

AMTRAK REFORM BOARD NOMINATIONS

• Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, for the last three years, this Congress struggled with many of the difficult issues in the Amtrak reauthorization bill. We finally reached an agreement late last year and sent legislation to the President for his signature, which he signed on December 2, 1997.

In the process, my state, and its neighbors, lost a valuable service on the route of the Pioneer. I fought hard to keep that service running but citizens of eastern Oregon continue to feel frustrated over the loss of this service.

I want Amtrak to succeed and I want to make sure that the legislation we enacted last year is properly implemented. The Administration is late in submitting its nominations for the Amtrak Reform Board which was created in last year's bill. Although I hear that the Administration has begun the process of picking candidates for the seven positions that are required by law, I am concerned that the names under consideration will not represent the various regions of the country that make up the Amtrak system. If the restoration of the Pioneer is to receive fair consideration, it must be by a Board of Directors that reflects the regional needs of all sections of the country. My friend, the Majority Leader, who also sits on the Commerce Committee has made clear on more than one occasion that if Amtrak is only a series of regional corridors and not a national system, it will not continue to receive the support of Congress.

While I believe the new Amtrak Board should meet the qualifications spelled out in the Act, they should also have a sense of geographical balance. I fear the loss of support for a national system if we wind up with a Board that represents only one region of the country. In particular, the west and mid-western states again appear to be left out of consideration as sources of Amtrak director candidates.

As a member of the Senate Commerce Committee, I will be looking for regional balance when these nominations are submitted and encourage my colleagues to do so as well. •

APPOINTMENT BY THE MAJORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair, on behalf of the majority leader, in consultation with the Democratic leader, pursuant to Public Law 102-246, appoints Bernard Rapoport, of Texas, to the Library of Congress Trust Fund Board for a term of 5 years.

The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR BLAST

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I regret that I have to take a few moments and keep the distinguished Senator here, but I don't know whether I will

get a chance to talk about the India nuclear blast if I don't do it today. I will be as brief as I can.

Yesterday, two committees of the Senate held hearings on India's recent underground nuclear tests. It is my understanding that those committees, particularly the Select Committee on Intelligence, which heard testimony from CIA Director Tenet, are most interested in why the United States had no advance warning of India's plan. I think the Senate needs to be very careful as it reviews the India situation not to kill the messenger.

The simple fact is that covert nuclear operations are extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to detect. Even before its tests, we knew a great deal about India's nuclear weapons program. We were cognizant of the readiness of their weapons, that because their test site had been prepared for tests in 1995, they could test on very short notice, and that the newly elected party had campaigned on a platform that included the development of nuclear weapons—all signs that should have made this week's tests less surprising. Yet, we were caught off guard. But I do not think that it is entirely the responsibility of our intelligence agencies.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers have been subject to two sets of pressures, both of which have led us to consider reducing our nuclear stockpile to the lowest possible levels and have reduced our vigilance.

One of those pressures comes from an anti-nuclear movement which feels a moral imperative to abolish nuclear weapons. Everyone knows that we would like to abolish nuclear weapons, but what is going on in the world indicates that that will not occur just because the United States decides to do so.

The second pressure comes from our military, and it is felt largely in the authorization and appropriations process in the Congress.

Today, the emphasis in the Pentagon is on readiness, warfighting capability and nuclear weapons, and the strategic command which is responsible for their use has taken a second-class status to those branches of the service interested in tanks, planes, ships and troop readiness. As a result, we are seeing a diminution of the strategic command within the Pentagon and across policymakers in the Congress, as well as the administration, and a failure to recognize how attractive and important nuclear weapons are.

It takes the actions of an India to remind us that for a nation that perceives itself as threatened, wants to threaten, demonstrate its technical prowess or simply wants to join the elite nuclear club, nuclear weapons are extremely attractive. That is a deplorable situation, but it is a fact.

Unfortunately, in taking the actions it has of the last 2 days, India has destabilized an already precariously balanced region of the world. Although

Pakistan and China were previously aware of India's nuclear capability, India's demonstrated willingness to further develop and demonstrate those capabilities is, by its nature, threatening to Pakistan and China. In turn, China and Pakistan, but Pakistan in particular, may also take steps to demonstrate their nuclear willingness.

The United States is correct to impose sanctions on India and to prepare to do so on Pakistan if they test. I hope that Pakistan will recognize by evaluating the situation in Russia that superpower status built on economic prowess is significantly more desirable than superpower status achieved through nuclear weapons at the expense of economic prowess.

Regardless of the achievements of the high-level U.S. delegation dispatched to Pakistan yesterday, it is obvious that there could be under consideration by both Pakistan and China the effect of nuclear weapons in the hands of India, which might force both countries to proceed with nuclear weapons.

We learned about India's tests first through a press announcement and then through our seismic monitors. India could just as well have tested their devices thousands of miles offshore on ships or drone planes. We would certainly have registered the tests, but we might never have known who tested. That was the situation in 1978 when a device exploded in the Indian Ocean and it took us many years to determine whose it was.

Incidentally, although today our satellites can detect atmospheric nuclear explosions, there has been some consideration of not replacing that capability when our current systems reach the end of their true lifetimes. This is just one symptom of our lax policy and declining attention to the threat of nuclear weapons.

Until they are disproved, and by that I mean something more than reassurances from the Indian Government which has already demonstrated a willingness to be misleading about these issues, we need to consider the possibility that India cooperated with other countries in conducting these tests.

We currently assume that all the devices that were detonated were Indian, that all the technicians on the site were Indian, and that the data has not been shared with other nations, but we cannot base our final analysis on assumptions.

India's tests cast a long shadow over the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. To date, Chairman HELMS, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which has jurisdiction over all treaties, has indicated he is not in a hurry to report the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I know some in arms control may have been frustrated by his position. Today, I think they are fortunate that the treaty will not be considered in the near future.

In light of the event which occurred in India, we need some time and, obviously, we need to think through the application of resources to the information necessary to make sure the test ban treaty can be carried out. India's willingness to test reminds us that global nuclear capabilities will not remain static if the United States agrees to lock in its nuclear capabilities pursuant to a test ban.

In the coming decades, other countries, whether they are signatories to the treaty or not, may develop nuclear capabilities and, given time, may even develop significant threatening nuclear capabilities, which is not the case at this point.

The United States nuclear posture is not established in response to the threat posed by a single country, but also considers threats that may be posed by strategic alliances. We need to recognize that the nuclear buildup we now expect to occur on the Pakistan-India border and that may spread to China could one day not be directed against one another, but there could be alliances which put America's future in jeopardy.

More so, we need to recognize that the nuclear arsenal of the United States, one that we maintain today and will maintain into the indefinite future, has to be able to respond to all potential scenarios that might unfold in an uncertain and changing world.

That means at a minimum, our weapons must be safe and reliable, not just theoretically so. We must have confidence in them as our tools of foreign policy and military policy. That requires our potential adversaries, whether they are our current adversaries or our current allies, be aware of our formidable scientific skills and our willingness to direct them toward the maintenance of our stockpile.

While there is some uncertainty, and my skepticism can be expected to continue to demand improvements, I am reasonably confident that the United States has the scientific ability to maintain our stockpile if we make that a priority. That requires that we make it a priority today, even though current focus is more on conventional warfighting capabilities, and we make it a priority into the future.

Everyone should understand that the United States has made a commitment that we will not test nuclear weapons. So we are not going to have any underground tests or any other kinds of tests. That means our scientists have to be capable of telling us that our stockpile is secure, safe and trustworthy.

That requires that we pay attention to what is needed to do that. The reason for the explosions in India is to make sure they can say, "We now know how to build a bona fide weapon, and that it will work." If they did not do the testing, they would be acting theoretically, they would be basing it on science, on modeling, on previous data about other weapons and weapons

they might try to duplicate. But the only way to be sure and to have it right is to do tests.

We have done those. We are not doing them anymore. But everybody in this body and in the House and in the White House have to be concerned that if we have them, they have to be trustworthy. And to do that, we may have to spend a little bit of money on science and technology to make sure that without testing that they are valid.

We are not building any new nuclear weapons. We have committed to that. We have not for some time; and for the foreseeable future we will not.

Our nuclear posture cannot be based exclusively on our dedication to maintaining our own stockpile so it can respond to any potential threat; we must also work to understand and then reduce that threat. India's ability to conduct five tests without our previous knowledge, even though we should have been on alert for them, demonstrates how easy it is for a nation to develop such a capability.

So while I began my remarks by saying that the focus of our frustration should not be on our intelligence agencies alone, that they were unable to provide us advanced warning of India's plans, I also believe that in the future we must improve by an order of magnitude our ability to understand the nuclear threats we face.

We are considering entering into discussions on a new round of arms control agreements that would, for the first time, limit the number of nuclear warheads in the United States and Russia. We need to approach the notion of counting warheads and of entering into limits with a single country with great skepticism. Our inability to monitor India's nuclear activities should make it clear that we are far from having the ability to monitor a warhead limitation treaty now and for some time to come.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

THE INDONESIAN CRISIS

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, I take the floor today to discuss the sorry state of affairs that we find in Indonesia. The latest reports are that nearly 400 people have died in the past week of rioting and looting.

Despite the crumbling of this nation, there is a stony silence from the Clinton administration. We have heard nothing. The administration apparently has no policy in place to deal with the instability in Indonesia. Yet, in my opinion, administrative policies were largely responsible for many of today's problems in Indonesia. We created the problem, and we are not doing anything about it.

First, during this administration, investments in Indonesia have soared. Lending to Indonesia during the last 4 years by U.S. banks was larger than to other major nations in Europe. It was too much money chasing too few

worthwhile investments. So the money began to chase investments that were not worthwhile. The administration encouraged it and promoted it and had close ties to Indonesian conglomerates, the Lippo Group being a leading candidate.

Of course, this gold rush could not sustain itself. Vast amounts of money and weak investments always come home to you. And the bottom dropped out in Indonesia.

Rather than take responsibility for these problems and take a leadership role in handling the financial crisis in Asia, the answer of this administration has been to delegate the problems to the International Monetary Fund.

The IMF has bungled, from day one, the handling of the Indonesian crisis. From the closing of the banks on, from the day it went in, it has created a greater crisis.

We never should have turned over international economic and foreign policy to a group of 2,000 silk-suited bureaucrats that have little if any success to show for the billions and billions of American taxpayers' dollars that they have wasted throughout the world.

The panic began when IMF imposed their austerity measures. They have driven the Indonesian currency down to record low levels. Is it any wonder that riots have begun to break out in the streets and that 400 people have been killed when the currency is worth 300 percent less than it was a year ago?

In fact, the riots began to take hold when the government raised the cost of fuel and electricity, as mandated by the IMF.

Now, I repeat, the riots began to take hold when the government raised the cost of fuel and electricity as mandated by the IMF, the people we sent to bring calm and common sense to Indonesia. Another brilliant recommendation from the IMF, for a country finding itself plunged into poverty, was to raise the price of fuel and electricity.

This is, again, another reason why the IMF is the last institution we need to provide funding in order to solve the world's economic problems. Their record of solving world economic problems could not be worse. In fact, I would like for someone to point out a world economic problem that they solved. The numbers they have made worse are far greater than those they have helped.

The only upturn in the Indonesian currency came when a currency board was suggested to stabilize monetary policy and there was a slight uptick in the value of the currency. But this idea was immediately smothered with pressure from the United States, this administration, and the IMF, that they could not have a currency board. Now we have a full-blown crisis in Indonesia. And the President is in Europe this week, and his aides are saying very little to nothing.

I think it is incumbent on this country to take a leadership role and solve