

in the real world—not the rhetorical world—will not trigger an adverse Russian reaction. Why? Because the U.S. and our allies have taken so many steps to reach out to Russia since the end of the Cold War.

As I mentioned in my opening statement on Monday, the critics of enlargement are guilty of what might be called the “Weimar Fallacy.” They suggest that Russians will see NATO enlargement as post-Cold War punishment, which will trigger a nationalist backlash in the same way that the Treaty of Versailles helped to trigger the rise of National Socialism in Germany.

But the supposed parallel is utterly specious. The Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to pay billions in reparation to the victors of World War I. By contrast, we and our allies imposed no reparations on Moscow after the Cold War.

On the contrary, reparations went in the other direction. We and our allies have provided Moscow with over \$100 billion since 1991 to aid its political and economic reform.

One of the most important forms of aid has been through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program—known popularly as the Nunn-Lugar Program—which has provided \$2.3 billion to Russia and other former Soviet states since 1992, with \$442 million requested for FY99.

Today, this program is supporting the annual elimination of over 20 Russian SS-18s and 10 SSBNs. The Russians have proposed using the program to support processing of missile materials from dismantled Russian warheads for storage at the Mayak facility.

Through this program, we are helping to finance efforts that make both our countries safer—not punishing the Russians at their own expense.

The spurious comparison to Weimar Germany is also a fallacy because we and our allies have sought to integrate Russia into the transatlantic community, not isolate it.

In 1991, we made Russia and the other former Soviet states part of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and part of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the successor to the NACC, in 1997. In 1994, we made Russia and the other newly independent states part of the Partnership for Peace program.

After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, NATO invited Russia to participate in the coalition in Bosnia, and today Russia has an airborne brigade of approximately 1,400 troops servicing in northern Bosnia under NATO command alongside American and other NATO forces.

In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined President Clinton and the other NATO leaders in signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Permanent Joint Council has met several times at the ministerial level since then, and proved a useful forum for discussions with

Russia on security issues of mutual concern.

Our efforts to reach out to Russia go well beyond NATO. In March 1997, at their summit in Helsinki, President Clinton told President Yeltsin that the U.S. would support Russia efforts to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined G-7 leaders in Denver to inaugurate the “summit of the Eight.” The “Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission” continued to meet during the very period that NATO was pursuing its enlargement, and American cooperation with Russia continues on a wide range of cultural, scientific, technological, and environmental efforts, such as our continuing efforts in space.

RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

The Senator from New York in a recent speech in Texas warned darkly that NATO enlargement might lead to nuclear war. With all due respect to my good friend, I think his assertion is incorrect and alarmist.

He and other opponents of NATO enlargement have underscored Russia's disproportionate reliance on its nuclear forces, sometimes even resorting to scare tactics.

It is well known that the dissolution of the Soviet empire and Russia's transition to a market economy required jolting changes within Russia. Since 1990 Russia's economy has contracted by perhaps 40 percent and has only recently established and shown the first signs of recovery.

Partly as a result, Russian military spending contracted substantially. Russia's number of combat-ready divisions has also declined.

Beyond these measures, non-payment of wages and other factors have dampened morale among officers and enlisted personnel. The war in Chechnya showed the cumulative toll on Russia's forces.

Given this decline in Russia's conventional forces, it is understandable that Russia has apparently placed a heavier reliance on nuclear weapons. But this change became evident as early as 1992, when Russia declared that it would no longer abide by its previous policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons.

There are many signs that “no first use” had been more of a propaganda tool than an actual reflection of Soviet policy, but the declared abandonment of this policy was significant. The move away from “no first use” gained a higher profile when it began to be discussed in public in 1997.

The Senator from New York and other proponents of NATO enlargement have recently charged that this increased reliance on nuclear forces was a consequence of Russia's fear of NATO's enlargement. This analysis is simply not credible.

First, as noted earlier, NATO's enlargement results in no significant in-

crease in NATO's military capability relative to Russia.

Second, it is hardly likely that NATO's enlargement, begun in 1994, could have triggered a change in Russian policy that began in 1992. The fact is that opponents of NATO enlargement have constructed this argument retroactively.

The same is true for those who have attributed delays in Duma ratification of START II to NATO enlargement. Well before NATO enlargement was proposed, Duma critics of START II based their opposition on other arguments, from the cost of compliance with START II to the loss of national pride.

NATO enlargement became another useful argument for confirmed opponents, but hardly the cause of their opposition.

In any case, the Russian government is now moving to push ratification of START II through the Duma, perhaps by the end of June—another sign that NATO enlargement is no impediment to constructive relations with Russia or progress on arms control.

So, I would sum up by reminding my friend, the Senator from New York, of four key facts:

First, Poland's accession to NATO will not be creating a geographically new move of the Alliance to Russia's borders. It has had a strategically important border with Russia in the north for nearly fifty years, plus one in the south with Russian-ruled territory.

Second, there is absolutely no comparison with the allies' triumphalist behavior toward defeated Germany after World War One and the reaching out of the United States and its NATO partners to Russia after it lost the Cold War.

Third, NATO has conclusively demonstrated through its movements of troops and equipment away from Russia's borders, and by concluding and carrying out significant arms control agreements, that it in no way threatens Russia.

Finally, it is completely false—even irresponsible—to assert that NATO enlargement is driving the world toward nuclear war. Cooperation, not confrontation is occurring on many fronts.

Russia need have no fear from NATO enlargement.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I believe NATO expansion is in the best interest of the United States. Also, expanding NATO will be in the interest of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and for that matter—world peace.

The United States' security is intrinsically tied to the security of all of Europe. An enlarged NATO will only extend the influence of peace and prosperity to these three deserving countries. Also, as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary continue to grow and flourish, their acceptance into the NATO Alliance will only further integrate Western values and will lock in the practices of democracy. Locking democracy into this region is in the

United States interest and we should never shirk from our responsibility and duty to see that democracy is spread throughout the world.

While many foreign policy issues don't make the headlines and gather press, I do want to add to the record three opinion editorials from a few Colorado newspapers. I ask unanimous consent that an April 21st, 1998 editorial from the *Daily Sentinel*, a paper from Grand Junction Colorado, an April 28th, 1998 editorial from the *Denver Post*, and an April 5th, 1998 editorial from the *Rocky Mountain News* be printed in the *RECORD* at the end of my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLARD. Let me highlight a few comments from these editorials.

The *Daily Sentinel* writes,

Adding Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to NATO rewards three countries for their efforts against communism during the Cold War. More importantly, expanding the western alliance to include the three former Soviet bloc captive nations not only is in the best interests of NATO and the United States, but it unequivocally proclaims to the rest of the world that the fate of Central Europe will no longer be in the hands of whatever despots come along, be they Nazis, Communists or something else.

The *Denver Post* states,

The Post believes adding these three nations will contribute to stability in Eastern Europe and thus to world peace. . . . Any student of the 20th century has to admire the freedom-loving spirit displayed by the Hungarians, Poles, and Czechs, often against great odds. . . . their current governments are stable and they are worthy partners of NATO.

Lastly, from the *Rocky Mountain News*,

NATO enlargement is the Western world's way to show that the Cold War is over and that we welcome these countries to freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming new alliance to ensure that these democracies do not fall prey to nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary know life without freedom and now deserve freedom and security that only NATO can provide.

For me this sums up many of the reasons why I believe adding these three countries to NATO will strengthen, stabilize, and promote peace for the United States and Europe. I urge my colleagues to support this NATO expansion.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the *Daily Sentinel*, Apr. 21, 1998]

CONGRESS SHOULD OK EXPANSION OF NATO

Sometime very soon, perhaps by the end of the week, the Senate will vote on whether to ratify a treaty that would allow Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join NATO. It should vote decisively to allow the expansion.

Much has been said about the fact that the expansion will offend Russia because it will appear that NATO is expanding to the Russian doorstep. Clinton administration officials attempting to defuse that argument have declared that NATO is a peaceful alliance "not arrayed against Russia" or anyone else.

Such statements are, of course, necessary to deal with global politics. And they are

misleading. NATO's purpose is to protect its western European members and the United States against outside aggression, including the possibility of a reawakened Russian bear decades down the road.

It's true that the Cold War is over but it's equally true that NATO was founded primarily to stem the expansionist proclivities of Soviet Russia.

Moreover, the three nations in question all challenged Soviet domination during that period, and each paid a heavy price in some form of Soviet retaliation—Hungary during the 1950s, Czechoslovakia in the 1960s and Poland in the 1980s. In discussing the NATO expansion, few people note that rejecting the membership of these three countries would be an even greater offense to them than their inclusion in NATO would be to Russia.

Additionally, while Russia is no longer communist, there is still reason to be suspicious of its expansionist tendencies which have gone on almost continuously since the days of Peter the Great. Two of the leading candidates to succeed Boris Yeltsin as president are nationalists who have hinted at trying to reassert Russian control over some of the old Soviet states which are now independent nations.

Adding Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO rewards three countries for their efforts against communism during the Cold War. More importantly, expanding the western alliance to include the three former Soviet bloc captive nations not only is in the best interests of NATO and the United States, but it unequivocally proclaims to the rest of the world that the fate of Central Europe will no longer be in the hands of whatever despots come along, be they Nazis, Communists or something else.

[From the *Denver Post*, Apr. 28, 1998.]

ADMIT 3 MORE TO NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization may well be history's most successful military alliance. Since its formation in the early days of the Cold War, not one square inch of any member country has been lost to external aggression. That record has not been lost on nations that were once members of the rival Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.

This week, the U.S. Senate will vote on whether to admit three of those former rivals—Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic—to NATO. The Post believes adding these three nations will contribute to stability in Eastern Europe and thus to world peace. But we would urge the administration and Senate to be extremely cautious about any more applicants, some of whom seem likely to embroil NATO in their domestic difficulties.

Any student of the 20th century has to admire the freedom-loving spirit displayed by the Hungarians, Poles and Czechs, often against great odds. The 1956 Hungarian revolution, the 1968 Prague Spring and the rise of Solidarity in Poland bore eloquent witness to the ideals of their peoples. Their current governments are stable and they are worthy partners of NATO.

The Clinton administration has wisely stated it has "no reason, no intention and no plan" to station nuclear weapons in the new member states. Added to NATO but left in a nuclear-free condition, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary should be able to resume their historic role as a buffer zone between Germany and Russia and should thus be a stabilizing influence in Eastern Europe.

Beyond those three candidates, however, NATO should be very wary about further expansion. Already Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are eyeing admission and Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Slovakia are waiting in their wings.

Some of these nations (Slovenia, Macedonia) are relatively new with little experi-

ence at democracy. Others, like Romania and Albania, had long histories of dictatorship alternating with instability. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are democratic and stable, but their location between Russia and the Baltic Sea makes them all but indefensible by nonnuclear means. Admitting Ukraine, Belarus or other former Soviet republics would be provocative to Russia.

In short, we support admission of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO. But there needs to be a great deal of thought, discussion and diplomacy before any more invitations are issued to join this exclusive club.

[From the *Rocky Mountain News*, Apr. 5, 1998]

SHOULD NATO GROW?—ENLARGEMENT OF ALLIANCE WILL TRULY SIGNAL THE END OF THE COLD WAR

(By Senator Wayne Allard)

The Cold war is over and many have argued that we can now begin to dismantle our defenses and look inward. I believe Secretary of State Albright said it best when testifying before the Armed Services Committee on April 23, 1997, "[I]f you don't see smoke, that is no reason to stop paying for fire insurance."

The United States nor the world face the imminent threat of the Soviet Union, but this is no time to relax. United States' interests are still threatened by local conflicts; internal political and economic instability; the reemergence of ethnic, religious, and other historic grievances; terrorism; and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

Soon, the U.S. Senate will debate and vote on the invitation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Just because we are in a time of relative peace, we can not stop from being engaged in a fight for peace and freedom. I believe expanding NATO is the best way to ensure peace and stability.

First, NATO is and has always been a force for peace and prosperity. Enlarging NATO will only enhance the U.S. and European security and stability. Throughout our history, the U.S. has been closely linked to the stability of Europe, and that has not changed. The U.S. has been through two World Wars and a Cold War in Europe. However, since NATO was formed, not one major war or aggression has occurred against or between member states (except for Argentina's invasion of the British Falkland Island).

An enlarged NATO can do for all of Europe what it has done in Western Europe by strengthening the emerging democracies, creating conditions for continued prosperity, preventing local rivalries, diminishing the race for arms buildups and destabilizing nationalistic policies, and fostering common security interests. Enlargement will truly signal the end of the Cold War by no longer validating the old Stalinistic lines but will secure the historic gains of democracy in Central Europe.

Second, enlargement of NATO will further the integration of Western values into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Their invitation and movement into NATO will lock in Central Europe's practices of democracy. Enlargement will promote American-led multinational defense structures and prevent the renationalization of these democracies. As enlarged NATO will fill the security vacuum created with the fall of the Soviet Union, subduing fear that the area will begin to divide nationalistically and begin to look like the former Yugoslavia.

However, just the possibility of membership into NATO has given these countries the incentive to peacefully resolve their border disputes. Since 1991, we have seen 10

major accords settling these differences and much of this is credited to the opportunity to join NATO. Even if old disputes resurface, NATO membership will help keep the peace, just as NATO has done in relation to the problems between NATO members Greece and Turkey.

Third, there has been concern about the Russian response to NATO enlargement. Russian leaders have expressed their dislike of NATO enlargement, in part due to the misperception that the Alliance poses a threat to Russia's security. NATO is not, and never has been an offensive Alliance, but one of defensive purposes only. We must respect the Russian concerns, but as my predecessor Senator Hank Brown has written, "[W]orking closely with Russia in an attempt to allay their concerns makes sense, slowing or altering NATO expansion * * * hands the Russian government a veto pen." This would be a tragic mistake.

An enlarged and strengthened NATO promotes security and stability in an area of Europe that is vital to Russian security. The invited states must clearly know that they are no longer considered Russian "eastern bloc nations" but an integral part of the circle of democratic nations. Plus, unlike the Warsaw Pact, the decision by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join NATO was made by each individual country, without any coercion or force from any current NATO member.

Fourth, with any expansion there are costs. A bulk of the cost is to modernize and reform militaries and make them operable with NATO. However, being that the U.S. already has the world's premier armed forces, the bulk of the cost will be incurred by our European allies and the three invited nations. They are voluntarily joining and understand the commitments asked of being a NATO member.

The United States' percentage of burden sharing for the NATO budget will go down with the addition of the three countries. Also, the U.S. is not obliged to subsidize the national expenses of any of the three invitees to meet its NATO commitments. Adequate defense systems always costs money but alliances make it less expensive because costs are shared and countries join together to meet the challenges.

NATO enlargement is the Western world's way to show that the Cold War is over and that we welcome these countries to freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming new alliances to ensure that these democracies do not fall prey to nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary know life without freedom and now deserve freedom and security that only NATO can provide.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for Senate ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This is the fourth time that the Atlantic alliance, which rose from the ashes of World War II, has decided to expand. And each time, expansion has served the same purpose—to expand the area in Europe within which peace, stability, freedom and democracy could flourish. The NATO Alliance was remarkably successful throughout its initial decades. Today we are considering a step designed to ensure that the success continues into the next century. This is not a decision that NATO, the U.S. or the Senate takes lightly. It is a more serious issue which goes to the heart of the question of

how the U.S. can best promote our interest in peace and stability in the post-Cold War era. After all, these new members will enjoy all the benefits and bear all the responsibilities which apply to the current members of this mutual defense alliance. The U.S. will be obliged to consider an attack on Warsaw, Budapest or Prague in the same manner we are not obliged to consider an attack on London, Paris or Bonn. Having fought in two wars, I am most cognizant of the solemnity of the obligation we will be undertaking through the ratification of this agreement.

The 1990s, which witnessed the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, brought about a fundamental transformation in Europe. Where once we saw Europe divided into hostile, ideologically-opposed camps, we now see a continent increasingly united by a commitment to the principles of democracy and free market economics.

Initially I had two principal concerns about the proposed enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—the cost to the U.S. and the impact on relations with Russia. In the nearly ten months since NATO made the official decision to offer membership to these three nations, I have continued to examine these two areas and will summarize, very briefly, my conclusions.

In December of last year NATO completed a review of the estimated increases in the costs to NATO's commonly-funded budget resulting from enlargement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report describes how NATO conducted its review and calculated its cost estimate.

NATO first identified the military requirements of incorporating these three new members into the Alliance. Teams of experts were then dispatched to each country to evaluate facilities, infrastructure, and current capabilities to meet NATO's projected military requirements. With this information, NATO then developed a cost estimate for bringing the current capabilities into line with NATO requirements. The NATO studies concluded that the cost of enlargement will total \$1.5 billion over the next ten years. Thus, according to NATO, the additional U.S. payment to the common-funded budgets will average approximately \$40 million per year over ten years.

This amount does not seem to me to be excessive, given the U.S. stake in continued security and stability in Europe. Obviously, in addition to these commonly-funded costs, there will be considerable additional costs to the new members themselves, which each of them has pledged to meet. Yes, the United States may decide to help these new NATO members modernize their military forces; just as we have provided such assistance to many of our current NATO allies through, for example, the provisions of loans or loan guarantees, for the purchase of U.S.-made military equipment. However, Mr. President, that is a separate decision for the U.S. government, one that

is neither required by nor prohibited by our decision to support enlargement. The responsibility for ensuring that their militaries are capable of meeting their obligations to the common defense rest with the new members themselves.

It hardly needs repeating that cooperative relations between Russia and the U.S., and Russia and NATO, serve the interests of the U.S. and the Alliance. I am convinced that NATO enlargement and the development of a NATO-Russia relationship are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, since NATO made clear its intention to expand, NATO and Russia have concluded the "NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security", signed last May. This agreement is designed as a means of regularizing and formalizing consultative procedures between NATO and Russia.

Further, NATO is a purely defensive alliance, and a threat to no nation. The peace and stability within Europe promoted by the Alliance benefits the entire continent, including Russia. It may be unreasonable to expect Russia to approve of NATO expansion. But neither is Russia's unhappiness over the expansion likely to become the determining factor in Russian behavior toward the U.S. and the Alliance.

In summary, Mr. President, I believe that these two major issues arising from NATO expansion have been satisfactorily addressed. I will support NATO expansion and hope that the Senate will ratify the expansion agreement by an overwhelming margin.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Managers' amendment to the Resolution of Ratification, and of the Resolution of Ratification itself.

Even though the Berlin Wall has crumbled and the Soviet Union has dissolved, NATO remains vital. It is the cornerstone of stability for a continent that is under massive transition. The nations of central and eastern Europe have established democratic forms of government and have deregulated their economies. The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is the best way to bolster their fledgling democracies and market economies thereby making their newly-won freedom irreversible.

Let there be no mistake: our engagement with Europe since NATO was formed in 1949 has not been without its costs and not without its risks. Our engagement with the new democracies of Central Europe will not be without costs and risks either. The expansion of NATO will most likely antagonize Russia.

More importantly, as a military alliance, we risk obligating the United States military to defend the citizens of distant and unfamiliar lands. In the end, though, we have found it difficult to stay out of these conflicts. Just about anywhere in the world where there is conflict, our military is there.

I believe that disengagement from Europe, as history has repeatedly

shown, would have far-reaching consequences. Therefore, I believe that we have no choice but to go forward with our current commitment to an expanded NATO. The Senate should vote to approve the Resolution of Ratification.

But, like many senators, I remain concerned at the potential financial costs of expansion. As a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I am concerned that the Administration has not yet come to terms with the price of supporting NATO expansion or more generally with the costs of America's position as the sole superpower.

As was the case with Bosnia, there is reason to believe that the Administration is underestimating the costs of expansion in order to make ratification more palatable in the Senate.

Without pouring additional funds into the defense budget, NATO expansion costs that are unaccounted for may hinder the Defense Department's ability to carry out missions in other vital areas of the world and at the same time to modernize the force.

We have heard a number of cost estimates in the course of this debate. We must keep in mind that the new member nations, as the primary beneficiaries of expansion, must devote the resources necessary to shoulder their fair share of the common burden.

And I know that nothing would undermine the support of this body for NATO, or that of the American people, faster than a perception that the new members, or existing members, for that matter, were not living up to their responsibilities in this regard.

I am also concerned about another aspect of NATO expansion—one that has received less attention than the broader strategic issues, but one that is critical to the long-term success of an expanded alliance—namely intelligence and counterintelligence matters.

Here too, after a careful review, I have concluded that the long-term national interests of the United States are best served by a vote in favor of the Resolution. But I would like to encourage Senators to take the time to review the report that I will describe shortly, which is available in classified form in S-407.

An unclassified summary can be found in the Foreign Relations Committee report, Executive Report 105-14, on the Resolution of Ratification.

This report was prepared by the Intelligence Committee staff at the direction of Senator Kerrey, the Committee Vice Chairman, and myself, and submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Senate at large.

It contains the staff's assessment of the intelligence implications of NATO expansion.

The report is the culmination of the committee's work over the past year monitoring the progress of the accession process set in motion by the Alliance's decision last July to formally invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join NATO.

The staff has routinely reviewed the state of the accession negotiations, a process that concluded in December 1997 with the signing of the accession protocols. Committee members and staff have met numerous times with NATO negotiators as well as representatives from the acceding states, both in European capitals and in Washington, D.C.

In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent, committee staff held numerous briefings with U.S. and NATO intelligence officials; reviewed documents prepared by the Intelligence Community; and posed numerous questions for the record.

The committee directed the Executive branch—the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of State—to submit a formal report on the intelligence implications of enlargement.

Committee staff also met with members of the Alliance's Interagency Working Group on NATO Enlargement (IWGNE) to discuss integration efforts in the intelligence field.

Finally, committee members and staff traveled to national capitals of the three aspiring members to gain a more detailed, first-hand knowledge of how the civilian and military services of these countries operate, and whether adequate procedures are in place for the sharing of sensitive information with current NATO members.

Once again, I would remind my colleagues that the classified committee staff report is available in S-407 for Senators who may wish to read it.

The Committee has also prepared an unclassified summary of the report's major findings, and I would like to share with my colleagues the highlights.

OVERVIEW

The United States, along with its NATO allies, believes that membership in NATO cannot be granted piecemeal.

NATO has thus determined that there will not be a two-tiered security structure within the Alliance. If and when the three accede to full NATO membership, they will share in all rights and obligations, and will be entitled to share in Alliance secrets.

The work undertaken bilaterally and through NATO is geared to ensuring that the three invitees take the necessary steps over the transition or pre-accession period to demonstrate that they can and will guard NATO secrets appropriately once they join in April 1999.

In assessing the reliability of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in guarding NATO secrets, the following factors are critical:

1. the strength of democratic reforms, with a focus on ministerial and legislative oversight of intelligence services and activities;
2. the degree to which the three countries have succeeded in reforming their civilian and military intelligence services, including the ability of the services to hire and retain qualified West-

ern-oriented officers, and the evolution of political and public support for these services;

3. Russian intelligence objectives directed against these countries, including any disinformation campaigns designed to derail, retard, or taint their integration with the West;

4. counterintelligence and other security activities being pursued by the three countries, and the adequacy of resources devoted to these efforts; and

5. the work underway between the three invitees and NATO to ensure that security standards will be met by the time the three join the Alliance.

COMMITTEE FINDINGS

As a result of their investigations, the committee staff arrived at a series of key findings.

Their report includes general findings, findings derived from the experience of our respective intelligence agencies working together in both bilateral and multilateral fora; and findings relating to the counterintelligence threat, the pace of reform and the NATO work program for intelligence issues.

GENERAL FINDINGS

Perhaps most important, the report makes a point that is obvious but nonetheless bears repeating: any intelligence sharing relationship inevitably involves some risks.

Nevertheless, I believe that the intelligence relationships with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be, on balance, a net plus for U.S. and NATO interests. As many of my colleagues are aware, cooperation with the three countries on intelligence issues began before the idea of NATO enlargement itself took root.

In that respect, sharing intelligence in the NATO context will build on a pattern of bilateral cooperation which has existed for nearly a decade.

Based on the information provided to the Committee, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have proven to be reliable in handling operational information and capable of guarding classified information—some of it extremely sensitive.

THE MULTILATERAL CONTEXT

In the multilateral context, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have participated in the Implementation Force and the Stabilization Force operations in Bosnia, and have cooperated actively with U.S. intelligence to provide critical force protection information.

The three countries have demonstrated a solid record in the area of information and operational security within the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.

In addition, all three countries value their bilateral links to the U.S. and wish to expand them. They view multilateral intelligence cooperation in NATO as a complement to, not a substitute for, these bilateral intelligence relations.

THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREAT

The single most critical intelligence issue we face in inviting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO is the counterintelligence question.

It is an unavoidable fact that past associations with Soviet intelligence services, together with proximity to Russia, make these countries vulnerable to hostile intelligence activity.

Over time, personnel and generational changes, training, and more robust counterintelligence programs by the three countries should reduce further this vulnerability. But for the time being, the threat is there.

The problem is not one of attitudes. The legacy these countries inherit from 44 years of Soviet domination makes them suspicious of Russian policies and motives.

Indeed, for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the problem is not complacency about the foreign intelligence threat, but ensuring a capability to counter it.

Lastly, and to put this issue into perspective, we should recall that Russian and other intelligence efforts to penetrate NATO will continue, irrespective of new Alliance members.

THE RECORD OF REFORM

With respect to the critical issue of reform, all three countries have made significant strides in restructuring, reforming, and redirecting their intelligence services.

More needs to be done to attain greater experience in parliamentary oversight of the services, to secure acceptance by politicians of the need for these services to maintain political neutrality, to retain and promote experienced officers with Western orientation, and to enhance computer security.

As professionalism increases, morale will improve, and the intelligence services will be looked upon as contributing to common security interests. Adequate funding and visible support from the political leadership will be essential to this process.

THE NATO WORK PROGRAM

The three invitees are continuing to work with NATO in preparation for their final accession.

In cooperation with NATO to date, in a variety of interactions with the U.S. and other current NATO allies, including the sharing of sensitive information through the Partnership for Peace program, IFOR/SFOR, and in bilateral intelligence cooperation, the three invitees have demonstrated solid records in the area of information and operational security.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have undertaken significant steps to conform to NATO security standards and have enhanced personnel and information security practices.

Looking toward accession in April 1999, from a NATO perspective, the intelligence aspects of NATO enlargement appear to be on track. Indeed, the intelligence planning in NATO is cur-

rently ahead of the other NATO programs which must be readied for the April 1999 accession date.

NATO and U.S. officials have been reviewing the capabilities and intentions of the three governments to handle sensitive information, and the extent to which the military and intelligence services of these former Warsaw Pact members have distanced themselves from their former mentors.

The NATO Intelligence Board has worked closely with NATO's Office of Security to ensure adequate security measures are developed with new members.

The specific criteria that the Alliance is using to ensure that NATO practices and regulations become standard operating procedures for the three new invitees are based on established security guidelines developed for the Alliance and approved by the member states. Each of the three NATO invitees has thus far achieved or exceeded each criterion set before it, according to the Executive Branch.

INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE CONDITION

Based on these findings, I together with Senator Kerrey have proposed a condition to the resolution of ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty, which is included in the Managers' amendment now before the Senate.

The purpose of the condition is to monitor the progress that the three aspiring members are making in adopting NATO practices and regulations as standard operating procedures in their own intelligence services, and in enhancing their overall procedures for protecting intelligence sources and methods.

To monitor the progress in meeting NATO standards during the transition period up to April 1999, as well as to provide a benchmark following formal accession, the condition requires the President and the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the appropriate committees of Congress with three "snapshots"—two before and one after formal accession of these countries to the alliance.

The President is required to report by 1 January 1999, on behalf of all the interested agencies, the progress made by the three countries in meeting NATO membership security requirements.

The Director of Central Intelligence is also required to report on or before 1 January 1999, and again not later than 90 days after the date of formal accession of these countries to NATO, on the latest procedures and requirements established in these countries for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, including a comparison of the overall procedures and requirements for such protection in these three countries with those in other NATO member states.

I believe that this condition sets forth a balanced approach to monitoring the progress of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic toward meeting

the intelligence and security-related requirements for full NATO membership.

In what I believe is the unlikely event that a serious problem arises with respect to one or more of the prospective members, the reports due on January 1, 1999 will provide both the Senate and the Executive Branch with an opportunity to address and resolve any such problem before final accession.

FINAL ASSESSMENT

I would like to close with the following.

In developing an overall assessment of the security risks associated with the inclusion of the three new invitees in NATO, the issue is not only how to ensure that these three countries protect NATO secrets, but also to ensure that the new members, and NATO at large, devote sufficient attention and resources to address the overall non-NATO intelligence threat to the Alliance.

To reiterate, based on the information provided to the Committee, the governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have demonstrated both an intent and an ability to protect the classified military and intelligence information that would be routinely provided them as members of the Alliance.

While past associations make these countries vulnerable to Russian intelligence activity, over time, personnel and generational changes, training, and more robust counterintelligence programs by the three countries should reduce further this vulnerability.

As I noted earlier, cooperation on intelligence issues began before the idea of NATO enlargement took root. In that respect, sharing intelligence in the NATO context builds upon a pattern of cooperation of nearly a decade.

As with other aspects of NATO integration, it will take some time and technical advice and assistance from other NATO members for the governments of these three countries to totally overcome the legacy of their communist past.

As a critical element of such a program, the three governments must devote adequate resources to support professionalized intelligence and counterintelligence services, and must demonstrate their political support for these services' role in safeguarding the democratic political order.

Lastly, by the time the three invitees join NATO, a decade will have passed since the collapse of their communist regimes.

Contacts with the U.S., other allies, and NATO, coupled with continuing modernization programs and priority assistance efforts from current NATO members, should help to ensure that all three countries satisfy membership security requirements by the time of their accession to NATO in April 1999.

In closing, I would like to thank the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator HELMS, and the

Ranking Member, Senator BIDEN, for including the Shelby-Kerrey condition as part of the Managers' amendment, and for their leadership in ensuring the thorough and expeditious consideration of this historic resolution.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for the Resolution of Ratification currently pending before the Senate. I do so with less enthusiasm than I wished, and more doubts than I prefer.

I will vote yes because Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will strengthen NATO's resolve and improve the chances that a post-Cold War NATO will be the same stabilizing force for peace it has been for the past half-century. I will vote yes because the requirements for NATO membership, such as civilian control of the military and democratic rule, especially domestic laws that protect minority rights, make it more likely that external conflicts are resolved peacefully. I will vote yes because the benefits of doing so appear, on balance, to outweigh the potential liabilities.

My vote of support is also based on my belief that denying the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland entry after their expectations have been raised so high would do more harm than good. Further, I believe these three countries - on account of their passionate understanding of what life is like under the iron fist of a dictator—will stiffen the resolve of NATO to be a force for peace. NATO has no will to fight unless consensus can be achieved amongst all members, and it is the will to fight which will do the most good in deterring future military conflicts.

Too often during this debate I have heard the argument of some advocates who presume enlargement as a necessary insurance policy against the risk of Russia becoming an expansionist military threat again. These proponents often speak as if the circumstances of 1998 closely resembled those in Europe when NATO was created.

This vision is flawed. It is flawed because it misrepresents the comparative conditions of 1949 and 1998. It results in the subordination of other more important foreign policy goals such as assisting the Russian transition to democracy, reducing nuclear weapons, and confronting the threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the less important task of adding three new members to a Cold War military alliance.

Consider what President Truman and Congress faced in the wake of the Second World War. In 1949, when they led America into the North Atlantic Alliance, only thirty years separated them from the end of the Great War, the war which was supposed to end all wars. Only twenty years had separated the end of this terrible war and the beginning of the next. Twenty years. Imagine what our attitudes would be if a war as savage and futile as World War

I had been concluded on November 11, 1968, and then in 1988, the enemy we had vanquished rose to the attack again.

Both those wars were within memory's reach of President Truman and the Congress on April 4, 1949 when the Washington Treaty was signed. Europe lay in ruins. Their economies had been destroyed. Food and medical supplies were in short supply. Political uncertainty and instability were the order of the day. The Red Army was threatening in the east and their belligerence well established by the Communist coup d'état in Prague in February 1948 and the Berlin Blockade which began in June 1948.

All of this combined to justify the creation of a powerful military alliance. It is worth noting that even with these factors, NATO at first had no military structure. Only after the Korean War began in June 1950, did the idea of a worldwide communist offensive gain credibility. This led to the establishment of a NATO military force, the major element of which is the Allied Command Europe. In December 1950, General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The command's headquarters—the Supreme Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) - was located in Brussels.

President Truman was 65 years old in April 1949 when the Washington Treaty was signed. But certainly he must have remembered the day in mid-January 1919 when he was bivouacked near Verdun, France awaiting the demobilization orders needed before he could go home. In Paris, U.S. President Wilson, English Prime Minister Lloyd George, and French President Clemenceau had begun their discussions of terms and conditions for peace.

In a letter to his fiancée, Bess Wallace, Truman had written:

It's my opinion we'll stay until uncle Woodie gets his pet peace plans refused or okayed. For my part, and I'm sure every A.E.F. (American Expeditionary Force) man feels the same way, I don't give a whoop (to put it mildly) whether there's a League of Nations or whether Russia has a Red government or a Purple one, and if the President of the Czechoslovaks wants to pry the throne out from under the King of Bohemia, let him pry, but send us home . . . For my part I've had enough vin rouge and frog-eater victuals to last me a lifetime.

Mr. President, in our modern age of see and invade-all journalism, this letter would probably have surfaced to embarrass Truman when he entered national politics a decade later. However, it is also likely that cameras manned by brave men and women would have broadcast 1919 street scenes of Berlin, Moscow, Paris, Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna, and Prague. I believe these scenes would have made Americans less anxious to withdraw from the devastating instability of starvation, demobilized and poorly led Armies, and the sudden collapse of the old order of the Kaiser, the Romanovs, Hapsburgs, and Ottomans.

Yet only thirty years after he wrote this letter, Lieutenant Truman had become President Truman, and he faced a world that looked not all that different from 1919. As he considered what policy would guarantee the peace after 50 million lives had been lost in the Second World War, he saw a Europe as devastated as it had been in the First. He saw a threatening Soviet Union in the east. Withdrawal, pacifism, and demilitarization were the failed policies of the 1920's and 1930's. Political engagement and military strength were logical and correct alternatives. Forty years later, as communism collapsed and our former enemies embraced democracy, Truman's vision and path was vindicated.

Mr. President, too many proponents of expansion have tried to cast this vote as a vote about our future engagement in the world. I am not persuaded by the preposterous either/or arguments used by these proponents. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for repeating the mistake we have made twice in this century to withdraw from Europe. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for appeasing the Russians. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for allowing instability to reign supreme on the European continent.

What nonsense. If NATO were to disappear tomorrow—as it almost did by refusing to become engaged in Bosnia—America would not withdraw from Europe. We are becoming more and more connected through travel, trade, and telecommunications. Any comparison of the political, economic, and social conditions of 1998 and 1919, or 1998 and the 1930's should be greeted with raised eyebrows and laughter.

Mr. President, many times during this debate I have heard my colleagues say that NATO has been the most successful military alliance in history. I do not disagree with their assessment. But the statement leads me to ask a question: why has NATO been so successful and what does that mean for the future of the Alliance?

Ultimately, NATO was successful during the Cold War not for any military operation, but for its military power and the willingness to use it. For nearly 50 years, NATO has served as the vanguard of peace and security in Europe. For forty of those years, NATO forces stood ready to engage in the defense of Europe from the very real threat posed by Warsaw Pact forces on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The reason NATO was able to maintain the peace and never had to fight a hot war in Europe came from the recognition by our adversaries that NATO, despite the horrors of a potential superpower conflict, was prepared for real military action.

Equally as important as the will to act, NATO commanders understood the importance of maintaining a formidable capability to fight. Throughout the Cold War, NATO's military forces were highly motivated, superbly trained,

and equipped with the latest weapons and technology that made the Alliance a force to be reckoned with.

Beyond the success of the Cold War, I believe that NATO has survived in the post-Cold War era, despite many predictions to the contrary, because it was prepared to change to reflect new realities. First, NATO has begun the difficult task of restructuring and downsizing its force and command structure. As we in the Congress are well aware, following three rounds of U.S. base closures, making the necessary decisions to downsize the military is politically difficult. NATO deserves credit for what it has accomplished in this area, but more work will be needed in the future.

NATO has also been successful because of its willingness to address the challenges of the post-Cold War world. NATO has made significant progress in tackling difficult new issues such as arms control, regional ethnic instability, and creating partners out of former enemies. In this final area, the Partnership for Peace program has made tremendous progress in encouraging civilian control of the military and promoting military transparency, each of these essential in creating greater confidence between nations.

Each of these steps have contributed to transforming NATO into the Alliance that we have today, an Alliance that serves the interests of each of its members and promotes cooperation and stability. However, as NATO officials admit, the Atlantic Alliance must continue to evolve. We must ask ourselves: what must NATO do now if it is to be relevant in the future?

First, NATO must continue with the difficult work of reforming its force and command structure to reflect changes in its mission and strategic concept. Second, as during the Cold War, NATO must maintain a credible force and the will to use that force when diplomacy fails. These are the core elements of the Alliance that must be carried into the future.

But I believe NATO must also be prepared to take on new missions. It will have to be ready to address future threats to regional stability like Bosnia in an efficient and timely manner. Mr. President, the true lesson of the Dayton Accords is that sometimes force, or the credible threat of force, precedes diplomacy. I do not believe the Dayton Accords would have been possible had NATO not reached consensus to respond militarily, albeit late, to Serbian aggression in Bosnia. I hope we have learned the lesson of Bosnia, and I hope these three new members will help strengthen our will to react to Bosnia-style aggression in the future. The recent memory of the Solidarity movement, the moral leadership of President Vaclav Havel, and the impact of the 1956 uprising in Hungary will be extremely beneficial contributions to the diplomatic decision-making that occurs in Brussels. We may find the newest members of the Alli-

ance will soon play a critical role in leading NATO into the future.

Mr. President, having addressed the history and future of the Alliance, let me restate that I will vote in favor of this Resolution of Ratification because I believe that NATO enlargement is a positive step forward for the three invitees and for the future of the NATO alliance.

The enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is a statement of the success of their transition to free-market democracies. Each of these countries have experienced the peaceful transitions of democratic government, established the rule of law in the interaction of people and institutions, and implemented strong civilian control of their militaries. We should not forget the difficulty with which each of these countries has made these changes, nor should we underestimate the political leadership that was necessary to make the decisions involved in transforming from a command-style economy to free-market democracy.

Mr. President, NATO membership, along with eventual membership in the European Union, will re-establish their contacts to the West and help solidify the political reforms in place today. Furthermore, the benefits of collective defense will limit the need to reconstitute national defenses and allow for continued focus on strengthening their economies and rebuilding the infrastructure necessary to compete in the global economy.

I also believe that these countries will benefit from NATO enlargement through the promotion of regional stability. The prospect of NATO membership has already caused Central European nations to re-examine their relationships with one another and to address age-old political and ethnic disputes. The resulting treaties and bilateral agreements will lessen the chance of border and ethnic conflicts in the region after these three nations become full members of the Alliance.

Mr. President, I also believe NATO will benefit from the inclusion of new members. Each of these countries will bring a unique set of capabilities to the Alliance. To be sure, each still needs to make significant progress in bringing their militaries up to NATO standards, but they are not starting from zero. Initial estimates show that following their own military restructuring, these countries will bring an additional 280,000 troops to the Alliance; this will undoubtedly boost NATO's ability to perform future missions.

An example of this enhanced capability for NATO can be seen in the contribution each of these three countries have made to the IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia. Poland is currently providing SFOR an airborne infantry battalion, the Czech Republic has provided an engineering company and is maintaining a mechanized infantry battalion, and Hungary has contributed an engineering battalion. Hungary has

also leased the Taszar airbase to the United States which provides a critical point of entry for U.S. forces into Bosnia. I am confident that when these countries become full members of NATO, we can expect that they will continue to provide a strong commitment to NATO operations.

In my duties as Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I joined with my colleagues in reviewing the security consequences of bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance.

In directing this review, Senator SHELBY and I did not for a moment suspect the sincerity or the commitment of these countries to be loyal members of the Alliance. But because some of their intelligence professionals and other military and civilian personnel had served in similar positions when their countries were dominated by the Soviet Union, we felt duty-bound to examine how well these countries would meet NATO security requirements, especially with regard to handling NATO classified information and protecting intelligence sources and methods. We determined that, even in these narrow security terms, the new members will be a major net gain for the Alliance. They have the expertise and the dedication to protect the information which NATO will share with them, and they bring intelligence capabilities to the Alliance which will make NATO stronger.

To help measure and assist the transition of the new members to NATO security standards, Senator SHELBY and I proposed a condition to the resolution of ratification which would require two reports: one to be rendered by the President next January on the progress of the new members in meeting NATO security requirements, and another to be rendered in phases by the Director of Central Intelligence identifying the latest security procedures and requirements of the new allies and assessing how they compare with those of other NATO members. In my view, these reporting requirements are prudent and should help the expanded Alliance more quickly reach a common security standard.

Mr. President, I am encouraged by the prospect of membership for these three countries. However, this is a major change in U.S. policy, and a very real commitment that should not be entered into without a full understanding of its meaning. The American people must understand that membership in NATO for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic carries with it all of the commitments of the 1949 Washington Treaty. In particular, by ratifying this change to the Washington Treaty, the United States extends full Article V protection to each of these countries.

Article V states:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,

each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such actions it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The quantitative result of this treaty is that the United States has pledged to defend an additional 15% of European territory in the event of an attack. The qualitative result is that we as Americans pledge to send our young soldiers to defend Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest. However, let me state, Mr. President, my firm belief that enlargement of the Alliance will in fact reduce our chances of having to fight a war in this region of the world. By solidifying democratic reforms, encouraging regional cohesion through the Partnership for Peace program, and limiting the need for national defenses, we will promote cooperation and limit the threat of war.

Like many of my colleagues, I also have concerns about the costs associated with NATO enlargement. Wide discrepancies in the assumptions on which the various cost estimates have been based have left us with, at best, an incomplete view of what enlargement will cost current and future members. I am hopeful that after the vote, the Administration will continue to work closely with Congress to address our remaining concerns regarding costs. At a time in which our military is being called on to protect against threats to U.S. security interests throughout the world, we must carefully scrutinize additional spending commitments.

Mr. President, I am concerned with the slowness with which the European Union has moved to address the needs of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. I strongly encourage the EU to catch-up to NATO by quickly completing negotiations over their own expansion. In the long-run, the success of the former-Soviet bloc countries will hinge more on their ability to access the economic benefits of the EU than membership in NATO.

While I support NATO enlargement for these three countries at this time, we must also ask how do we define our future foreign policy priorities. For the past year, members of the Administration have worked tirelessly to ensure ratification of NATO enlargement. I believe it is time for the United States to shift our foreign policy focus: our number one priority must become the successful transition of Russia to a stable, free-market democracy. I for one am very optimistic about the prospects for Russia.

I think at times we suffer from the inertial effects of Cold War thinking that limit our ability to see the world for what it is today. Just as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are not the Warsaw Pact, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Russia no longer poses the immediate threat to our survival as expressed in Cold War rhetoric of Josef Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. It

is a new era, and we should use this opportunity to our utmost ability to work with Russia to ensure the establishment of the rule of law, to assist with the ethical privatization of state owned enterprises, to promote the continued development of the democratic process, and to realize meaningful progress on arms control.

We already have positive examples of what cooperation with Russia can accomplish. Mr. President, few may realize the Bosnia mission is the first time in which NATO troops have participated in an actual military engagement. Few would have guessed during the dangerous days of the Cold War that NATO's first military mission would have occurred with Russian soldiers working alongside American soldiers not as the enemy, but as partners. The Bosnia mission demonstrates the potential we have when we work with a democratic Russia to solve disputes. Another positive sign is that in recent months the Russian government has stepped up its participation in the Partnership for Peace program and I am hopeful about the possibility for continued dialog through the Permanent Joint Council as established under the Russia-NATO Founding Act. Mr. President, I encourage both the Congress and the Administration to address the future of U.S.-Russian relations with the same vigor with which we have worked to achieve NATO enlargement.

At no point in the future do I want to look back to this unique point in history and have to ask if we could have done more to ensure a peaceful, democratic Russia. Mr. President, I encourage all of us to take a long-term view of history. We should consider how the world has changed from the chaos and danger that led President Truman to create NATO in 1949 to the sweep of democracy that liberated Central and Eastern Europe from communist control. We should consider how these same nations have transformed themselves into stable democracies ready to become full members of the Atlantic Alliance. And finally, we should consider how we want the world to look in fifty years, and then set our priorities to ensure our children will have the benefit of living in that world.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for the protocols of accession to NATO, specifically for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. NATO expansion is clearly in the security interests of the United States and the NATO alliance as a whole.

We have an opportunity in the Senate today to make a truly a historic vote that will shatter, once and for all, the artificial division of Europe that occurred at the end of the Second World War. By expanding this alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, we will further erase the Cold War lines of division and broaden the scope of protection of this defensive military alliance which has

played the central role in maintaining peace and stability in Europe since the end of World War II. Now, if history is any guide, it ensures and enhances the prospects for peace, prosperity, and harmony throughout Europe.

It is important to remember that NATO is a defensive, not offensive, strategic military alliance. Although the new member countries were once considered so-called "allies" of the former Soviet Union, their so-called alliance had more to do with the presence of Soviet troops within their countries than any commitment to Soviet values or ideals. Bringing them into the NATO alliance is not a charge against Russia and should not be so construed. To the contrary, we are recognizing that the people of these countries are now our allies. We pledge to come to their defense if they are attacked by a non-member country, and they in turn make the same pledge to support all other NATO countries who may be attacked by a non-member party.

Mr. President, in the nearly 50 years of its existence, NATO has provided the military security umbrella that has permitted old enemies to heal the wounds of war and to build strong democracies and integrated free economies. Expanding NATO to include the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe will, I hope, produce the same results. That is, stronger and freer economies whose people can live in the same harmony as do the people of France and Germany.

Communism has collapsed. The Soviet Union is no more. This is not to say, however, that Europe no longer faces any security threats. I think that would be shortsighted. Threats continue to exist in Europe, and many of these threats are more difficult to identify and combat. Ethnic strife in many parts of Eastern Europe; the instability which we face daily with Iraq; terrorism; the list is long. These are all verifiable threats to which the United States and other NATO member countries must be prepared to respond and defend. By adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the NATO alliance, we are broadening and strengthening our ability to combat and defend against these threats.

Mr. President, I would also note that the prospect of NATO enlargement has already begun as seen by the process of harmonization in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary has settled its border and minority questions with Slovakia and Romania. Poland has reached across an old divide to create joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania.

Without question, an expanded NATO will make the world safer simply because we are expanding the area where wars will not happen. As Secretary of State Albright testified last year before the Foreign Relations Committee, and I quote, "This is the paradox at NATO's heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters aggression." At

the same time, we gain new allies, new friends who are committed to our common agenda for security in fighting terrorism and weapons proliferation, and to ensuring stability in places such as the former Yugoslavia.

There is no doubt in my mind that had Soviet troops not in 1945 occupied Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and installed puppet governments, the debate over whether these three countries should be members of NATO would have long ago been resolved in their favor.

The people of these countries have yearned for freedom, democracy, and peace for more than 40 years, as evidenced by Poland particularly. The blood in the streets of Budapest in 1956, the demonstrations of the people in Prague in 1968 who confronted Soviet tanks, and the public confrontations of Solidarity throughout Poland beginning in the 1970s all laid the foundation for the collapse of communism, which we have seen in our lifetime.

Now as they begin to build institutions of democracy and free enterprise, as they move to further integrate their economies with the rest of Europe, they should participate in the collective security of the continent. I think this will bind these countries closer together far into the future and ensure stability and peace throughout the continent.

Mr. President, there have been expressions of concern by some people that expanding NATO is a mistake because it would somehow be perceived as a threat, a threat to Russia. I find that argument hard to accept. In my opinion, NATO has never been a threat to Russia. Even during the height of the Cold War, no one seriously considered that NATO threatened the Soviet Union. Quite the contrary. NATO stood to defend—defend—against any potential military threat to its members. There is a difference between defense and offense. And NATO is designed for defense. It was never designed as an alliance of aggression—rather, it is an alliance against aggression.

I think the same holds true today, Mr. President. The people of Russia, who are slowly trying to emerge from the darkness and terror of 70 years of communism, have nothing—I repeat, nothing—to fear from NATO. Our goal is not to isolate Russia; but to engage and support her in her efforts to develop a lasting democracy and a free market.

The people in the evolving democracies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have earned the right to become full partners in Europe and full partners in NATO. I hope my colleagues will support the dreams, hopes, and aspirations of these people who have struggled for freedom for so long, after so many decades in which they have lived without hope. They have that opportunity today.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to commend these countries for the rapid progress which they have made

nurturing democracy and building stable economic development based on free market principles. While some would argue that they have not evolved far enough, I would simply say that they are light years from where they were when the Berlin Wall fell and that democracy and the free market is an evolving process. They are well on their way; bringing them into the NATO alliance will only serve to help them along.

The people of these nations have dedicated themselves to these democratic ideals, and it is incumbent upon us to support them in their quest. Mr. President, I strongly support expanding the NATO alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and hope that the Senate speaks loudly and strongly on this issue today.

Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an important vehicle for maintaining security in Europe. For half a century NATO has been critical to maintaining security in Europe. Largely because of NATO, Europe has enjoyed more than 50 years without war among its major powers, the longest period in modern history. Because of this success, European countries that at one time were in a competing alliance, are now clamoring to join NATO. Today we have a historic opportunity to extend the NATO umbrella to additional European countries, and to expand the benefits that the alliance has created.

Dr. Brzezinski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a compelling case for NATO expansion and its importance to the United States. He said:

For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-term historic and strategic relationship between America and Europe. NATO expansion is central to the vitality of the American-European connection, to the scope of democratic and secure Europe, and to the ability of America and Europe to work together in promoting international security.

The expansion of the Euroatlantic alliance will bring into NATO counsels new, solidly democratic and very pro-American nations. That will further deepen the American-European kinship while expanding Europe's zone of peace and democracy. Such a more secure Europe will be a better and more vital partner for America in the continuing effort to make democracy more widespread and international cooperation more pervasive. That is why NATO's enlargement—in itself a vivid testimonial to the dynamism of the democratic ideal—is very much in America's long-term national interest.

Since its inception, NATO has provided a forum to resolve disagreements among members and for institutionalizing norms and relations fundamental to modern democracies. It is natural therefore, that newly emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, which qualify, should be considered for membership in the alliance.

The accession to the alliance of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary

is the culmination of years of work on these countries part to meet the requirements of NATO membership. As Dr. John Micgiel, Director of the East Central European Center at Columbia University has said, "the mere prospect of membership . . . has acted as a catalyst for political reform. . . ." Furthermore the "three prospective member countries have each taken a proactive role in cooperating with their neighbors and sometime former adversaries."

These three countries have demonstrated functioning democratic political systems, as well as economic reforms that will allow them to share the costs of NATO membership. Although there are no set requirements for membership, at a minimum, candidates for membership must meet the following five requirements: new members must uphold democracy, including tolerating diversity; new members must be making progress toward a market economy; their military forces must be under firm civilian control; they must be good neighbors and respect sovereignty outside their borders; and they must be working toward compatibility with NATO forces.

Poland's membership is the logical culmination of its long struggle for freedom and economic independence. In 1989, the world watched as Poland became one of the first former Soviet-controlled countries to hold free and democratic elections. "Solidarity" became a symbol of freedom recognized around the globe.

In 1993, Poland was the first country in the region to record economic growth, and it now has one of the strongest economies in Europe. In 1997, its GDP grew at a rate of about seven percent, while its inflation and unemployment rates declined.

Moreover, Poland has demonstrated its readiness to contribute to security beyond its borders, one of the requirements of NATO membership. Poland contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition and currently provides troops to the NATO-led Stabilization Force mission striving to keep peace in Bosnia.

Hungary has met the requirements for NATO membership by holding fully free and fair elections since 1989. Over the past nine years, the country has had two complete democratic changes of government. Economically, Hungary has engaged in successful, yet painful, stabilization programs to cut its current budget deficits. Since 1990, Hungary has attracted almost \$16 billion in foreign direct investment; almost a third of all foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe.

Since 1989, the Czech Republic has held three fully free and fair elections. Their constitution contains protections similar to ours, such as the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the freedom of the press. Economically, the country has privatized state-owned enterprises, engaged in tight monetary policies, and liberalized trade policies. As a result inflation is

controlled, the GDP has been rising since 1994, and unemployment is low.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were chosen to join the alliance because they meet all the requirements of admission. Each will be a good ally and each country is prepared to accept the responsibilities of NATO membership, including contributing their share to NATO's costs. I would like to congratulate Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, for their courage, for their perseverance and now for their imminent membership in the greatest military security alliance the world has ever known.

Other countries will soon also be prepared to join the alliance, that is why I believe the expansion of NATO should be regarded as a process rather than the enactment of a single policy. Nations such as Romania and Slovenia, who were not invited to join NATO at the Madrid summit should be extended NATO membership once they meet the alliance's admission requirements.

During the 104th Congress, I supported the NATO Enlargement and Facilitation Act of 1996. This legislation would have extended economic aid to those countries in Central and Eastern Europe showing genuine interest in furthering economic privatization and political pluralization as a prerequisite to NATO membership. This legislation sent an important signal of American support for these countries undergoing the painful transition from communism to democratic market reform.

Mr. President, constituents from my state have indicated strong support for NATO expansion. While my constituents include Americans of Hungarian and Czech descent, you may know that Chicago has been called the Warsaw of the Midwest because of the large number of city residents of Polish descent. Statewide, there are nearly 1 million Illinoisans of Polish-ancestry, many of whom who have contacted my office in support of Poland's imminent entry into NATO.

Mr. President, it is not, however, merely the many Polish-Americans, or Hungarian-Americans or Czech-Americans in Illinois and around the United States who wish these countries well as they assume the responsibilities of full NATO membership. Freedom-loving people in every part of the world can take heart from these countries' examples. History records the innumerable times that they have been invaded by hostile armies. But these people have strived to maintain their culture and their unique way of life, and that struggle has finally been rewarded. For as long as there is a North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, their security will be guaranteed by some of the most powerful nations on earth.

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today as we reach the end of our debate on NATO enlargement to restate my firm support for the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty providing for the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. NATO enlargement

is the right thing to do. We must seize this opportunity now to help make Europe whole and free. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of enlargement.

While NATO was born out of the Cold War to protect ourselves and our allies from the Soviet threat, it is also part of the broader U.S. policy to foster European integration after the end of World War II. The first step in this policy was the Marshall Plan, not NATO. But after Stalin's Iron Curtain divided Europe, and Soviet-installed puppet governments rejected Marshall Plan aid, it was clear that economic recovery and political cooperation could not proceed without a security shield. NATO provided that shield.

The Soviet Union is gone. So are the Moscow-controlled puppet governments in central and eastern European states. Once again, we have a window of opportunity to complete the work we started at the end of World War II. We must not miss this historic chance to advance our policy of supporting European integration based on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

We have a chance to bring into the circle of Western democracies those states, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, that were denied this chance by Soviet occupation at the end of World War II. By voting for enlargement, we are again extending the hand that Stalin slapped away, affirming the promise of freedom and security for the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech peoples.

As Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, better known as the Helsinki Commission, I have seen NATO candidate states take steps to resolve internal problems and external disputes that have been major features of national life within those states for generations. Human rights violations in those states have substantially decreased, and their membership in NATO and, in the future, the EU, will give us leverage to resolve remaining problems. But for the promise of the security guarantee that comes with NATO membership, I believe these problems and disputes would not only have remained unresolved, but would likely have given rise, over time, to confrontations between states that could have led to war.

Thus, by that measure, NATO enlargement is already having positive results.

Once NATO enlargement is realized, the political risk associated with economic reform in central and eastern European states will diminish. This will make international investors more willing to provide capital to businesses in these states, creating jobs and improving economic health. Improved performance during and after transition to free market economies will help cement in place stable democratic governments.

The combination of healthy economies and stable democratic govern-

ments will help the European Union expand to include these states. Thus, expansion of NATO's security shield is the first step, not the last step, toward further broad European integration.

There have been many statements of caution about the impact of NATO enlargement on Russia. I firmly believe that Russian democracy will be better served by having healthy, stable, and prosperous democracies on its western border, than by leaving a gray zone between a steadily more integrated Europe and Russia.

Since coming to the Senate in 1981, I have been a member of the Helsinki Commission. This work has brought me into contact with the Soviet dissident community, which over time has become the core of the Russian pro-reform and pro-democracy movement. From this long experience, I can tell you that a failure to expand NATO and the European Union to embrace every European state that can meet the established entrance requirements would be a victory for the anti-democratic forces in Russia.

Especially if NATO enlargement were to fail because the United States would not agree to it, extremist politicians of all stripes from Russia through eastern and central Europe would take heart and encouragement. Democrats and free market reformers would be seriously damaged, and political and economic stability would be called into question. The influence of the United States would be greatly decreased, and our commitments would be open to doubt. When we cast our votes today, we need to keep in mind the probable highly negative consequences of what would, in effect, be a veto by the United States Senate of NATO expansion.

NATO enlargement, European integration, and the advancement of political reform, democracy, individual freedom, and free market economics are all part of the same effort. What we do here today can make a major contribution to the security and prosperity of future generations of Americans.

The opportunity to expand the circle of free and democratic countries can not be missed. This amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty should be approved. I will vote for it, and I urge all of my colleagues to support it.

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, for quite some time I have been studying the issue of whether we should expand NATO. There are some who have argued that there has not been sufficient debate about NATO expansion. Yet, we have been considering NATO expansion for several years now, long before this resolution of ratification made it to the Senate floor. By wide margins, the Senate indicated its support for the concept of NATO expansion in 1994 and 1995, and since then, there has been much discussion in the Senate and in the media on the pros and cons of expanding NATO. As the Administration has worked with our allies on the details of NATO expansion, building on

the Partnership for Peace which lay the ground work for this move back in 1994, and culminating with the signing of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in December 1997, we have reached the point where there is little doubt that the Senate will ratify the resolution before us today. It is interesting to note, that as a bipartisan consensus for NATO expansion has emerged, opponents of NATO expansion have sharpened their arguments. I want to credit these opponents for giving us all much food for thought and for ultimately helping me focus my thinking on this important issue.

After careful consideration, I have concluded that expanding NATO is in our national interest and I intend to support the resolution of ratification before us today for a number of reasons.

NATO will help to fill a security vacuum in newly democratic Central Europe. It has only been a few short years since Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have embraced democratic institutions and embarked on the path to political and economic reform. We need to send the strongest possible signal to the fledgling democracies of Central and Eastern Europe that they must not falter in this endeavor. It is in our national interest for these nations to succeed, and support from the West allows them to proceed with difficult political and economic reforms. Just as it made sense in the breathless months after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to invite these countries to join NATO, we cannot back away from them now. Following through on our invitation offers them a sense of security after years of domination by the Soviet Union. And, it is fitting that a military alliance originally conceived to counter the Soviet threat would offer them a safe haven from the threats of the future. Although it may seem that they have little to worry about now, we cannot predict what threats may emerge. After all, few among us could have predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

We should support NATO expansion because it will help ensure that Russia does not pose a threat to those countries in the future. Russia may not pose a threat now, but the fears of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic that Russia will change its stripes or that some other hegemonic power will threaten them are all too real. We must respond to these fears. It's easy for critics of NATO expansion on this side of the Atlantic to say that these fears are not justified but we must not forget that the reason the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are clamoring for NATO membership in the first place is because of their long history of invasion and subjugation. Who among us could look the Poles, and the Czechs, and the Hungarians in the eyes and say that even without NATO they need not fear an invasion in the future.

True, no one can make the case that the Russian military in its current state is in any position to reconstitute the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. Recent articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times lay out in stark terms the weakened state of the military, and the difficulties Russia is facing in developing strong economic and political alliances with its neighbors. Although some have argued that these are reasons to oppose NATO expansion, for me this underscores the challenges Russia faces today in realizing full political and economic reform, challenges that have little to do with NATO expansion. If Russia does not succeed—and we must do all we can to ensure that it does—I shudder to think of the consequences. NATO expansion will shield Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic from these consequences.

I do not intend to respond to all of the arguments made by opponents of NATO expansion, but I want to say a few more words about Russia. I do not believe that NATO expansion will undermine Russian efforts to achieve democratic reform: If Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic want greater integration with Western Europe this should not pose a threat to Russia. However, just as we are responding to the fears of the Central Europeans by inviting them to join NATO, we must recognize Russian fears. We must continue to remind the Russians that NATO is not antagonistic to their interests. And, we must redouble our efforts to help the Russians so that they too can succeed in their economic and political reforms. As the resolution of ratification states:

The Senate finds that it is in the interest of the United States for NATO to develop a new and constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as the Russian Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations with its neighbors.

I hope that at some future date the Senate will consider specific measures to further this goal.

As tensions between the United States and Russia have subsided, the end of the Cold War has brought many long dormant ethnic rivalries to the surface. NATO expansion is a reasonable response to these developments: A broad based military alliance can help keep ethnic tensions from escalating into violence. As we have seen all too vividly with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions in Europe are still deep rooted. The world was taken by surprise at the atrocities that were unleashed in Bosnia and it took several years for the West to bring enough pressure on the parties to end the violence. We want to do what we can to prevent the dissolution of state militaries into murderous ethnic militias as took place in Bosnia. There are no guarantees, but by bringing the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into a broad based military alliance we are encouraging military cooperation and understanding and fos-

tering relationships that will make it easier to resolve major conflicts. Although NATO's primary purpose is not as a dispute resolution body, it is my hope that NATO can help prevent many of these disputes from emerging in the first place.

NATO's strength is that it is not only a military alliance, but an alliance of nations sharing democratic values. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made great strides over the last seven years demonstrating that their commitment to democratic institutions and political reform runs deep. Some have argued that political stability rests on economic stability and that we should press the European Union to admit the countries of Central and Eastern Europe before we engage them in a military alliance. However, free market economies are not the only key to stable democracies. The role of the military can make a difference in the long-term success of democracies. A military alliance that defers to civilian leaders can serve as an example of stable civil-military relations. I am confident that inclusion in NATO will strengthen democratic values in the new democracies of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

The NATO alliance has been a successful alliance. It is in our national interest to build on that success. For fifty years, NATO has united Europe and America in a common purpose, and with its strong emphasis on cooperation and a collective defense, NATO will serve as a building block for the security arrangements of the future. We have established some very important relationships in NATO. These relationships are a source of strength and they should not be abandoned. And, the strong ties we have with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic can be formalized by admitting them to NATO.

Earlier in the debate we reaffirmed the strategic purpose of NATO. I believe that as the threats of the future come into sharper focus, the strategic rationale for NATO will evolve. This will not happen overnight. And that is why I supported the Warner amendment. Before we remake an alliance that has served American interests and proceed with further expansion we need to spend more time thinking about the role NATO will play in our changing security arrangements. The Warner amendment also would have allowed us to step back from the process without specifically rejecting any of the nations of Central or Eastern Europe. Regardless of how long we wait before the next group of nations is admitted to NATO, we must closely monitor the integration of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about the cost of NATO expansion, an issue of particular concern to me. Although there have been numerous estimates, the most recent Administration estimate is that we will spend \$400 million over the coming decade to

cover the US share of NATO expansion costs. This is not a small sum. Consider, however, that we have already spent more than \$6 billion on US operations in Bosnia in the last two and a half years. If NATO can help prevent the Bosnians of the future, even if NATO expansion costs are double the Administration's current estimate, this will be money well spent.

I am disappointed that there is no consensus in the Senate to limit our spending in this area beyond the existing limit on the US contribution to the NATO common budget. I supported the Harkin amendment that would have placed a 25 percent cap on expenses that might be incurred to help NATO's newest members integrate their forces with NATO, and I will continue to watch spending in this area. As the Resolution of Ratification states: "the United States is under no commitment to subsidize the national expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments."

Our future is and always has been inextricably tied to Europe, a region that has been beset by war. After two devastating World Wars dominated the first half of this century, we have relied on the NATO alliance to help keep the peace during the second half. I believe that NATO expansion can also help us maintain peace and stability in Europe into the next century and for that reason the resolution of ratification to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic merits our support.

Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, almost 10 years ago, the wall that had divided Europe for more than a generation suddenly crumbled. Brave, freedom-loving people in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia took matters into their own hands, eventually toppling their communist governments. East Germans attacked their wall with gusto, and in a matter of months, Germany was reunited. Ever since that time, there has been talk in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary of joining the West in a more formal way, to solidify their break from the East, to recognize their conversion to democracy and free markets, and to insure against future aggression from the East. NATO membership was seen as one way to do this. Eastern Europe also recognized that economic development was critical to their success and sought economic integration with the West and access to its markets. Membership in the European Economic Union was a high priority for most states.

While the West spoke glowingly of the transformations taking place in the East, it soon became clear that there would be only meager amounts of foreign assistance and economic investment for the East, and access to new markets would remain limited. Western Europe and North America were wrestling with their own economic difficulties and fighting popular expectations that the end of the Cold War would bring reduced financial

commitments abroad. Increasingly, it became clear to many Eastern European governments that joining NATO was their best chance of getting membership in a western "club". NATO membership would address the historical and emotional anxieties of many East Europeans left by decades of domination and oppression by the East, and would provide western aid to modernize their militaries. While it wasn't what they needed most, at least it was something.

As the prospects of membership in the Economic Union faded, many East European governments jumped at the 1995 NATO announcement that it would consider taking in new members. NATO, led by the United States, was faced with the difficult task of deciding which countries would qualify for membership immediately and which ones would be refused, pending further political, economic and military maturation. The stakes were high, and in some cases, the disappointment was great. The United States made it clear to all who were not accepted that there would be other chances to join in the near future, that the door to membership would remain open. No clear vision of the shape or boundaries of NATO emerged from this exercise.

The decision to enlarge NATO also altered the context for the newly formed Partnership for Peace (PFP). Rather than concentrating on the quality of PFP discussions and ways that it could enhance regional security, the focus shifted instead to the benefits of full NATO membership. Rather than easing the tensions caused by the Cold War dividing line through the heart of Europe, enlarging NATO revived those tensions, once again creating a sense of "us" versus "them", and reducing the ability of the PFP to address the void left by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Americans feel the strong emotional pull of the countries who want to join NATO. We want to do what we can to reward them for their struggles and solidify their political, social and economic gains. We have little ability to pry open European markets, and few financial resources to commit to economic development programs. So NATO membership at first glance seems the obvious thing to do.

I have some very deep reservations about this course of action. For one, NATO membership will not provide what the new democracies of Eastern Europe need most—economic and political development. Secondly, NATO expansion may well jeopardize critical U.S. national security concerns that require close cooperation with Russia. Additionally, moving to expand NATO at this time cuts short the potential development of the PFP into a more innovative structure for handling the very diverse military concerns of its members who now span the globe from the Arctic Ocean to Central Asia to the Pacific Ocean. We also must recognize that estimates of the cost of NATO ex-

pansion vary widely, and it is likely that the American taxpayer will get stuck picking up a very sizable percentage of the costs. Finally, I do not believe that the American public has given sufficient attention to the question that is being asked of the Senate: Should we extend our very best security guarantee to more nations? Are we ready to commit US troops to the unconditional defense of even more territory? The Senate should not act until it is sure that the American people support this commitment.

Now is not the time to make this move. Let's think for a moment about the most immediate threat facing both Europe and the United States. It is not really a Russian attack upon Eastern Europe. The war in Chechnya showed that the Russian military is not even capable of putting down internal rebellion. Yet this is what NATO is designed to protect against.

A very real and pressing threat to U.S. and European security is the leakage of Russian weapons of mass destruction. An expanded NATO gives us no advantage in countering this threat, while at the same time cutting back on the degree of cooperation we will get out of Russia in addressing these threats. If we want to work with the Russian military, we must convince them that we are not escalating the threat against them. Much as we might say that NATO is not an aggressive alliance aimed at Russia, Cold War perceptions do not dissipate that quickly, and if Russia feels increasingly threatened, it will be even more reluctant to scale back its military capabilities, to ratify START II and to cooperate in other arms control initiatives. And these are things that matter very much to U.S. national security.

We have increasingly found that the resolution of most thorny international crises require some assistance from Russia. The standoff with Saddam Hussein over UN weapons inspections was the most recent example. Bosnia will continue to demand active US-Russian cooperation, and other efforts such as reducing the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia will be enhanced if we have Russian assistance.

The decision to move NATO closer to the borders of Russia may well have one other unintended and dangerous consequence—driving Russia into a closer relationship with China. China will continue to emerge as a greater presence on the international scene. And I believe we will have even more serious disagreements with its leadership. Russia is a part of this strategic equation. Our job now is to convince Russia that it shares our concerns vis a vis China, and that it is not in Russia's best interest to turn a blind eye to dangerous Chinese behaviors. But if Russia feels that a closer relationship with the West will not bring it greater security, then this will be a very difficult argument to make.

Mr. President, Senate ratification of this enlargement of NATO is just the

first step. Other countries are now very anxious to get "in" and eventually more of them are going to meet the stated qualifications for membership. Yet every new addition beyond the three before us today brings more trouble, both in terms of Russian reaction and challenges to the cohesion of the NATO structure. If NATO is unable to act decisively on matters that we feel are central to our security, it will be of diminishing use to us in the future.

I am quite concerned that by accepting these three countries today, we are increasing the pressure on others to join. Putting top priority on developing a close military relationship with NATO is not what these new democracies need right now. They should be focusing primarily on their economic, social and political development. I fear that we do them a disservice by holding up NATO membership as the best way to be "tied" to the West. After all, having a stable democracy and strong economic ties with one's neighbors has proven to be the most successful way to ward off both military and political strife.

If we proceed to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO, I believe we must be very cautious about any additional rounds. I have proposed an addition to the document before us that would require the Administration to report regularly to Congress on the status of discussions with other countries about joining NATO. Hopefully this will allow us to be more involved in the process before any new invitations are extended. I appreciate the Managers acceptance of my amendment. And I trust that the vigorous debate we have had on this issue will encourage much greater caution by the Administration and NATO in extending future invitations.

I know some Senators objected earlier to efforts to postpone consideration of this treaty. Yet, no matter where my Colleagues come down on this issue, I trust they all now will agree with me that U.S. foreign policy and the American public have benefited from the fuller debate we have had as a result.

In closing, Mr. President, let me say that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic deserve to be recognized for the great strides they have made in recent years. But I am not convinced that immediate full membership in NATO is the right answer for them or for us. And I am very concerned that the process this treaty sets in motion is one that we may well ultimately come to regret.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise in support of expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

As the Congress has considered this issue, I have evaluated the arguments for and against NATO expansion. There are compelling arguments on both sides. However, on balance, I have concluded that this round of NATO expansion should be supported.

The first question I asked myself in making this vitally important decision is whether expanding NATO serves America's national security interests. I concluded that it does.

America has fought two brutal world wars in Europe, and we have thousands of troops stationed in Bosnia. Our vital interests in promoting European stability and democracy are clear.

I believe that NATO expansion will promote stability in Europe. The mere possibility that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic might be invited to join NATO created a strong incentive for them to resolve peacefully longstanding ethnic and border disputes and to improve ties with their neighbors. Hungary, for example, concluded Basic Treaties on Understanding, Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with Slovakia and Romania in 1996, and its relations with Romania are greatly improved. Clearly, Europe is more stable as a result, and that is good for America.

While I hope tensions will not arise in the future among any of these new members, they may. If these countries are not NATO members, our ability to prevent tensions from boiling over into full-blown conflicts will be more limited. Experience has shown that NATO can play a constructive role in resolving conflicts between members, helping reconcile former adversaries like France and Germany and moderating tensions between Turkey and Greece. It could play the same role in mediating conflicts between new member countries.

NATO strength has come from the fact that it is not only a security alliance but also a political organization. Just as it has been a force for stability in Europe, so it has been a force for democratic development. Now that the Cold War is over, that political role will be increasingly important. By including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO, the U.S. and NATO will have a greater ability to influence the continued democratic development of these countries.

Furthermore, expanding NATO will advance America's long sought goal of defense burden sharing. We've spent a considerable amount of time in the Senate debating the costs of NATO. But few have talked about the benefits of including three countries that are willing and prepared to share the defense burden in the Alliance. Already prospective members are working with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program and serving with American troops in Bosnia. All three would have supported American air strikes in Iraq. They're willing to pay their fair share and contribute to the collective defense. The West ought to welcome them.

The second question I asked in making this decision, Mr. President, was whether each of the prospective NATO countries meets the five criteria articulated in 1996 by then Secretary of Defense Perry: commitment to demo-

cratic reform; commitment to a free market economy; good neighborly relations; civilian control of the military; and military capability to operate effectively with our other NATO allies. I am satisfied that each of the countries the Senate is being asked to approve for NATO membership meets these criteria.

In Poland, where communism once reigned, democracy is flourishing. Seven free and fair elections have been held since 1989, and two democratic changes in the government have taken place. A new Polish constitution has been approved in a popular referendum. The judiciary is independent, and the press is free.

As a result of Poland's economic reform program, the country currently has one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. The private sector is thriving and currently accounts for about two-thirds of GDP and about 60% of the country's work force.

Poland has good relations with all seven of the states it borders. Its new constitution codifies civilian control as well as parliamentary oversight of the military. And American officials have determined that Poland has the most capable armed forces in Eastern Europe.

Hungary receives high marks on each of these criteria as well.

A stable, parliamentary democracy, Hungary has had two democratic changes of government since 1989 in free and fair elections. Its governmental institutions are stable, and its judiciary is independent.

Since 1989, the country has implemented price and trade liberalization, extensive privatization and instituted important legal changes. That almost one-third of all foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe has been attracted to Hungary speaks to the strength and attractiveness of its economy.

After many years of tension, Hungary has made tremendous strides in improving its relations with neighboring countries, such as Romania, where large concentrations of ethnic Hungarians reside. New Treaties with Slovakia and Romania include important provisions on ethnic minority rights and reconfirms Hungary's commitment to respect existing borders.

Importantly, Hungary's military is under civilian control, and its armed forces are reorganizing to meet NATO standards.

Finally, Mr. President, there is the Czech Republic, a parliamentary democracy which has held three free and fair elections since 1989. Vaclav Havel, a former political prisoner and human rights advocate, serves as President and conscience of the country.

The economy of the Czech Republic has been so transformed that nearly 80% is currently in private hands, an astonishing amount for a formerly centrally planned economy, and 65 percent of the GDP is generated by the private sector. Since 1991, the Czech Republic

has operated on a balanced budget. Relations between the Czech Republic and its neighbors, including Germany and Slovakia, are sound. And the Czech military is under civilian control.

As a Member of the Helsinki Commission, I am aware of the issues that continue to form a part of the U.S.-Czech bilateral dialogue, including property restitution problems and discrimination against the Romani minority. At the same time, I believe that Czech leaders are committed to resolving these problems and I am committed to working with the Czech Government until they are.

I am keenly aware, Mr. President, that there are some risks involved in expanding NATO and that many are deeply concerned about the impact that expanding NATO will have on our relations with Russia. I have thought long and hard about this risk. I have discussed it at length with Undersecretary Pickering, and I have concluded that while NATO expansion may create some complications in our relations with Russia, those difficulties can be managed.

Despite the fact that most of the Russian political elite say they oppose enlargement, Russia continues to pursue a cooperative relationship with the U.S. Public opinion polls in Russia reveal that the vast majority of the Russian public would rather cooperate with than confront the enlarging Western alliance.

Even on arms control issues, progress is being made with the Russians despite the debate over NATO expansion. For example, Russia has continued to implement START I reductions in strategic forces. In fact, I am told that Russia is dismantling its strategic nuclear forces more rapidly than the Treaty requires.

Despite the fact that NATO was well on its way to expansion, at the March 1997 summit in Helsinki, President Yeltsin agreed to the outlines of a START III accord, and he agreed to urge the Duma to ratify START II. Importantly, there are signs that the Duma will move forward and ratify the START II agreement this summer because, according to Duma speaker Seleznev, it "meets Russia's interests."

There are other positive signs regarding arms control. While NATO expansion was being debated, Russia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. It also continued to work with the U.S. on adaptation to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

While I do not have a crystal ball, and I cannot predict the future of arms control, I am encouraged by these signs. They indicate to me that this round of NATO expansion will not derail arms control.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. Expanding NATO will erase Stalin's artificial dividing line. Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia ended up, against their will,

on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain after the Second World War. Now that democracy is flourishing in each of these countries, it is to America's advantage to erase that dividing line and bring them into the NATO alliance. We expanded NATO in 1952 when we allowed Greece and Turkey to join. We expanded it in 1955 when we allowed Germany to join. And we expanded it in 1982 when we invited Spain to join.

We should expand it now by allowing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join as well.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, after much consideration of the pending resolution of ratification to expand NATO, I intend to vote in favor of this resolution. It is in the national security interest of the United States and our allies. But, as the Senate continues this historic debate on the expansion of the NATO alliance to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, I would like to make some observations about the cost implications of expanding NATO and steps we have taken in the Senate to address them.

When the Senate committees began to consider NATO expansion last year, I was skeptical. The Senate, I feared, was approaching this issue with insufficient information or appreciation for the costs of such expansion for the American taxpayer.

That is why I joined with our colleague from Texas, Senator KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, on a letter of June 25, 1997, to the President requesting specific facts and analysis regarding the cost and military implications of NATO expansion.

I continued to pursue the cost issue last October, when the Senate Appropriations Committee held a series of hearings on this important issue. On the first day, the committee heard about the policy implications of NATO expansion from Defense Secretary Cohen and Secretary of State Albright. The next day, the committee heard about the military implications from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command, General Clark.

What came out of both days of hearings was the fact that no definitive estimates existed for the true costs of NATO expansion.

The committee heard how the original Defense Department estimates may have been inflated because they took into account a fourth country, rather than only those three currently invited to join NATO. Those estimates also considered a greater Russian threat than actually existed because of that country's recent reductions in force. The generals testified that, first, specific military requirements will be developed; then, NATO will determine the costs for meeting those requirements.

The third day of those hearings was critical. On October 23, 1997, I asked a witness from the General Accounting Office to provide for the Committee a

definitive analysis of the cost of this expansion. During that hearing, I expressed my concern that no official estimates yet existed about what the U.S. contribution will be to an expanded NATO. In fact, the title of the GAO report summed it up—"Cost Implications for the United States Remain Unclear."

The hearing also revealed that the GAO cost estimates lacked critical information, such as the \$60 million in bilateral aid which the U.S. had already provided the three invited countries. In response to my question, the GAO conceded the \$60 million was American taxpayers' money and should be counted.

Ultimately, I was informed that an accurate projection could not be provided for some months.

Then in February of this year, the administration provided much lower figures for the U.S. share of NATO expansion—approximately \$40 million each year over the next 10 years. This estimate stood in stark contrast to the much larger figures that had been quoted just months before.

Because of my concerns about the unpredictability of future expansion costs, I joined the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator STEVENS, on his amendments as an original cosponsor. The Senate adopted these amendments earlier this evening. They establish limits on the U.S. share of the common NATO budget and ensure Congress has the necessary authority to keep close watch over these costs in the future years of expansion.

Another important aspect of the cost issue is the expected contributions from the new members of NATO. Although Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made tremendous economic strides since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, there have been concerns about their ability to live up to their individual cost commitments to NATO. It is important for the Senate to fully consider the commitments from these countries so the American taxpayers will not be forced to shoulder an unfair burden in the future. Therefore, I obtained letters of commitment from each of these Governments and ask unanimous consent that the text of the letters be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. CAMPBELL. Before I close, I want to recognize the work of our former distinguished colleague in this body from the State of Colorado, Senator HANK BROWN, who is one of this country's most ardent supporters of NATO expansion. Few have played a more crucial or steadfast role in the effort to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the NATO alliance. His outstanding work will have a lasting impact.

After much consideration of the cost and military implications of the pending resolution of ratification to expand

NATO, I intend to vote in favor of this resolution. It is in the national security interest of the United States and our allies.

EXHIBIT 1

WARSAW, FEBRUARY 28, 1998

Hon. Mr. TRENT LOTT,
Senate Republican Majority Leaders,
Hon. Mr. TOM DASCHLE,
Senate Democratic Minority Leader,
Washington, DC.

DISTINGUISHED SENATORS: The Senate of the United States of America will soon vote on NATO enlargement with respect to Czech, Hungarian and Polish membership. It will be an important political decision with particular implications for the security of many nations, especially of those from Central and Eastern Europe.

Decisions of the member state of the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States' decision particularly, will provide our region, which suffered so much in the XXth century, with stability, security and lasting democratic order.

As leaders of all parliamentary caucuses in the Polish Parliament—those ruling as well as in the opposition—we assure you, Honorable Senators, that this question of Polish membership in NATO is vital for security of the Euroatlantic region and enjoys overwhelming support in our society.

Poland as a future member of NATO would like to be not only a security consumer but also a security provider. At the same time, we are determined to fulfill all necessary Alliance obligations—including financial ones.

It is our hope that the United States Senate will meet the expectations of millions of Poles and will give consent and advice to the President of the United States to ratify the Protocols of Accession.

We address ourselves to you, as American Statesmen, to use your authority to assure the successful outcome of the Senate vote on NATO enlargement.

We remain, respectfully yours,

LESZEK MILLER,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Democratic Left Alliance.

JANUSZ DOBROSZ,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Polish Peasant Party.

MARIAN KRZAKLEWSKI,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Solidarity Election Action.

TADEOSZ SYRYJCZYK,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Union for Freedom.

JAN OLSZEWSKI,
Chairman, Parliamentary Group, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland.

THE AMBASSADOR OF HUNGARY,

April 28, 1998.

Hon. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL,
U.S. Senate,
380 Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR CAMPBELL: As the U.S. Senate continues its debate on the enlargement of NATO and the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the Alliance, I am writing to you as the representative of the Hungarian Government in the United States. I highly appreciate your interest in this matter important for both the security of the United States and that of the European continent. I understand that you need assurances of our countries commitment to share the financial burdens of the enlargement.

Earlier last year, the Hungarian Government decided to raise the ratio of defense expenditures within the GDP by 0.1 percent annually until Hungary reaches the average level of defense spending by current NATO members of the same size as Hungary. Given the 4%+ growth of our GDP, this commitment will result in a 8-10% yearly increase of defense spending in real terms. Since both domestic and international financial institutions project the same or more growth in the years to come, it will be an "increasing slice of a growing pie" and my country's commitment to meet all the financial obligations stemming from our accession is supported by a solid economic background.

Mr. Senator, I remember that during the Appropriations Committee hearing last fall, you raised a concern that the U.S. cost implications would be unclear until NATO adopts its Target Force Goals report. It is true that this study will be adopted in June by the NATO Ministerial, however I should clarify that the Target Force Goals include military requirements to be fulfilled by the 3 nations. These requirements are national expenses and to be exclusively financed by the applicants, thus, they would not have an impact on the U.S. costs. It is clearly stated in one of the conditions of the Resolution of Ratification that "the United States is under no commitment to subsidize the national expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments". As a matter of fact, during our recent accession talks Hungary underwent a thorough "screening" by NATO which resulted in a conclusion that all the military requirements of NATO accession can be paid from the existing defense budgets.

With the above, I would reiterate the commitment of the Hungarian Government to pay all the necessary expenses of our membership. It is our fundamental interest to successfully adapt into an alliance that continues to be successful. This approach is supported by all the parliamentary parties of Hungary. This was also communicated to the U.S. Senate: our Foreign Minister visited Washington twice during the last half a year and meeting your distinguished colleagues as well as the leaderships of both aisles, he assured them about our firm commitment.

Enclose please find the Hungarian Government's memorandum on the enlargement that includes the financial commitment, as well. The memorandum was disseminated in the Senate in February.

I hope you will find the above useful in your consideration. I look forward to a continuing cooperation with you.

Sincerely yours,

DR. GYÖRGY BÁNLAKI.

MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY ON THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Hungary considers the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a unique historic step that will expand the zone of stability and security to the benefit of all countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. Hungary's accession to NATO is a decisive step in the process of firmly anchoring itself in the community of democratic nations, with whom it shares values, interests and goals. Hungary is determined to play its part in ensuring international peace and justice, democracy and fundamental human rights, the principles and practice of the rule of law and a free market economy. The Hungarian Government is convinced that the strengthening of the transatlantic link assured by NATO is an indispensable prerequisite of the security of both present and future members of the Alliance.

Hungary's accession to NATO is based not only on the consensus of all parties represented in the Hungarian Parliament but also possesses an overwhelming support of Hungarian citizens. This was manifested in the impressive result of the referendum held on 16 November 1997 on the country's accession to the Alliance.

It is the firm intention of Hungary to provide for its own security and contribute to the security of all its Allies within the framework of a cohesive, strong NATO, based on solidarity among its members on both sides of the Atlantic. Hungary fully accepts all responsibilities and obligations and wishes to enjoy all rights stemming from membership.

Hungary accepts the broad approach to security as outlined in NATO's Strategic Concept. Hungary is determined to participate fully in NATO's Integrated Military Structure and in Collective Defense Planning. Hungary will commit the bulk of its armed forces to collective defense and is ready to commit forces, as necessary, to other NATO missions as well.

Hungary will allocate adequate budgetary resources for the implementations of its commitments. The country's sustainable economic growth and the envisaged increase of defense expenditure will provide solid foundation for fulfilling them.

The Republic of Hungary fully supports the continued openness of the Alliance, as stated in the Madrid Declaration. Hungary has a vested interest in seeing all countries of Central and Eastern Europe become members of the Alliance that wish to do so, once they have fulfilled the criteria of membership. Hungary remains committed to supporting their efforts and to sharing its experiences gained during the accession process.

In the period to come Hungary will further intensify her efforts to successfully complete her preparation for membership.

The Hungarian Government expresses its gratitude to all those in the United States of America, civilians and military alike, who have helped the entire process of Hungary's accession to NATO with dedication and a high level of professionalism.

The Hungarian Government hopes that the upcoming discussions and debates on NATO enlargement in the Senate will reflect the constructive approach that has consistently characterized the United States' position in all earlier phases of the enlargement process. Legislators in both current and future member states are facing the historic challenge of making a decision that will shape the future of the Euro-Atlantic region for a long time to come.

EMBASSY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
3900 SPRING OF FREEDOM ST. N.W.

Washington, DC, March 18, 1998.

Hon. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR CAMPBELL: The Embassy of the Czech Republic appreciate your interest in the contribution the new NATO members will make to the common defense of the North Atlantic Alliance.

I can assure you that the Czech Republic is ready to bear its share of the costs of NATO enlargement. In September 1996, the Czech Government decided to increase the military spending by 0.1% of the GDP annually until the year 2000. The 1998 budget adopted by the Parliament last December provides for a 22 percent increase in defense spending as compared with the previous year.

Attached please find statements of Czech officials on the costs of NATO enlargement and basic data on Czech military expenses.

Sincerely,

ANOTNIN HRADILEK,
Deputy Chief of Mission.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I rise today in support of Senate approval of extending North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For me this issue is very clear, admitting these countries into NATO will strengthen the Organization, reinforce new democracies, renew the American commitment to European security, and reaffirm American leadership in international relations and diplomacy.

The United States plays a pivotal role in international relations because of our position as the world's only military and economic superpower, and as the world's strongest democracy. The existence of NATO is one of our best hopes for relieving much of the burden of that role. NATO initiatives can prevent international incidents from becoming serious military conflicts by encouraging member nations to work together to resolve conflicts. The success of NATO initiatives depends entirely on the support and participation of member nations. Ratification of this NATO expansion resolution is a test of whether the United States will stay engaged in a changing and evolving Europe.

If NATO was not regularly reinforced and reinvigorated, the world's only superpower, the United States, would necessarily be involved in every international conflict and crisis. There is overwhelming bipartisan support for the notion that the United States taxpayer should not be responsible for policing the world, and that this should increasingly be an international responsibility. While I share this belief, I also have a personal interest in NATO expansion. My oldest son Brooks is in Bosnia as part of a NATO support effort. As NATO becomes more inclusive, the chances of going to war for all countries decreases. Likewise, as more countries join NATO, spreading the burden of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, fewer American soldiers will be needed abroad. This is a positive blessing for all Americans.

Nevertheless, there are some who oppose the expansion of NATO and others who would like to place limitations on expansion, eroding the body's effectiveness. Because Russia and the rest of the world know that NATO is a defensive peacekeeping body, not an offensive regime, the current fears that an expanded NATO will directly threaten relations with non-NATO member neighbors are inflated. Instead, including eastern European countries in NATO will lead to increased stability in the region, something good for all countries throughout the world. Additionally, efforts to preclude other countries from joining NATO over a specified time period and attempts to limit the powers of the Organization

are not well thought out. Limiting the mission of NATO would not be wise, particularly because we would be limiting our own abilities in the future. And a mandated pause would undermine the open door commitment that NATO has had since 1949. All countries have always been welcome to join the fold of NATO and all countries should forever remain welcome to join an Organization committed to peace and security. The United States cannot walk away from the role of leadership in Europe. By what we have witnessed in Bosnia, Europe is at a very fragile stage. We must embrace the European countries that wish to be a part of a world alliance for peace and security, and we have a moral obligation to strengthen Europe and reduce the possibility of war in the region. The door to NATO must remain fully open, not half closed, to those nations equipped to shoulder the responsibility and reforms necessary to meet NATO membership standards.

With regard to the cost of NATO expansion, I believe that equitable financial involvement of member nations should be enforced. The U.S. should do what it can to support NATO to an extent equal to efforts of other countries involved. It is imperative that NATO expansion costs be kept as low as possible, and I do not believe that substantial expenditures to upgrade the new entry militaries is necessary or wise. Instead, I applaud the efforts of NATO to prioritize communications infrastructure, language skills, and strategic training for new members over big ticket items as the immediate criteria for NATO membership. It should also be noted that the governments of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic estimate that they would spend more on defense, not less, if they remain outside NATO. Although the United States will have a proportional increase in overall NATO expenditures, I believe the cost of forgoing NATO expansion is much greater.

For these reasons, I fully support Senate approval of extending North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Admitting these countries into NATO will strengthen the Organization and reaffirm American leadership in international relations and diplomacy. President Clinton announced his support for NATO enlargement in 1994 and in 1997 the Senate held over ten hearings on this issue. Debate on this issue has been extensive and thorough. NATO expansion is good for America and for the world.

Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to make a few remarks about expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO.

I believe in a United States that is an activist leader and respectful participant in world affairs. This leadership comes with responsibilities that are often difficult for the United States: troops stationed and foreign aid dollars expended abroad; cooperation with

international organizations like the United Nations; and the decision on NATO expansion that is before the Senate today. U.S. leadership abroad remains a vital national interest to the American people. My record as a United States Senator is strongly in support of a United States fully engaged with the world, a country and a people that participate and lead the international efforts to address the many problems that transcend borders and cultures.

NATO, since its founding in 1949, has been a successful foundation of U.S. security and cooperation with our European allies. This was particularly true throughout the period of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and communism can be partially credited to NATO; both to the alliance's collective defense arrangements and to its complimentary role in bringing Europe together which has fostered democratic and economic ties among countries with historical and cultural grievances. NATO has played a significant role in creating a Europe free from serious conflict for nearly 50 years.

The Senate is now considering whether to enlarge the sixteen member alliance by admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Few will deny that these three countries are prepared and committed to assuming the responsibilities of NATO membership. Few will contest the statement that these three countries have long ties to the West; that these three countries are the most Western states of the former Soviet bloc. And few will assert that these three countries face any military threat from Russia or other foe, either today or in the foreseeable future. I am confident that the enormous changes that have taken place in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will not be jeopardized by the upcoming vote. These changes including the creation of democratic institutions, new respect for human rights, and a growing market economy all enjoy enormous public support and will be continued regardless of Senate's decision on NATO expansion.

I do have a number of very serious concerns about NATO expansion including several which have been addressed through the amendment process. My concerns have very little to do with the three candidates for NATO expansion. In fact, I believe the United States and our allies should take aggressive steps to support these burgeoning democracies which have demonstrated so much promise since the fall of the Soviet Union. Each of these countries has a remarkable story to tell and each is deserving of closer ties to the United States and the West.

I voted for the amendment offered by Senator HARKIN to call for an accurate accounting of all expenses to the United States related to NATO expansion. The Senate and the American people ought to better understand the obligations we are assuming if we agree to NATO expansion. I have no confidence in the various cost estimates

that have been presented during this entire process. In fact, I am fairly certain the costs to U.S. taxpayers will exceed even the Administration's highest estimates. The various cost estimates for NATO expansion have ranged from \$1.5 billion to \$125 billion.

Opponents of the Harkin amendment argue that the U.S. is not issuing a blank check on behalf of our taxpayers. Certainly, Congress will object to escalating costs for NATO in the future and particularly if a significantly larger NATO burden falls upon the United States. However, my concern is that without a full accounting of costs, the United States is assuming a new moral and financial obligation to NATO without adequate consideration by the Senate. U.S. prestige and our position in the world should not be risked at some future point because we did not know or were not prepared to consider today the full costs on NATO expansion.

The Moynihan amendment to link NATO expansion with admission to the European Union also addresses my concerns regarding the most appropriate forum for integration between the West and the many former Soviet satellite states seeking closer ties with Western Europe and the United States. Senator MOYNIHAN has been an articulate voice throughout this debate and I do agree with many of the eloquent points he has brought before the Senate. I voted for the Moynihan amendment as I believe European Union membership is the most appropriate of the available forums for integrating with the West the three nations invited to join NATO.

These three countries are in various stages of economic development and each is committed to improving the lives of its citizens through closer ties to the West. In my mind, the European Union is a far better vehicle for economic growth and integration with the West. Participation and inclusion in the EU and its marketplace will pay dividends for the people of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary that far outweigh the security assurances inherent with NATO membership.

The European Union has begun negotiations for EU admission with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and several other countries. Frankly, I am very skeptical that the EU will in a timely manner admit new members. The EU has a history of protected industries—particularly agriculture—and I doubt Europe's protected industries will be anxious to take on lower wage countries or significant agricultural producers. Export states here at home, like my state of Washington, have long sought to open Europe's protected market and system of state subsidies. We should be careful not to aid or validate Europe's trade practices which have hurt the United States.

Admission to the EU is a question for EU countries to consider, however, I do not think we should give the EU the opportunity to settle for NATO expansion. Europe has the strongest interest in the success of many former Soviet

states. The EU, including the European states who do not belong to NATO, should also be expected to make sacrifices to ensure a peace for all time in Europe.

My vote for the Moynihan amendment should be viewed as a call for new thinking on the shared objective of bringing the newly independent nations of Europe into the existing political and economic system. We have to ask ourselves if the tools of the Cold War will work for the U.S. and Europe as we enter a new century.

The impact of NATO expansion on our relationship with Russia is my most significant concern on this issue. I am delighted so many of my colleagues have raised the issue, both those who favor expansion and those who oppose it.

Unfortunately, I believe that the impact of the vote we are to cast today will have very little effect on the U.S.-Russia relationship. For I believe, from the very beginning of the expansion process, we have pursued a process and a policy that has seriously damaged our relationship with Russia. I believe the Administration has erred greatly here and our foreign policy will be affected by it for years to come regardless of the outcome of the NATO expansion vote.

Already, numerous Senators have cited the historic work of George Kennan. I also take his counsel very seriously and I encourage my colleagues to ponder his words from a 1997 New York Times opinion piece. Mr. Kennan wrote, "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking."

Kennan's final words are particularly troubling as he states, "... to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking." One needs only look at recent weapons inspection crisis with Iraq to see the worsening ties between the U.S. and Russia as a result of NATO expansion. There are other examples of the growing divide between the U.S. and Russia: cooperation with Iran on ballistic missiles, agreements with China to counter a world with one superpower, and an assortment of other nuclear weapons related issues from declarations on the first use of nuclear weapons to ratification of START III and the eventual negotiation of START. All of these issues are vital to the United States and all have been negatively impacted by NATO expansion.

It goes without saying that Russia does not dictate to the United States our foreign policy interests and policies. However, U.S. policy makers should not underestimate the degree to

which Russia matters to our own future. Russia is the largest nation in a new Europe. Any attempt to guarantee the future peace and security of Europe by excluding Russia creates more problems than promise for the future.

NATO Expansion fails to consider the political landscape of Russia. Approximately two-thirds of the Russian Duma is controlled by communist and nationalist parties. These political parties are very anti-American and the West. The Russian Constitution grants enormous powers to the Presidency that have allowed the West to underestimate Russia's opposition to NATO Expansion.

My fear is we have undermined those in Russia who are advocating and following the course of democracy, international cooperation and economic reform. I hope the Senate does not revisit the words of George Kennan with immense regret in future years. The Administration and the Senate now must take it upon themselves to rebuild those ties with Russia to go forward and address our many shared interests for the future. Vice President Gore has been instrumental in building ties between our two countries, and I certainly encourage him to continue his leadership role with Russia's new prime minister.

I have discussed in detail my concerns with NATO expansion. This has been a very difficult decision for me. In the end, I was swayed by one additional, very powerful concern.

This powerful concern is for U.S. credibility. I do believe U.S. credibility is on the line with this vote. Regardless of the wisdom of NATO expansion, I fear that rejection of NATO expansion at this point will send dangerous messages to the world about U.S. intentions for the future. The international community will view a rejection of this initiative which was started and driven by the United States as a sign of U.S. isolationism. Allowing that message to be sent around the world will, in my mind, be far more damaging to U.S. interests worldwide than admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Quite frankly, I think the Administration has marginalized the United States Senate on the question before us today. While I doubt that the Administration intended to do this and I know the Senate has been active and engaged throughout this process, the result is the same. The Senate, as I see it, has little choice in the matter before the body today. To reject NATO expansion at this point will also cause serious long-term problems for U.S. interests throughout the world.

Therefore, I will vote for NATO expansion.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to engage in a colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Delaware, the Minority manager of the resolution of ratification regarding NATO enlargement.

I had planned to submit an amendment to the resolution of ratification as I discussed in my floor speech of October 27, 1997. This amendment, simply put, would express the Sense of the Senate that the United States should consult with all NATO member nations, subsequent to the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic but prior to the consideration of any other nation for accession, concerning the desirability of establishing a mechanism to suspend the membership of a NATO member if it no longer conforms to the Alliance's fundamental principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

Mr. President, I raised this issue with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when he testified before the Armed Services Committee on January 29th. In response to my question as to whether NATO should have a mechanism to suspend a member, Secretary Kissinger stated:

I think in situations in which a government emerges incompatible with the common purpose of the Alliance, there ought to be some method, maybe along the lines you put forward. I have not thought this through, but I fully agree this is a very important issue which does not apply to any of the new countries that are now before us.

I also raised the issue of establishing a mechanism for suspending a NATO member with former Secretary of Defense William Perry when he testified before the Armed Services Committee on March 19th. I posed the question in the context of a NATO nation that no longer conforms to NATO's fundamental principles but still has a veto over NATO operations. Secretary Perry stated:

That is a very good question, Senator LEVIN. What you are describing is a problem—in fact, I would call it a flaw—in the original NATO structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my judgment, this is a problem which should be addressed. It has been a problem for many, many years. And, therefore it is important, in addressing that problem to separate it from the issue of NATO accession. I would not in any way want to tie that issue to the NATO accession issue.

We could have predicted several decades ago that that would cause a problem, there would be some major issue come up on which we could not reach consensus, and that would bring NATO to a halt, or that some member would depart from the NATO values. Happily that has not happened. But it is a potential problem, and I think we ought to address it.

Mr. President, I do not intend to offer this amendment at this time because it has nothing to do with Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic and I do not want to suggest or imply any such connection. Nevertheless, I do believe it is an issue that needs to be raised within NATO councils. I believe it should be resolved before any additional accessions to NATO are considered. And so, I would ask the distinguished Senator from Delaware if he believes this is a matter that merits consideration?

Mr. BIDEN. I agree with the Senator from Michigan that this is an impor-

tant matter that raises fundamental issues for the United States and our Allies. I believe that this is a matter that merits careful consideration within NATO councils. It would certainly be preferable for NATO to discuss this in a careful and measured way now, rather than to be faced with the issue at some future time when an emergency situation exists. I want to commend the Senator from Michigan for raising this matter. I also commend him for not seeking to amend the resolution of ratification, for, as he has correctly noted, this issue is not related to Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I have voiced a number of concerns with regard to the Administration's open-door policy on NATO enlargement, and in particular the implementation of that policy with regard to the Baltic states.

Over the last few days, the Administration and Sen. BIDEN and his staff have worked closely with myself and my staff to address my concerns.

I wish to confirm with Sen. BIDEN and Sen. HELMS that my understanding of certain provisions in the NATO resolution, as modified by the Manager's Amendment, is correct.

First, there is the issue of consultations with the Senate. I understand that the Resolution, as clarified by the Manager's Amendment, states that the Senate will be consulted prior to the U.S. consenting to invite any European state to begin accession talks with NATO, as was done for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic at Madrid last year. This would apply for the Baltic states, and for any other European state seeking admission to NATO. Is that correct?

Mr. BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Second is the issue of U.S. security commitments. The NATO resolution contains a provision stating that only "a consensus decision by the full membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each NATO member * * * will constitute a security commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty." This means that a political document, like the Baltic Charter, which has not been approved by the Senate pursuant to constitutional treaty-making process, does not constitute a U.S. security commitment to the Baltic states. Is my understanding of that provision correct?

Mr. BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. BINGAMAN. The third concern that I wish to address is whether the United States, in signing the Baltic charter, has "pre-committed" to support Baltic membership in NATO in the future. The Resolution, as modified, contains a provision to the effect that, other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the United States has not consented or committed to invite any other country to join NATO in the future. My understanding of this provision is that it reflects the fact that the Baltic Charter of Partnership does not constitute a U.S. pre-commitment to

NATO membership for the Baltics, and that presently the United States has not consented or committed to support NATO membership for any European state (other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) that may seek to accede to NATO. Is that understanding correct?

Mr. BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I want to begin my discussion of this very important issue by commending the people of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for their brave and determined transition to democracy and free market economies. The citizens of these three nations have suffered grave injustices and brutal atrocities during World War II and the Cold War and now, to see these nations emerge from these dark days and turn toward democracy, deserves the praise of every man and woman who cherishes freedom.

I also want to express my strong support for the security and independence of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. I also believe the United States and its military forces will support the independence of these nations whether or not they join NATO.

While I want to encourage the move toward democracy, free markets and Western values in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, I also want to see these values take root in Russia. It is because of my concern that a vote now on NATO expansion will hinder our relations with Russia and risk the Duma's ratification of the START II Treaty that I will vote against NATO expansion at this time.

I have spent a good deal of time and effort discussing the issue of NATO expansion with a number of U.S. foreign policy makers and military leaders. I have given this question a considerable amount of thought because I believe before the United States commits itself to defending additional nations, with U.S. nuclear weapons if necessary, we must carefully consider all of the ramifications of this action.

As I look at the current security situation in Central Europe, I do not see a security threat that necessitates a vote to expand NATO today. What I do see however, is a weakened superpower in Russia with thousands of nuclear weapons that can reach the United States.

I think if anyone looks at the lessons of the end of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles, it shows that the harsh terms of the peace imposed on Germany fed the antagonisms that allowed Adolf Hitler to come to power. That, I believe, is the real threat we face today.

At present, we have an historic opportunity to bring Russia into the West and cement Russia's commitment to freedom, democracy and free enterprise. On the other hand, we can expand NATO, right up to Russia's border, and we can thereby inadvertently recreate a Russia that is a threat to U.S. security and peace in Central Europe.

It is ironic that by adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO we may create the security danger these nation's fear. More importantly, by voting to expand NATO today I believe we run the risk of undercutting the supporters of democracy in Russia and fuel the fears of those who want to restore an aggressive, imperialist Russia that will then require billions of dollars in additional American taxpayer money to deter.

This is not idle speculation, this scenario is real and it is here now. At present, the Russian Duma has refused to ratify the START II Treaty and this action has led the United States to maintain nuclear armed ICBMs, SLBMs and ballistic missile submarines that we would otherwise deactivate under the START II treaty. In fact, the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal would drop from about 6,000 warheads under START I to 3,000 under START II. Department of Defense figures indicate by fiscal year 2000 it will cost hundreds of million of dollars to keep the U.S. nuclear arsenal at a START I level.

While we wait for the Russian Duma to ratify START II, the Secretary of Defense, our friend Bill Cohen, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, believe that we must keep our forces at a START I level to keep the pressure on the Russian Duma to ratify the treaty.

Therefore, when the supporters of NATO expansion discuss the costs associated with adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the alliance, I would ask that they add the cost of keeping U.S. nuclear forces at a START I level to their calculations. Let the record show, no Administration official has stepped forward to argue that a Senate vote to expand NATO will encourage the Russian Duma to ratify START II.

In fact, in a conversation I and several members of the Senate Armed Services Committee had with Alexie Arbatov, a member of the Russian Duma and a democratic reformist, Mr. Arbatov told us that NATO expansion undercuts democratic reformists ability to promote cooperation between NATO allies and Russia. He continued to tell us that expansion of NATO to include these three countries will delay Russian ratification of START II.

The Washington Post recently included two articles describing the degraded state of Russia's nuclear arsenal. These articles also confirm the extensive testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee which documents Russia's growing reliance on nuclear weapons.

As my colleagues, know, Russia's economic problems have resulted in a huge reduction in that nation's conventional capability. This reality has led Russian policy makers to enunciate a policy stressing a reliance on nuclear weapons to defend Russia's security interest.

We therefore find ourselves in a situation, under the proposed NATO expan-

sion, where we are extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella closer to Russia's border, and literally to Russia's border in the Kaliningrad province which borders Russia, at a time when Russia is increasing its reliance on weapons of mass destruction to defend its interests.

Given Russia's growing reliance on nuclear weapons, I believe it is dangerous for the United States to push the border of NATO eastward to Russia's border at this time.

Administration officials tell us NATO expansion is not directed toward Russia, indeed some offer the hope that Russia will eventually join NATO, but I ask these officials do the Poles, the Hungarians and the Czechs believe NATO is their defense against Russia? Of course they do!

I also question the logic of those who say Russia is free to join NATO. If Russia is allowed to join NATO, what is the real mission of NATO? If Russia and everyone else who wants to is allowed to join NATO, is NATO still a self-defense alliance or is it then a new version of the United Nations?

I believe NATO expansion at this time will decrease U.S. national security because I believe it will hinder joint U.S.-Russian efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. According to a February editorial in the New York Times by Howard Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye, "frictions over NATO distract Moscow and Washington from profound common dangers." At the top of the list of the "profound common dangers" is the threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This enormous challenge begins with our effort to control the nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and nuclear scientists in Russia. All of these crucial non-proliferation programs require the active cooperation of Russia and a vote today to expand NATO does not contribute to this cooperation.

As it stands today, even my good friends on the other side of this issue will agree Russia's conventional forces are weak and getting weaker. Russia's plans for new conventional weapons systems are slowed and reduced. Russia cannot afford to regularly pay the members of her armed forces. Instead, Russia has turned efforts inward to refocus and rebuild their country; and, with our help, Russia may reemerge with a strong market economy rooted in freedom and democracy. Without a doubt, Russia's continued evolution toward the West will have the greatest impact on long term U.S. security.

Mr. President, I support efforts by the United States and the European Union to help Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to become strong democracies with robust market economies. But I also want Russia to continue on the road to freedom and democracy so I therefore will oppose the resolution to expand NATO at this time.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the expansion of the North Atlan-

tic Treaty Organization to include the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. The inclusion of these three countries will alter the Alliance, but the benefits clearly make this expansion both timely and worthwhile.

In 1949, if the founders of NATO had been asked to predict where the alliance would be five decades later, few if any could have foreseen a more extraordinary success. The NATO nations stood firmly together as the great bulwark against communism during the Cold War. NATO is, without doubt, the most successful security alliance in history.

The original purpose of NATO was to protect the West against the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. Now, even though the Cold War is over, NATO continues to be essential. It makes sense to adopt this modest expansion of the Alliance beyond its Cold War borders to include three nations which were once part of the Warsaw Pact.

The greatest threats to European security are now the long-standing ethnic conflicts that have simmered inside many of these nations for centuries. Two world wars in this century began in Central Europe. Extension of NATO's security umbrella to these three additional nations will place them in a part of Europe where wars no longer happen.

Obviously, there are concerns about the expansion of NATO that Congress and the country must be sensitive to—especially the potential impact of this expansion on our relationship with Russia.

We have rightly spent much of the past decade and billions of U.S. taxpayers' dollars in working with Russia to achieve nuclear arms reductions and to help Russia safeguard its nuclear arsenal and its nuclear materials. Russian cooperation with the U.S. under the Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program and our bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaties with Russia have substantially reduced the chance of nuclear war. In my view, anything that would disrupt or harm this vital progress would be a fateful error.

Many of Russia's leaders do not support NATO's invitation to Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic. But the addition of these countries to NATO poses no threat to Russia. I commend President Clinton for his effective leadership in making this point clear. We must continue to work to assure President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders that the expansion of NATO is not a danger to their country or their security. We must do all we can to address Russia's concerns and increase our cooperation in all key areas with Russia to ensure that our goal of a more secure future is achieved.

We must also deal with the concerns over costs, especially the costs that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have to bear to upgrade their military forces to NATO standards.

These costs will inevitably have to compete with pressing domestic needs in those countries.

Together, these three nations will have to spend as much as \$14 billion over the next 10 years to meet NATO standards. These costs are the responsibility of these prospective new members. They committed to pay these costs when they asked to become members of NATO. The U.S. already pays 25% of NATO's commonly-funded expenses. NATO expansion should not impose costly new burdens on U.S. taxpayers.

Nevertheless, these countries are on the right track, and so is NATO. This expansion of NATO is amply justified. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will strengthen NATO. They are solid democracies, and they will make our alliance for peace even stronger. Their rightful place is in NATO, and I urge the Senate to support this Resolution of Ratification.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, later this evening the Senate will conclude debate on a resolution of ratification authorizing the United States to support the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The decision that the Senate takes with respect to this resolution will have an historic impact on the future of Europe and the nature of the Transatlantic partnership that will take us into the next millennium.

Without question, NATO has been the singularly most successful alliance for mutual defense in modern history since its establishment in 1949. For nearly fifty years it has served as a bulwark against communism, and as a deterrent against threats posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites.

Today the world has changed. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and the Warsaw Pact is fast becoming a mere footnote in our history books. In that context, it seems to me to be a particularly appropriate moment to review whether and how NATO's role should evolve, to keep pace with the changing political landscape.

Some changes have already been undertaken by NATO. For example, not too long ago NATO members agreed that it was an appropriate mission for NATO forces to assist with efforts to implement the Dayton Peace accords in war torn Bosnia.

Certainly the debate this week is as much about such matters as it is whether Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic will be good NATO partners.

The debate is also about the merits of admitting additional members beyond these three—and the order and timing for doing so. And, it is about the budgetary implications of an enlarged organization with an expanded land area requiring collective defense. Finally, it is about the impact on U.S. and NATO's relations with Russia and other NIS countries and the implica-

tions for internal Russian political stability.

These are all important and legitimate areas for discussion. The Senate's debate on these questions has been thoughtful and constructive. Senators WARNER, MOYNIHAN, HARKIN and others have asked some very important questions that deserve answers before moving forward to take NATO from 16 to nineteen members and beyond. It would be foolhardy not to carefully assess these matters before making changes to NATO.

I agree with those who have held up a yellow flag urging caution. Certainly it behooves us to act judiciously in reshaping NATO to ensure that whatever we do does not undermine the effectiveness or efficiency of the current organization. Nor should we foster expectations in Eastern and Central Europe that cannot be fulfilled—or create additional and unnecessary financial burdens on existing or new members.

I also believe that it is important that we take into account the implications for our current and future relations with Russia and other former Soviet states. And particularly with respect to Russia's continued willingness to move forward to ratify Start II and other future arms control agreements.

While I agree with those who suggest it would be wrong to give Moscow veto power over NATO decisions—on the other hand, I see nothing to be gained from causing unnecessary uncertainty or anxiety with respect to our intentions toward Russia.

After the many hours of debate we have had on the pending measure, I believe a strong case has been made in favor of admitting these three new members. Foreign policy experts and scholars who have spent a great deal of time studying NATO over the years make a persuasive case in support of expansion.

I also believe that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen, together with other Clinton Administration officials, have during hours and hours of Congressional testimony made a very compelling case in favor of ratification of the pending protocols. Former Presidents Bush and Carter have endorsed the President's decision. As have a number of our distinguished former Secretaries of State and former members of the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also adequately addressed concerns that have been raised with respect to NATO expansion.

During the July 8, 1997 Madrid Summit, NATO heads of state, including President Clinton reached common agreement at that time to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the organization, while leaving open the door to other interested governments. However, no commitment was made with respect to the sequence or timing of such additions.

That was appropriate in my view. It goes without saying that we must assess any impact of enlarging NATO by

three on that organization's ability to continue to fulfill its primary mission—namely collective self-defense—before moving forward to consider additional new members.

Realistically, such an assessment is likely to take three or more years by my estimation—in line with the time frame fame Senators WARNER and MOYNIHAN have included in their so called pause reservation. Having said that, I really do not think it necessary to codify this time frame into a binding proposition. In fact, the time period could even turn out to be longer than three years. Were we to codify the time period, we might in fact be creating false expectations in the minds of countries waiting to join that invitations will automatically be forthcoming once three years have elapsed. It was for those reasons that I voted against this amendment earlier today.

It is important as we review the current structure, purpose, and membership of this important organization that we remain mindful of the central proposition—the organization's relevance to today's and tomorrow's realities. We should ask as well whether and what changes best further U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Only after such questions have been fully explored should we move forward to alter NATO.

I believe that during the course of the current debate we have exhaustively reviewed the implications and U.S. interests at stake with respect to the pending protocols. I am satisfied that the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will enhance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by strengthening and fostering European unity and security.

There is little doubt in my mind, Mr. President, about the likely outcome of the final vote on this matter. In my judgement the United States Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification, and thereby authorize the United States to consent to the admission of these three members.

Mr. President, I will join my colleagues in voting aye on this matter. To do otherwise would severely undermine the cohesive support that has existed for NATO since its establishment in 1949 and leave us ill prepared to promote a strong, secure, and united Europe in the 21st century.

THE COST OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is no more complex issue than the financial cost of NATO enlargement.

Over the past two years there have been several studies by private and by governmental organizations, which have yielded widely differing estimates.

The highest figure reached one hundred twenty-five billion dollars over ten years, with over thirty billion of that accruing to the United States. The most recent—and I believe the best—estimate is NATO's own cost study, which estimates only one-and-a-

half billion dollars in direct costs over ten years. According to the latest estimate, the expected U.S. contribution to the direct costs of enlargement are estimated to average forty million dollars per year for ten years.

There are good reasons for the vast disparities in the estimates—basically there was a lot of “apples and oranges” mixing going on.

Explaining all this requires a fair amount of effort, which, I regret, some of the critics of enlargement either were unwilling to give, or which they eschewed for the easier route of utilizing unexplained, raw data for partisan purposes.

Mr. President, at this time I would like to examine the cost issue.

The 16 NATO nations collectively spent about \$455 billion on defense in 1997. Of that total approximately \$1.6 billion goes to the NATO common budget.

What does the NATO common budget pay for? Let's take the airbase at Aviano, Italy, as an example.

The host country, Italy, maintains an airbase that has been designated for NATO use. Italy pays for all costs related to the base except new construction and improvements that benefit the United States Air Force units stationed there. These improvements, above and beyond the national needs of Italy, comprising some \$260 million, are paid for by NATO's common budget.

One of NATO's founding principles was (and remains) equitable cost sharing—that is, nations make financial contributions to offset costs based on their ability to pay.

In the 1950's, the U.S. paid almost 50% of NATO's operating costs. In the 1960's, however, our European allies assumed about half of the original U.S. contribution in recognition of our worldwide security commitments.

Since then, our overall national contribution to NATO's three common budgets has been reduced to about one-quarter. Our allies account for the other three quarters of NATO operating costs.

We participate in NATO at a reduced rate, but we receive security benefits that far outweigh our financial contributions.

Let's take a closer look at where our annual contributions to NATO's budget go.

NATO has three budgets, each supporting a distinct aspect of NATO operations.

NATO's Civil Budget pays for the operating costs of NATO's modest, 1960's-vintage headquarters building plus associated staff in Brussels.

Additionally, there are numerous public information, political, and scientific activity programs supported by this budget, including civilian elements of NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace activities.

The annual U.S. contribution is provided by the State Department.

NATO's Military Budget provides support for NATO's military head-

quarter (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and other elements of the integrated command structure.

This budget also supports operations of several key NATO military agencies, like the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, the NATO C3 Agency, for example, and the costs of running the NATO AWACS fleet.

Annual contributions are paid from Department of Defense Operations and Maintenance funds.

NATO's Security Investment Program pays for construction of the facilities and installations NATO uses to support alliance military activities, such as command structure C3 support, force mobility projects, and training facilities—in other words, infrastructure.

It is also used to support common-user procurements to meet priority military requirements set by SACEUR and SACLAN, like integrated air defense and interoperable communications systems.

U.S. contributions to this budget are obtained from Department of Defense Military Construction funds.

As I said, the U.S. pays approximately one-quarter of the overall NATO common budget.

If there were no enlargement in 1999, we would still expect to pay about \$458 million.

Now let's turn to the costs of enlargement. NATO has estimated that over 10 years, the cost to the NATO common-funded budgets will be about \$1.5 billion.

While the amount may not be distributed evenly over 10 years, let's accept for the sake of discussion that it will.

This means that the U.S. quarter-share will be about \$400 million over 10 years, or about \$40 million a year.

This represents only a 9% increase in our total contribution to the NATO common-funded budgets.

Bearing in mind that the U.S. share of NATO's common-funded budgets represents only one-tenth of one percent of the current defense budget, I believe that enlargement expenditures are a pretty good deal.

The key questions for us should be: Is the \$1.5 billion figure accurate? What is the U.S. share? and Is the U.S. share a fair share?

Anyone who has looked at this issue would, I believe, agree that it is extremely confusing.

There are lots of numbers out there on enlargement costs in addition to the \$1.5 billion.

You will recall that the Administration told us in February 1997 that the total cost of enlargement would be about \$27 to 35 billion.

Let's look at those numbers.

First, as the General Accounting Office (GAO) has pointed out, the Administration's estimate included two categories of costs that are not direct enlargement costs.

The first was costs to current NATO members—\$8 to 10 billion. These are the national costs the current allies

needed to spend to meet their commitments under the revised 1991 Strategic Concept to improve their mobility, reinforcement, and power projection capabilities.

They would incur these costs even if NATO did not enlarge.

That's why GAO said the Administration made a mistake in including them in the February 1997 estimate.

The U.S. has already met its power projection requirements, so we would not have additional costs in this area.

The second figure in the February 1997 estimate, which is not counted in the final NATO study, represented the costs to new members to restructure and modernize their militaries—\$10 to 13 billion.

They would incur these costs even if they did not join NATO.

Once again, this is why GAO said the Administration goofed in including these costs in their February 1997 estimate.

This leaves us with \$9 to 12 billion in direct enlargement costs.

Of this \$9 to 12 billion, the Administration said in February 1997 that about 60% would be eligible for NATO common funding.

The rest of these direct enlargement costs would be picked up by the new members.

For example, there is the procurement of something called Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) gear—you need to have it if you're in the Alliance—but NATO common funding won't pay for it.

60% of \$9 to 12 billion is about \$5.5 to 7 billion.

This is the number we should start with when comparing the NATO estimate of common-funded costs of \$1.5 billion.

What accounts for the difference? \$5.5 to 7 billion versus \$1.5 billion?

I just talked about the top half of this chart * * * above the dash line.

Let's focus on why the Administration's \$5.5 to 7 billion estimate and NATO's \$1.5 billion estimate are different.

First, there is the matter of four versus three new members. The Administration did its estimate several months before the decision in Madrid. The extra member counts for about \$1.1 billion. That brings us down to \$4.9 to 6.2 billion.

The February 1997 estimate did not have the benefit of detailed responses by the three to NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) or the benefit of site visits to the three countries' facilities conducted by SHAPE military experts.

The infrastructure turned out to be much better than expected. This is a key point. In February 1997, we thought we had a lot of work to do to bring airfields up to NATO standards.

The reality is that a number of the Polish, Czech and Hungarian airfields are in very good shape. The earlier Administration assumptions about the capacity of the airfields to host NATO aircraft were incorrect.

For example, during Partnership for Peace exercises, a Hungarian airbase successfully hosted a Dutch F-16 squadron, that is, the Dutch F-16s landed, were serviced and refueled, and took off again.

With regard to funding eligibility: The Administration assumed NATO would pay for some works that NATO later determined were national responsibilities.

There were also some pricing differences. The U.S. used generalized cost factors and pricing, while NATO used by-item, historical cost data from their files.

While there were some military requirements differences between the U.S. and NATO studies, these were modest and not operationally significant. What are we getting for \$1.5 billion? Is it the right set of requirements? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says it is. What are those categories?

C31 Requirements include: Cross border connections, transmission media, terminal and security equipment; Upgrades to military headquarters interface equipment; C2 info systems, including the NATO-specialized functional area sub-system; and a NATO satellite communications (SATCOM) terminal for Hungary.

Air Defense Requirements include: Air Sovereignty Operations Center communication links to airfields; NATO air defense ground environment C2 sites; Interface to the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS); Installation of Combined Air Operations Centers in Hungary and Poland; Upgraded air defense radars; and Air Command and Control System acquisition.

Necessary reinforcement improvements (land, air & maritime facility upgrades) include: Tactical fighter airfields; An AWACS and air-refueling forward operating base; Rail and storage facilities for land reinforcement; Petroleum, oil and lubricant facilities; and Maritime facilities.

Training and exercise improvements include: Upgrades to air and ground communications, Tank and vehicle wash facilities, Movement costs for new allies' exercise participation, and Costs for minor construction and administrative travel.

Now I would pose the question: are these the right requirements.

I have confidence in the positive assessment of these requirements given by General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Department of Defense has assured us that the scenarios which these requirements have been planned against include robust assumptions.

These assumptions have changed from the Cold War assumptions of about 40 to 60 divisions coming across the border with less than 24 hours' warning, to scenarios of 10 to 20 divisions with 60 to 90 days' warning.

We can discuss the specifics in a classified setting.

But I am satisfied that the requirements are based on reasonable assumptions, and that they include sound, worst-case analyses, given the current security environment.

To sum up, the most recent NATO estimate of the direct costs of enlargement appears to be sound.

The annual costs of NATO enlargement to the United States are real, but they are affordable, constituting only a tiny fraction of our annual defense expenditures. For them, we gain three loyal allies with a quarter-million troops. The costs are, in short, a bargain.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate is considering whether Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary should be admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is one of the most important foreign policy issues to be considered by the Senate in recent years, and the outcome will shape the future direction of NATO and our military relationship with our European allies.

In addressing this question, we should begin with the fundamentals, by examining the past and future purpose of NATO. NATO is a collective security military alliance, with the original purpose of defending Western Europe from a possible attack by the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact. When considered from that perspective, NATO stands as one of the most stunningly successful alliances ever conceived. Not just because it maintained the peace for over forty years—other alliances in human history have kept the peace for longer periods of time. The success of NATO cannot be judged merely by time, but also by the scope of its mission. For, unlike previous military alliances, NATO was not intended merely to prevent another conventional war, but also to deter nuclear war. At stake was—and still is—nothing less than the preservation of global civilization, and the world owes a debt of gratitude to the alliance and its leaders for maintaining the peace.

Some have argued that NATO also serves to maintain democratic traditions, since its original purpose was to protect Western democracy from an attack by an authoritarian Warsaw Pact. Today, NATO continues to defend those democratic values, which are part of the criteria in the decision to expand the membership of the alliance.

Nonetheless, NATO continues to be, first and foremost, a defensive alliance. Critics of NATO expansion question whether Russia perceives NATO to be defensive or offensive, and argue that the admission of the these three new members will "alarm" Russia. These critics believe that Russian nationalists will perceive the expansion of NATO to be the enlargement of an offensive alliance aimed squarely at the heart of Russia, rather than the enlargement of a defensive agreement among nations inclined to keep, not break, the peace.

The question of Russian nationalists, and their future role in their own country, speaks to the core of the issues surrounding the future of NATO. The question is not only how Russian nationalists react today, but also whether the most militaristic and virulent nationalists might gain power in the future, and whether that could pose a renewed threat to peace in Europe.

Russia is unstable in virtually every societal area—her economy is weak, her military in shambles, and civil order is increasingly dominated by violence and corruption. Although we all sincerely hope that this wounded bear will regain her health and settle into a peaceful way of life that protects the interests of all her citizens and which deals fairly and openly in the community of nations, it is not at all clear that democratic traditions will survive within that nation for the next ten years. Some have argued that the expansion of NATO could be a factor in bringing the nationalists to power. The available evidence suggests that this is not the case. The Yeltsin government has publicly accepted the expansion of NATO, and public opinion polls indicate that the Russian populace is barely aware of this question, and everyday Russians do not have strong opinions on the question of NATO expansion. They are far more concerned about bread and jobs than they are about NATO.

If authoritarian nationalists are to gain power in Russia in the future, that sad scenario will be caused by the fundamental instability of Russian democratic institutions, and the general collapse of the economy, not by NATO expansion. If nationalists seize power, and impose a new militaristic dictatorship upon Russia, it will pose a new threat to the peace of Europe, and the continuation of NATO will be essential to again preserve that peace. We might again face the question of a newly hostile Russia that possesses a still formidable arsenal of nuclear-tipped missiles.

I would also note that critics of NATO expansion argue this question both ways. They argue that we dare not enlarge NATO because it might irritate or anger the most virulent of the Russian nationalists, yet those same critics do not address the question of the threat posed by a future rise to power of those very same nationalists.

In the event of the rise to power of authoritarian nationalists in Russia, NATO would be strengthened by the admission of these three nations. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic occupy key geopolitical positions in the heart of central Europe. For that reason alone, their addition to NATO is of strategic importance. These three nations have also met the criteria for membership, and their inclusion in NATO would more firmly cement their ties to the U.S. and Western Europe.

Another related question is whether we should enlarge NATO now, or wait until some undefined future date.

There is little to be gained through delay, since the Russian government has largely accepted the addition of these three countries to NATO. The diplomatic and political conditions are not likely to be any better in the future, and there is a serious risk that circumstances may only worsen. For example, if militaristic nationalists gained power in Russia in the future, they would likely vehemently object to any expansion of NATO. NATO would likely not act to expand the alliance in the face of such Russian opposition, fearing that it might lead to renewed cold war tensions. The bottom line is that we would not be able to expand NATO at the very time that such enlargement would be in our national interest. Under such circumstances, NATO might deeply regret not including Poland, with the geopolitically important Polish plain, as part of NATO.

It is probably true that some xenophobic Russian nationalists will tell their people that NATO enlargement poses a threat to their country. But we know, as do they, that this argument is entirely false. NATO is inherently a defensive alliance. Its military structure revolves around the defense of its own territory, and not around the launching of offensive operations aimed at subjugating Russia. We cannot base our foreign policy upon the paranoid concerns of the opponents of democracy in Russia. They will advance arguments to undermine democracy and U.S.-Russian relations regardless of what we do.

Another important question is whether there should be another round of NATO enlargement, and if so, which nations should be included. Critics of NATO expansion have argued that a decision to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic implies yet another round of expansion, and that if we start down this path, we will inevitably include even more nations into NATO.

In my opinion, there is nothing inevitable about this at all. I am voting on the admission of three nations, and only three nations. My vote to admit those three does not imply either approval or disapproval for any other nations. If this or any future administration decides to recommend another round of countries for admission to NATO, that recommendation must receive the consent of the Senate to become a reality.

I want to clearly separate our vote on enlargement today from any vote in the future on other nations. I recognize that there are deep-seated concerns about the possible future admission of the Baltic nations of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. These are important questions, which would be carefully evaluated by the Senate, and any decision involving the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic stands by itself.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has performed a vital role in maintaining the peace and deterring catastrophic nuclear war. I believe that the

enlargement of NATO, by including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, will further strengthen that role in the future. Therefore, I will cast my vote in favor of expansion.

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. It is the right thing to do, right now.

Fifty years ago, President Harry Truman perceived the very real threat to our national interest posed by the rise of Soviet Communism in liberated Western Europe. He understood that although turning a blind, isolationist's eye to trans-Atlantic affairs may have seemed attractive in the short term, it could prove far more dangerous and costly to American interests in the long term. Therefore, it was absolutely in our national interest to promote and defend abroad our values of democracy and opportunity against an aggressive and oppressive Soviet regime. To that end, we fashioned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—a collective security agreement with fifteen of our allies. With NATO, insuring that Western Europe's democracies flourish—and that its economies grow—became a top U.S. priority, and rightly so.

Fifty years later, the results are impressive and worth examining. By instituting collective security among its member nations, NATO achieved collective stability. This stability allowed Western Europe to enjoy one of its longest periods of sustained peace and economic development ever. It has recovered remarkably from the scourge of two World Wars, and free markets have thrived inside of democratic institutions. NATO not only deterred the Soviets from aggression, but so strong is our alliance that since its inception no NATO country has ever been attacked. Of course, this success has not been achieved without sacrifice or without cost. However, the price of peace is a mere fraction of the cost of war.

Clearly, the mission of NATO needs to be adapted to the post-Cold War world. The threat is no longer the clearly defined ominous shadow of Communism; but the threat of instability is just as real. The Cold War has ended, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been dismantled, but now is not the time for passive complacency. Just as the war-torn countries of Western Europe did fifty years ago, the emerging democracies and economies of today's Eastern Europe need NATO security to rebuild and to thrive. And now, like then, it is in the national interest of the United States that this occur.

Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will sustain current and future economic reforms. It will promote cooperation and peace among neighbors. NATO's presence also will fill a dangerous military and political vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, and further ce-

ment European security by uniting East with West.

As well as increasing global security, NATO expansion will have tangible economic benefits. Free but untapped markets in this part of the world hold tremendous economic potential for U.S. exporters. And undoubtedly, the prestige, the security, and the validation that comes with NATO membership will have a profoundly positive psychological impact on the minds of foreign investors.

Throughout this process it was important that the invited nations demonstrate that they are willing to make the sincere commitment required of NATO members, and it seems to me that they have. Politically, economically, and diplomatically, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland show great promise that they will become strong partners in our alliance.

Poland, for example, has just witnessed its second democratic change of government since 1989 as a result of fully free and fair elections. Its new democratic constitution was approved last year by national referendum. Economically speaking, Poland is sound. Its economy has been one of the fastest-growing in Europe since 1993, and the private sector now accounts for two-thirds of its gross domestic product. Poland has also codified civilian control and parliamentary oversight of its military. On the diplomatic front, Poland has resolved outstanding differences with its neighbors, including Ukraine, with whom it recently signed a declaration of reconciliation. These diplomatic efforts would not have been possible but for the promise of NATO expansion.

After forty years of dictatorship, democracy now reigns in Hungary. All six of its parliamentary parties support entry into NATO. The Hungarian government upholds human rights, freedom of expression, rule of law, and an independent judiciary, and it too has twice held free elections since the fall of Communism. While attracting almost \$16 billion of direct foreign investment, Hungary has engaged in a strict stabilization program and cut its budget deficits substantially. And on the diplomatic front, Hungary has recently signed treaties with Romania and Slovakia, thus ending territorial disputes that had existed for generations. And the government has agreements with its neighbors, including Ukraine, to cooperate against organized crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

The story is much the same in the Czech Republic, which has a constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press. Two national elections were held in 1996 for the legislature, and they were free and fair. Since 1989, the Czech Republic has engaged in tight fiscal policy, liberal trade practices, and privatization of state enterprises. As a result, unemployment is low and inflation is controlled. It maintains

strong relations with its neighbors, especially Germany—its leading foreign investor—and with Poland, as the two countries have harmonized their approaches to European Union and NATO membership.

I would now like to make some comments about some of the amendments we have voted on.

First, I want to say that I opposed the amendment which would have linked admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to admission to the European Union. While NATO and the EU have overlapping membership, they have different missions. NATO is a collective defense organization designed to protect and defend the territory of its member states. The EU is not a military but an economic alliance of European states which does not include the United States. It also does not include Canada, Iceland, Norway—which by the way rejected EU membership—nor does it include Turkey.

The question I have is why would we want to allow an organization of which the US is not a member, to dictate our security interests? Another concern I have about this amendment is that it would ultimately—and unnecessarily—delay NATO enlargement, since Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are not members and have only recently been invited to begin the process of joining.

Second, I opposed the amendment which would have mandated a three year pause on new members. Article 10 of the NATO charter provides a mechanism to enlarge the alliance. This article has successfully worked for 50 years in bringing new member states into NATO. I strongly feel that this amendment would not have helped NATO, but rather have added an additional and unnecessary layer of bureaucracy to the process.

The amendment also would have dampened the spirits of other countries who eagerly want to join NATO. Many of these countries have made significant sacrifices—both political and economic—to prepare themselves for future NATO membership. Enacting this amendment would have reduced the incentives of these countries to continue these important reforms. I would like to point out, however, that there is no commitment at this time to invite other nations to join NATO.

Let me conclude. Through democratic and economic reforms, these three nations have invested in long-term stability. NATO membership promotes confidence in this regional stability, thus making it even stronger.

If this century has taught us anything, it is that European instability ultimately becomes our problem. By admitting these committed and deserving nations to NATO, we will strengthen our alliance and expand the dividends of peace and prosperity to a level unprecedented in modern history.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today regarding the topic before us:

Senate ratification to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to allow for the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

I wish to commend Senator HELMS and Senator BIDEN for their sustained efforts to investigate thoroughly the issues inherent in this historic move.

As befits the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous public hearings and provided many briefings and reports giving consideration to all aspects—and all views—regarding this historic move.

The Budget, Appropriations, Armed Services and Intelligence Committees in both bodies of Congress have further contributed to this valuable debate. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era in which we now find ourselves, I don't believe any issue has been more thoroughly vetted, and I thank my colleagues and the leaders of the relevant committees for their efforts.

I have lent a great deal of thought to this issue. Amid the euphoria of 1989, when many focused on the stunning collapse of Soviet occupation throughout central and eastern Europe, we had to recognize that a yawning geopolitical vacuum had just opened. For the first few years we correctly focused on assisting the Germans in their successful reunification efforts, but as nascent democratic and free markets institutions arose in central Europe, the United States stepped in to assist and solidify these developments.

The costs to us of solidifying these institutions were significantly less than the costs of waging the Cold War, but the benefits we saw—in terms of the freedom spread where darkness reigned for nearly half a century—were so much greater.

Mr. President, I have regularly visited the countries that will soon be accepted as NATO's new members, sometimes on my own, sometimes with other members, and regularly with our delegations to the North Atlantic Assembly, recently under the leadership of my colleague Senator ROTH. I have met with their political leaders, their military representatives, and local analysts on many occasions, as I have sought to measure their level of democratic advancement.

In 1995, I was honored to address the first multinational graduating class from the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary, where the FBI now works with law enforcement officials from throughout central Europe to assist in combating criminal challenges to us all.

Democracy is strong in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The rule of law is established, civilian control of militaries is well-established, and these nations rightly take their place alongside the nations of the West.

There are a few voices, Mr. President, who argue that what the nations of central Europe need more than NATO membership is economic development. This is the essence of the amendment

proposed by my respected colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN, which requires European Union membership prior to the deposit of our instrument of ratification.

With great respect for the senior Senator of New York, I must disagree: Yes, the countries of central Europe require economic development, but it is mistaken, in my view, to believe that economic development and geopolitical advantage are exclusive of each other.

The European Union has only planned for joint defense capabilities; NATO has preserved the territorial integrity for its members for nearly half a century. The European Union excludes the United States; but the United States leads NATO. Therefore, subjecting determinations for future NATO expansions to the European Union is not only unwise, it is, in my view, illogical.

Mr. President, you have heard this many times already in this debate, and I daresay you will hear it many more times. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the most successful treaty defense organization in human history.

Twice, before the founding of NATO, the United States was drawn into wars on the European continent, where we suffered huge losses of blood and treasure. An unbridled Germany and an unstable central Europe were predominant reasons for the calamities that became these world wars. The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO in 1955 firmly established free Germany into the community of western democracies. With the unification of Germany in 1990 following the collapse of the Soviet empire, the integration of Germany was complete. Throughout that period, NATO succeeded by the virtue of its defensive cohesiveness and its deterrent effect on the European continent.

Today, we are set to integrate three important nations of central Europe, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. With their integration, geopolitical space in central Europe will be firmly incorporated into the territory protected by the defensive military alliance of NATO.

As the report accompanying the resolution of ratification asserts correctly: "With the enlargement of NATO, the United States and its allies have an opportunity to build a more stable Europe, to lock in that stability, and to replace the dynamics of confrontation and conflict with trust and cooperation."

Some have asserted that no threat exists to legitimize such an enlargement to the alliance now.

Mr. President, the extension of geopolitical stability in Europe is an insurance policy against the future development of regional threats. The United States, and the United States Senate, should not need to wait for the development of an imminent threat in order to implement sound geopolitical strategy.

NATO's mission has always been subject to certain applications beyond the core mission to defend territory. These applications have reflected consensus among members regarding military challenges, and I am hesitant to amend this resolution in any way that would impose definitions or mechanisms that might politicize the carefully honed language of the original North Atlantic Treaty.

I believe the language of the resolution sufficiently asserts the central mission and strategic rationale for this enlargement.

It is entirely reasonable for the Senate to carefully review the costs that this enlargement will incur.

Through the years of considering this move, many numbers have been manufactured: the range has been startling and the spin has been confounding.

I suppose it is somewhat predictable that attempts were made to politicize these numbers, but the scrutiny of many committee hearings have provided great focus. I am confident that the most recent GAO and CBO estimates are accurate: a total of \$1.5 billion in increased U.S. contributions over the next 10 years. For increasing the geopolitical stability well into central Europe, this is a sound and defensible expenditure.

A great deal of debate has focused on the consequences of NATO enlargement on Russian geopolitical behavior and U.S.-Russian relations.

I am not convinced of any direct causality between NATO's decision to enlarge and the content and direction of Russian foreign policy. I think historians and analysts of Russia concur with my view.

Despite an unprecedented U.S.-Russia relationship that has developed over the past decade, a relationship that has seen billions of U.S. assistance go to the development of Russian democratic institutions, a relationship that has seen Russian and American troops serving side-by-side in Bosnia, some believe that this expansion of NATO will poison our efforts, or will, in the words of some, "scare the Russians."

I have visited Russia many times in my career in the Senate, most recently three weeks ago. Senator GORDON SMITH, who is chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I had many meetings with the Russian foreign policy establishment, including Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, responsible for U.S.-Russia relations, and Andrey Kokoshin, Secretary of President Yeltsin's Security Council. We met with a number of Duma and Federation Council members. We discussed many aspects of our bilateral relations, and NATO was reviewed in every meeting.

Every Russian official I met in Moscow objected to NATO enlargement. Yet every official I met denied that they believed NATO posed a military threat to Russia's territorial integrity,

and every official I met admitted that, despite being unhappy with this enlargement, they were all reconciled to this development. Mr. President, no Russian—not one—told me that NATO enlargement would be a legitimate cause for reversal of Russia's domestic evolution toward democracy.

Not one Russian official told me he was afraid of NATO enlargement. Not one Russian, Mr. President, objected to the new contiguous border between Poland and Kaliningrad.

I must admit that I find this objection raised by opponents to enlargement to be somewhat bizarre. Since Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952, NATO had a long border with what was then the Soviet Union—we used to have nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles in that border country. We also had a contiguous border between NATO and the Soviet Union along Norway's eastern border with the Kola peninsula, behind which the Soviet Union's strategic naval forces resided.

And now we have opponents objecting to a border with Kaliningrad, which is not contiguous with Russia itself? Or, even stranger, there are those who analogize the Kaliningrad situation with a Russian alliance with Mexico along our southern border.

Such an argument would have been denounced 15 years ago as "moral equivalence." Today, the Kaliningrad argument is ahistorical and simply dilatory.

Every Russian I met three weeks ago told me they still objected to NATO enlargement, but told me also they wanted to work with the Founding Act instrumentalities and were eager to continue and expand our many levels of bilateral cooperation.

The enlargement of NATO that this body will pass in the next few days is not short-sighted, Mr. President, but the most significant foreign policy act before the end of this century.

It has been long-considered, and, frankly, desired even longer. I recall the days when we looked across the Iron Curtain to countries we knew had once had Western, democratic societies.

I hope this is not the last enlargement, although I am confident that future enlargements, if they occur, will occur with the same detailed, painstaking consideration as we have conducted over the past four years.

Over the course of this debate we will hear quoted many testimonials by Americans from all walks of life, both parties, and all regions in favor of the move we will ultimately take.

It is particularly significant to me that the American Legion, as well as the American Veterans of Foreign Wars, have endorsed NATO enlargement. These men and women know the territory; they know the history; and they know the price. I'm proud to be associated with them on this important issue.

Mr. President, I am a strong supporter of this historic move. The coun-

tries formerly imprisoned by the Soviets have come out of the cold, have elected democratic governments that have established the rule of law, civilian control over their militaries and individual liberty and free markets. They have all indicated strong support from their publics for NATO membership and its responsibilities.

A geostrategic vacuum, long a source of instability on the European continent, is being filled—by an organization that is strictly defensive, with absolutely no offensive intentions. The action this body takes in the next few days—by ratifying this protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty—will not only extend stability into central Europe, but will extend the promise of peace and stability into the next century.

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DEWINE). The Senator from Missouri.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, may I inquire as to the order of business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution is open for general debate.

Mr. ASHCROFT. I thank the Chair. I am pleased to have this opportunity to make some comments about NATO expansion, particularly as it relates to the resolution of ratification for protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty.

As was evident earlier, I had an amendment which was designed to challenge a transformation of NATO that would take place as a result of the resolution of ratification which would essentially expand the scope of NATO.

I would refer Members of the Senate to the New York Times of last Friday, April 24.

The editorial is identified as "The Senate's Duty on NATO." It reads as follows:

The ratification resolution promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere in the world. That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military operations demands extensive debate.

Here you have the New York Times drawing attention to this expansion of NATO's scope and mission. It says that the mission of NATO is being—in the words of the New York Times—changed when the resolution "promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere in the world." To change the nature of a treaty promiscuously, as the New York Times suggests, without asking the Senate to ratify the change, is a dangerous and troubling precedent. It is inappropriate.

I have raised this issue of NATO's broadened mission throughout the debate on NATO expansion. I raised it before this New York Times editorial was published, but I am very pleased that they would draw attention to this "startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military operations." I don't think you can expand a treaty's license to conduct military operations without consulting the Senate and obtaining this body's advice and consent.

The New York Times stated this issue demands extensive debate. I proposed that we debate it, and I proposed

that we curtail this expansive extension of the ability of the NATO alliance to be involved in military operations around the world, regardless of whether they are related to NATO's collective defense mission. Frankly, I am very disappointed that the Members of the Senate have not engaged in extensive debate in this area—an area in which the Senate has been largely ignored by an administration which seeks to transform NATO into an entirely new organization. Treaty creep is what is occurring and NATO is being altered from a defense of territory organization to a defense of interest organization. The interests of NATO nations can be pursued around the globe, with international deployments of NATO forces not necessarily for the defense of NATO territorial integrity or political independence.

The New York Times properly says this expansion of NATO's scope demands extensive debate. I am sorry to say that the Senate decided to walk away from its obligation to oversee the ratification of this fundamental change in the treaty. By tabling the amendment, the Senate has failed to address an issue of fundamental importance for the future strength of NATO and the security of the United States.

It is not every day that I agree with the New York Times, but I think the article is insightful and clear on this point. I would like to take just a few minutes—and I will use some of these charts—to indicate the missed opportunity of the Senate to look carefully at what is happening to the mission of NATO. I intend to vote against the ratification of this treaty, if for no other reason than the promiscuous expansion of NATO's mission endorsed in this resolution of ratification. This shift from a defense of territory to a defense of interests is a tremendous question that must be addressed with regard to the future of NATO.

Let me just refer the Senate to the statement of William Perry, the immediate past U.S. Secretary of Defense. He was one of the architects of the treaty expansion that is before us. Here is what he says:

The original mission of NATO—deterring an attack from the Soviet Union—is obviously no longer relevant.

Then he goes on.

The original geographical area of NATO responsibility is no longer sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is no longer appropriate. . . . The new missions of NATO—

You know, this debate hasn't been about new missions. This debate has been about three new countries. But here the architect of the expansion said:

The new missions of NATO should be preventive defense—creating the conditions for peace in Europe . . . the geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world

That means the ambit of deployment, the arena for the deployment of NATO troops, including young men and

women from the United States, is anywhere in the world. I think before we make that kind of change, we ought to think very carefully. No wonder the New York Times says, "That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military operations demands extensive debate." I shudder to think that we consider tabling "the most extensive debate."

But here is what the Secretary of State had to say. Secretary Albright, according to the Washington Post:

. . . also has urged that an expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization . . . must extend its geographic reach beyond the European Continent and evolve into a 'force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa.'

All of us want to see peace around the world. We all want peace in the Middle East. We all want peace in central Africa. But if we allow a treaty to evolve through treaty creep, letting it expand on its own rather than having a real discussion on the role and responsibility of the United States and NATO and its proposed new missions of serving as a force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa, then we are not fulfilling our responsibility as members of this body.

It is sad that the Senate of the United States decided to turn its back from that kind of discussion and decided that it would table that debate. This is a serious matter, whether we are going to be sending young men and women of the United States of America to perhaps stain the soil of Africa under some NATO mission, perhaps an international policing operation not envisaged in the NATO treaty. Such operations were never before thought to be within NATO's scope, because the alliance was explicitly for the defense of territory.

Now, by expansion of NATO's mission through press release and speech, the Secretary of State says we are going to be involved in central Africa and the Middle East in ways we had not ever anticipated. This treaty is changing in fundamental ways. If we allow NATO's expanded mission to be achieved through the unilateral press release, statement, and policy of this administration, what is the value of the U.S. Senate in giving its advice and consent to treaties? If the Senate does not fulfill its role, perhaps it would just take a single treaty that any administration then could evolve into whatever it chose. I think we ought to think seriously about allowing an organization, the most successful military collective defense organization in the history of the world, to be simply evolved into something for which it was never intended.

Just to make it clear that it was never intended, let me refer you to the statement of Senator Tom Connally. Tom Connally is not one of our contemporaries but was a Senator, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the year 1949, when the NATO alliance first came into existence. Here

is what Tom Connally said: "Let us not forget"—awesome words, because I think we are in the process of forgetting—"that this treaty is limited in scope."

It was to be limited to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states. Now we are talking about anywhere in the world. We are talking about beyond Europe to central Africa.

This treaty is limited in scope. [I quote again Senator Connally.] Its main purpose is to maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. We do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the entire globe.

The elasticity of stretched treaties has reached new limits, or perhaps has found no limits in what we are willing to do here today. The suggestion of the New York Times that this kind of expansion, this promiscuous opening of the door to military deployments around the world, doesn't merit discussion at all, it merited tabling—this is a sad day. A global NATO? That is not what Tom Connally thought we had.

As a matter of fact, NATO's first strategic concepts really focused on two things, "Defense planning limited to the defense of the treaty area," and, "NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or authority except with respect to incidents which are covered by articles V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty." It was a defense of area treaty. It wasn't to be an alliance the troops of which could be deployed like a mini-United Nations, with a standing army, to the hot spots around the globe for so-called international policing or so-called peacekeeping. It was to be something that defended the NATO nations. And to change this essential mission for NATO, I contend, should come before the Senate for its advice and consent.

However, these strategic concepts of the past have been superseded by the Strategic Concept of 1991. Here, instead of having the defense of territory as being primary, we find "to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe"—all of Europe this time, not just the NATO nations—"in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European Nation." This is treaty creep. We have gone from the member nations of NATO to the European Continent as a whole to "stop intimidation" and "coercion".

The first priority in the 1991 Strategic Concept is to expand beyond the member nations of NATO. Talk about the latitude to deploy troops throughout Europe, and we have seen out-of-area deployments become the primary focus of the NATO alliance.

No. 2, "to serve as provided for in article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests."

Oh, no, we have moved from defense of territory and the defense of the political integrity of member nations to the defense of vital interests. I suppose "vital interests" could include trade

interests or interests in humanitarian concerns or interests in cultural exchanges. We find ourselves with a real potential for the expansion of the scope of this treaty.

All of a sudden, the collective defense of the territory of the NATO nations is no longer the prime task, according to the Strategic Concepts of 1991. Where do we find the collective defense? We find them down in 3 and 4. They have been placed at the bottom of the list.

There is a new agenda for NATO nations. Not the defense of territory, it is the defense of "vital interests." No wonder they are talking about deploying troops in Africa in international policing operations. No wonder Secretary Perry talked about deploying troops around the globe. The NATO nations could have commercial interests and trade interests around the world.

Some would say this expansion of mission is an appropriate thing. I think when the New York Times said this demands extensive debate, they weren't ruling out such an expansion of mission out of hand. I don't think setting NATO on a course to become a mini-U.N. with a standing army is a good thing, and, as the New York Times points out, we should at least have an extensive debate before NATO takes this step. When the time came this evening to look carefully at this, we found the Senate saying, "We'll table it; we won't consider it." As we all know here, a motion to table cuts off debate. It doesn't provide for debate.

Let me just say, when the treaty was entered into, it was pretty clear what territory was covered. Article VI defined the territory that was to be defended:

Any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey, or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Sounds like the legal description of a deed to the house. It is specific; it is particular. It doesn't say you deploy resources all around the globe to protect interests. It says that resources are to be used to defend territory. We have seen this change, and it is reflected over and over again.

The point that I am making is that when you change the nature of a treaty, you have a responsibility, at least as members of the United States Senate, to do so carefully. We didn't even have debate on this amendment today. We simply had a motion to table the amendment in haste to move on to other things.

Here is what happens when you cut defense and you start thinking about global deployments. One of the things I fear is that the same problem that has attended the deployment of our own Armed Forces around the world in peacekeeping and policing operations could happen to NATO. And you know, our Armed Forces are threatened because we have a tremendous willingness in the administration to deploy,

but not much willingness to fund. We cut the funding and cut the funding and cut the funding, and we keep sending more troops to different places. As this administration has slashed defense spending, one wonders whether the resource that is devoted to the military and defense of this country is being impaired. I am confident that there are instances where it is.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic comprise 301,000 new square miles of territory to be defended; 2,612 miles of new borders to be defended. And yet, our total national defense spending fell by 27 percent over the last 8 years. And we are going to take on a substantial new commitment. Our share of whatever happens in NATO has always been about 25 percent. We are going to have that kind of an increase in commitment while we are having this kind of plummeting devotion of resources to our own military spending.

Additionally, we have spent money in a lot of different ways in these out-of-area deployments for our own Armed Forces. Outside normal training and alliance commitments, the Army conducted 10 operational events between 1960 and 1991. Ten times we deployed troops in that 31-year period, and that is when we had a significant devotion of resources to support the troops.

Since 1991, we have been cutting our resources to the troops substantially. And what have we done while we have been cutting their supplies? We have been sending them out at an alarmingly higher rate. We had 10 deployments in 31 years, and then in the next 7 years, we have had 26 deployments. That is a formula for difficulty, and if that is the way we are going to treat NATO, by having increasing deployments based on the interest of the parties, not to defend the strategic territories of the parties, but to just sort of defend their vital interests, be they in Africa, Asia or the Middle East or somewhere else, then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is North Atlantic in name only.

If we begin to deploy NATO forces without reference to the alliance's mission, we could hollow out this most successful defense organization ever in the history of mankind. We could hollow it out so it loses its effectiveness.

Our Marine Corps conducted 15 contingency operations between 1982 and 1989 and 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

This business of deploying people all around the world is serious, and if we are going to do that with NATO, we are going to see some of the same challenges that we have seen in our own operations, because we are having trouble with maintaining our armed forces. Our fleets are getting old, and we are having trouble with reenlistments because we don't have the resources.

The same kind of problems besetting our own military also could beset the NATO alliance. The point I am making is simply this: If you are going to change the mission of NATO, if you are

going to change it from defending territory, which is identified and understandable, located and clearly marked, and you are going to start making NATO into an organization the troops of which can be sent anywhere, anywhere in the world in the defense of "the interests," we may well threaten the viability of NATO itself.

Let me just conclude by making this statement: We talk about NATO troops as if they are individuals who are strangers. Well, NATO troops include folks from the United States of America. They include our sons and our daughters, our brothers and sisters, our nephews and nieces. I don't think we should embark upon a program of substantial change in the responsibility and duty of those troops without considering it very, very carefully. To switch from defending the territory of the NATO nations to defending interests potentially around the globe is to make a major change that merits the close scrutiny and extensive debate that this Senate should and could provide but which it declined to provide when this amendment was tabled.

However, these strategic concepts of the past have been superseded by the Strategic Concept of 1991. Here, instead of having the defense of territory as being primary, we find "to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe"—all of Europe this time, not just the NATO nations—"in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European Nation." This is treaty creep. We have gone from the member nations of NATO to the European Continent as a whole to stop intimidation and coercion.

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Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity, and I yield the floor.

Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

Mr. LOTT. I believe the Senator from Texas wishes to be recognized next, but just so the Senators will be on notice to what I think will happen now, the Senator from Texas wishes to speak a few minutes on the final disposition of this issue. Senator SMITH will be recognized to offer an amendment. His amendment will be set aside, and Senator INHOFE will have an amendment he will offer. At the conclusion of their debate, then we would anticipate that there would be two or three votes that would occur, hopefully in sequence, so this could begin in a relatively short period of time.

We do not have a time agreement, but we hope to reach conclusion before too late into the night.

Mr. FORD. Would the Senator yield?

Mr. LOTT. Yes.

Mr. FORD. Is there a chance we might get a time agreement on those other two amendments?

Mr. LOTT. I believe, I say to the Senator, they would prefer that we not have a time agreement, but they do not anticipate taking a long time.

Mr. FORD. I thank the Senator.

Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I believe I share with a substantial number of my colleagues a real sense of unease about the process that we are about to finish. When I made my opening comments about the resolution before us, I noticed that a legislative body is ill-suited to the task of establishing order, coherence, and discipline to a foreign policy initiative. The last few days have proven me right, as we have missed the opportunity to greatly improve the resolution before us.

The decision to expand NATO and extend invitations was made in the heat of a political campaign, with little attention given to the truly important questions that should have been addressed.

There has been no assessment of the threat against which the military alliance was supposed to defend. There were no clear criteria established for membership in NATO. We did not use

this opportunity to debate what the mission of NATO should be in the post-cold-war era. We have not used this opportunity to lay out clear expectations for the next group of would-be members of NATO. We have left no roadmap for the future.

Unfortunately, the administration did little to address these issues when it proposed to expand the alliance in the first place. The Senate was placed in the position of having to do so because of a failure of executive leadership. And I do not think the Senate has done very well, either.

Why was it left to us to wonder about the possibility for border and ethnic disputes to impact the expanded alliance in a way that might hurt U.S. interests?

While my amendment on that matter was defeated, 37 Members, more than one-third needed to stop future expansions, believe that a process to address such disputes is important and should be discussed. Other Members raised equally valid concerns, and they were nearly all defeated.

The Senator from Virginia had a prudent proposal to step back after the first round of expansion to let the experience be fully absorbed by the United States and her allies. Defeated.

Our colleague from Idaho wondered if we should not at least vote to authorize the ongoing and possibly open-ended NATO mission in Bosnia before we think about expanding the alliance to new members. Defeated.

The Senator from New Mexico said strategy should be adopted before we take in new members. Defeated.

Because the concerns of so many Members were so summarily dispensed with, many will find it difficult to support this resolution. How much stronger a signal might this body have sent on this important matter if there had been more willingness to find an acceptable compromise with concerned Members, many of whom are not on the relevant committees and had no opportunity to really fashion the underlying resolution.

Instead, we have a resolution that has very little to say about the future beyond the fact that we will likely add three new members to the alliance. But that has never really been the debate here as far as I am concerned.

Most of us have not opposed the three countries being considered for immediate membership. We were concerned about the process by which we got to this point. In many ways, after more than a week of debate, we are still not much further than when we started.

For example, there is no strategic rationale for the new NATO alliance. It is not due from the President until 180 days after this resolution is passed. There is still no credible estimate about the cost. We have seen estimates miraculously shrink from \$125 billion to a couple of million as we have gotten closer to this vote. Obviously, no one knows what the real cost will be.

At least we have the protections available because of the cost caps imposed by the amendment of the Senator from Alaska.

In the meantime, this body over the last couple of days has voted for a provision that allows NATO possibly to engage in military efforts on border and ethnic disputes but, rather strangely, voted against letting NATO attempt to resolve such disputes peaceably at the lower levels through dispute resolution.

In short, I think, Mr. President, that both the administration and the Senate have approached the issue of NATO enlargement in a rather haphazard and disjointed manner. Because this Senate defeated the pause proposed by the Senator from Virginia, we will probably be debating the admission of yet another tranche of countries before we have any idea about cost, border disputes, or strategic rationale.

So where are we now? Instead of debating the more challenging issues involving the future of the alliance, we are left with a narrow question: Should Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary be admitted to NATO?

These countries have made a sustained commitment to democratic capitalism since the end of the cold war. In numerous discussions with the Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers from each of these three countries as a member of the U.S. Senate's NATO Observer Group, I am convinced that they intend to aggressively shoulder the burdens of membership in NATO. They seek no special treatment, and they wish only to be treated as full members of the alliance with the rights and the responsibilities entailed.

Further, these countries have demonstrated a commitment to the goals of the alliance. They have contributed, in some cases heavily, to the ongoing NATO mission in Bosnia. In the case of Hungary, the United States has staged its Bosnia operations there for some years. The U.S. presence there has approached that of our closest NATO allies and our non-NATO allies. And the Hungarians have been excellent hosts to U.S. forces.

While I remain steadfast in my belief that NATO needs and should at least discuss the adoption of a formal dispute resolution process, the fact is that these countries have worked hard to resolve disputes with neighbors. The Czech Republic peaceably separated itself from Slovakia. Hungary and Romania have signed a treaty to resolve issues surrounding the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Romania.

Despite these strong indications that these countries are ready for the burdens and benefits of alliance membership, I would nevertheless have retained additional reservations had the managers not accepted the U.S. cost limitations proposed by the Senator from Alaska.

A major issue that must be addressed is how much should the United States continue to shoulder for peace in Eu-

rope? We pay 25 percent of the cost of NATO. The Stevens amendment will keep U.S. costs at no greater than what we now spend for NATO. Additional costs incidental to the adoption of three new members will have to be specifically authorized by Congress.

With great reservations about this process, I will not vote against three countries that I believe will strengthen the alliance. I do hope this administration will not come to us again with new countries invited before the strategic rationale, cost limitations, border dispute processes and other conditions many of us tried and failed to impose. I hope we will not put the cart before the horse.

To that end, I take some comfort in the vote totals for at least two of the amendments that failed. My amendment on conflict resolution received 37 votes. Senator WARNER's amendment, requiring a pause of 3 years, received 41 votes. It takes 34 votes to stop a future treaty.

I hope the administration and its successors would see these votes as cautionary should they consider going forward and raising expectations of good people in other countries before looking at the long-term security interests of America and considering what our responsibility is throughout the world. America has never walked away from its responsibilities. We want to pay our fair share. But we would not represent the taxpayers of this country if we allowed our country to take more than its fair share and thereby debilitate the strength of our own security.

I hope that we can move forward now and continue to have the Senate maintain its constitutional responsibility in treaties of advise and consent, not just consent. What we have done instead of truly rewriting the course of our future and creating an alliance for the next century is to add three new members to an alliance whose purpose and therefore whose future is no more certain than when we began this process.

While I cast a vote in favor, I take no great comfort in doing so and I hope the next debate is on the role of NATO in the post-cold-war era. Only then will we assure that the greatest defense alliance in the history of the world will remain exactly that.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2328

(Purpose: To condition United States ratification of the protocols on specific legislative action for the continued deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission)

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. SMITH], proposes an executive amendment numbered 2328.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

() LEGISLATIVE ACTION REGARDING DEPLOYMENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have taken a vote on legislation that, if enacted, would contain specific authorization for the continued deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that country.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I say to my colleagues I will be very brief and try to keep it within 10 minutes.

This amendment is really quite simple. It is very much like the Craig amendment that we voted on earlier with the exception that it doesn't call for the passage. It simply says that one way or the other we would require Congress to debate and then vote—which ever way the vote comes out—but just vote on our deployment in Bosnia prior to depositing the instruments of ratification.

I want to briefly touch on why I am offering this amendment. When the Congress first considered the President's plan to send troops to Bosnia in 1995, the administration placed very clear limits on the duration of this commitment. On every single occasion I am aware of, the administration official stated that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia for 1 year. In fact, Secretary Perry, on December 1, 1995, said, "We believe the mission can be accomplished in one year, so we based our plan on that time line. This schedule is realistic because the specific military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first six months and thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We expect these civil functions will be successfully initiated in one year. But, even if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison."

I think these remarks were well intended, and I think it is clear that the Secretary of Defense meant what he said, but it is also clear that they didn't bear out.

We also heard from Secretary of State Holbrooke on December 6, 1995: "The military tasks are doable within 12 months. There isn't any question * * * The deeper question * * * [is] whether the nonmilitary functions can be done in 12 months. That's a real question. But it's not the NATO or U.S. force responsibility to do that. It's on

the civilian side, working with the Europeans. It's going to be very tough. Should the military stick around until every refugee has gone home, 'til everything else in the civilian annexes has been done? No, that is not their mission."

There were many of us who watched these comments—especially in the Armed Services Committee—very closely, studying the conflict in Bosnia. We felt that this was an unrealistic commitment. We didn't feel that those kinds of commitments should have been made, because we didn't feel they could have been kept. But the American people had no choice but to kind of accept these comments from our leaders.

I was disappointed but I wasn't surprised when right after the 1996 elections, the President announced the continuation of the military commitment for an additional 18 months, to June of 1998. That is where we are now. It is almost June of 1998. Last December, the President acknowledged that our commitment now in Bosnia is open ended but we are still talking about clear and achievable goals.

For 2 years the President has had this opportunity, and I believe that he has been wrong in making these statements. I believe it is wrong for the Government to conduct the foreign policy of the United States without any input from Congress and the public. The American people need to understand what is at stake and either agree to the commitment or not. We have a commitment. The President made it, and now he has extended it open ended.

The question before the Congress today is, do you want to continue with an open-ended commitment, a blank check in Bosnia or don't you? The President has stated he wants to, and he stated why. Now the American people ought to hear from us, the Congress, as to whether or not this is a good idea or a bad idea.

This is no longer simply a Presidential use of force based on his judgment of an immediate threat. We now have nation-building in Bosnia as deliberate foreign policy, and it ought to be approved and funded by the Congress of the United States. Failure to place this before Congress, in my opinion, will destroy congressional support for his foreign policy and, frankly, it insults the intelligence of the American people.

There already has been a casualty in Bosnia, and that casualty is the trust of the American people that their Government will do what it says it will do when it puts American armed forces in harm's way.

I don't see how Congress can allow this extended commitment to continue simply because the President sees no way out. Now, I have been around the cloakroom and in meetings for a couple of years now while this policy has been going on and I have been hearing a lot of complaining from my colleagues, a lot of complaining about how this will

continue, it is open ended, what are we going to do about it.

Here is a chance to vote—and I'm not asking you to vote to say that we ought to take the troops out or leave them in; I'm asking you to vote. All I'm asking for is a vote. It could go 5-90 against deployment or the other way around for deployment. I'm not asking for a vote to come out either direction. I'm just simply saying the Congress should vote, the Senate and the House of Representatives, before we deposit the instruments of ratification. That is all this amendment does. It does nothing less and it does nothing more.

I don't, frankly, think that is asking very much. With the new nations we may have more Bosnias. We may have more Bosnias before we are finished, especially as we continue the expansion that Senator HUTCHISON of Texas was talking about a few moments ago, where we defeated the WARNER amendment. So who is next down the line? We continue to draw lines. Where do we draw these lines? This is a very important debate, and I really cannot understand why anybody would oppose this amendment that simply says vote one way or the other. Keep them in 90-10, or take them out 90-10. Just vote. That is all this amendment asks for, before we submit the articles of ratification. In either case, I think the objective is clear that the American people need to be heard. They haven't been heard. We should let them be heard right here on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

Again, let me just say that if my colleagues on both sides of the issue don't support this amendment, which simply requires them to cast a vote—just cast a vote—on this matter before the June 30 deadline, they ought to forever keep their peace on Bosnia. No more complaining in the cloakroom, no more speeches on the floor about how the policy is so bad and so open-ended, no more second-guessing the President, no more criticizing the President, no more saying Congress doesn't have any responsibility. If we can't force ourselves to stand up here tonight and be counted on this subject, then we don't have a right to criticize the President on this issue. Every time I am on the floor and I hear somebody criticizing the President on this, I am going to check the vote list and see how the votes were, and I am going to rise up and challenge that Senator. This is not going to delay the passage, the instruments of ratification. We can vote on this any time. We can vote next week or the following week, or tonight, for that matter. It doesn't matter to me when we vote on it. Whenever the leader wants to schedule it.

Mr. President, my final remarks. The purpose of this amendment is to simply require Congress to vote, period, one way or another on deployment to Bosnia prior to depositing the instruments of ratification for NATO. That's it.

WHAT WILL EXPANSION COST, AND WHO WILL PAY THE BILL?

It is obvious to me that nobody really knows what the true costs of NATO

expansion will be. Just look at the cost estimates that are available.

In March of 1996, CBO issued a report that provided five options or scenarios for NATO expansion. The cost of those five options ranged from \$60 billion to \$124 billion.

In the fall of 1996, Rand Corporation completed a study on the costs of NATO expansion and concluded that the costs could range from \$10 billion to \$110 billion.

In February of 1997, the administration provided its own cost estimates. In this report the cost of NATO expansion was pegged at \$27 to \$35 billion.

In December of 1997, NATO itself estimated the cost of NATO expansion as \$1.5 to \$2 billion.

The February 16 edition of Defense News reports that the Pentagon will issue yet another study that will peg the cost of NATO expansion at \$1.5 billion over 10 years.

According to the CRS, the administration assumes that the new nations will pick up 50 percent of the bill, the current NATO members will pay 44 percent and the U.S. will pick up 6 percent of these costs.

CAN POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC AFFORD NATO EXPANSION?

Supporters of NATO expansion say we must expand in order to help the young fledgling democracies and market economies of these countries grow. This is not what NATO does.

NATO is first a military or security alliance, not an economic alliance. If the goal is economic and not security, then let the EU deal with these countries, not NATO.

With NATO expansion, we are placing a requirement that the new members "buy" their way in. If they could buy their way in, their young market economies wouldn't need the protection of NATO expansion. This circular logic is no logic at all.

In an article on NATO expansion that appeared in the January/February 1998 edition of Foreign Affairs, Amos Perlmutter writes:

The belief that the new members should be able to absorb costs of close to \$42 billion between 1996 and 2001 overlooks the International Monetary Fund's rules and the Maastricht Treaty's expectations. The IMF requires former Warsaw Pact states to invest in economic infrastructure, and the Maastricht Treaty will accept members only on the basis of their conformity to its rigorous fiscal standards. Hungary and the Czech Republic are already experiencing serious budget crunches and are seeking ways to cut spending to meet IMF demands. Where, then, will the money come from to expand their military budgets?

POLITICAL WILL

In addition, there is also the question of whether or not there is the political will in these countries to help pay for expansion. The United States Information Agency (USIA) conducted a poll in October of 1997 in the countries listed below and asked if the respondents supported increasing their government's defense spending:

	Support	Oppose	Don't know
Czech Republic	29	63	8
Hungary	36	60	4
Poland	56	31	13
Slovakia	21	71	8
Slovenia	22	72	6
Bulgaria	28	55	17
Romania	55	39	7

Result: Only Poles, not Czech or Hungarians willing to increase spending to pay for expansion.

FISCAL REALITIES

Even our current European allies have had sharply declining defense budgets as they prepare to meet the fiscal requirements of the European common currency.

Sir John Kerr, the British Ambassador to the U.S. stated the following on July 23, 1997:

I think, realistically, it is very unlikely that the Europeans will stump up another \$15 billion on their defense budgets. It would mean increasing defense budgets on average by about 1.5 percent a year, a very much larger number than the cost for the United States. And I don't think it will happen.

In July of 1997 French President Jacques Chirac made the following statement:

We have adopted a very simple position: Enlargement must not cost anything in net terms. We are convinced that it is possible.

A Washington Post article from July 10, 1997 quotes German President Helmut Kohl as saying:

It is completely absurd to link NATO enlargement with cost factors as if the aim was to rearm large areas of Europe to the teeth.

Another German, Walther Stuetzle, a former senior defense planner for the German Government said in the March 12, 1997 edition of the Washington Post:

So who will pick up the tab? I think it will have to be the United States.

So we've heard from our NATO allies and they are saying that they are not willing to pay for NATO expansion. Some supporters of NATO expansion will downplay these comments as political comments made for consumption at home. They say our allies will come through.

I am a firm believer that past performance is an indicator of future performance. What hasn't been heard too much in public is the fact that our NATO allies have been falling well short on their current NATO commitments. That certainly doesn't bode well for any additional commitment from our current NATO allies to pick up their share of the costs to expand.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Admiral Jack Shanahan (USN retired) made the following comments:

In 1970 I was assigned to the U.S. mission to NATO in Brussels. The prevailing attitude of most of the alliance was that they were safely under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and that the Warsaw Pact was not a major concern. As a result our allies did not consistently meet their NATO commitments in terms of defense spending. Their prepositioned war reserve of food, ammunition, fuel etc. were well below NATO standards. Interoperability was a joke. They were not ready then, they are not ready now, and as we integrate East European militaries into the alliance this condition will worsen,

placing greater demands on the U.S. military to shoulder the burden. Even as we speak, our allies are making significant reductions in military spending and in their force structures.

This testimony is very revealing and speaks for itself—especially in light of the additional commitments that our present NATO allies will be asked to bear through expansion.

We not only have statements from the major Western European countries indicating that they are not willing to pay for NATO expansion, but also disturbing testimony before the Senate that our current NATO allies already have fallen well short of fulfilling their current NATO commitments.

Thus, it will probably fall to the United States to pay for NATO expansion. Indeed, the March 12, 1997 Washington Post quoted a senior U.S. official as saying: "There was a strong political imperative to low-ball figures. Everybody realized the main priority was to keep costs down to reassure Congress, as well as the Russians."

What are the implications of all this for the article V commitment that an attack on one is an attack on all? Do we really believe we can effectively carry out this commitment if the cost of NATO expansion has been fudged in order to reassure the Congress and Russia? Don't the supporters of expansion take the alliance more seriously than this?

ARE THEY PREPARED?

The three nations who would become part of NATO have military infrastructures that are profoundly unprepared to join NATO. Defense news recently reported on NATO's most recent assessment of the invitees. The report concluded that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are years away from having militaries that are minimally functional, much less strategically interoperable with NATO's military systems. Examples include:

All of the Czech Army's equipment is "old and approaching obsolescence."

None of Poland's naval ships are "capable for command and control of joint or combined operations."

In Hungary, 70 percent of the pilots carry out only 50 hours of training per year, far below NATO standards.

The United States cannot even pay for its own modernization. Why would we want to pay for the modernization of three new NATO members?

CAN THE U.S. FOOT THE BILL?

Don't be naive—NATO expansion is not going to be free—no matter how much the figure is lowered to make it more "palatable."

The balanced budget agreement has locked us into a flat if not declining defense budget during the next few years. We've all heard reports that readiness in the military is starting to deteriorate.

The House National Security Committee issued a report recently that chronicled some of the readiness problems that are starting to appear in our military. What we are facing, in my

opinion, is the very real scenario where we will be increasing our national security commitments without a corresponding increase in our defense spending because of the balanced budget agreement.

The current defense budget we have now is inadequate to meet our current plans and requirements. Just like every other contingency operation the Clinton administration has signed U.S. forces up to, an underfunded Defense Department will have to foot the bill once again.

We keep hearing from this administration that another round of BRAC is necessary to reduce infrastructure and pay for modernization. Could it be that the real objective of another BRAC is to pay for NATO expansion? Does the Senate really want to approve adding one more IOU to an already empty Pentagon checkbook, when we do not even know how large the IOU will be? I don't think so.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay my amendment aside so that Senator INHOFE may discuss his amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, can I ask a question of Senator SMITH?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield for a question.

Mr. DOMENICI. Senator, I was thinking. Do you mean if I vote no on this, 3 weeks from now if we want to vote again in the Senate on the Bosnia policy, I can't vote?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Did I say that?

Mr. DOMENICI. So the vote means we are going to vote for it or not, and we can have a vote on Bosnia if we want it, whenever we want, whatever we do with your amendment.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. You certainly can. But I am saying this should be a requirement. If we don't have that vote, we ought not to complain about the resolution of ratification.

Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. I yield the floor.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2325

(Purpose: To require the President to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Senate for its consideration under the Treaty Power of the Constitution)

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. INHOFE] proposes an executive amendment numbered 2325.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

() REQUIREMENT OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE SENATE OF KYOTO PROTOCOL ON GLOBAL WARMING.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall submit the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at Kyoto on December 10, 1997, to the Senate for its consideration under Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the making of treaties).

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me briefly explain what my amendment does. It simply requires the President to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Senate for its consideration under the Treaty Powers of the Constitution.

Mr. President, the White House has made a full-scale effort for ratification of expansion of NATO. We are considering that now and we have had a lot of debate. Some of us are against it and some of us are for it. We have had a chance to get our positions out and we know where we stand. But according to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, we are the only body—and it has to be by a two-thirds vote—that can ratify treaties of the United States. The President can't do it, the Secretary of State can't do it, the Vice President can't do it, the Secretary of Defense can't do it, the Director of the EPA can't do it—just the U.S. Senate.

Some might argue that the NATO expansion debate is not an appropriate place to raise the question about the Kyoto Protocol. But the issue here is whether the President is going to have serious regard for the Senate's advise-and-consent authority under the Constitution, which the senior Senator from West Virginia has reminded us many times is our prerogative. The President cannot be expected to send treaties up for advice and consent when he thinks the Senate agrees with him and refuse to send them up unilaterally when he feels that we do not. Truly, that is the case.

We made our case very specific when we voted 95-0, prior to going to Japan, that if they came back with something that did not treat the developing countries the same as the developed nations, we would oppose it, and the President came back with exactly that, putting us under obligations that the developing nations were not under. So that China doesn't have to worry about it, or Pakistan, and other countries, like Mexico. But we do. This is the issue we are dealing with here.

I am going to deviate from that for a moment in this very short time to repeat something that I said earlier in this debate because I understand I am the last speaker now and this is the last amendment. I would like to just say there are four reasons why we should not, in the final analysis, expand NATO.

The first one is the cost. I don't know why nobody seems to be upset that the range goes all the way from \$400 million to \$120 billion, and those at the low end are the administration—the

same administration that said that Bosnia was going to cost us \$1.2 billion, and now our direct costs have skyrocketed way way above \$9 billion, and there is no end to it. It is a permanent commitment. Yet, we were told that it was going to be \$1.2 billion.

So here we have an amount of money—at a time when we have cut our defense down to the bone, at a time when we have to be able to do something to put ourselves in a position to defend America. Yet, we are talking about an open-ended commitment by extending NATO to these countries.

The second reason is it is the open door. I hope nobody thinks we are talking about three countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. We are talking about an open door now that is extended to everyone. I want to read what our Secretary of State said in a statement she made:

We must pledge that the first new members will not be the last and that no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map.

She talks about Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovakia, and the list goes on and on. So it is the clear intent that this is not the last. If you think this is going to be expensive, just think what it is going to be when we start extending it to other countries. Where would we draw the line?

The third concern I have is a genuine concern that we talked about on the floor, and that is, what does this do to our relationship with Russia? Everybody says, "That's all right, I have been to Russia and they don't mind." I have gotten commitments from people saying that is all right, go ahead, this is not going to be a problem. But that's not what the Duma said, which is their parliamentary body. The Duma passed a resolution calling NATO expansion the "biggest threat to Russia since the end of World War II."

There is one person I had a great deal of respect for in this body, and I regretted when he left this body; it was Sam Nunn, who I served with on the Armed Services Committee. There is not a person who would stand up on the floor and question his integrity or his knowledge of foreign affairs or question his concern for defending America. Sam Nunn said that Russian cooperation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our most important national security objective, and "This NATO expansion makes them more suspicious and less cooperative." He further said, "The administration's answer to this and other serious questions are what I consider to be platitudes."

So everyone is on record. Last, I will address the concern that the Senator from New Hampshire had. He has a very good resolution, and I think everybody understands it. If anybody wants to get on record as to where they stand insofar as Bosnia is concerned, his amendment is your opportunity to do so. Because right now we don't have

anything to show who is on record. We do have a resolution of disapproval that was barely defeated by only three votes in November of 1995. I suspect that some people now have changed their minds now that they realize this open-ended commitment is there.

So I would like to wind this up by saying that if this cost to support the Bosnian operation is any indication, I remind you that in November of 1995, we were on the brink of being able to defeat this and not send our troops to Bosnia, except they said that this is going to be a short commitment, it is not going to be something that would last a long period of time.

It was going to be over within less than a year, and it was going to cost \$1.2 billion. The only reason that they were able to get those votes to pass this was, they said, "We must protect our integrity with our partners in NATO." Now that same argument can be used—I wonder who is going to be the next Bosnia.

Mr. President, while I have this amendment, I know the votes are not there for this amendment, and there is one very good reason, because of a dear person in this body, that we want to not extend any longer than it should be extended. So nothing would be gained by considering my amendment.

For that reason, I withdraw my amendment and urge my fellow colleagues to vote against the extension of NATO.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is withdrawn.

The amendment (No. 2325) was withdrawn.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I was opposed to the amendment offered by Senator INHOFE. Quite frankly, I believe the consequences if this amendment passed would have been extremely deleterious to our foreign policy.

Mr. President, everyone should recognize that his amendment is nothing more than a thinly-veiled threat to delay NATO enlargement and to ensure that we won't have NATO enlargement for a significant period of time. It is very clear that President Clinton can't and won't submit the Kyoto Protocol for Senate ratification until the conditions he has set are met—meaningful participation by developing countries. The Administration is not in a position of saying now when that milestone will be achieved, but it probably won't be soon. So a vote for this amendment is a vote to stop NATO expansion.

But even if you oppose NATO expansion, you should oppose this amendment because the approach it takes is without precedent and would have a significant impact on how the country conducts foreign policy.

Let me say also that I was a member of the Senate observer group to the Kyoto conference last December. There has never been a more complicated, difficult international negotiation attempted. I believe that the conference

was a historic success: more than 160 countries recognized that the common threat of climate change was more important than each nation's separate anxiety about the immediate impact of an agreement.

The Conference was also a historic success because American proposals won the day. We called for much more real and realistic targets and time-tables. We proposed flexibility through a trading program to use the power of the market to achieve lower compliance costs for business. We offered a joint implementation system that would allow American firms to build clean power plants or preserve forests in developing countries in exchange for emission reduction credits that could be used or sold later. Our negotiators won on each of these battles—and they were very hard fought battles.

But the President has clearly said that the Kyoto protocol is not ready to be submitted to the Senate. The President has made clear that the protocol will not be ready for submission until we have succeeded in achieving the meaningful participation of developing countries. At Kyoto, a down payment was made in the form of a "clean development mechanism" which embraces the U.S. backed concept of joint implementation with credit. This will allow companies in the developed world to invest in projects in countries in the developing world for the benefit of both parties.

But developing countries will clearly need to do more in order to meaningfully participate in combating global warming, and in order of the President to submit the protocol for the consideration of the Senate. Secretary Albright recently announced a full court diplomatic effort to achieve this goal.

Mr. President, as far as I can determine, there is no precedent in our history for doing essentially what this amendment seeks to do, force the President to transmit a treaty to the Senate before the President deems it appropriate to do so. This amendment is a high-handed attempt by Congress to undermine the President's constitutional power.

Mr. President, I asked the American Law Division of the CRS to look at a related issue: whether there are any time limitations within which the President must submit a treaty after it has been negotiated and signed. Let me quote from that report: "As a general proposition, there do not appear to be any time constraints on the transmittal of treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent. The spare language of the Constitution provides simply that '(the President) shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. . . .' Under this structure, it is the President who negotiates and ultimately ratifies treaties, provided the Senate gives its advice and consent. But the constitutional language does not set time limits on any aspect of the process of treaty-making."

The report goes on to note that "nor does statutory law appear to impose any time constraints on the submission of treaties."

Mr. President, the memo goes on to discuss numerous cases in which treaties have not been submitted to the Senate for ratification for a long time after they were negotiated and signed. For example, the United States signed the "International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination" on September 28, 1966. Nearly 12 years passed after the United States signature before it was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on February 23, 1978.

Let me read here from the memorandum's review of the Legislative Calendar for the 104th Congress: Final Edition of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which discloses a number of examples of significant delay in transmittal of treaties.

A review of the Legislative Calendar for the 104th Congress: Final Edition of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discloses a number of additional instances of significant delays in transmittal. A bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Haiti "Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment" was signed on December 13, 1983, but not submitted to the Senate until March 25, 1986. A treaty on "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters" between the U.S. and Nigeria, signed on September 13, 1989, was not transmitted until April 1, 1992. A "Revised Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States and Canada With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital," originally signed on September 28, 1980, and then amended in 1983 and 1984, was finally submitted to the Senate on April 24, 1995. An extradition treaty with Belgium was signed on April 27, 1987, but not submitted until June 12, 1995; and one with Switzerland was signed on November 14, 1990, but not transmitted until June 12, 1995. The "International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants" was originally negotiated in 1961, amended in 1972, 1978, and 1991, and finally signed by the U.S. in 1991, but was not submitted to the Senate until September 5, 1995. Finally, the "Convention on the International Maritime Organization," originally signed on March 6, 1948, was transmitted to the Senate on October 1, 1996.

All of these examples illustrate the absence of any legally binding time constraints on the President's transmittal of treaties to the Senate.

I hope the foregoing is responsive to your request. If we may be of additional assistance, please call on us.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am a strong supporter of the treaty before us to expand NATO. I also strongly support the agreement that emerged from Kyoto, as well as the President's position that the agreement is not ripe for submittal to the Senate at this time. There is no precedent for forcing the President to submit a treaty on a timeframe established by the United States Senate before the President believes it is appropriate. But that is what this amendment seeks to do. Adopting this amendment would have been a terrible precedent for conducting our foreign policy and I believe would have stopped the treaty now pending before us.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2328

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question remains on the Smith amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will take only 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. The hour is late. It has not improved the substance of the Smith amendment—the time. It is essentially, as the Senator from New Hampshire indicated, similar to the Craig amendment; very little difference. I urge my colleagues to recall how they voted on the Craig amendment, and the same rationale applies with regard to the Smith amendment.

I hope when we get to the vote—which I hope is very shortly—that we will vote no on the Smith amendment. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. KYL) is necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 16, nays 83, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 116]

YEAS—16

Ashcroft	Hutchinson	Sessions
Brownback	Hutchison	Smith Bob (NH)
Craig	Inhofe	Specter
Faircloth	Kempthorne	Warner
Feingold	Nickles	
Grassley	Roberts	

NAYS—83

Abraham	Durbin	Lott
Akaka	Enzi	Lugar
Allard	Feinstein	Mack
Baucus	Ford	McCain
Bennett	Frist	McConnell
Biden	Glenn	Mikulski
Bingaman	Gorton	Moseley-Braun
Bond	Graham	Moynihan
Boxer	Gramm	Murkowski
Breaux	Grams	Murray
Bryan	Gregg	Reed
Bumpers	Hagel	Reid
Burns	Harkin	Robb
Byrd	Hatch	Rockefeller
Campbell	Helms	Roth
Chafee	Hollings	Santorum
Cleland	Inouye	Sarbanes
Coats	Jeffords	Shelby
Cochran	Johnson	Smith Gordon H
Collins	Kennedy	(OR)
Conrad	Kerrey	Snowe
Coverdell	Kerry	Stevens
D'Amato	Kohl	Thomas
Daschle	Landrieu	Thompson
DeWine	Lautenberg	Thurmond
Dodd	Leahy	Torricelli
Domenici	Levin	Wellstone
Dorgan	Lieberman	Wyden

NOT VOTING—1

Kyl

The amendment (No. 2328) was rejected.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remaining votes in this series, then, be limited to 10 minutes in length.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, the question of whether to expand the NATO alliance is one of the most important foreign policy decisions this Senate has been called upon to make since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

We will make history with this vote. So it would seem appropriate to consult history before we cast it. That's what I did the other day. I re-read some of the debate that took place in this chamber 49 years ago, when our predecessors, in the tumultuous years following the Second World War, had the courage and foresight to commit our own nation to this alliance.

One of the chief supporters was Arthur Vandenberg, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Vandenberg, a Republican from Michigan, predicted that NATO would become "the greatest war deterrent in history."

History has proven him right. Because of NATO, a region that produced two cataclysmic wars in this century has now known a half-century of peace and stability. Those of us who were born after the Second World War tend to take that for granted. But in fact, it is a remarkable accomplishment.

Just as the map of Europe was redrawn at the end of World War II, it has been redrawn again with the end of the Cold War. Nations that once marched in lockstep with totalitarian dictatorships have been transformed into struggling young democracies.

It is time for us to redefine NATO to match the new map, the new reality, of this post-Cold War world.

Enlarging NATO's circle of security to include the new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is not only in the best interests of those nations. It is in the best interests of the entire European continent. And, it is in the national security interest of the United States.

For these reasons, I intend to vote for ratification of the treaty expanding NATO. And I urge my colleagues to do so as well.

I do not underestimate the seriousness of this action, nor do I take lightly the thoughtful arguments some of my fellow Senators have made against ratification of this treaty.

As I see it, there are essentially four such arguments. In making my own decision, I have wrestled with each of them. And I would like to share with you some of my thoughts on them.

First, though, I want to read something from a man who has thought very deeply about these arguments, and about the future of Europe: the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel. President Havel is among the most articulate supporters of the treaty we are now considering.

"As I follow the debate over whether NATO should be enlarged," he has written, "I have the strong sense that the arguments are often purely mechanical, somehow missing the real meaning of the alliance. 'The process of expansion must be accompanied by something much deeper: a refined definition of the purpose, mission and identity of NATO.'

"The alliance," he continues, "should urgently remind itself that it is first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to defend mutually held and created political and spiritual values. 'It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of Euro-American civilization, and thus a pillar of global security.'"

Does NATO exist to defend a fixed list of nations, chosen 49 years ago, against an enemy that no longer exists? Or does it need to respond to the new threats we face by including, under NATO's collective security umbrella, the three countries that have demonstrated not only a deep commitment to democracy, but a willingness to defend it? That is the fundamental question in this debate.

The answer, in my view, is yes. We should expand NATO to include the new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

There are, as I said, four other questions as well. They also deserve serious reflection.

The first is: What effect would expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have on Russia's relations with the West—particularly its relations with the United States?

Russia clearly would prefer that we not expand NATO. Given their history, that is understandable. Russia lost 20 million people in the Second World War.

Despite assurances from NATO that no troops or nuclear weapons will be stationed in the three new member nations, there are those in Russia who remain fearful of an expanded NATO, and others who are trying to exploit those fears to weaken the hands of Russian democratic reformers. This is troubling, because it is clearly in our national interest to see Russia fully engaged with the West.

There is evidence, however, that Russian leaders wish to continue that engagement. Russia's willingness last year to sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act is one example of Russia's commitment to improved relations with the West. Perhaps an even better example is Russia's continued active participation in the international peace-keeping effort in Bosnia.

Some of my colleagues cite fear of antagonizing Russia as a reason to reject this treaty. While I respect their opinion, I do not believe this concern warrants such action, and I cite as evidence Russia's own actions.

We must remember what Secretary of State Albright calls the "productive

paradox" at the core of NATO. That is, by demonstrating that we are willing to defend our allies, we dramatically reduce the chances that we will ever actually have to commit troops to do so.

This has been true in the past, and I believe it will remain true in the future.

A second question we must address is the price of enlargement.

It is important that we be clear from the very start: There are costs associated with expanding NATO. And, while most of these costs will be borne by the new member nations, some of the costs will fall to existing members of the alliance, including the United States.

The initial estimates of the costs to the US were quite high. Two things have happened in the last year, however, to reduce projections of those costs.

First, NATO invited three members to join the alliance instead of four, the number on which earlier estimates were based.

Second, and more significant, the military committee of NATO conducted a thorough analysis of the three potential new members and found that their military infrastructures were in better shape than had been assumed. As a result, the cost of bringing them in line with NATO standards is projected to be considerably less.

The new, more accurate estimates put the cost to US at an average of \$40 million a year for 10 years.

I am not suggesting for a minute that this is a small amount. It's not. But compare it to the price of some pieces of military hardware. One Blackhawk helicopter costs \$10 million. One Harrier jump jet costs \$27 million. One F-15 Eagle fighter costs \$43 million. One Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile costs \$53 million. And one B-2 bomber costs \$2 billion—five times more than the entire 10-year cost of expanding NATO.

No, \$400 million over 10 years is not a small amount. But if it can help extend stability and security in central and eastern Europe, it is not a bad bargain.

It is also important to note, Mr. President, that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be compelled to modernize their defenses—whether or not they join NATO.

If that modernization takes place within NATO's framework, however, we avoid the risk of re-nationalizing militaries that have caused so much instability in Europe in the past.

The third question we must consider is if, in expanding NATO, we are simply drawing new lines in the sand, and thus creating the potential for new conflicts.

Again, I want to quote President Havel, who has also considered the consequences of refusing to erase the old lines. "If this way of thinking prevails," he warns, "it will turn the alliance into a hopelessly antiquated club of Cold War veterans."

We can't allow that to happen.

It is not this Senate, or the NATO alliance, that erased the old dividing lines of Yalta. History erased those lines. The power of freedom and democracy erased those lines. We must not maintain an obsolete line in Europe because we are afraid of drawing a new line. We must not let fear of an old enemy keep us from embracing a new ally.

Hitler and Stalin helped draw the line that placed Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic on the wrong side of freedom in 1944. By admitting these nations to NATO, we are erasing that line.

Finally, there is a fourth question that some have raised in this debate. That is, when will we next consider expanding NATO? And which nations should we consider?

I believe that question is premature. We should remain open-minded. But we haven't yet approved the first expansion. We need to see this process through and carefully and thoroughly evaluate it before we can make any sort of informed decision about admitting additional new members to the alliance. I see no reason why we should commit ourselves to a fixed timetable or list of additional entrants now.

The danger in Europe today does not come from a totalitarian superpower. The danger in Europe today comes from aggressive nationalism and terrorism and the spread and misuse of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

By bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO's circle of security and democracy, we will strengthen the bulkhead against these destructive forces. We will bolster NATO's fighting capacity by adding 200,000 troops. We will add geographically significant territory to the alliance. We will increase NATO's understanding of these new threats, and thus its ability to head them off.

And all of this, Mr. President, is in the United States' national security interest.

When the Berlin Wall fell, it answered the prayers of millions of people all over the world. It also created a new landscape in Europe. Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will help ensure that democracy and freedom fill that landscape, rather than old hatreds and outdated ideologies.

In his first speech as President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel described his dream for his country.

"I dream," he said, "of a republic independent, free, and democratic, of a republic economically prosperous and yet socially just, in short, of a humane republic which serves the individual and which therefore holds the hope that the individual will serve it in turn."

In the years since the Berlin Wall collapsed, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic all have made great strides toward achieving that dream. They have demonstrated that they

meet NATO's standards for membership, and that they can contribute to the alliance in a meaningful way.

For all these reasons, I will vote to expand the NATO Treaty to include these three new democracies, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I will be brief as we complete debate on the resolution of ratification providing our advice and consent to the addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This has been an excellent debate in the finest traditions of the Senate. We have spent more than 40 hours on the resolution over the course of 9 days. Almost 50 Senators have made statement, many of them on several occasions. The Senate has considered 20 amendments. We have adopted 12 and rejected 8. This is in addition to the 4 conditions and 7 declarations in the committee's Resolution.

Many people deserve credit in this debate. The Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, Senator HELMS, has shown great leadership. Senator ROTH led the NATO Observer Group with energy and diligence. Senator BIDEN served as the lead Democrat to both and made valuable—and frequent—contributions to our debate. Senator GORDON SMITH, Chair of the Europe Subcommittee played a central role.

Many staff played key roles as well. Steve Biegun, Brian McKeon, Beth Wilson and Mike Haltzel of the Foreign Relations Committee can all now get on with their lives. Ian Brzezinski (BRA-zin-ski) with Senator ROTH was always there for the Observer Group. The Congressional Research Service, especially Stan Sloan, on the floor now, provided invaluable services for members on both sides of the issue. Legislative Counsel Art Rynerson drafted virtually all of the language we have been debating.

A number of issues have been raised in our consideration. We have addressed future enlargement, NATO's mission, costs, Bosnia and arms control. I believe all sides have had an opportunity to have their voices heard. Now it is time to cast our votes.

Much has been said about Russia over the past week—how Russia will react to NATO enlargement and the impact on a wide range of bilateral issues. Both sides agree that Russian hard-liners should not have a veto over our course of action. But supporters and opponents of enlargement differ greatly over the impact on our relations with Russia.

We have heard many estimates of how our vote will influence the tangled web of Russian politics and the disturbing course of Russian foreign policy. I do not think anyone can predict the impact with complete precision. But we can look at some basic facts.

First, NATO poses no threat to Russia. No serious person inside or outside Russia believes NATO—with 16 or 19 members—jeopardizes Russia. The

thought of Czech tanks rolling across the Russian steppes is ludicrous.

Second, the average Russian is not concerned about NATO enlargement. A recent poll even shows the majority of Russians in Moscow support adding these three countries to NATO.

Third, the Russians have delayed action on START II for years. NATO enlargement is only the latest in a long line of reasons given for their inaction.

Fourth, Russian diplomacy in Brussels has not been affected by our debate here. Just yesterday, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council discussed a wide range of issues. Alleged Russian concerns about enlargement were not an issue.

Finally, long before NATO enlargement became a real possibility, Russia has engaged in a large number of foreign policy actions that harm our interests—from proliferation to Iran and violations of START I to subversion of its neighbors. NATO enlargement may provide an excuse for Russian adventurism, but will not provide a cause.

Our principle concern with Russia must be Russian behavior—not the volatile mood swings of Russian domestic politics.

Mr. President, this will be a historic vote. It is fitting that we are voting on including the Czech Republic in NATO sixty years after the sellout at Munich, fifty years after the communist coup in Prague, and thirty years after Soviet tanks crushed the winds of freedom in Czechoslovakia.

That is the past and, as many Senators have pointed out, this vote is about the future. It is about what kind of a Europe we want to see. It is about what kind of allies we want in a continent where we have fought three great wars in this century.

Expanding NATO is about ensuring this generation and future generations are not called to fight a fourth time. It is about a 21st century trans-Atlantic partnership that provides more freedom, more security and more opportunity for all of us.

A few days ago, I received a letter from Polish Foreign Minister Geremek (GAR-a-mech). His words are an appropriate way to close debate:

The consistent and visionary foreign policy of the United States has opened a historic window of opportunity. Just as in 1989, it was American leadership which was the decisive factor in ending the Cold War. . . . so today it is the U.S. Senate which will decide whether a new page is turned in history of the Transatlantic area and Eurasia. It will be a chapter testifying to the triumph of freedom and democracy and to the success of the biggest and most successful alliance in world history. It will strengthen the Alliance to the clear advantage of Europe and America.

I thank all Senators for their cooperation in reaching this moment. I yield the floor.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, the votes are final passage of the NATO enlargement treaty, and according to the rules of the Senate, Senators should be in

their assigned desks and vote from their desks. That is in the rules. I have discussed it with Senator BYRD. We are all here. I think it would be an appropriate thing for us to do. The rules do require it.

I also think it would help us expedite the vote. So, if the Senators would take their assigned desks, we will have a vote on the historic treaty.

The second vote is final passage of the supplemental appropriations bill. Tomorrow, the Senate will debate the Workforce Development Act under a time agreement of no more than 4 hours. Several amendments will be offered. Consequently, those votes will be postponed to occur Tuesday, May 5, at 5:30.

Monday, the Senate will begin consideration of the IRS reform bill. I know we will have a number of Senators who will wish to make opening statements. We will check with the managers and with the leadership to see about the possibility of amendments being offered. But if they are offered, they, too, would occur at 5:30 on Tuesday.

Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for a productive week. I congratulate the managers of this legislation. I thank the Senators who made it possible for us to complete this action tonight. I know some of those who are opposed to it would have liked to have delayed it over until next week, but I believe the time is right for us to vote. I thank all Senators for their help, and I thank Senator DASCHLE for his cooperation and I yield to Senator BYRD.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished majority leader for yielding. I also thank the distinguished majority leader for calling to the attention of Senators the following standing order, which I hope that Senators will contemplate. And I congratulate the majority leader for enforcing this regulation. Any Senator may ask the Chair to enforce this regulation at any time. I have often thought about it. I think we ought to follow this regulation, Mr. Leader, and I hope that we will establish this as a practice and continue to do it.

The Senate would make a much better impression, not only upon the visitors but also on Senators themselves, if they learn to sit in their seats to answer the rollcall. And they will take greater pride in this institution. I guarantee that, watching from the galleries, it would be a much more impressive sight during rollcall votes than what we have been accustomed to seeing down here in the well, which looks like the floor of a stock market. I have been to the stock market on a few occasions. It doesn't look any worse.

Let me read this standing order of the Senate. It is on page 157 of the Senate manual. All Senators who wish to read it, here it is. It is only three lines. The heading, "VOTES SHALL BE CAST FROM ASSIGNED DESK."

Resolved, that it is a standing order of the Senate that during yea and nay votes in the

Senate, each Senator shall vote from the assigned desk of the Senator.

This was by Senate Resolution 480 in the 98th Congress, the Second Session, October 11, 1984.

This is a great day for me. I am glad to see the leader asking that Senators abide by this regulation, which we voted on, those of us who were here in 1984.

I thank the leader.

Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Senator BYRD. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do the Senators yield back the time? The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic endured nearly half a century of communist domination as a result of expedient and short-sighted policies of the West. Today, we have the opportunity to remedy that injustice while securing democracy in Central Europe for future generations.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have established democratic governments, each has built a market economy, and all three work with us in defense of liberty from Cuba to China.

In my judgment, Mr. President, these three countries belong to NATO. I have met with the Foreign Ministers of all three countries. They understand the commitment and responsibilities that they undertake by joining NATO. I am confident they will meet all of their obligations.

The Foreign Relations Committee held 8 hearings in the past six months, heard from 37 supporters and opponents of NATO expansion. Before the Committee hearings, I myself had concerns about NATO expansion, including what it would cost, how we could deal with Russia, and the future mission of NATO. The Committee's resolution addresses all of these points and passed by a vote of 16-2.

Mr. President, NATO enlargement has been endorsed by countless distinguished individuals including Margaret Thatcher, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Caspar Weinberger, and Richard Perle. In addition, the Foreign Relations Committee has received endorsements of this policy from every living former U.S. Secretary of State, numerous former Secretaries of Defense and national security advisors, and more than sixty flag officers and general officers, including five distinguished former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote overwhelmingly in support of NATO enlargement. This is the right decision for the United States of America.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. A century ago, our predecessors in the U.S. Senate took a very bold step in ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty.

It is easy for us today to forget what a break with the past that vote represented. For the first time, this country committed itself, in peacetime, to