

But Russia is a big country. Big countries expect to exert a certain amount of power in their sphere of influence, and it will take time for Russia to recognize that those ways of acting are no longer acceptable.

No one knows who will follow President Yeltsin. Russia's future is too unpredictable for us to disband NATO, and in any event there are other important missions for NATO than to defend against Russian aggression. On that point I fully agree with the administration. I have lived most of my life in a world with NATO. I want future generations to benefit from this unmatched military alliance led by democratic nations. It serves us well.

But the United States should be doing everything possible to build a non-threatening, cooperative and stable relationship with Russia. Rather than rush to extend an historically anti-Russia alliance and build up the military capabilities of its neighbors—an approach that has undeniably caused great resentment and uneasiness in Russia, we should be building alliances that do not create new divisions between us.

Mr. President, my fourth question is whether enlargement would result in benefits that justify substantial additional military costs to the United States and the new NATO members.

One of the most troubling issues in this debate has been the cost projections. Estimates range from several hundred million dollars, which I find impossible to take seriously if these countries are to pull their own weight in NATO, to tens of billions of dollars. The administration's estimates have changed so many times that are virtually devoid of credibility.

As best I can tell, we only know that we do not know how much the admission of these three countries would cost, but that it would cost a lot and possibly a lot more than the administration says. When was the last time the Pentagon overestimated the cost of anything? I cannot recall a time.

Nor can I recall a time when we were asked to vote for something when the cost estimates differed so dramatically—from as little as \$400 million to as much as \$125 billion. That is a difference of over 300 times.

Nor do we know what it would cost to admit additional members after we cross this threshold. The President has said that "no qualified European democracy is ruled out as a future member." There are over twenty. That is a potentially huge investment and a bonanza for the arms manufacturers who are not surprisingly among NATO enlargement's greatest champions.

The last thing we want to encourage is for the newly admitted countries will go on a weapons buying spree when they should be spending their scarce resources on economic development and infrastructure.

What would NATO be with 22 new members? That may sound farfetched, but under the President's scenario it is

at least a plausible outcome and one we must consider before we start down the path of enlargement. I am afraid it would be a much weakened alliance, and one that Russia, rightly or wrongly, could quite reasonably regard as a threat.

And what commitments would we be making to those future members? President Clinton has said that NATO "enlargement requires that we extend to new members our alliance's most solemn security pledge, to treat an attack against one as an attack against all." That is what the NATO charter says, but it is far from obvious that the American people are ready to accept that commitment. Others speak vaguely of different types of missions. I have strongly supported international peacekeeping, but I am uneasy about the lack of specificity about what we are committing to here.

Mr. President, I do not doubt that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have every reason to want to be part of NATO. I also recognize that they have made tremendous progress in meeting the criteria set for NATO admission. But we must judge, above all, if enlarging NATO at this time in history is in the best interests of the United States—not Poland, not Hungary, not the Czech Republic, but the United States and NATO itself.

I have considered this resolution carefully, but I have been unable to satisfy myself that it is either necessary, or in our best interest. George Kennan, a man I admire greatly, called NATO expansion "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era." I do not know if George Kennan is right. But neither am I confident that he is wrong. I am not prepared to gamble on his being wrong.

I hope that I am wrong. It appears that two-thirds of the Senate will vote for this resolution. I sincerely hope that the admission of new countries to NATO produces the desirable outcome the administration forecasts. If that happens I will be the first to admit that I was wrong, and to welcome that outcome.

As I said at the outset of my remarks, this has been a difficult decision for me. I obviously share the administration's goal of a united, secure and prosperous Europe. We all do. But I believe continued progress can be made to achieve that through Partnership for Peace and other means, without the risks and cost involved in enlarging NATO. Nothing, I am convinced, bears more directly on the future security of Europe and the United States than a democratic Russia that does not fear the West.

That should be our priority, that is what is at stake, and so the Senator from Vermont will oppose this resolution.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before we proceed to a vote, may I ask the distinguished Senator from Delaware, Mr. BIDEN, if he is satisfied now with TED STEVENS' amendment?

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2065, AS MODIFIED

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am satisfied, and I will send to the desk, if I may, with the permission of the chairman, a modification that has been agreed to by Senator STEVENS and myself.

On behalf of Senator STEVENS, I ask that a modification to amendment No. 2065 be sent to the desk. This adds one word to the amendment which I have cleared with Senator STEVENS and with Chairman HELMS. I want to state my understanding about this amendment before we adopt it, which I have also cleared with the Senator from Alaska.

First, this amendment does not affect the Partnership for Peace Program.

Second, I understand this to mean that NATO cannot incur NATO expansion costs for which the United States would be obligated to pay except through NATO's common-funded budgets unless specifically authorized by law. And with those understandings, the amendment, as modified, is perfectly acceptable to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.

The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the following:

(C) REQUIREMENT OF PAYMENT OUT OF FUNDS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED.—No cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), other than through the common-funded budgets of NATO, in connection with the admission to membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of the United States unless the funds are specifically authorized by law for that purpose.

Mr. BIDEN. I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. To keep the Record straight, that is No. 2066, as modified?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 2065, as modified.

Mr. BIDEN. Amendment 2065, as modified.

Mr. HELMS. Amendment 2065, as modified. Very well.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Do we need to vitiate the yeas and nays?

I move to vitiate the yeas and nays on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. I urge its adoption by voice.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.

The executive amendment (No. 2065), as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. HELMS. I think you have a UC, Mr. President.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2320

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is now on amendment No. 2320. By previous order, the yeas and nays have been ordered to occur at 7 o'clock. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HARKIN. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. Are we proceeding on the basis of a unanimous consent request that was entered into earlier to vote at 7 o'clock?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. HARKIN. Further parliamentary inquiry. Will there be a series of votes?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are two votes currently stacked—

Mr. HELMS. If the Senator will yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is mistaken. There is only one vote currently called for under the previous order which was a result of the unanimous consent agreement. It is to occur at 7 o'clock.

Mr. HARKIN. As soon as the vote is over, I assume the floor would be open for further amendments and debate. Is that affirmative?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There have been amendments set aside. They would recur, if called up.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. At the conclusion of this vote, the regular order would be to return to the Ashcroft amendment; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. HARKIN. Return to the Ashcroft amendment?

Mr. BIDEN. Ashcroft.

Mr. HARKIN. Is there a limited amount of time on that amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time limit.

Mr. HARKIN. So the floor would be open at that time. I thank the Chair. Thank you.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, if I am not mistaken, we have two votes; the first would be 15, and the second 10?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair was equally confused. But this is the parliamentary situation. Under a standing unanimous consent agreement, the Senate should now vote on the Conrad amendment No. 2320. By unanimous consent, there is a 10-minute limit on the vote on the Bingaman amendment, but the agreement did not call for the Bingaman amendment to occur immediately after the Conrad amendment. If that is the desire of the Senator from North Carolina, he will have to ask unanimous consent that that happen.

Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Now, this whole situation is fraught with sideline agreements that nobody recorded. Now, the understanding was that at this point—all right. So we will vote first on the Conrad-Bingaman; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. HELMS. Amendment No. 2320, and then followed by 2324?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no order for 2324.

Mr. HELMS. I suggest we get something done.

I suggest we proceed with the vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from North Carolina asking that we move to 2324 after 2320? That would require a unanimous consent.

Mr. HELMS. We will do that afterwards.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All right. The question is on agreeing to the executive amendment No. 2320. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 16, nays 84, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 113 Ex.]

YEAS—16

Bingaman	Jeffords	Leahy
Bryan	Johnson	Murray
Bumpers	Kennedy	Wellstone
Conrad	Kerry	Wyden
Dorgan	Kohl	
Harkin	Lautenberg	

NAYS—84

Abraham	Faircloth	Mack
Akaka	Feingold	McCain
Allard	Feinstein	McConnell
Ashcroft	Ford	Mikulski
Baucus	Frist	Moseley-Braun
Bennett	Glenn	Moynihan
Biden	Gorton	Murkowski
Bond	Graham	Nickles
Boxer	Gramm	Reed
Breaux	Grams	Reid
Brownback	Grassley	Robb
Burns	Gregg	Roberts
Byrd	Hagel	Rockefeller
Campbell	Hatch	Roth
Chafee	Helms	Santorum
Cleland	Hollings	Sarbanes
Coats	Hutchinson	Sessions
Cochran	Huthchison	Shelby
Collins	Inhofe	Smith (NH)
Coverdell	Inouye	Smith (OR)
Craig	Kempthorne	Snowe
D'Amato	Kerrey	Specter
Daschle	Kyl	Stevens
DeWine	Landrieu	Thomas
Dodd	Levin	Thompson
Domenici	Lieberman	Thurmond
Durbin	Lott	Torricelli
Enzi	Lugar	Warner

The executive amendment (No. 2320) was rejected.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 2318

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I call for the regular order with respect to amendment 2318, the Ashcroft amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.

That amendment is now in order.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I wish to express my strong opposition to this amendment and to urge my colleagues to vote this amendment down.

Before I start Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article published today on this amendment in the Washington Times by David Gompert, who served as senior director for Europe and Eurasia on the National Security Council staff under President George Bush. This is a very insightful piece, and I intend to reiterate and elaborate on the sound points raised by David Gompert.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A VOTE AGAINST NATO

(By David Gompert)

As the Senate prepares to ratify the enlargement of NATO, the debate has taken a troubling turn. While not questioning the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Sen. John Ashcroft has offered an amendment to the ratification resolution aimed essentially at limiting NATO's purpose to the Cold War mission of defending the borders of the European allies. Should such a new restriction be imposed, the big loser would be the United States.

Needless to say Sen. Ashcroft has no intention of harming U.S. security interests. His motivation, it seems, is to keep the U.S. from being drawn into peacekeeping operations, like Bosnia, that the Europeans ought to handle on their own. Reasonable people can disagree about the merits of U.S. involvement in Bosnia and other peacekeeping missions. In some cases, the nation will opt to send forces, as in Bosnia; in other cases, it will not, as in last year's crisis in Albania. But let's be clear: The NATO treaty does not and will not require the U.S. to participate in peacekeeping. The Clinton administration has never claimed that the U.S. has a *treaty obligation* to join its allies in Bosnia.

Thus, the Ashcroft amendment is at best unnecessary. Far worse, it could foreclose a potentially crucial strategic option for the United States, namely, to seek NATO's help in confronting future threats to the common security interests of the Atlantic democracies. In this world of rogue states with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons poised to seize Western oil supplies, why would we want to restrict NATO's purpose to our coming to the defense of European soil? Why would we want to cut off U.S. options in this unpredictable era? Why would we discard our chance to get allied support for U.S. security interests?

Wisely, the drafters of the NATO Treaty 50 years ago provided not only for the defense of the territory of the European allies but also for the possibility of common action to protect other interests. The United States wanted this latter provision—not as an obligation but as an option. When the treaty was signed, Secretary of State Acheson proclaimed that it contained no limitations on alliance missions. As long as the Soviets threatened Europe, the defense of allied territory was NATO's overriding concern. But now, the U.S. has begun to ask the Europeans to contribute more to the protection of other common interests, such as oil and security from weapons of mass destruction. It is time for the U.S. not only to give but also to receive security benefits from NATO.

Accordingly, since the Gulf War, when the U.S. had to send nearly all the forces and run nearly all the risks, the Bush administration and the Clinton administration have urged

the Europeans to move beyond the Cold War mission of border defense and to join the United States in combating the new threats. This work has just begun to bear fruit: The British, French and Germans have, somewhat reluctantly, agreed to build forces that could help out if, for example, another war erupted in the Persian Gulf. The allies are becoming convinced by the United States that NATO is too valuable—and the world is too dangerous—to restrict its options.

The Ashcroft amendment could derail this effort. By stressing that NATO's only business is to defend European borders, it would remove any motivation for the allies to field better forces for post-Cold War missions and give them a perfect excuse to let their military readiness decline. By suggesting that the U.S. will not support any other NATO missions, it would guarantee that the allies will not. By disapproving of the use of NATO to combat today's threats it would signal that the U.S. sees the alliance as having little value in the new era. Those Europeans that prefer to see the U.S. face the new era's dangers alone would welcome the Ashcroft amendment.

Worst of all, those who would threaten U.S. and European common interests, such as Iraq, Libya, Iran and Serbia, might be relieved, if also astounded, to learn that the United States was not going to use NATO to face them with a common U.S.-European front, in peacetime and war. These renegades are already trying to split us from our allies. The only thing that would bother and deter them better than U.S. power is U.S. power backed by NATO. The Ashcroft amendment—unintentionally, of course—could rule that out. Upon admitting the three new democracies as members, thus consolidating security within Europe, NATO will turn its attention to how the U.S. and Europeans can work together to combat common threats wherever they might arise. We will be debating and refining such a concept for years to come, and the Senate will have an important voice. By design, the treaty itself neither requires nor forbids new missions. The Ashcroft amendment would pinch off options that the treaty was meant to provide and that the U.S., above all, can now use to its advantage.

Mr. ROTH. I fully recognize that the sponsors of this amendment are motivated by the desire to preserve the vitality of NATO and the central priority of its collective defense mission. These are goals that I fully endorse. However, the motivations behind this amendment and its real and potential impact upon the Alliance are leagues apart. Mr. President, this amendment would do great damage to the Alliance and to the interests of the United States.

First, it intends to unilaterally impose for the first time in the history of the Alliance new restrictions on NATO's roles and missions. And it would do so, in absence of serious consultations within the Alliance.

Second, such a unilateral move by the Senate runs counter to the spirit and traditions of the Alliance. It would invite other allies to unilaterally impose their own restrictions and definitions on the terms of the Washington Treaty. We must not set the Alliance upon such a slippery and divisive slope.

Third, by imposing such restrictions, this amendment would undercut the ability of the United States to prompt NATO to take actions necessary to protect and defend the interests of the

North Atlantic community. Worse yet, the language of this amendment would undermine the ability of the United States to call NATO to action in defense of American security interests.

Fourth, this chamber has repeatedly called upon our Allies to stop the decline of their defense establishments and do more to bear burdens of the Alliance. This amendment directly undercuts those efforts to attain more equitable burden-sharing within the Alliance and the transatlantic community. It would do by granting our European allies yet another excuse to not improve their defense forces.

At its best this amendment is unnecessary to achieve the goals of its sponsors. At its worst, the amendment would undercut the Alliance's will and capability to defend the security interests of the North Atlantic community of democracies.

This amendment is unnecessary to attain the goal of preventing the United States from being drawn into dangerous peace-keeping operations that the countries of Europe should handle on their own. The United States already reserves the right to veto any such initiative within or by the Alliance. Moreover, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty makes U.S. participation in a NATO mission strictly a national decision. It is not an obligation. That has always been the case and will always remain the case in NATO.

It is quite evident that not everyone in the Senate supports the decision of the United States to have NATO lead the effort to bring peace to the Balkans. Nonetheless, it was a national decision by the United States and the United States Congress to support the NATO mission in Bosnia. And, the fact is that this military operation is completely consistent with the Washington Treaty. We should not allow disagreements with the foreign policy of the executive branch, as serious as they may be, to prompt dangerous revisions or restrictions upon a treaty that has been an unprecedented success for the deterrence of aggression and the preservation of peace. Yet, that is exactly what this amendment would do.

I understand that one key intent of the amendment is to express the opinion that the Alliance must remain first and foremost an institution of collective defense. That goal is already accomplished through the resolution of ratification. Just read it.

Section 3.1.A of the resolution of ratification declares clearly that the "core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members." The resolution makes crystal clear that the Senate firmly believes that NATO's first priority must be the mission of collective defense.

Unfortunately, this amendment is not only unnecessary, it is dangerous. By attempting to define and restrict the missions that NATO can and should undertake, it risks foreclosing the ability of the United States to seek

NATO's assistance in confronting future threats to the transatlantic community of nations.

Ironically, this amendment's current construction would not keep the United States from becoming engaged in any future "Bosnia-type contingencies"—a core intent of its authors—because such contingencies as Bosnia can be defined as meeting its requirements. Indeed, the U.S. Congress has done just that by supporting our troops in Bosnia. But, this amendment, could serve as an excuse for our allies to avoid sharing the risks and burdens of such contingencies with the United States.

In a world of rogue states with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons increasingly at their disposal, why would we, the United States Senate, want to undercut NATO's willingness and ability to defend the common interests of the North Atlantic community of democracies? Why would we, the United States Senate discard one of the best vehicles through which to prompt allied support for U.S. security interests?

Some fifty years ago, the drafters of the Washington Treaty included provisions not only to provide for the territorial defense of the North Atlantic region, but also for the possibility of common action to protect other interests of the North Atlantic Community. It was the United States that insisted upon this provision—Article 4 of the Charter—and a construction of the Charter that would permit actions beyond the narrow scope of territorial defense. Secretary of State Dean Acheson spoke to this point clearly before the Treaty went into force in 1949, and I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt of a memorandum of his press conferences in which he spoke definitively on this point be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPT OF MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 1949

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A correspondent asked the Secretary to consider a situation which might arise if there was a demonstration of a power, not a member of this group, in the direction of one of the Middle Eastern countries such as Iran or Turkey which was considered by one of the powers in the group to constitute a threat to peace and security. He asked if there was any provision in the Treaty beyond the provision for consultation and Secretary Acheson replied in the negative. Asked if Article 9 did not provide for a recommendation by the council on a situation of this type, the Secretary replied that this was correct. He said that it applied for recommendations for carrying out or implementing the Treaty but said that this did not change what he had said earlier. He declared that there was no provision which looked toward these Parties acting as a unit in regard to some matter not covered by the Treaty and said they might act as a unit or they might not, but that there was nothing in the Treaty which required them to do so.

Asked if there was no provision for anything except consultation, except actual

armed attack on one of the signatories, the Secretary replied that there were Articles one, two, three and four. Asked if there were no limiting clause the Secretary stated that there was no limiting clause. A correspondent asked if the area of the Treaty was specified but was not necessarily limited as to what the Parties might do after they might consult, considering the fact that an attack to security might originate outside of the geographical limits of the Treaty. The Secretary said that, in the first place, there was the very first article of the Treaty which says that the Parties affirm their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to settle their disputes peacefully. He added that he didn't know whether this would be called limiting but that it was one of the great obligations of the Charter, and that if it were carried out by all members of the United Nations a great many problems in this world would disappear. In conclusion, he said that he would think that it was quite limiting. A correspondent said that geographical limitations in Europe and the North Atlantic had also been set up in Article 5 and the Secretary said that this was right.

Asked if the Treaty stipulated that if armed attack should originate outside of the area no action might be taken, the Secretary replied in the negative.

* * * * *

Mr. ROTH. The fact is that the policy of the United States and the policy of NATO have always permitted actions by the Alliance that go beyond the narrow scope of territorial defense. Yet, this amendment clearly attempts to constrict the interpretation of the Washington treaty rendered by its founding fathers.

And, let us not underestimate what kind of example passage of this amendment would set for our Allies. It would encourage our European Allies to impose their own unilateral reinterpretations or restrictions upon the Washington treaty. Imagine our reaction, if one of the parliaments or governments of our allies were to attach such conditions to NATO enlargement. How would we react, if for example, one ally were to prohibit the use of NATO-designated units against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq? Judging from recent events in the Persian Gulf, I imagine the reaction in this chamber would be one of complete outrage.

Mr. President, we must also be aware of the message this amendment would send to our European Allies should the Senate make the profound mistake of accepting it.

For years, the United States, and especially the United States Congress, has worked arduously to make our European Allies more outward looking in their security policies and to assume a greater share of the risks and burdens in addressing common challenges and threats. We have repeatedly called upon them to stop the decline of their defense establishments and to devote the resources that will enable them to better contribute to the transatlantic security.

Yet this amendment, perhaps inadvertently, would signal that the business of NATO is only territorial defense, and no more. It would thereby

eliminate any motivation for the Allies to field the forces necessary for post-Cold War missions. It would serve as an excuse to let the military establishments continue an over decade long decline.

Worse, this amendment would infer that the United States views the Alliance as having limited value in the post-Cold War era. This is an important point made by David Gompert, and I fully agree. Passage of this amendment could be interpreted by our allies and the detractors of the Alliance that the United States no longer regards its vital interests as being best secured through the fabric of the transatlantic community and the NATO alliance. That would be a dangerously counterproductive message—a message that would ignore the lessons of two world wars and the Cold War. I just don't believe that our memory is so short.

Mr. President, the Senate must reject this amendment. As I stated earlier, at its best, this amendment is redundant and unnecessary. At its worst, it is a radical and dangerous departure from the Washington Treaty of 1949 and the way in which the United States has over the years used the Alliance to advance our own national interests.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I now move to table the Ashcroft amendment, and ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Delaware to lay on the table the amendment of the Senator from Missouri. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

The result was announced—yeas 82, nays 18, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 114 Ex.]

YEAS—82

Abraham	Enzi	Lugar
Akaka	Feingold	Mack
Allard	Feinstein	McCain
Baucus	Ford	McConnell
Bennett	Frist	Mikulski
Biden	Glenn	Moseley-Braun
Bingaman	Gorton	Moynihan
Boxer	Graham	Murkowski
Breaux	Gramm	Murray
Bryan	Gregg	Reed
Bumpers	Hagel	Reid
Burns	Harkin	Robb
Byrd	Hatch	Rockefeller
Campbell	Hollings	Roth
Chafee	Inouye	Santorum
Cleland	Jeffords	Sarbanes
Coats	Johnson	Shelby
Cochran	Kennedy	Smith (OR)
Collins	Kerrey	Snowe
Conrad	Kerry	Specter
Coverdell	Kohl	Stevens
D'Amato	Kyl	Thomas
Daschle	Landrieu	Thompson
DeWine	Lautenberg	Torricelli
Dodd	Leahy	Wellstone
Domenici	Levin	Wyden
Dorgan	Lieberman	
Durbin	Lott	

NAYS—18

Ashcroft	Grassley	Nickles
Bond	Helms	Roberts
Brownback	Hutchinson	Sessions
Craig	Hutchison	Smith (NH)
Faircloth	Inhofe	Thurmond
Grams	Kempthorne	Warner

The motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2318) was agreed to.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2324

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on the Bingaman amendment, No. 2324. By previous agreement, this is a 10-minute vote. We have 10 minutes of debate equally divided. Then there is a 10-minute vote. Who yields time?

The Senator from New Mexico will be recognized when the Senate is in order. The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the members of NATO are engaged today in revising and updating the so-called strategic concept of NATO. We are part of this ongoing review. It was agreed to in July of last year in Madrid, by the Council, that this revision of the strategic concept would take place, and they set out a three-stage process to do it. They are well into that process now. The idea behind it was that the new, revised strategic concept will be presented next April at the Ministers meeting.

My amendment says that after the admission of Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic, it will be the policy of the United States not to invite other members to come into NATO until that revised strategic concept has been agreed to by the Council, by the NATO Council. To my mind, this is not a radical proposal in any respect. It is exactly the process that is intended to take place. It is very important, I believe, for ourselves to know what the new mission is and to have agreement on what the new strategic concept is before we take on new members and commit to defend their territory. Of course, I think it is also very important that the new members who would like to become part of NATO understand precisely what this strategic concept is before they sign on to participate in it.

So that is the amendment. There is no great mystery about it. It is not intended to subvert anything, to delay anything. It has absolutely no effect on the question of whether Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary should be admitted into NATO at this time. But it does say before we go beyond that, we should get this strategic concept agreed to. It is intended that that happen next year. I have every reason to believe it will happen next year. It is important that it happen before we begin to invite others to join NATO after these three countries.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very, very brief. This is a rerun of the amendment by my distinguished friend from Virginia, Senator WARNER. This is

a means by which to artificially delay any new decision relative to new entrants. We already have the strategic concept that contemplated and reflected the changes that took place in 1991. You all voted 90 to 6 last night on the amendment of the Senator from Arizona, Senator KYL, laying out in detail what must be taken into consideration by the United States of America to sign on any new strategic concept. This is, in fact, not necessary. It is not needed, and it is an unnecessary delay. So I am prepared—if my colleague will yield the remainder of his time, I will yield the remainder of mine and I am ready to vote.

I urge you all to vote no.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I would like to use an additional 1 minute of my time. How much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 2 minutes 33 seconds.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Let me just sum up my position. I do not think the amendment by the Senator from Arizona is related to this. That is a statement by the U.S. Senate as to what we think ought to be in the revised strategic concept. It is not a statement by the Council, NATO Council, as to what ought to be in there. I think it is important that we get agreement among our NATO allies as to what is in this strategic concept before we go ahead to invite new members. That is what my amendment says.

Unless someone intends that we invite new members in the next 11 months, there is no delay involved in this. So I hope very much my colleagues will approve the amendment and add it to the treaty.

I yield the floor and I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I see no purpose for this amendment. I hope my colleagues will view it the same way.

I yield the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will now call the roll on the Bingham amendment, No. 2324.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. KYL) is necessarily absent.

The result was announced, yeas 23, nays 76, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 115 Ex.]

YEAS—23

Ashcroft	Hollings	Reed
Bingaman	Hutchinson	Roberts
Bumpers	Hutchison	Smith (NH)
Conrad	Inhofe	Torricelli
Craig	Jeffords	Warner
Dorgan	Kempthorne	Wellstone
Graham	Kohl	Wyden
Harkin	Murray	

NAYS—76

Abraham	Biden	Bryan
Akaka	Bond	Burns
Allard	Boxer	Byrd
Baucus	Breaux	Campbell
Bennett	Brownback	Chafee

Cleland	Grassley	Moseley-Braun
Coats	Gregg	Moynihan
Cochran	Hagel	Murkowski
Collins	Hatch	Nickles
Coverdell	Helms	Reid
D'Amato	Inouye	Robb
Daschle	Johnson	Rockefeller
DeWine	Kennedy	Roth
Dodd	Kerrey	Santorum
Domenici	Kerry	Sarbanes
Durbin	Landrieu	Sessions
Enzi	Lautenberg	Shelby
Faircloth	Leahy	Smith (OR)
Feingold	Levin	Snowe
Feinstein	Lieberman	Specter
Ford	Lott	Stevens
Frist	Lugar	Thomas
Glenn	Mack	Thompson
Gorton	McCain	Thurmond
Gramm	McConnell	
Grams	Mikulski	

NOT VOTING—1

Kyl

The amendment (No. 2324) was rejected.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FAIRCLOTH). The Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2326

(Purpose: To urge examination of the compatibility of certain programs involving nuclear weapons cooperation with the obligations of the United States and other NATO members under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. HARKIN] proposes an executive amendment numbered 2326.

At the end of section 2 of the resolution, insert the following:

() COMPATIBILITY OF CERTAIN PROGRAMS WITH OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.—The Senate declares that the President, as part of NATO's ongoing Strategic Review, should examine the political and legal compatibility between—

(1) current United States programs involving nuclear weapons cooperation with other NATO members; and

(2) the obligations of the United States and the other NATO members under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FAIRCLOTH). The Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa.

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Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. HARKIN] proposes an executive amendment numbered 2326.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, it is not a long amendment. That is why I wanted it read.

It is very straightforward. It will be my intention to just speak for a few minutes on the amendment, and then I will withdraw the amendment. After seeing how all of the amendments seem to be faring here, it seemed ridiculous to waste any more time of the Senate to be voting on these amendments.

I feel strongly about this aspect of going into NATO enlargement. More than anything else, I want to explain the purpose of my amendment and lay down a marker regarding an issue that I know concerns all of us here and which could have very severe repercussions in an expanded NATO. That is the issue of the nonproliferation treaty of which the United States is a signatory and, of course, an issue that we have pushed very hard.

Many of us have spoken many times about the importance of not slowing down international arms control and nonproliferation efforts. This amendment is simply a sense of the Senate regarding NATO's relationship to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and urges that the President should propose that NATO examine the compatibility—

Mr. President, could I have order? I have trouble hearing myself.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we have order so the speaker can be heard? He is entitled to be heard.

Mr. HARKIN. I thank the President.

This amendment just urges that the President should propose that NATO examine the compatibility of its nuclear-weapons-sharing programs with our obligations under the NPT, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

The NPT is one of our most important international agreements. Not only is the United States a member of the NPT regime, we were a strong leader in establishing the treaty.

Its purpose, of course, is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Through a series of provisions, it helps halt the spread of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons knowledge. That is the important part of this—the nuclear weapons knowledge.

The nonaligned members of the NPT have expressed great concern over NATO's nuclear-sharing programs. Let me make it clear. The United States has nuclear weapons at U.S. bases in NATO nations. In time of war the United States could release these nuclear weapons to these allied nations.

Of course, in peacetime our allies do not have control over them. We retain control. However, we do assist in training foreign militaries in nuclear-use capabilities.

For example, we train our NATO ally pilots how to drop nuclear weapons. We train their ground crews on how to store nuclear weapons and how to load them onto aircraft. And 110 nations have expressed concern over NATO's expansion impact on the NPT.

The first indication of this, Mr. President, was in an article that appeared in *Defense News*, on March 30, saying that:

"The 113 members of the so-called nonaligned movement, none of which have nuclear weapons, have asked conference leaders at the meeting to discuss assurances for parties to the NPT that they will not be targeted by nuclear weapons." Stephen Young, of the British American Security Information Council was quoted in the article as adding, "If NATO won't give nuclear weapons up, and in fact continues to publicly declare nuclear weapons as part of its strategy for the future of the alliance, the fear is that some states that do not currently have nuclear weapons may become frustrated and decide to acquire them for protection."

Now, we have a news release from the same organization that came in just yesterday that stated that: "At the meeting of the member states of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty"—in Geneva on April 28, just 2 days ago, 110 nations of the nonaligned movement—"demanded an end to NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements."

A working paper representing the position of more than 110 states demands that—and I quote—"the nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, and with states not party to the treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements."

Well, NATO is the only alliance which operates nuclear-sharing arrangements. Under these arrangements, somewhere between 150 to 200 U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed in the six European States: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.

NATO countries, of course, have always maintained that NATO nuclear sharing is legal under the NPT because it does not involve the actual transfer of nuclear weapons unless a decision was made to go to war.

However, the NPT regime also involves, as I stated earlier, the sharing of nuclear knowledge. So I think it is a well-grounded concern of the non-aligned nations to express their concerns about the expansion of NATO and the fact that we will begin sharing nuclear knowledge with the three new member nations. I think their fears are well founded and worth considering.

Will we now, of course, with the addition of these three new nations, begin to share this nuclear knowledge? Are these three new nations full and absolute partners of NATO—as many have said here on the floor during the course of the debate, that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should not be second-class NATO partners but should have all of the rights, obligations, and powers inherent in any NATO member nation? If that is the case, then certainly we will begin to share nuclear knowledge with those three countries.

I believe, Mr. President, that this could fly in the face of our obligations under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Therein lies the conundrum.

If we do proceed with NATO expansion—and it obviously looks like the votes will be here to do that—and if these three nations become full partners in NATO, as many have said they should, and obviously they will under the reading of the protocols, we then will proceed to share nuclear knowledge with those three nations. And what of nuclear capabilities? I am not saying that we will turn over control of nuclear weapons—we have not yet done that to any nation of NATO—but we could get to the point where we might turn over nuclear weapons to those three nations if, in fact, conditions warrant it.

There is one other aspect—and I was going to offer another amendment, but I will not—the use and stationing of dual-use aircraft in these countries. Again, as members of NATO, we will be stationing aircraft in the countries that have dual uses. They can be used for conventional weapons delivery, but if fitted with the proper hard points and racks, they can also be used for nuclear weapons delivery. And will we then proceed to train ground crews and pilots in those countries in the delivery of these nuclear weapons, in their storage, and in their handling and loading capabilities? Again, I believe that we may do something which probably a lot of Senators have not thought about. That is how NATO expansion affects our obligations and our stated interest in the nonproliferation treaty.

So I am hopeful that the President will give due consideration to this. Quite frankly, I don't know what the President can do. Either we are going to adhere to the letter and the spirit of the NPT and not share nuclear knowledge and capabilities and training with the three countries coming in, or we will share nuclear capabilities, knowledge, and training with these countries, and violate the letter and the spirit of the nonproliferation treaty. You can't have it both ways.

Another reason why I believe this rush to approve these three nations' accession into NATO is a march to folly—to quote the Senator from Arkansas, who last night quoted Barbara Tuchman's book, "The March to Folly"—is that it just seems that the expansion has not been fully thought through, especially in the nuclear regime. If in fact we go ahead down that course, what then will Russia say? I know a lot of people have said, "Well, Russia, understands what we are doing; they haven't raised a lot of objections." They have raised some.

Again, as Senator BUMPERS said last night, it is not now, it is when the elections are going to be held in Russia. That is when the hard-line right-wingers and the Communists will come out and say, see, we told you so. They will say that an expanded NATO in violation of oral assurances given to Mr.

Gorbachev. Not only that, they could say that we have violated the non-proliferation treaty by providing nuclear capabilities to those three countries.

Right now, the Duma has already delayed ratification of the START II treaty. Nationalist elements have begun to gain power by accusing members of the democratic party with appeasement of the West. This will just give them another bullet in their arsenal in arguing that, in fact, Russia should change its course of action.

I was interested that former Ambassador Matlock, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union under the Bush administration, opposes NATO expansion. He stated, NATO expansion "may go down in history as the most profound strategic plunder made since the end of the cold war." Ambassador Matlock further stated NATO enlargement "fails to take account of the real international situation following the end of the cold war, and proceeds in accord with the logic that made sense during the cold war."

I agree with those words of Ambassador Matlock. I don't know Ambassador Matlock, never met him, as far as I know, but I think he has given us wise counsel. He is joined by many others across the Nation. I have watched this debate unfold over the course of the last few months. As more and more knowledge has gotten out around the country as to what NATO expansion really entails, the possibility of derailing START II talks, the unknown factor of what the costs are eventually going to be, the fact that once we have opened this door and with, I am sorry to say, the defeat of the Warner amendment—it was close—with the defeat of his amendment, you can bet your bottom dollar next year elements within our country will start pushing for new nations to be brought into the NATO umbrella.

How will we respond to those? By saying that they are less worthy than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic? Will we say that somehow they are not ready, that we are going to have this hard dividing line in Europe? So it is going to exacerbate and cause even more tensions in Europe in the future.

Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will allow me to comment with him. I talked to former Ambassador Matlock today. I have known him since 1972, when he was part of our delegation that went over to work on the agreement. I have the highest regard for him. He confirmed to me very much what he advised the Senator. I just want to acknowledge that I think he is an authority that should be listened to.

Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate the Senator saying that. I have not met Mr. Matlock or talked to him personally. It is nice to know that even yet today he feels the same way. With words from respected people like Matlock, and with concerns such as what I have pointed out this evening in this amendment, more opposition has come out in

editorials around the country opposed to NATO expansion. The Des Moines Register, the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, the Salt Lake Tribune, and the Houston Chronicle—spanning the spectrum of the country geographically, spanning the spectrum of the country, philosophically and ideologically.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that some of these editorials be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Register's Editorials]

WHY RUSH? WHY NATO?—WHY EXPAND A MILITARY ALLIANCE THAT HAS NO LOGICAL ENEMY?

The end of the Cold War should logically have meant the end of NATO, the military alliance intended to offset the military power of the Soviet bloc, in favor of formal and informal alliances promoting more economic and social links. But logic has run up squarely against the interests of the defense industry. And far from disbanding NATO, the Senate is scheduled to vote soon on expanding it—to include the former Communist states of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Textron have already promised to build arms factories in that area. The World Policy Institute reports that \$1.2 billion in U.S. tax money has thus far been spent arming the countries in anticipation of NATO membership, and billions more must follow.

Meanwhile, the proposed NATO expansion has been one of the soundest sleeper issues in American politics. While the defense industry has dumped millions on Congress to win a favorable vote, the matter has rated the most meager of media coverage. But both President Clinton and the Senate Republican leadership favor it, and the skids are greased.

"What's the rush?" Republican Senator John Warner of Virginia asked in a recent floor speech. Warner said expanding NATO will isolate Russia, needlessly threatening an already-insecure nation that retains a huge nuclear arsenal. Our priority, Warner said, should be further reduction of nuclear stockpiles. Instead, we seem intent on beefing up a military alliance that has no logical opponent—unless we succeed in creating one.

The Senate can vote to approve expansion, reject it or delay action pending further discussion. Expanding NATO without allowing reasonable time for considering alternatives is reckless and foolhardy.

[From The New York Times, April 29, 1998]

NATO AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

The small but vociferous band of senators opposed to NATO expansion retreated yesterday to trying to sell a series of amendments they hoped would delay enlargement or limit the financial costs to Washington. Only one, offered by Daniel Patrick Moynihan and John Warner, would put off this round of growth by making NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic contingent on their gaining admission to the European Union.

While it was encouraging to see the Senate at last thoughtfully debating the merits of expansion, the significance of the moment seemed to escape many members. Pushing NATO eastward may, as its proponents argue, only reinforce democracy and unity in Europe. We will be pleased if that proves true. But with the Senate now moving to-

ward approval, the consequences could be quite different. The military alliance that played such a crucial role in preserving peace in Europe through the hard decades of the cold war could become the source of instability on that Continent.

The reason enlargement could prove to be a mistake of historic proportions is best explained by comparing the decision before the Senate with the far different course America chose at the end of World War II. America acted then not to isolate Germany and Japan, or to treat them as future threats, but rather to help make them democratic states. It was a generous and visionary policy that recognized that America's interests could be best secured by the advancement of its principles abroad and the embrace of its former enemies.

Now, in the aftermath of the cold war, the United States is taking an entirely different approach to the loser of that conflict. Though it has offered financial assistance and friendship to Russia, the Clinton Administration has made NATO expansion the centerpiece of its European policy. It is as if America had sent Japan and Germany a few billion dollars when the war ended while devoting most of its energy to strengthening a military alliance against those countries.

It is delusional to believe that NATO expansion is not at its core an act that Russia will regard as hostile. At the very moment when Russia is shedding its totalitarian history and moving toward democracy and free markets, the West is essentially saying it still intends to treat Moscow as a military threat. The best way to defend Eastern Europe is not to erect a new barrier against Russian aggression but to bring democracy and prosperity to Russia so it will not be aggressive. The genius of American policy toward Japan and Germany was that it looked to the future rather than the past. It is lamentable that Washington lacks the imagination and courage to do so again.

[From the Chicago Tribune, February 1, 1998]

A CASE OF LESS IS MORE WITH NATO?

Like a fighter aircraft flying just above treetop level to evade detection by radar, the issue of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is moving, all but unnoticed by the American public, toward ratification by the Senate.

With formal consideration of the expansion treaty expected to begin in March, most knowledgeable observers look upon NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as an all but foregone conclusion. And with no serious opposition among the 15 other current members of the alliance—Turkey is the only one that has even feinted at rejection—that conclusion seems well warranted, even if the actual expansion is not.

This means that, very shortly, the U.S. will be committed to treat an attack on Prague like one on Peoria, a blow to Budapest like one to Birmingham. Since it is their sons and daughters, husbands and wives who will put their lives on the line. It would behoove the American people to give this issue the most careful thought. Unfortunately, that has not happened.

Indeed, the Clinton administration and its supporters in the expansion effort also may not have thought as carefully about it as they might, because expanding NATO could have the ironic result of making Europe, in the end, less secure than it otherwise would be.

Americans who supposed that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War meant that the U.S. could finally lay down the burden of defending Europe may be surprised to learn that that is not so—at

least not in the view of many in the foreign policy priesthood. What it has meant, according to the new NATO theology, is that NATO's *raison d'être* has become not European defense from a ferocious USSR but European security.

The difference may seem so subtle as to be insignificant, but it is not. Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, summed it up as a matter of keeping the Europeans from falling into a "war of all against all," of becoming ex-Yugoslavia on a continental scale.

That is not an ignoble thing to do. The question is why is it the job of the U.S. any more than it is America's job to keep Hutus and Tutsis from each other's throats in Rwanda or to separate antagonists in any of the several dozen other places in the world where they insist on killing each other?

Good question, and one that never gets satisfactorily answered in discussions with European supporters of NATO expansion—and virtually every European of any standing or influence seems to support bringing in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

We have argued in the past—along with such foreign policy eminences as Henry Kissinger—that expanding NATO is a bad idea mainly because it would feed Russia's centuries-old insecurity about having foreign powers along its western border.

Certainly the West should not kowtow to Russia out of such concern, but neither should it needlessly antagonize Moscow and strengthen the anti-democratic crazies who use NATO expansion to promote themselves.

In interviews last week with NATO and American officials in Brussels, it was clear they believe they have disarmed the Russia argument by the friendship and cooperation treaties and consultations that have been concluded with Russia over the last year.

That's all very nice, but it's not at all clear that this era of good feeling is all that good or that it will outlast the perpetually infirm Boris Yeltsin. Even if Russia is currently no threat militarily, it's a good bet that it will not always be so weak.

Leaving Russia aside, the question remains: Is it wise for the U.S. to make a commitment so grave as that implicit in expanding NATO?

It is not, and for an ironic reason: The more such promises America makes, the less seriously, ultimately, they will be taken, by those to whom they are made and those who might be tempted to test them.

Even without a NATO commitment, the U.S. probably would treat an attack on Warsaw as it would an attack on London or Wausau. But even with a NATO commitment, would it do the same for Bucharest or for Prague (where there seems to be a resounding public indifference to NATO enlargement)?

The very fact that the question can be asked—and it is asked by serious thinkers on this issue in Europe—suggests that, instead of increasing security in Europe, NATO expansion could weaken it.

Philippe Moreau Defarges, an expert with the French Institute of International Relations, sums up this irony with a French proverb that, translated, means, "He who seeks to kiss everyone, kisses badly."

[From the Salt Lake Tribune, March 8, 1998]

QUASH NATO EXPANSION

The expansion of NATO is a policy in search of a justification. The U.S. Senate should reject it.

The pivotal truth in the debate is this: NATO was created as a defensive alliance to contain the spread of Soviet communism in Europe. When the Soviet Union died, the reason for NATO died with it. Expanding an alliance which lacks a reason for being makes no sense.

If NATO had been redefined to meet a new threat or to serve a new purpose, the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to its membership might be logical. But that has not occurred, except on a basis that is ill-defined and ad hoc.

If the new NATO is to be the policeman of Europe—a force to keep ethnic bloodshed and civil war in check in the Balkans, for example—that job can be accomplished without an expanded membership. Exhibit A is Bosnia, where NATO has taken the lead but where peacekeepers also have been drawn from nations outside the alliance.

The Clinton administration argues that adding the three new members will integrate them back into the West after five decades of separation. But NATO expansion is not necessary to bring the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians back into Europe's embrace. They already are there by virtue of having established democratic governments and market economies. Indeed, their inclusion in the European Union would be a surer sign of their return to the democratic European family.

The largest challenge for genuine European integration is not the three nations invited to NATO membership but rather Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. Enlarging NATO toward the Russian frontier complicates this task, not because NATO threatens Russia or vice versa, but because, psychologically, the expansion looks backward to Cold War hostilities and suspicions.

The NATO expansionists charge that it is old Cold Warriors who cannot grasp the vision of a new, larger alliance. In fact, the opposite is true. It is those who are still thinking in Cold War terms who would expand an alliance whose purpose no longer exists.

[From the Houston Chronicle, Apr. 6, 1998]

**ARMS CASH—DON'T LET WEAPONS DEALERS
UNDULY AFFECT NATO EXPANSION**

Like any group or individual, arms makers have a right to petition the government. But America's six biggest military contractors have spent \$51 million over the last two years mainly to promote North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion, and that raises concerns. As does the fact that 48 companies whose primary business is weaponry have given \$32.3 million to candidates to advance their companies' causes, including NATO expansion.

American arms manufacturers stand to gain billions in weapons and other military equipment sales if the Senate approves the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO. New alliance members will be required to upgrade their militaries, and there is absolutely nothing wrong with weapons makers getting this business.

However, it is vital that lawmakers not be blinded by lobbyist cash to the importance of approving NATO's eastward expansion only if NATO retains its focus on military matters and if enlargement costs are shared equitably among member nations. Also, the United States must continue to insist that the new NATO-Russian Council has no real or implied "veto" of alliance matters—a move that had been designed to make the expansion more cooperative with and palatable to Russia.

These are important conditions, and they will continue to be important as perhaps a dozen other countries come to be considered for NATO membership. So however arms dealers' enthusiasm might infect senators considering expansion, lawmakers must keep their focus on maintaining NATO's integrity.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would have more articles, but I believe these are representative, geographically and

philosophically, as to why we should not be rushing to expand NATO.

I will close by saying that I will withdraw my amendment, but I wanted to lay it down as a marker. We are going to hear more about the NATO expansion treaty and what it will mean to the nonproliferation treaty with our sharing of nuclear knowledge with these three countries, all of whom, I might point out, are signatories to the NPT. I think therein lies a dilemma. To this Senator's way of thinking, I believe the NPT is more important to us and more important to the world community than the expansion of NATO to include these three countries. Again, as Barbara Tuchman said in "The March of Folly," "I believe we are rushing into this without considering all of its ramifications, especially with non-proliferation."

So, Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will not take the time of the Senate to respond to all the Senator said. We have rehashed a lot of those things. I will just note that a 59-41 vote—I have been here a long time and I never thought that was a close vote. But let me say with regard to only one point, because a lot is not rehashed and lacking consequence, but we have debated it a lot. One point was raised that is new, and I thought it would be raised by someone.

The Senator from Iowa has just repeated the oft-heard assertion that the United States promised Gorbachev during negotiations on German unification that we would not expand NATO.

This is an important assertion. It is also historically incorrect.

Since opponents of NATO enlargement have taken to repeating this assertion as if it were true—most recently in a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, which contained other striking factual errors—I think it is imperative to set the record straight.

Both Robert Zoellick, a senior State Department and later White House official in the Bush Administration who drafted the famous "Two-Plus-Four" Agreement with the Russians in 1990, Eduard Shevardnadze, the current President of Georgia who was then Soviet Foreign Minister, have both made clear the no such promise was ever made.

There is nothing in the "Two-Plus-Four" Agreement about NATO expansion.

There is no secret addendum to the "Two-Plus-Four" Agreement.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker did make a comment "not one step further east," which has been intentionally or unintentionally misinterpreted as having precluded NATO enlargement.

In actuality, according to Mr. Zoellick, the drafter of the agreement, this remark was related to what would be the status of U.S. forces if a united

Germany were part of NATO. That is, *there would be no permanent stationing of American troops east of Germany, a position which did become official NATO policy* as enunciated by the well-known statement of the North Atlantic Council on March 14, 1997:

In the current and foreseeable security environment, the alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.

In fact, with possible NATO enlargement in mind, Zoellick made sure that the "Two-Plus-Four" Agreement did not foreclose the possibility of forces transiting Germany to reinforce Poland.

The September 12, 1990 Treaty precluded stationing NATO-integrated German forces on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (i.e. East Germany) until after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. These agreements explicitly did not apply to the rest of Europe.

Any agreement on the future security arrangements of other European countries would have been inappropriate, since such countries were not part of the talks.

Mr. President, lest anyone believe that this is one-sided American historical analysis, I would like to quote from an article in The Reuter European Community Report of February 13, 1997 entitled "West Made No Pledge to Moscow, NATO Told":

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze told NATO this week that the West did not offer Moscow any guarantees about the alliance's future during talks over German unification in 1990...

...Shevardnadze's comments, made to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana during a meeting in Tbilisi on Wednesday, contradict Russian claims that NATO's enlargement plans represent broken promises by the West.

Shevardnadze, who was Soviet foreign minister when Moscow cut the deal in 1990 with Western powers opening the way for unification, told Solana that the talks only concerned Germany...

President Shevardnadze told the secretary general that during those two-plus-four talks, no guarantees had been given concerning NATO enlargement...

Mr. President, the striking fact that the chief negotiators of German unification on both the Soviet and the American side have made categorical denials that any assurances were given about NATO enlargement should lay this specious claim to rest.

Mr. HARKIN. If the Senator will yield, now we get two sides. It seems to me if there is a meeting with the Secretary of State—it was James Baker at the time—and Mr. Gorbachev and our Ambassador, there would have been—there has been at every meeting I have been to—a memorandum called MEMCOMS were sent back to the State Department. I wonder if we can produce the MEMCOMS so we can look at those and see what did transpire.

Mr. BIDEN. You could ask them.

Mr. HARKIN. Who?

Mr. BIDEN. The President, the State Department. My understanding is that they are never released. I would be happy to have them released.

Mr. HARKIN. Would the committee ask for that?

Mr. BIDEN. I will not ask for it because we have never asked for a release for those purposes, other than affecting the outcome of a significant debate or an issue of national consequence.

Mr. HARKIN. This is a pretty significant debate.

Mr. BIDEN. It is *ex post facto* now. I would be happy to talk with the Senator about it. The Senator doesn't need me to ask. You are standing next to a chairman of a powerful committee. I am a mere ranking member of a Foreign Relations Committee. So I am sure if you get him to do it, he may be able to get others to do it. I have learned, even when I was a chairman, there was not much consequence to what I did and how I was viewed. Now, as a ranking member—we all know that ranking members are people who have no power. So I would find a Republican to help you out. You have a very fine one standing next to you.

Mr. HARKIN. My experience in my years here is that the distinguished chairman of the committee has been very successful in getting documents and papers out of the State Department in the past. I would hope that the committee would at least try to get these MEMCOMS so we can see what the facts are.

Mr. BIDEN. I will say this much to the Senator. I will inquire formally whether or not MEMCOMS have ever been released to the committee. If they were, I would be happy to talk with the Senator about how to get this released. It would be worthwhile knowing.

Mr. HARKIN. I appreciate that very much.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want everybody to know I am not usurping the prerogative of the chairman. He has asked me to do this. So I understand the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma has an amendment, which I believe, after some negotiation with the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, we are likely to be able to accept. Is that correct, I say to my friend?

Mr. LEVIN. My understanding is that there is one change in those two words near the end. I think it ought to be accepted with that change.

Mr. BIDEN. I know it hasn't been introduced yet. Colleagues are saying: What is the deal? What is the schedule? I think we can facilitate rapidly a very important amendment which could have had a long debate in just a moment here. And then, as I understand it, the Senator from New Hampshire has an amendment and the junior Senator from Oklahoma has an amendment. To the best of my knowledge, they are the only remaining matters relating to this treaty, other than final passage.

I yield the floor.

Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

AMENDMENT NO. 2327

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. NICKLES], for himself and Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, proposes an amendment numbered 2327.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

In subparagraph (C) of section 3(1) of the resolution, strike clauses (ii) and (iii) and insert in lieu thereof the following:

(ii) An analysis of all potential threats to the North Atlantic area (meaning the entire territory of all NATO members) up to the year 2010, including the consideration of a re-constituted conventional threat to Europe, emerging capabilities of non-NATO countries to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons affecting the North Atlantic area, and the emerging ballistic missile and cruise missile threat affecting the North Atlantic area;

(iii) the identification of alternative system architectures for the deployment of a NATO missile defense for the entire territory of all NATO members that would be capable of countering the threat posed by emerging ballistic and cruise missile systems in countries other than declared nuclear powers, as well as in countries that are existing nuclear powers, together with timetables for development and an estimate of costs;

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, the amendment that I send to the desk on behalf of myself and also Senator SMITH of New Hampshire basically says that under the report that is required by the resolution of ratification right now, the report says that we should have a study considering the cost of deployment of a NATO missile defense system for the region of Europe. I think, frankly, it should apply to all NATO countries.

That is the essence of the amendment. This is a NATO treaty. This is a mutual defense treaty for all NATO countries. All NATO countries are saying that they will come to one another's aid for the following reasons. If we are going to have a missile defense study for Europe, it certainly should have a missile defense study for the United States and for Canada.

That is the essence of my amendment. It is to make sure that we are not just having a treaty just to defend Europe but it is also to defend the United States and, of course, Canada, which I believe, as both the United States and Canada are instrumental and very important members of NATO, should not be denigrated and should not be put in a separate category or separate class.

I want to compliment my colleague from North Carolina for his leadership

on this issue. He has done a very good job, as has the ranking member.

I will tell my colleagues. It has been I think a proud week for the Senate. We have not had a partisan vote yet. We have had a very, very significant foreign policy debate. I compliment my colleague from Virginia and my colleague from New York, Senator MOYNIHAN, for raising some very important issues.

Some people said, "Well, the Senate hasn't considered this treaty. I will tell my colleagues, I think a lot of it has addressed this treaty pretty closely and even the committee reports. This is the committee report section. A lot of times some of us don't read those things. I happened to read this, or my staff brought it to my attention. I said, "Wait a minute. This doesn't make sense. We are going to correct this."

I appreciate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for their willingness to accept this amendment. But I think we have had some good debates. I think it has been very positive for the Senate and also positive for the mutual defense of all NATO countries.

I thank my colleagues. I also want to thank my colleague from New Hampshire for his leadership on this amendment as well.

Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the treaty before us not only promotes stability of Europe but also adds a measure of security to the United States. It also promotes universal values for freedom and democracy.

The amendment before us simply broadens the language of a study that is already required in the resolution to include the other NATO countries besides those in Europe.

I am one of those who is opposed to the commitment of a deployment of a national missile defense system before we know costs, threats, impacts on arms reduction, and technological feasibility. But this amendment does not call for any commitment to the deployment of a national missile defense; it simply broadens the geographical area of a study which is already provided for in the resolution.

I believe with that understanding and those two words that have been stricken, I understand, on line 6 of page 2, this amendment should be acceptable to all of us.

I thank my good friend from Oklahoma.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I want to compliment my colleague on his amendment. As chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee on the Armed Forces Committee, this has long been an irritation and frustration for many of us, the fact that we don't have a national missile defense. As it is right now, you have a provision in the NATO resolution that would exclude a missile defense system for Canada and the United States, and, in turn, having specifically mentioned Europe would be just outrageous.

I think that the fact that the Senator has identified this and brought this forward is a huge plus to this debate.

I also would like to lend my remarks in support of the remarks the Senator made about the caliber of the debate here. We have had, as the Senator said, no partisan debate but rather a very academic debate for several days now and one which I think is very, very important and I think will have a profound impact on our future and perhaps the future of the world.

I know people, as we get down to the latter part of the time here, get a little upset with planes to catch and so forth. But this is a very, very important debate. Votes have been changing in the past several days. In one case somebody told me they were absolutely in favor and are now opposed.

I think we are moving in the right direction. Even though this may seem dilatory, I am very much pleased with the debate and where we are.

I again want to say on this amendment that it is extremely important to identify and not to have this separation. To say in the NATO resolution that we would have Europe protected and not the United States and Canada just wouldn't work.

Let me just make a couple more points.

The President's plan, as we know, does not cover all of the United States. A plan for a missile defense system would comply with the ABM Treaty and, as required by the treaty, would be based out as a single site. The evidence available shows the areas that the President's ABM Treaty compliance system would protect in the event of a ballistic missile attack. As one can clearly understand, Alaska and Hawaii are left vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack under the President's plan.

There are a whole number of other factors, which I will not go into at this point other than to simply say that I am very strongly in support of this relatively minor change in terms of semantics and words. But a couple of words, where you change the word "Europe" and add "Europe and the rest of NATO," that is very, very important and sends a very, very strong signal.

Again, I strongly support the amendment, and urge its adoption.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma, the Nickles amendment No. 2327.

The amendment (No. 2327) was agreed to.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. NICKLES. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, what is the regular order? Are we permitted to speak at this point, or are there only amendments in order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may speak.

Mr. DOMENICI. I ask that I be permitted to speak for 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, fellow Senators, it was many days ago, it seems to me, that I spoke on this treaty. We have been on it for 4 days. I accepted the invitation to speak early on, like the leadership suggested. All this time has passed. Tonight, as we choose to do something rather historic, which I have no doubts about it in my mind and I believe it will be proper and I believe America will be very proud that we enlarge NATO tonight, all of the ominous predictions I believe will not happen and we will just have laid out another great big giant American stake for freedom, prosperity, and democracy.

I believe that is the way it is going to work.

I was most impressed as I studied this and met with different people in my office. I met with the Ambassador of Hungary, Gyorgy Banlaki. He was in my office visiting. My reason for being overwhelmingly in favor of this is what he said to me in the office. Let me quote it. It is very simple. It is two sentences.

The people of my country would like to be able to choose our own allies. We would like to enjoy all those things that history has denied us.

A few days ago I was here to say this is the Senate's chance to make the hopes of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic come true. Let them choose their own allies, for they have been denied that in the past. They have been denied the right to choose their own allies. We all know that part of history. In fact, they have been forced to choose their allies and to be part of their international arrangement, which was not for peace, as it turned out, but for nothing but troubles for the world and for these countries. We all know that.

I believe what we are doing tonight is typically American. We are saying to the three countries that were denied freedom and denied the right to choose their allies that we are glad that you are choosing the allied group that we are part of, and we are glad to have you.

I yield the floor.

Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, I plan to speak for about 11 or 12 minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, NATO has been the foundation of European security since its creation in 1949, containing the Soviet Union for more than forty years and providing security to Western Europe. With the dissolu-

tion of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO now stands as possibly the most successful alliance in history. Since that time, however, the Alliance has been forced to consider the continued relevance and future of NATO, and the United States has reviewed its role in Europe.

Since 1995, when the Alliance announced its intentions to enlarge NATO, the Armed Services Committee in particular, and the Senate in general, have conducted numerous hearings on enlarging the Alliance.

On February 27, the Committee forwarded its views on NATO enlargement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Those views are incorporated in the Executive Report of the Committee, which is before members of the Senate, along with the resolution of ratification.

During the Armed Services Committee's review of NATO enlargement, the following concerns were raised: the cost of enlarging the alliance; adapting NATO to the post-Cold War strategic environment; and, NATO relations with Russia.

Defense spending has declined steadily since 1985, from \$423 billion to \$257 billion—the amount of the defense budget request for fiscal year 1999. Because of the increasing scarcity of defense funds, the Committee focused extensively on the issue of costs, as the majority of the funding for the NATO budget is requested through the defense budget.

The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of enlarging the NATO to be as high as \$125 billion over a fifteen year period, while the NATO Military Committee estimated the cost of enlarging NATO to be \$1.5 billion over ten years. I remind my colleagues that the differences in the cost contained in the four estimates are primarily due to differing views on the threat, current and future military requirements of NATO forces, the condition of infrastructure and facilities in the prospective new member countries, and the activities identified by NATO as eligible for NATO funding.

Concerns were also raised about the willingness and commitment of current NATO members to bear their share of enlargement costs, as well as to continue to develop and modernize their military forces to defend their national borders and fulfill their Article V collective defense obligations as well.

Cost estimates developed by the Department of Defense for U.S. participation in the NATO operation in Bosnia raise concerns about the validity of cost estimates. In December 1995, the Secretary of Defense testified to the Committee that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia for one year to implement the Dayton Agreement would be \$1.5 billion, and additional \$500 million to provide logistical support. Before the year was over, the Committee was advised that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia had increased to \$3.0 billion. Mr. President,

you are aware that the cost of deploying U.S. forces to Bosnia over the past three years is now approaching \$10 billion. We may once again be discussing the need for funds for Bosnia, as there are no funds available now in the budget resolution for the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia in fiscal year 1999.

The Senate has been assured by the foreign and defense ministers of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that they will live up to their financial commitments. Our current allies have likewise given us the same assurances. If they fail to do so, the Senate can revisit the issue of burden sharing. Likewise, if the new NATO members, or current allies, do not live up to their financial obligations, I would expect the Administration to take appropriate action in the NATO military committee to revise the amount of the U.S. contribution.

With regard to adapting NATO to a new strategic environment, the committee was very clear on its position that collective defense should remain the primary mission of NATO, and recommended in its letter to the Foreign Relations Committee, that the resolution of ratification include an understanding to that effect. Regardless of changes in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO's mission restructuring it to deal with potential new challenges of out of area operations and to support peacekeeping and peace enforcement operation, first and foremost, NATO is a military alliance. NATO must remain militarily strong in order to execute its Article V obligations.

I understand that the NATO Policy Coordinating Group has developed suggested revisions to the 1991 Strategic Concept, which were circulated to Allies in late January. I also understand that the process in NATO for changes to be made to its strategic concept will take over a year. I believe it is important that the Senate be advised of any recommended revisions to the Strategic Concept, before the United States agrees to them. In particular, I believe it is important that the Senate be advised of any recommendations to change or dilute the core mission of the Alliance, revisions that would affect the distribution of forces in peacetime and redeployment capabilities, any recommendations to further enlarge the Alliance, and revisions that would affect the strategic balance in Europe.

As I stated earlier, since the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the Soviet Union, many Americans wonder why we need NATO at all, much less an enlarged NATO with expanded security obligations. Skepticism about NATO's continued value is at least as widespread as support for an enlarged NATO. Frankly, I do not believe that the Administration has made the case to the public, or the Congress on why NATO should be enlarged, and why the United States should remain engaged in Europe. As a consequence, I worry

that the lack of public support will result in a weak domestic political foundation, where the United States will find it difficult to maintain an expanded commitment in a future crisis.

We need to think about NATO enlargement in relation to national interests of the United States and our global strategy, and not just narrow political, organizational or even vital security interests. I believe NATO is still vital to U.S. interests. However, all Americans must first understand the magnitude of the commitment we are undertaking, and why it should be made.

I support a renewed and enlarged NATO because it ensures a U.S. involvement in the European community, and a "seat at the table" to the world's most vital, productive region. Quite simply, the U.S. has clear, abiding and vital interests in Europe. Europe is the soil where our deepest roots run. We are bound to Europe by innumerable links of trade, finance, communications, and technology exchange; ties of history, culture and shared values, and nearly five decades of mutual security arrangements.

A free and stable Europe has always been essential to the United States. In this century we have intervened in two bloody world wars to prevent the domination of Europe by aggressive dictatorships. We paid a high price for forty-five years of Cold War to prevent the domination of Europe and the Eurasian landmass by Communist imperialism. This long U.S. involvement and stabilizing presence have made the United States in effect a European power.

I do not believe Europe can remain stable and prosperous, to the mutual benefit of the United States and our European allies, if its post-Cold War boundary is drawn along the borders of Germany and Austria. Such an artificial division would leave a power vacuum in each central Europe, and consign millions of people who share our democratic values and aspirations to an uncertain fate. I do not believe a new European security framework will hold up unless it reflects the realities of the political upheaval that marked the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The new strategic environment includes the reorienting of former East Bloc states toward the West.

Some have said that the end of the Cold War spelled the "end of history." I believe we are seeing the opposite. The end of the confrontation between the Soviet Empire and the Free World has unleashed historical forces suppressed for forty-five years. Nations and peoples are reverting to their patterns of the past.

One of those patterns of the past is Russian imperialism. Czarist Russia was an expansionist, aggressive regional power long before the Bolshevik Revolution. Although there is no longer a Soviet Union, Russia is still a great power—if no longer a super power—and is exerting its will in the so-called "Near Abroad". The brutal

suppression of the revolt in Chechnya and Russia's intervention in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova are worrisome examples.

America's primary national security goal in Europe should be to ensure that Russia makes the transition to a stable, free-market and democratic nation, but especially one that remains within its borders. Democracies do not make war on their neighbors. We should do everything within reason to help Russia's transition to democracy, to maintain warm and friendly relations, and to avoid unnecessary provocations. Likewise, Russia should take the hard steps required to transition to a stable, free-market and democratic nation. However, we cannot afford to let Russia's opposition decide the course of NATO enlargement.

In taking steps to assist Russia to transition to a stable and democratic nation, both the United States and NATO have established programs to reach out to, and cooperate with, Russia. With regard to NATO, just prior to the Madrid Summit, President Yeltsin, President Clinton, and NATO leaders signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This Act established a forum in which Russia can consult with NATO on issues of mutual interest, called the Permanent Joint Council. The United States has established programs in the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy to assist Russia in controlling its strategic arsenal, and to meet its arms control commitments.

The committee did, however, point out in its letter to the Foreign Relations Committee its view that activities in the Permanent Joint Council should not distract NATO from its core function. Again, while I believe we should take steps to aid Russia in transitioning away from its communist and imperialist past, I do not believe the Permanent Joint Council should be allowed to be used by Russia to participate in NATO matters, not used as a platform to divide the Alliance, or denounce U.S. policy.

The Clinton administration's policy toward Russia places all its stakes on the fate of Boris Yeltsin, and it does not appear to be having the desired effect. Moreover, the Administration's Russia-centered policy has caused us to neglect building solid relations with Ukraine and other former Soviet states. This also does not serve our goal. In fact, the policy of giving such sustained preferential treatment to Russia, and depending too much on President Yeltsin is the most destabilizing factor in Eastern Europe.

We have to face the very real possibility that our policies may not succeed. Russia may not make the transition to a stable, democratic nation, nor one content to remain within its borders. In fact, an unstable Russia, torn by factions and internal strife, may not even be able to agree where its natural borders lie.

The greatest potential threat to peace, stability, and security in Europe

is the return to power of Russian hardliners. President Yeltsin's popularity has sunk so low—that since his illness and heart operation—there is almost no yardstick against which to measure.

The United States and its allies need to look seriously at bringing into NATO the states of the East and Central Europe which share our democratic values, and which are able to assume mutual security obligations inherent in the Alliance. Only a strong NATO that includes those states can keep a future, resurgent Russia contained and deterred.

There are other reasons to expand membership of NATO, for example, the lessening of international tensions between members, and facilitating the resolution of conflicts. But we must not lose sight of the fact that NATO has been successful because it was a defensive alliance. Turning it into something else could fatally weaken it. Unless we understand that NATO's underlying and abiding purpose remains to defend Europe, the burdens of the Alliance over time will cause NATO to crumble.

As a great maritime power and trading nation, America has intervened all over the globe to protect freedom of the seas and our vital interests, from the earliest days of our existence as a nation. Over time we formed strong alliance to protect mutual interests, demonstrating that free democratic nations acting collectively, can survive the threat of tyranny. These kinds of alliances, the kind represented by NATO, with allies who share our democratic values, should be the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

Mr. President, I believe Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic share our values, and have worked hard to transition toward democratic nations and stabilize their economies. They have shown their willingness to act collectively with the United States by contributing forces to the coalition during the Persian Gulf War, and more recently, by sending military forces to work with NATO in Bosnia. Equally important to me, they have demonstrated their support for the United States during the most recent crisis with Iraq. They represent the type of nations which are deserving of membership in NATO, and I believe will be allies which the United States can look to in the future for support in areas of mutual defense and foreign policy interest.

The Senate will have to vote on behalf of the American people by a two-thirds majority to ratify the admittance of any new country to NATO. I do not want to see the Senate become an obstacle to progress toward the Nation's national security interests. For the reasons that I have outlined, I will vote to support NATO enlargement.

THE ALLEGED "NEW THREAT TO RUSSIA'S BORDERS" BY NATO ENLARGEMENT

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from New York has asserted several times that NATO's enlargement to

include Poland would for the first time bring NATO up to Russia's borders. This is because Poland shares a small border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

As I mentioned in our floor debate last month, the Senator's assertion is factually incorrect. Ever since the founding of NATO in 1949, Russia—first as the Russian Republic in the Soviet Union, then since 1991 as the Russian Federation—has shared a border with Norway, a charter member of NATO.

Norway's relations with Russia have remained excellent throughout. In fact, Norway gives Russia foreign aid, as do many other NATO members, the United States included.

The Senator from New York responded by minimizing both the size and importance of the Russian-Norwegian border. Here again, he was incorrect.

First, in regard to length, the Russian-Norwegian border is nearly as long as Poland's border with the Kaliningrad exclave—104 miles versus 128 miles, to be exact.

Second, militarily speaking the Russian-Norwegian border is much more important than the Polish-Kaliningrad border. Norway abuts Russia's Kola Peninsula, one of the most heavily militarized regions on earth. Among the Kola Peninsula's armaments are nuclear weapons.

In spite of the strategically sensitive nature of the NATO-Russian border, for nearly half-a-century relations have remained very good.

One might ask why. Aside from the tact and diplomacy of the Norwegians, another reason may be that NATO has not permanently stationed in Norway troops from other Alliance countries.

Mr. President, this is precisely what NATO declared on March 14, 1997 as the Alliance's policy for the prospective new members. So let's dispose of this bogey-man: Russia will not have to worry about large numbers of permanently stationed non-Polish NATO troops facing Kaliningrad.

I would like to return to geography for a few minutes, since the Senator from New York and the Senator from Virginia have brought this topic up several times.

I think that they would agree that in the bad, old Soviet Union the non-Russian Republics were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Moscow. Ethnic Russians who took their orders directly from the Kremlin filled the key positions in the Republics' political, economic, and military structures.

In that context, it is important to note that since Turkey entered NATO in 1952, the Alliance had a common border with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—at that time Russian-ruled parts of the old Soviet Union.

For the record, that border was considerably longer than either the Russian-Norwegian or the Polish-Kaliningrad borders—328 miles long, to be exact.

So for nearly forty years, NATO had a lengthy border with the strategically

vital southwestern flank of the Russian-ruled Soviet Union.

In fact, Mr. President, even today there are Russian troops stationed in the independent states of Armenia and Georgia.

So, once again, let's finally put to rest the nonsensical argument that Poland's joining NATO would constitute a new geographic move by NATO up to Russia's borders. It just isn't true.

ALLEGED AGGRESSIVE POSTURE OF NATO TOWARD RUSSIA

Moreover, the opponents of enlargement, the Senator from New York included, have asserted that by enlarging to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, NATO will be assuming a militarily aggressive posture toward Russia.

Mr. President, nothing could be further from the truth. NATO simply does not threaten Russia. Never did—never will.

Critics often characterize NATO's enlargement as if it were a massive deployment toward Russia. In reality, NATO's entire evolution since the end of the Cold War has been in the other direction, a fact which is patently clear to Moscow.

Since 1991, NATO countries have greatly substantially reduced their military forces, as measured by total spending, spending as a proportion of GDP, and by overall force levels.

American troop levels in Europe have declined by over two-thirds, down from a peak of over 300,000 to about 100,000 today.

NATO's forces during this period have moved away from Moscow, not toward it, as the Alliance abandoned its Cold War doctrine of forward, stationary defenses and relied instead on rapid reaction.

These changes have made NATO's posture unambiguously less threatening to Russia. The Alliance's enlargement does not appreciably change this fact.

Those who characterize NATO's enlargement as a movement of NATO power into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are simply wrong, and they do the public a grave disservice by suggesting this is the case.

The record has been clear for well over a year that this is not what enlargement means. In December 1996, the Alliance declared that it had "no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members," and has clarified that this statement subsumes nuclear weapon storage sites.

I have already cited the March 1997 statement regarding no need to move combat troops into the territory of the new members.

Moreover, the willingness of all Allies to negotiate adaptations to the Treaty on Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) is a clear signal to Moscow that NATO seeks a post-Cold War arms build-down, not a build up.

NATO'S REACHING OUT TO MOSCOW

NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,

in the real world—not the rhetorical world—will not trigger an adverse Russian reaction. Why? Because the U.S. and our allies have taken so many steps to reach out to Russia since the end of the Cold War.

As I mentioned in my opening statement on Monday, the critics of enlargement are guilty of what might be called the “Weimar Fallacy.” They suggest that Russians will see NATO enlargement as post-Cold War punishment, which will trigger a nationalist backlash in the same way that the Treaty of Versailles helped to trigger the rise of National Socialism in Germany.

But the supposed parallel is utterly specious. The Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to pay billions in reparation to the victors of World War I. By contrast, we and our allies imposed no reparations on Moscow after the Cold War.

On the contrary, reparations went in the other direction. We and our allies have provided Moscow with over \$100 billion since 1991 to aid its political and economic reform.

One of the most important forms of aid has been through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program—known popularly as the Nunn-Lugar Program—which has provided \$2.3 billion to Russia and other former Soviet states since 1992, with \$442 million requested for FY99.

Today, this program is supporting the annual elimination of over 20 Russian SS-18s and 10 SSBNs. The Russians have proposed using the program to support processing of missile materials from dismantled Russian warheads for storage at the Mayak facility.

Through this program, we are helping to finance efforts that make both our countries safer—not punishing the Russians at their own expense.

The spurious comparison to Weimar Germany is also a fallacy because we and our allies have sought to integrate Russia into the transatlantic community, not isolate it.

In 1991, we made Russia and the other former Soviet states part of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and part of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the successor to the NACC, in 1997. In 1994, we made Russia and the other newly independent states part of the Partnership for Peace program.

After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, NATO invited Russia to participate in the coalition in Bosnia, and today Russia has an airborne brigade of approximately 1,400 troops servicing in northern Bosnia under NATO command alongside American and other NATO forces.

In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined President Clinton and the other NATO leaders in signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Permanent Joint Council has met several times at the ministerial level since then, and proved a useful forum for discussions with

Russia on security issues of mutual concern.

Our efforts to reach out to Russia go well beyond NATO. In March 1997, at their summit in Helsinki, President Clinton told President Yeltsin that the U.S. would support Russia efforts to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined G-7 leaders in Denver to inaugurate the “summit of the Eight.” The “Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission” continued to meet during the very period that NATO was pursuing its enlargement, and American cooperation with Russia continues on a wide range of cultural, scientific, technological, and environmental efforts, such as our continuing efforts in space.

RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

The Senator from New York in a recent speech in Texas warned darkly that NATO enlargement might lead to nuclear war. With all due respect to my good friend, I think his assertion is incorrect and alarmist.

He and other opponents of NATO enlargement have underscored Russia's disproportionate reliance on its nuclear forces, sometimes even resorting to scare tactics.

It is well known that the dissolution of the Soviet empire and Russia's transition to a market economy required jolting changes within Russia. Since 1990 Russia's economy has contracted by perhaps 40 percent and has only recently established and shown the first signs of recovery.

Partly as a result, Russian military spending contracted substantially. Russia's number of combat-ready divisions has also declined.

Beyond these measures, non-payment of wages and other factors have dampened morale among officers and enlisted personnel. The war in Chechnya showed the cumulative toll on Russia's forces.

Given this decline in Russia's conventional forces, it is understandable that Russia has apparently placed a heavier reliance on nuclear weapons. But this change became evident as early as 1992, when Russia declared that it would no longer abide by its previous policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons.

There are many signs that “no first use” had been more of a propaganda tool than an actual reflection of Soviet policy, but the declared abandonment of this policy was significant. The move away from “no first use” gained a higher profile when it began to be discussed in public in 1997.

The Senator from New York and other proponents of NATO enlargement have recently charged that this increased reliance on nuclear forces was a consequence of Russia's fear of NATO's enlargement. This analysis is simply not credible.

First, as noted earlier, NATO's enlargement results in no significant in-

crease in NATO's military capability relative to Russia.

Second, it is hardly likely that NATO's enlargement, begun in 1994, could have triggered a change in Russian policy that began in 1992. The fact is that opponents of NATO enlargement have constructed this argument retroactively.

The same is true for those who have attributed delays in Duma ratification of START II to NATO enlargement. Well before NATO enlargement was proposed, Duma critics of START II based their opposition on other arguments, from the cost of compliance with START II to the loss of national pride.

NATO enlargement became another useful argument for confirmed opponents, but hardly the cause of their opposition.

In any case, the Russian government is now moving to push ratification of START II through the Duma, perhaps by the end of June—another sign that NATO enlargement is no impediment to constructive relations with Russia or progress on arms control.

So, I would sum up by reminding my friend, the Senator from New York, of four key facts:

First, Poland's accession to NATO will not be creating a geographically new move of the Alliance to Russia's borders. It has had a strategically important border with Russia in the north for nearly fifty years, plus one in the south with Russian-ruled territory.

Second, there is absolutely no comparison with the allies' triumphalist behavior toward defeated Germany after World War One and the reaching out of the United States and its NATO partners to Russia after it lost the Cold War.

Third, NATO has conclusively demonstrated through its movements of troops and equipment away from Russia's borders, and by concluding and carrying out significant arms control agreements, that it in no way threatens Russia.

Finally, it is completely false—even irresponsible—to assert that NATO enlargement is driving the world toward nuclear war. Cooperation, not confrontation is occurring on many fronts.

Russia need have no fear from NATO enlargement.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I believe NATO expansion is in the best interest of the United States. Also, expanding NATO will be in the interest of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and for that matter—world peace.

The United States' security is intrinsically tied to the security of all of Europe. An enlarged NATO will only extend the influence of peace and prosperity to these three deserving countries. Also, as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary continue to grow and flourish, their acceptance into the NATO Alliance will only further integrate Western values and will lock in the practices of democracy. Locking democracy into this region is in the