.

Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to have time to debate it. That is why I think we should just go ahead, have the two amendments, vote. And then the Senator and I and others who wish to debate it from 3 o'clock on, to debate as long as you want. That is fine by me.

Mr. STEVENS. All I am trying to do, Mr. President, is accommodate the Senate. I thought instead of having three votes, have five votes after we are finished. It is all right by me. I will wait. I want to be assured some time—I am leading a delegation, pursuant to the Byrd amendment to the supplemental bill, to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia tonight. I would prefer that we were going to finish this or postpone it until we get back, one or the other.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, every effort is being made to accommodate the important mission undertaken by the Senator from Alaska and to have the final votes on this treaty tonight. This Senator has given his commitment to the leadership of the Senate. I suggest that we continue with this debate now and that the colleagues confer on the Stevens amendments and then revisit the possibility of five consecutive votes.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, what is the order of business after the—if I may, with the Senator's permission?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. What is the order of business after the Warner vote, after the three votes scheduled at 3 o'clock? Is there an agreement after that time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have two pending amendments that we would go back to after the vote. They would have to be disposed of and then other amendments offered.

Mr. WARNER. Of course, Mr. President, they could be laid aside to accommodate the Senator from Alaska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to lay them aside after the scheduled votes at 3 o'clock and take up my two amendments at that time before I leave.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I do not intend to object, but I wonder, before the Senator from Delaware leaves the floor, prior to his arriving, the Senator from Virginia outlined a series of speakers who will speak in support of the amendment, but we did not establish a lineup for speakers who would speak in opposition to Senator WARNER's amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am delighted to yield 5 minutes to my friend from Michigan.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I believe we established Senator DORGAN would speak next. And if we could establish as part of that unanimous consent that—

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues, those wishing to speak in opposition to the amendment, that I have been told of, who have not yet spoken, two of them, who are here, are the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Virginia, Senator ROBB, with the possibility of the Senator from Indiana, Senator LUGAR, and the Senator from Arizona, Senator MCCAIN, all of whom are against the amendment, I believe all of whom wish to speak against the amendment, two of whom are here. And since I have very limited time left, the two who are here I am very happy to give 5 minutes to, and those who show up next I will give 5 minutes, and then I am out of time. It is my full intention to yield to the Senator from Michigan to speak in opposition.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Fine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request made by the Senator from Alaska?

Hearing none, without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. One additional request, if I may. I ask that my second amendment be modified. I have that right without unanimous consent. And I send it to the desk so that it can be reproduced so all Senators have a copy of it when I call it up after the 3 o'clock votes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator can modify a previously submitted amendment.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Although I have no objection—I realize we have gotten unanimous consent already with the Senator from Alaska going next—as soon as I did not object, I was informed by my Cloakroom that Senator CONRAD, whose amendment is one of those listed as next, objected to it being put aside. I wanted Senator CONRAD to know I did not realize he would object to that. I

just want the RECORD to show that I was unaware of that.

Mr. STEVENS. I do not wish to inconvenience Senator CONRAD. I would be perfectly willing to wait if he is the next one in line. So I can get in line and I know what the time is, so I can plan the day. And I can tell the Senator, I will not take longer than 30 minutes on my amendments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this point I ask the Chair to advise the Senate with regard to the remaining time under the pending amendment, the Warner-Moynihan 3-year moratorium.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 16 minutes 18 seconds and 17 minutes 2 seconds to the opposition.

Mr. WARNER. So the time has been consumed by this important colloquy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that 10 minutes equally divided be restored, given that this colloquy was essential.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.

The order is that Senator DORGAN will now proceed. If the Senator would limit remarks to 8 minutes in favor of the amendment, the Senator from Minnesota would take 5 minutes, and the Senator from New Hampshire takes 3 minutes, that would enable the Senator from Virginia 2 or 3 minutes in conclusion.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to come to the floor of the Senate to support the amendment offered by Senator WARNER. I have not yet been part of this debate. I have followed it closely and read a great deal and want to speak about the larger issue and then explain why I support the amendment offered by the Senator from Virginia.

The proposal brought to this Senate to expand NATO raises a range of questions that will still be unanswered as we vote on this treaty later this evening. Let me just describe a couple of them.

First of all, the cost. The cost estimates for the enlargement of NATO range from a few billion dollars to \$125 billion. Our major European allies have made it clear that they have little intention of spending another lira, another franc, another pound, to pay for the expansion of NATO. The question, then, is: What will be the cost to the American taxpayer? We don't yet know.

Further, will there be a second round to expand NATO? The NATO Secretary-General said that there will be a second round, possibly including Romania, Slovenia, and three Baltic States. If there is a second round, what will that cost be? And if there is a third round, would it include some of the 19 other members of the Partnership for Peace in Central and Eastern Europe?

Where does NATO expansion stop? We don't yet know.

The other question is: What is the threat that requires the enlargement of NATO? What is the threat to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic that justifies NATO expansion? I am convinced these countries need economic integration into Europe rather than military integration into NATO.

The Warner amendment says, let us take the time to answer these basic questions. Let's wait for three years before we admit any more nations into NATO. Let's pause and try to understand what all of this will cost, what exactly is the threat, and what our response should be.

But more importantly, a three-year pause also will enable us to work with Russia to ensure our relations with Russia do not suffer as a result of the policy we seem about to endorse this evening.

NATO expansion, make no mistake about it, will play a large role in determining whether we will have a cooperative or a confrontational relationship with Russia in the years to come. I don't say this because I am sensitive to the feelings of Russia. I say it because I am sensitive to our own security interests.

I take a moment of the brief time that I have to describe why our relationship with Russia should play a role in this decision.

I wonder how many of my colleagues are aware of an incident that occurred on December 3, 1997, in the dark hours of the early morning, north of Norway in the Barents Sea. Several Russian ballistic missile submarines surfaced on December 3, last year, and prepared to fire SSN-20 missiles. Each of these missiles can carry 10 nuclear warheads and travel 5,000 miles—far enough to have reached the United States from the Barents Sea. Those submarines surfaced and launched 20 ballistic missiles. Roaring skyward, they rose to 30,000 feet. U.S. satellites tracked their path.

Last December 3, the radar and satellites in our Space Command NORAD complex and elsewhere saw that at 30,000 feet those Russian missiles exploded, they were destroyed. Why? Because this was not a Russian missile attack. In fact, seven American weapons inspectors were watching from a ship a few miles away as the missiles were launched. These self-destruct launches were a quick and cheap way for Russia to destroy submarine-launched missiles, which it is required to do under the START I arms control treaty.

Mr. President, let me present one more piece of evidence about what is really important. This is a hinge, and with the permission of the Presiding Officer, I show it to my colleagues on the Senate floor. This is a hinge that comes from a missile silo in the former Soviet Union. This belonged to a silo that housed an SS-19 with warheads poised at the United States. This piece

of a missile silo, with a missile and warhead aimed at the United States, comes from a silo that doesn't any longer exist. This comes from a silo which this picture shows is now gone. Silo removed, gone. The missile is gone. The warhead is gone. And where a silo once stood, sunflowers are planted.

How did that happen, that a Soviet missile was destroyed by taking it out of its silo? This country, with a program called Nunn-Lugar, helped pay for the cost of that. With that program, and under our arms control treaties, we help destroy the weapons of potential adversaries so they can never be used against us.

Now, the question for all of us is, What does enlarging NATO do to our relationship with Russia? There is no one on this floor who can stand and tell you with certainty what it does, but there is plenty of evidence that this is a step backward, not forward, with respect to our relationship with Russia.

One of the great lessons of this century's history is that the United States gains when we respect a former enemy. We have been through the cold war with the Soviet Union. They lost. The Soviet Union no longer exists.

Russia has enough fissile material to make 40,000 nuclear weapons if it wanted to. That's why our relationship with Russia is critically important. That relationship will determine whether we will see more nuclear missile silos planted with sunflowers, whether we will see bombers having their wing cut off—as this picture shows—whether we will see more progress in arms reduction.

The principal threat, in my judgment, to peace in this world is not a threat of a land invasion of Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary. The principal threat is the threat of nuclear weapons—loose nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, or proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue nations, or a resumption of the nuclear arms race. We are on a path in this country, because of our arms control agreements and cooperative relationship with Russia, where both sides are now destroying nuclear weapons. This is very, very important progress for humankind.

We now are confronted here in the U.S. Senate with a question of enlarging NATO, a security alliance in Western Europe, at the expense of, in my judgment, our relationship with Russia. I don't want to see our relationship with Russia deteriorate into a new cold war confrontation and a resumption of nuclear weapons production. In my judgment, we expand NATO at the potential risk of reigniting a cold war and impeding and retarding progress on arms reduction.

The Senator from Virginia brings an amendment to the floor that says if we go to a first round of NATO enlargement, and if the vote is successful tonight, before we expand further let us at least pause for 3 years to answer the

questions I posed at the start of my presentation. What will this cost? What will this cost, and who will pay the bill? What is the threat, and where does the threat come from? And what does this do to arms control agreements that now, as I speak, are resulting in the destruction of missiles, the retirement of delivery vehicles, the sawing off of wings of Russian bombers?

What does it do to that progress, progress that comes from arms control treaties and a bipartisan initiative here in Congress called Nunn-Lugar to help implement those treaties? In the Nunn-Lugar program we provide money to accommodate arms control agreements, to help the other side destroy their nuclear weapons. These are the weapons that were once housed in a silo that contained this piece of metal, near Pervomaisk, a former Soviet missile base. What does NATO expansion do to the progress that this piece of metal represents?

This piece of metal was in a silo that housed a missile with a nuclear warhead aimed at our country, but it is now just metal, and the ground is now sunflowers. That is substantial progress, in my view, for this world.

The question we need to ask, all of us, is, What does this issue, NATO enlargement, have to do with this progress? Will it impede this progress? Will it retard the progress of arms control? No one here knows the answer for certain. Our Nation's foremost experts on foreign policy are sharply divided. Yet, and I say this regretfully, the Senate seems prepared to vote on NATO expansion without understanding its potential consequences.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. DORGAN. I yield the floor and thank the Senator from Virginia for his time.

Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I will speak briefly in opposition to the Warner amendment. I will begin by saying that I think there are clear lessons that can be learned, but I disagree with my distinguished colleague from North Dakota as to what they are.

I think the last half of the 20th century demonstrated that when America did not assert itself adequately and act in its best interests after World War II by embracing the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, we in fact contributed to the development of a cold war; that when we in fact invested in our national security and asserted ourselves effectively—particularly during the 1980s—we brought the cold war to an end successfully. That is why I believe it is in our interests to move forward with expansion of NATO at this time.

In light of these reasons, I think it is ill advised for us to set arbitrary limits or deadlines or pauses in considering NATO expansion. If it is in our best in-

terests to expand NATO quickly, then I want to maintain that possibility. If it is not in our best interests to expand NATO beyond the three countries under consideration today, then the process already established in the North Atlantic Council and our own constitutional advice and consent ratification requirements provide us more than enough protection against rash action.

Let me speak briefly and more specifically as to other reasons I oppose the amendment offered by my colleague from Virginia mandating a "strategic pause."

First, I believe such a pause would send exactly the wrong signal at this critical point in history, as it would represent a drastic change in U.S. policy. The United States led the charge at last year's Madrid summit to keep the door open for future NATO expansion. Throughout the general discussion on expanding NATO, we also declared that any possible offer of NATO membership would be dependent upon successful implementation of democratization and market reform programs. Taking away the possibility of NATO membership, even for just 3 years, may also take away the incentive for completion of reform.

Second, I believe the Senate's position during any future membership negotiations will be protected. During Foreign Relations Committee hearings on this issue, both Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright expressed the administration's understanding of the need for consultation with the Senate prior to any future round of expansion. I believe that commitment is secure, given their scrupulous consultation process with the Senate that has gone on throughout the current expansion phase.

Finally, I think we must look at this round of expansion in its historical context. Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty specifically provides for the expansion of NATO to any European state in a position to further the principles of the treaty and contribute to North Atlantic security. This article has been utilized over the past 50 years for the accession of West Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Spain. This is not a brand new process but one we have always kept open to review.

NATO's Secretary General stated at the Madrid summit:

In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us. We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999.

This shows that NATO enlargement is an issue regularly reviewed by the North Atlantic Council, just as are the structure and requirements of the NATO armed forces.

In summary, I strongly oppose any measure which will place additional roadblocks in the way of future NATO expansion, roadblocks that are not

needed and will only lead to further feelings of abandonment and exclusion by nations wanting to join the West. A decision to enlarge NATO should not be based on a rigid time line; rather, it should be the net result of thoughtful deliberation—a process already well protected by both the North Atlantic Treaty and our Constitution.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, first of all, let me associate myself with the amendment earlier introduced by Senator MOYNIHAN from New York. I have said before on the floor of the Senate—and I will say it again—the Senator from New York, I think, has said something very important with his amendment, which is that we should be using our prestige as a great country to really insist on membership to the EU for Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. That is what is most important to enable them to reach their goals.

Also, let me associate myself with the amendment of my colleague from Virginia, Senator WARNER. I think what he is saying in this amendment is: Colleagues, Democrats and Republicans alike, please go slowly.

Mr. President, many of us had the opportunity to serve with Senator Nunn. I think more of us should talk about him and his wisdom. Senator Nunn raised three questions about NATO expansion. The first question is: Will this help us in easing or dealing with the whole problem of proliferation of weapons that might go to Third World countries—the kind of cooperation we need with Russia? The answer that Senator Nunn gives to that question is no.

The second question Senator Nunn asked is: What about nuclear threats? Is this going to help us in terms of further arms agreement with Russia? Is this going to move the world away from reliance on nuclear weapons? The answer Senator Nunn gives is no.

The third question that Senator Nunn raised is: What about reform within Russia? What about the forces for democracy? What are the democrats—with a small "d"—all trying to tell us? The answer, Senator Nunn says, is they are telling us with this NATO expansion, expanding the military alliance against a Soviet Union that no longer exists, against a military threat that no longer exists, is a huge step backward.

Mr. President, I will conclude this way. Other colleagues are on the floor and want to speak. From Senator Sam Nunn to Senator PATRICK MOYNIHAN, to Senator JOHN WARNER, to George Kennan, to scholars like Howard Mendelbaum, to prophetic thinkers like George Kennan, and, more importantly, the forces for democracy in Russia, there has been an eloquent and powerful plea to all of us to understand that this could be a tragic mistake.

Mr. President, I fear it will be a tragic mistake. I hope my colleagues will vote for Senator MOYNIHAN's amendment. I hope they will vote for Senator WARNER's amendments. I want to say one more time that I am in profound disagreement with NATO expansion. I think there will be fateful consequences. If we approve this, I hope and pray that I am wrong, but I have to speak for what I believe is right for my country and the world.

I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have 16 minutes remaining in my control. For the benefit of the Senators, so I don't get myself in more trouble in the allocation of time, I am going to yield, in the following order: 5 minutes to the Senator from Virginia, 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware, and 5 minutes to the Senator from Arizona. That will leave me probably 10 seconds. I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, it is not my intention today to belabor the points, so eloquently made by the principal proponents of this Resolution of Ratification—including the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the leadership of this body, and the Chairman and Ranking Members of the Foreign Relations Committee—about why enlarging NATO is in our national strategic interest.

The three national security committees on which I serve have dedicated an extraordinary amount of time to this issue, examining the full ramifications of enlarging NATO in over a dozen hearings, and following that intensive process I remain persuaded, that we ought to move ahead.

I certainly don't discount the concerns, that have been raised, by a number of highly respected opponents of ratification, most of whom I am normally in agreement with on national security matters, but I find the arguments advanced by the advocates more persuasive.

I would like to focus my remarks more narrowly on the implications for American leadership in Europe and beyond. The critical notion in my mind, is not simply that NATO is inviting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into its ranks, but that through our leadership, we've played a fundamental role in casting the light of freedom across Europe, and are prepared in peacetime or war, to guarantee the security of these new democracies.

Keeping the peace is something NATO has been doing well for 50 years. When an entity works as well as NATO has, in fact, the American people tend to either ignore it or take it for granted. Perhaps that explains the lack of widespread public interest in expanding NATO.

We have come to think of Europe mostly as a market for our goods, no longer as a territory under Soviet threat. Public apathy aside, we forget the lessons of history that made the 20th Century the single bloodiest of all, at our peril.

On two occasions American isolationism has led to world wars. What we thought was benign neglect of Europe turned out to be an abject failure of our leadership. Harry Truman was right when he said that if NATO had existed in 1914 or 1939, we never would have seen the toll in human lives that followed.

Mr. President, it is an undeniable fact that NATO has contributed dramatically to Europe's peace, stability, and democracy the past 50 years, and hence to our own security. The alliance was integral to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s, to tearing down the Berlin Wall in 1989, and to hastening the overall demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Now, some wonder, if it is still relevant, and express serious doubts as to whether or not we should expand it.

Mr. President, it will be decades before we know with any certainty whether central Europe establishes itself in toto as a model of democratic rule, or something less. But it is not difficult to conjure up images of exclusive ethnic and latent ultra-nationalism underlying future conflict.

The historical legacy of the region generally is worrisome. World War I started with a mere gunshot in Sarejevo. And even recent history in the region shows that stability can't be treated as a foregone conclusion given the conflagration of the former Yugoslavia after Tito. And now Kosovo threatens to inflame the area all over again.

NATO has performed admirably in restoring a semblance of order in Bosnia. Yet the job is far from finished. We face years of civil and political reconstruction. But NATO and American leadership have made the difference in resuscitating that country.

Mr. President, Bosnia demonstrates that the stakes are far too great to view NATO as some kind of anachronism.

NATO is a vibrant, meaningful, omnipresent military institution that helps preserve a favorable security environment. And let me emphasize that it safeguards American vital interests. We don't lead NATO as a favor to Europe.

Mr. President, perhaps the greatest challenge, or opportunity, in all this lies in developing a partnership between Russia and an expanded NATO. The Permanent Joint Council we've established with the Russians secures an important role for them in the new security architecture of Europe.

We should welcome their input and value their advice in charting a new course for the Continent. Russia, after all, has been a player in Europe for better than 300 years. We can, and should,

pursue those mutual security concerns with Russia that contribute toward peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

At the same time, an expanded NATO will retain the right to act independently, as has been the case for fifty years. Its core purpose will continue to be to ensure its own security through collective defense.

Where there might be disagreements, Russia should not interpret NATO actions as trampling on its national security prerogatives.

Rather, the aim of the alliance, in Vaclav Havel's words, "is first and foremost an instrument of democracy, intended to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values * * * [and is] the guarantor of Euro-American civilization."

NATO's expansion will erase the artificial lines drawn by Stalin, but is not and should not be perceived as a threat to Russia's security.

It is in our interest, and we should provide tangible support to further develop Russia as a peaceful democracy. Expanding NATO helps consolidate the hard fought gains of winning the Cold War, and sets a useful example for Russia among its neighbors to continue with democratic reforms internally.

Mr. President, the working predicate of a number of the amendments before the Senate seem designed to make the accession process more cumbersome and unwieldy. I believe we need to distinguish this particular matter, however, from common appropriations and authorization legislation we amend and consider in the Senate.

I believe, ambiguity regarding the protocol terms of entry, for example, will have a corrosive effect on our ability to lead the organization in the future. Existing and future members begin to focus more on American conditions instead of affirmative American leadership.

Mandating a multi-year pause in expansion, for example, would lead us into the same difficulty we encountered setting deadlines for troop withdrawals from Bosnia. Critical national decisions based on carefully reasoned and supported judgments are subjugated to an artificial time line that could actually end up proving harmful to our military interests.

We need to be flexible rather than arbitrary about future entrants into NATO: If the first round goes well, the Partnership for Peace program will keep the door open for new members. Present and future security considerations will then dictate the pace and scope of enlargement.

Along these same lines conditioning NATO membership on EU membership strikes a discomfiting parallel between two organizations whose core missions are fundamentally different, one being military and the other economic and social.

The amendment would, in effect, allow a group of EU nations veto power over a critical decision affecting U.S.

national security: our choice of military allies in any future contingency.

In all three previous rounds of NATO enlargement—Turkey and Greece in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982—it was clearly understood that expansion presaged European economic development and integration as a key benefit, not the other way around. Now, inclusion in NATO will help establish a climate of confidence for these three countries as they seek foreign direct investment and pursue economic integration.

Mr. President, strengthening NATO by expanding its ranks contributes to a peaceful, democratic, free and unified Europe. As the security landscape of central Europe rapidly changes, we ought to take advantage of this historic moment. A static, cautionary approach misses the opportunity to extend democratic principles across Europe.

Vaclav Havel, perhaps better than anyone, has stripped away the layers of argument on each side, observing that “if the West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West.” Europe looks to the United States for leadership, and it is time for us to act.

I urge my colleagues to support the Resolution of Ratification before us, and oppose burdensome amendments that would weaken an enlarged NATO.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. The distinguished Senator from New York desires to speak on behalf of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, in brief, a moment of history about Russia.

On March 20, 1917, one of the most momentous Cabinet meetings in American history took place in which Woodrow Wilson and his Cabinet judged that German submarine warfare had reached a point which left the United States with no choice but to enter the war on behalf of the Allied Powers. In 13 days Wilson would convene Congress and speak to a joint session asking for recognition of the state of war with Germany. At the Cabinet meeting, Robert Lansing, as Secretary of State, spoke in favor of doing this. He captured the meeting in a memorandum in which he wrote: “I said that the revolution in Russia which appeared to be successful had removed the one objection to affirming that the European war was a war between democracy and absolutism.”

Sir, in 1917, Russia had a democratic revolution. As a schoolchild in New York, I can recall the head of that provisional government, Mr. Kerensky, would come around to our assemblies to tell us about it. That democratic revolution was crushed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg. And the country lived a hideous 70 years under that regime. Then the Russians liberated themselves. They did it internally.

They had to face a second coup against Mr. Gorbachev with tanks around the government buildings. The tanks withdrew and the forces of an earlier protodemocratic government prevailed. There are Russians who genuinely believe that they liberated their country. They now once more have the possibilities they had at the beginning of the century before the Bolsheviks took power. Why some of us here hated the Bolsheviks, hated Lenin and Stalin, and their successes, was not just for what they stood for but for what they had crushed.

There is a belief that is growing in Russia—one learns this; one hears this—that they not only freed themselves of the infamous Stalin and Lenin but also the countries around them; and that they should be seen now as a partner, not as the enemy. They were under the rule of the their enemies.

I hope we will see this and not expand in their direction an alliance that was formed against Joseph Stalin and his politburo. Give us a chance to bring Russia into the democratic world in which it almost entered and which will now be put in jeopardy, or so some of us believe. What a historic failure that would be.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to my friend from Arizona.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to begin by stating my opposition to the Ashcroft amendment which would too narrowly limit NATO's freedom of action by permitting NATO missions only for collective self-defense, or in response to a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of a NATO member.

I believe that is understandable—the concerns that have led to this amendment being proposed, and some valid points have been made. Clearly, the NATO military forces must not be used frivolously. I do not believe that NATO is an organization that should take on worldwide military missions that have nothing to do with European security.

I think these types of problems, however, should be avoided as NATO makes decisions—not limitations to be placed on NATO's ability to make decisions. When real-world challenges arise, we need the ability to have free and unfettered consultations with our allies on all possible courses of action before a decision is reached. Article IV of the NATO treaty already permits this kind of unrestricted consultation, as it has ever since Dean Acheson first presented it to the Senate 49 years ago.

The Ashcroft amendment would for the first time restrict the scope of such article IV consultation by preventing NATO from considering taking action in many cases—even if we and our allies believed that such action would serve our common security interests. This is an unwarranted restriction on

our freedom to consult and take joint action with our allies through NATO.

The fear that NATO might take on missions that the United States opposes is unfounded. We already have all the safeguards we need at NATO because we have a veto. There can be no NATO mission, no military operation, no out-of-area deployment, unless the United States specifically supports that decision. Mr. President, not only do we have a veto but the United States is a leader of NATO. Rather than our getting dragged into missions we do not want, the reality at NATO is the opposite. The United States has always been the country to take a strong leadership position and to seek support from our European allies. We are the ones who seek to spread the burdens of maintaining security to our allies, not the other way around. The Ashcroft amendment would give a powerful tool to those allies who may seek to dodge burden sharing, who may want to prevent an active NATO role, or who would otherwise oppose a strong U.S. leadership role.

I suspect that part of the motivation behind this amendment is a lack of confidence that the current U.S. administration will say no to military operations when it has to. That is a concern I fully understand. But a lack of confidence in the current administration is one thing to be dealt with between the Congress and the White House. Putting a hard and fast limit on NATO, the most successful military alliance in history, and the best tool we have for spreading the burdens of common security, is quite another thing.

Mr. President, this is a serious amendment and one that I think would have serious consequences on our alliance and our relations with our allies, as well as our ability to act in the United States vital national security interests.

Finally, I oppose the Warner amendment because I believe it is an artificial barrier. I don't believe that we want to keep countries out of NATO. We can do that already because we have a veto of NATO. If the administration were to make a bad decision, we in the Senate could still withhold our consent at that time. But if we decide our own national security interests warrant bringing a qualified country into NATO in less than 3 years, this amendment would prevent us from doing so. I don't see why we would want to limit ourselves in this way.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. After consultation with the distinguished Senator from Virginia, in light of the fact several more Senators have asked to speak, I would ask unanimous consent, if the Senator is listening, for 10 additional minutes equally divided.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. My intention in terms of the now 10 minutes total time I control, I will yield 5 to my senior colleague from Delaware, and then I will yield the remaining 5—and I think that will leave me 1 minute to close—to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, just so people will know the order.

I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, as well mentioned as the WARNER amendment may be, I urge my colleagues to oppose it. To accept it would be inconsistent with the NATO Treaty. It would unnecessarily limit U.S. flexibility in pursuing further enlargement. It is constitutionally unnecessary. And, above all, it undercuts the tremendous gains for peace accomplished over the last decade in Central Europe and in our relationship with Russia.

What this amendment proposes is an arbitrary freeze—or a pause—in the enlargement process. This, despite the fact that Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's founding charter, states clearly that membership is open to, and I quote, "any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."

Mr. President, we all agree that NATO is an unprecedented success in deterring conflict and promoting peace and stability. Toward these ends, NATO has been expanded three times in the past. To remain vital, relevant, and successful in the future, NATO must remain consistent with Article 10 and keep its doors open to those European democracies ready to bear the responsibilities and burdens of membership.

NATO enlargement is a policy rooted in this principle and driven by moral imperatives, strategic self-interest, and objective criteria concerning military readiness and political and economic reform. Any proposal to freeze enlargement—whether it be permanent or temporary—subordinates these factors to an arbitrary timeline. And it opens the door to other significantly adverse consequences for the United States and the Alliance:

First, a freeze would reduce U.S. flexibility and leverage within NATO. It would unnecessarily undercut our ability—and the Alliance's ability—to respond to the inherent uncertainty of the future.

Second, it would send an unfortunate, and even dangerous message to the reformist governments of Central Europe. They would suppose—and not incorrectly—that the United States is slamming the door shut concerning their possible accession into the Alliance.

Do we really wish to send such a disillusioning message?

Article 10 of the Washington Treaty was a source of hope to Central Euro-

peans during Soviet oppression. The prospect of NATO membership remains an important incentive for democratic and economic reform. It has motivated the reconciliations between Germany and the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland, Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, as well as Italy and Slovenia, among others. Their unprecedented efforts to cooperate among themselves and to jointly consolidate peace and security in that region must be strengthened, not undercut.

Third, a mandated pause created by this amendment would prompt a new dividing line in Europe. If Central European countries not invited into NATO conclude that the process of enlargement has not only stalled, but stopped, a key incentive behind the aforementioned regional cooperation, including their current participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, will be seriously undercut. Thus, a freeze on enlargement would impede, if not reverse, the remarkable development of European security around an Alliance-determined agenda.

Fourth, Mr. President, an arbitrary freeze on NATO enlargement would harm Russia's historic reconciliation with NATO and the United States. A freeze would appear to give Moscow a veto over enlargement. It certainly would be interpreted as a victory—proof of their own legitimacy—by those who still advocate a Russian sphere of influence over its neighbors. Worse yet, it could lead others to draw the same conclusion. A freeze would undercut the basic principle that all of Europe's states have a right to choose their own security arrangements—a principle that must be one of the cornerstones of Russia's relationships with the United States and NATO.

While I am sure the intentions behind this amendment are admirable, we must recognize that its consequences would be potentially disastrous. It would undercut U.S. leadership and influence within the Alliance. It would contradict the founding document of the Alliance. It would threaten the historic progress we have witnessed in Central Europe—progress from which we all benefit. And it would reject a principle fundamental to establishment of a constructive relationship with a democratic Russia.

I suspect, Mr. President, that one false premise behind this amendment is that NATO enlargement has been a rushed process. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The velvet revolutions that restored democracy and independence to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary took place in 1989. Nearly a decade will have passed before these three countries become NATO members in 1999.

Moreover, the Senate has not rushed, and is not being rushed, into endorsing NATO enlargement. This chamber and its committees have been examining and promoting this initiative since 1993, if not earlier. Anyone concerned about the future enlargement process

can be assured that the same careful study, debate, and oversight that has attended this past effort will attend those to come. Read the resolution of ratification carefully. It explicitly requires extensive consultation between the Senate and the President about any such initiative.

It states that the "United States will not support the admission of, or the invitation for admission of, any new NATO member, unless (I) the President consults with the Senate consistent with Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the advice and consent of the Senate to the making of treaties); and (II) the prospective members can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership, and its inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the United States."

Before, I yield the floor, Mr. President, let me reiterate a key point to those who fear a rushed process of further NATO enlargement. The bottom line, is that further expansion of the Alliance will always be contingent on careful study, public debate, high-level consultations, political consensus, and the strategic interests of NATO and the United States. Any further expansion will also be contingent on Senate ratification—the difficult hurdle of securing 67 votes.

For these and other reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote against any proposal that undercuts the founding document and basic principles of the NATO Alliance. The ratification of the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO will erase destabilizing lines, which are relics of the Cold War. This amendment portends only be a step toward new, divisive lines in Europe—and, that is something we should never accept.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. For purposes of informing the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the following order take place and time for each vote. The order of votes will be that the Craig amendment which was finished last night would come first, the Moynihan vote second, the Warner vote third, that the normal time be given to the Craig amendment, that the second and third votes be 10 minutes each, and that they be up or down votes on each amendment.

Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. KERRY. I will not object, but I would just like to ask would it be appropriate to include in the unanimous-consent request time for me to speak after the vote?

Mr. WARNER. No objection.

Mr. KERRY. I would so ask.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Consent has been granted to recognize Senator STEVENS.

Mr. KERRY. I would ask unanimous consent to be recognized following Senator STEVENS.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains under my control?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator who is ranking member of the committee who is managing this business in the Chamber.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2316

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I speak with reference to the amendment offered by Mr. CRAIG that would, if adopted, require that the United States adopt a specific authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces now in Bosnia prior to the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification of the protocols for NATO expansion. I have long supported an active Congressional role regarding the ongoing U.S. mission in Bosnia. Congress *does* have a responsibility to carefully oversee that mission, to ensure that it stays on track and that limits are placed on the U.S. role there that will safeguard our troops from being consumed in an ever-expanding nation-building crusade. So, I support what I think is the Senator's intent, which is to apply pressure to the Administration and the Congress to fulfill their oversight responsibilities with respect to Bosnia.

However, that being said, I do not believe that this amendment is necessary. The Fiscal Year 1999 Department of Defense Authorization bill is likely to be considered by the Senate within the next several weeks, and the corresponding appropriations bill will also be taken up before we adjourn. These bills are the appropriate vehicles on which to debate and act to place limits on the U.S. mission in Bosnia. They provide a vehicle for establishing policy and then backing up the will of Congress with the power over the purse. We do not need this amendment today to force us into taking action on Bosnia. We do not need to hold these nations—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—hostage to any perceived inability or lack of will on our part to act independently on Bosnia.

So I say to my colleagues that this Senator from West Virginia does not lack the will to work to establish a policy and a specific, detailed authorization for the U.S. mission in Bosnia. I do not favor open-ended commitments to deploy forces to Bosnia, and I do not favor giving this administration or any other administration a free rein to involve our men and women in uniform in the kind of policing actions that got us into such trouble in Somalia. I am already working on such an amend-

ment in concert with other Senators, with the intention of offering it to the Department of Defense Authorization bill or perhaps some other vehicle. I welcome the participation of Senator CRAIG and his cosponsors in this debate. But we do not need to act on this amendment at this time. We do not need to leave this protocol bound and gagged in some dark closet until we ransom it with a debate and legislative action that, I assure you, will take place without a hostage on another occasion on another day and on another measure.

Although I will vote against this amendment, I assure my colleague from Idaho, and the other supporters of his amendment, that it is not because I do not wish to have a concrete policy regarding Bosnia. I urge Senators to vote against the amendment offered by Senator CRAIG.

I thank the Chair, and, Mr. President, I yield back the balance of my time.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2322

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. WARNER. I yield such time as the senior Senator from New York may desire. Could I inquire of the remainder of time on both sides, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 10 minutes. The Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes 8 seconds.

Mr. WARNER. Does the Senator from Delaware wish to let the Senator from Massachusetts proceed? Is that my understanding?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 1 minute to my friend from Massachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Delaware.

I share the concerns of many Senators with respect to the possibilities of future rapid expansion, and there are serious questions from the Congress about the control of that. But I do think the constitutional issues of restraint of a President before the fact on foreign policy are significant, and equally significant, I believe, that we will have ample opportunity for consultation.

I will ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter from the President that I received on April 23. I call my colleagues' attention to one particular paragraph, which is, the President says:

I pledge to undertake the same broad pattern of consultation before making any future decisions about invitations of membership to other states, or making any membership commitments.

In other words, no private membership commitments will be made outside of the process of the U.S. Congress consultation.

I might also add that that consultation in the past has taken over several

years, with a number of different resolutions of support having been passed previously. So I think in that light I will oppose the WARNER amendment.

I ask unanimous consent the full text of the letter from the President be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, DC, April 23, 1998.

Hon. JOHN F. KERRY,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR JOHN: In the coming days the Senate will complete consideration of the proposed accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO. NATO's enlargement offers our country an historic opportunity to increase America's security, improve Europe's stability, and erase the vestiges of the Cold War dividing line. For these reasons, I appreciate the support that you and a bipartisan majority of your colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee gave this initiative on March 3, when the Committee voted 16-2 in favor of a resolution of ratification on NATO enlargement.

I know, however, that you and other senators have certain concerns about the process of NATO enlargement. In particular, I am sensitive to the questions you raised during the Committee's March 3 meeting regarding future rounds in the enlargement process. These same questions underlie Senator Warner's proposal for a mandated pause in the enlargement process after admission of these first new members. Let me take this opportunity to comment on Senator Warner's proposal and the issues it attempts to address.

I have long maintained that, as part of our broader strategy to make Europe more united and stable, NATO should keep its door open for other qualified states that aspire to membership. I was pleased that NATO adopted this position at the Madrid summit last July. The Alliance also declared in Madrid that it would review the process of enlargement at our next summit in Washington. Neither my Administration nor NATO has made any decision about when the next invitations for membership should be extended, or to whom.

Both the United States and or NATO will need to address many complex questions before making decisions about the admission of other new members, but I am convinced that such a mandated pause is the wrong way to address these questions. A mandated pause would reduce our own country's flexibility and leverage in Europe, and it would fracture the open door consensus we helped build within NATO. It would also undermine support for reforms in the Central European countries still aspiring to NATO membership and thereby create a new and potentially destabilizing line across Europe. In contrast, the Open Door policy retains the positive incentives that have reinforced reforms and good neighborly relations throughout the region over the last five years.

For these reasons, I have urged the Senate in the strongest terms to reject any effort to impose an artificial pause in the process of NATO's enlargement, and I hope I will have your support for that position. It is not necessary for the Senate to mandate a moratorium on the enlargement process to ensure that future steps proceed in a careful and deliberate manner. I consulted extensively with members of both chambers and both parties in Congress on the full range of decisions concerning NATO's enlargement, including decisions on how many and which states to support for membership. I pledge to undertake the same broad pattern of consultation before making any future decisions

about invitations of membership to other states, or making any membership commitments. Of course, the admission of any additional new members also would require the advice and consent of the Senate.

The end of the Cold War has given us an unprecedented opportunity to help build an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe. There are many elements in our strategy designed to achieve that goal, including our efforts to make further reductions in nuclear arms levels and to adapt the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; our bilateral programs to support reform in Russia, Ukraine, and the other new democracies; and our work with other institutions, such as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. A strong NATO remains the foundation of our transatlantic security agenda and I am convinced that continuation of our open door policy will advance our overall interests and enhance NATO's capabilities.

I am grateful for the support and sound advice you and other senators have provided as we pursue that agenda, and I look forward to continuing our work on this and other national security issues in the days to come.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose the Warner amendment that would mandate a pause of three years before the United States would encourage, participate in, or agree to any further enlargement of NATO after the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

At the outset, I would note that I am unaware of any rationale for choosing three years for a pause—it appears to be an arbitrary number and I think it is inappropriate to legislate on such an important matter on an arbitrary basis.

Article 10 of the NATO Treaty states in pertinent part that “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” NATO's door has been open since the establishment of the Alliance and has resulted in the admission of Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain over the years. To mandate a three-year pause would be inconsistent with the policy that has guided the Alliance since 1949.

Mr. President, the desire to join the Alliance has been a productive force for candidate nations who have been seeking to establish their credentials for admission by perfecting their laws relating to democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the establishment of market economies and by reaching accommodations with their neighbors. We should not do anything to discourage these developments.

But also importantly, I am concerned that a three-year pause would imply too much—that after three years, the Senate would support more nations joining NATO. Mandating a pause is no more logical than raising expectations as to when the next round of NATO accessions will occur. Further enlargement of the Alliance should be judged by the circumstances that exist at the

time. I am not committed to further enlargement of the NATO Alliance after three years and I doubt that most of our colleagues are so committed. I fear that, by passage of this amendment, we would send a false signal to those nations that continue to aspire to NATO membership.

Mr. President, as noted in Foreign Relations Committee Report on NATO enlargement, Secretary of State Albright has committed the Executive Branch to keep the Senate fully informed of significant developments with regard to possible future rounds of NATO enlargement and seek its advice on important decisions before any commitments are made. More recently, in a letter to Senator JOHN KERRY that was released by the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on NATO enlargement, President Clinton wrote in part that “I pledge to undertake the same broad pattern of consultation before making any future decisions about invitations of membership to other states, or making membership commitments.”

Mr. President, those commitments and the Constitutional requirement for Senate advice and consent to any future amendments to the NATO Treaty that enlarge the Alliance are all that is necessary. I urge my colleagues to oppose the Warner amendment as both arbitrary and misleading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to point out, with regard to the military credibility of NATO raised by my friend from New Jersey, in terms of protecting Poland, I remind him, West Berlin was militarily indefensible but the Warsaw Pact never attacked. Why? Because the Soviet Union knew what would happen.

The third point I would make is with regard to the 3-year pause.

The clearest reason this amendment is superfluous is in the Resolution of Ratification itself, Section Two, Paragraph Seven. There it clearly states that the U.S. has not consented to invite any state other than the three before us today, and that many subsequent decision to do so would rest on that state's ability to fulfill the obligations of membership, as well as serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the U.S.

Further, Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty declares, and as the July 1997 Madrid NATO Summit Declaration repeats, that the door to NATO membership is open to other European states able to further principles of the treaty and to contribute the security of the North Atlantic area. Each applicant country will be judged on its merits.

Moreover, in the Resolution of Ratification before us, Section 2, Paragraph 7(A)(iv) requires prior consultation of the Senate by the President before the United States can support the invitation of any new member, and recalls that ratification of any new NATO ally

requires the advice and consent of this body.

To mandate a pause would tie NATO's hands should an obviously qualified applicant such as Austria applies for membership. For the moment, it appears that the Austrian government has decided against applying for membership, but that could change after elections next year.

In fact, Austrian public opinion is already changing. Earlier this month when the Austrian public was informed of NATO's Article 5 guarantees, for the first time in a national poll a majority of Austrians said that Austria should abandon its neutrality and join NATO.

So if the Austrian government decides to follow public opinion, would we then want to tell the Austrians, “Sorry, no applications accepted until the year 2002”?

As you know, many, including myself, believe that Slovenia already meets the criteria for NATO membership. I supported its entry in this first wave. There is every indication that Slovenia will be ready to join the Alliance within the next three years.

To mandate a pause would take the urgency off the reform efforts that nations such as Bulgaria and Romania have stepped up, at great short-term cost to their standard of living, precisely because they want to make themselves NATO-qualified for the next wave.

Even Slovakia, a long-shot applicant because of its poor record on democratization and privatization, may have a dramatic turn-around as a result of national elections this fall.

Such a decision would make NATO look like it can't be trusted to judiciously apply its own criteria; namely, that it cannot tell when and whom to invite to become new allies. This is no policy for a great nation like the United States or a great alliance like NATO.

Secretary of State Albright told the Foreign Relations Committee on February 24 that just the possibility of joining NATO has inspired declared applicants to accelerate reform, to reach out to their neighbors, and to reject the destructive nationalism of their region's past.

As one of many examples of this, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus signed in March a border agreement paving the way for a final demarcation of the 500-kilometer Baltic-Belarusian frontier.

Given these accomplishments, Secretary Albright warned:

A mandated pause would be heard from Tallinn to in the north to Sofia in the south as the sound of an open door slamming shut. It would be seen as a vote of no confidence in the reform-minded governments from the Baltics to the Balkans. It would diminish the incentive nations now have to cooperate with their neighbors and with NATO. It would fracture the consensus NATO itself has reached on the open door. It would be dangerous and utterly unnecessary since the Senate would, in any case, have to approve the admission of any new allies.

There are many foreign policy experts who share these views. But let me quote one concerned American who urged me to oppose this amendment.

David Harris, Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee, wrote to me on March third, stating:

Last June 26, we [the American Jewish Committee] observed that an enlarged NATO will mean greater security and stability and also hasten the political and economic integration of Europe. An expanded NATO means greater stability and security for Central Europe, a region that was the cockpit for the two world wars that brought such horror to the world—and to the Jewish people.

For many of the same reasons we supported NATO expansion we now oppose any effort to mandate a pause in initiating procedures for a second round of its enlargement.

States throughout Central Europe that hope for eventual membership would feel that the open door enunciated at Madrid had been slammed shut in their face.

At a minimum these states would be discouraged, and a pause might lead to instability in the region. Hardliners in the Russian Federation would find vindication.

Supporters of this amendment appear to believe that they are stopping a runaway train of immediate NATO membership for every state from Croatia to Kazakhstan.

They seem to be unaware that not every European state has declared an intent to join NATO. In particular, Ukraine, at its March 26 meeting with NATO officials, restated its view that while it “does not rule out” joining the alliance, such a move is currently unrealistic.

Ukraine issued three conditions for joining NATO: (1) decisive public opinion in favor of accession; (2) interoperability of its armed forces with those of NATO members; and (3) a guarantee that its accession would not harm relations with neighboring states, particularly Russia.

Recognizing that we already have all the control we need over the speed and choice of future NATO members, I urge my colleagues to vote down this amendment.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that NATO members, by unanimous agreement, may invite the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of any other European state in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. The resolution of ratification notes that only Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been invited by NATO members to join the Alliance. No other agreement or document, including the July 8, 1997 Madrid Summit declaration of NATO, or the Baltic Charter signed on January 16, 1998, should be construed otherwise.

Much has been said about these documents, but I am not certain that all of my distinguished colleagues have read them carefully. In Madrid, NATO's Secretary General stated “In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we also direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review

and report to us. We will review the process at our next meeting in 1999.” This is not a promise, a commitment, or any other guarantee that countries in Central and Eastern Europe will be invited to join NATO—it is merely a statement that enlargement is a process that should be reviewed by NATO regularly.

Further, the Baltic Chapter, signed this past January by the Presidents of the United States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania declares that the U.S. “welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance”. Mr. President, this last statement is important—the Baltic Charter clearly states that including any new members in NATO must serve the strategic interests of the Alliance. All candidate countries will be evaluated on these criteria.

The United States should not support the invitation to NATO membership to any further candidates unless the Senate is first consulted, unless any proposed candidate can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership, and unless their inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the United States. During Foreign Relations Committee hearings, both Secretary of Defense Cohen and Secretary of State Albright expressed the Administration's understanding of the need for consultation with the Senate prior to any future rounds of expansion.

I strongly oppose, however, mandating a period of time during which the United States is not permitted to pursue a policy of NATO enlargement that very well may be in our national interests. The decision to enlarge NATO should be based not on an arbitrary timeline, but should be the result of a thoughtful process—based on consultations with the Congress—that considers the security interests of NATO and the qualifications of candidate states.

I strongly oppose the Warner Amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 9½ minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, 19 years ago when I was privileged to come to the U.S. Senate, the leadership had just a year or so before passed from one of our most distinguished Members, the senior Senator from Montana, Mike Mansfield. A few weeks ago in the old Senate Chamber, at age 95, he held forth in a magnificent review of history of the Senate without a flaw, without a quiver in his voice, and with an expression on his face that conveyed the strength and the confidence that that man had.

I missed the opportunity to serve with him. But one of his major goals in

the concluding years of his distinguished career was to come to this floor, time and time again, and call for reduction of our commitment in troop size and financial commitment to NATO, saying that the job had been done, it was time to come home and to apply those dollars to the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States.

That was the majority leader of the U.S. Senate. I see my distinguished colleague from New York. He recalls those speeches very well.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the distinguished Senator yield?

Mr. WARNER. Certainly.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I remind the Senate that Mike Mansfield was in the Navy at age 14 and the Marines at age 17.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, saying that he spoke from some experience—having proudly worn the uniform of all three branches, by the way.

That could recur again in the minds of the American people, that we have spent enough, we have contributed enough, and the time has come for us to reduce our presence in Europe—which I think would be an absolute tragedy. I would fight against it, as I did in my earlier days in the U.S. Senate when, time and time again, Senator Jackson, Senator Stennis, Senator Tower, Senator Goldwater, Senator THURMOND would marshal the forces of those of us who had just joined the Senate on the floor to stop and ask the Senate not to cut NATO's budget. We felt it should be an orderly transition down in size. And that took place.

I just bring up this history to say that once again the taxpayers of this country, when they begin to look at the cost attributed to the accession of these three nations, costs which will be diverted in dollars from our own needs of the Armed Forces today, costs for the refurbishment and building of new bases in these three countries at the very time when we are going to shrink and continue to shrink the base structure in the United States—all of this to say that the magnitude of the decision to access countries to this treaty is just an important one. We are acting without full knowledge as to the future mission of NATO. We are acting without full knowledge of the cost of having these three nations build their military up to where they are a positive—not a negative, a positive—contribution to NATO.

I say with deep humility and respect of my colleagues, why not give America 3 years within which to study? Why not, I say to the leadership of the Senate, allow another President to give his or her wisdom to this question of whether additional countries should come in, preceded by, I hope, an active debate in the next Presidential election on the entire issue of the security interests of the United States using as a focal point NATO and the experience gained, in all probability, by accessing these three nations.

We owe no less to that future President, for he or she will have to incorporate in their budgets the costs of new accessions, will have to incorporate in their budgets the diversion of such funds as may be allocated to additional nations.

Furthermore, the changing face of Europe today from one of cold war to one our military leaders now refer to as instability—instability is the enemy in Europe and elsewhere in the world, largely because of the uncertainty associated with weapons of mass destruction and, in the wake of the new democracies, the instability as it relates to ethnic problems, religious problems and all those associated with these new nations trying to seek strength as democracies politically and strength economically in a one-world free market. But it is the whole range of instabilities and associated conflict with which we have had very little experience, other than Bosnia, possibly Kosovo. Should we not have the opportunity to study what are the requirements associated with these new instabilities? Learn from experience. Add up the costs in Bosnia. There have been many billions of dollars now contributed to bring about peace in that region.

I listened to our distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia talk about the policy in Bosnia. In many ways, I associate myself with his remarks. But we need—we need—that learning curve to make such important decisions as would be involved in adding more nations as members of NATO. Indeed the other—

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will my friend yield?

Mr. WARNER. I will yield in a moment. The other nations would like, I am sure, to have this period of time. This 3-year moratorium gives a perfectly logical, understandable tool to the current President of the United States, indeed a future President, to withstand the stampede that I predict will occur if this is not put in place. Mr. President, I yield.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I just ask my friend, and I know he will be aware of this, on January 16 this year, the President and the Presidents of the three Baltic States signed the U.S. Baltic Charter of Partnership, which states that the United States welcomes and supports the efforts of the Baltic States to join NATO, states that could only be defended by nuclear weapons.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I addressed that on the floor of the Senate before. I think it was an unwise movement by the President. We all have great compassion for those three states, the courage of their people, their desire to affiliate more and more with the Western World. But to have held out that hope which, once it is translated from the United States across the ocean into the states and down to the people, almost is equivalent to an absolute commitment to see that it is going to happen.

That is precisely why I am concerned about leaving open the opportunity for

new accessions to begin tomorrow unless the 3-year moratorium, which is a reasonable period for study, is put in place.

I close with, once again, do we not have that obligation to the American taxpayers who pay the costs associated, do we not have that obligation to the men and women of our Armed Forces who will proudly wear their uniforms as a part of the NATO force to have clarity with respect to future missions, which we will not have until 1 year hence, April of 1999?

I say to my colleagues, let's just pause and take stock and think about the seriousness of the decisions we are about to make and consider that it is not unreasonable to allow 3 years of experience to transpire to make future decisions regarding other nations. Mr. President, I yield the floor and yield back my time.

VOTE ON EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2316

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 2316 offered by Mr. CRAIG of Idaho.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on that amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 2316, offered by the Senator from Idaho, Mr. CRAIG. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that for the duration of the vote Sandra Ortlund, of my office, be permitted the privilege of the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry. The first vote is on the Craig amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 20, nays 80, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 110 Ex.]

YEAS—20

Allard	Grassley	Nickles
Ashcroft	Hutchinson	Roberts
Burns	Hutchison	Sessions
Craig	Inhofe	Smith (NH)
Faircloth	Jeffords	Specter
Feingold	Kempthorne	Warner
Gramm	Murkowski	

NAYS—80

Abraham	Brownback	Collins
Akaka	Bryan	Conrad
Baucus	Bumpers	Coverdell
Bennett	Byrd	D'Amato
Biden	Campbell	Daschle
Bingaman	Chafee	DeWine
Bond	Cleland	Dodd
Boxer	Coats	Domenici
Breaux	Cochran	Dorgan

Durbin	Kerrey	Reed
Enzi	Kerry	Reid
Feinstein	Kohl	Robb
Ford	Kyl	Rockefeller
Frist	Landrieu	Roth
Glenn	Lautenberg	Santorum
Gorton	Leahy	Sarbanes
Graham	Levin	Shelby
Grams	Lieberman	Smith (OR)
Gregg	Lott	Snowe
Hagel	Lugar	Stevens
Harkin	Mack	Thomas
Hatch	McCain	Thompson
Helms	McConnell	Thurmond
Hollings	Mikulski	Torricelli
Inouye	Moseley-Braun	Wellstone
Johnson	Moynihan	Wyden
Kennedy	Murray	

The amendment (No. 2316) was rejected.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I think this has been a very good debate. There have been significant amendments offered and now voted upon. I see from the list we have before us as many as six or eight additional amendments still pending, several of which we have not been able to work out a time agreement on. I thank all Senators for being cooperative. We have had opponents and proponents who have been cooperative. I encourage that to continue.

I believe maybe a Senator or two indicated that they didn't know we were going to try to finish this bill this week. I think I have said all along that we should have a focused, unobstructed debate, but the intent was to complete it Wednesday or Thursday. Here we are on Thursday at almost 4 o'clock. I talked to Senator DASCHLE, and we are agreed that we are going to finish NATO enlargement either at a reasonable hour this afternoon, or a late hour tonight, or tomorrow, or Saturday, but we are not going to leave this week until we finish NATO enlargement and the supplemental appropriations bill.

Now, we can do both of those in a very responsible way with still some good debate remaining. We need cooperation and time agreements. We need cooperation on the supplemental appropriations. We agree that these two issues must be completed this week so that next week we can move to IRS reform, or the Workplace Development Partnership Act, and perhaps even crop insurance and agriculture insurance. So we don't have the luxury of rolling this over until next week.

Our first vote will not occur until Tuesday at 5 o'clock. Please work with us, and we can complete this bill and have a vote by 6:30 or 7 o'clock if everybody will agree to a reasonable time limit.

I yield the floor.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2321

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 2 minutes of debate, equally divided, on amendment No. 2321 offered by Mr. MOYNIHAN of New York.

The Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, in the foreseeable future the central strategic object of the United States and the world will be that of controlling the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the Near East, in