15-page letter to the Federal district court detailing dozens of instances of obviously improper disclosure of grand jury information.

In response, Mr. Starr told numerous media outlets that these leaks were not coming from anyone in his office. In a letter to Mr. Kendall, Mr. Starr wrote, ''From the beginning, I have made the prohibition of leaks a principal priority of the office.'' Starr continued, ''It is a firing offense, as well as one that will lead to criminal prosecution.'' Mr. Starr continues, ''I have undertaken an investigation to determine whether, despite my persistent admonition, someone in this office may be culpable.''

Despite calls from the Department of Justice and the Office of Professional Responsibility to investigate, the Attorney General of the United States, Ms. Reno took Kenneth Starr at his word and allowed him to proceed with an internal investigation of his own office. Although Mr. Starr pledged to end these leaks and investigate any wrongdoing, it is obvious that he neither investigated nor changed the conduct of his office, or as now we know, even himself.

This week, Steven Brill in his magazine Content provided even further evidence of these transgressions. Mr. Brill reports that he has personally seen internal memoranda from 3 different national news organizations that cite Mr. Starr's office as the source of many of these stories of grand jury leaks.

He discloses an internal publication of the New York Times, in which its Washington editor is quoted as saying, ''This story was very much driven in the beginning on sensitive information that was coming out of the prosecutor's office. And the sourcing had to be vague because it was * * * given with the understanding that it would not be sourced.''

But if this sourcing, this reporting and analysis was not enough, these disclosures have been confirmed directly by Mr. Starr himself.

On April 15 of this year, Brill reports that Starr acknowledged that he and his office have provided non-public information to reporters. Mr. Starr said, ''I have talked with reporters on background on some occasions, but Jackie [Bennett, his deputy] has been the primary person involved in that. He has spent much of his time talking to individual reporters.''

Mr. President, in his statement, Mr. Starr confirms what many of us have suspected all along: the Office of Independent Counsel has not only violated department guidelines on providing information, but it may have violated Rule 6E of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and committed a criminal offense in its own investigation.

Mr. President, I need not remind my colleagues of the seriousness of this possible criminal offense by Mr. Starr's office.

It has been a founding principle of Anglo-American law that confidentiality of grand jury investigations is central to the administration of justice.

Mr. Starr has defended his media leaks by saying they were not a Rule 6E violation. He says, ''* * * if you are talking about what witnesses tell FBI agents or us before they testify before the grand jury or about related matters,'' they are not violations.

Mr. President, Mr. Starr's defense may be that he violated the spirit, but not the letter of the law. Tragically, Mr. President, that is not the case under the precedents of this country.

On May 5, 1998, in In Re: Motions of Dow Jones and Company, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia—the court which, ironically, has jurisdiction over Mr. Starr's current grand jury investigation—ruled that leaking information about prospective witnesses who might testify at a grand jury, about expected testimony, about negotiations regarding possible immunity, and about the strategy of grand jury proceedings, all violate Rule 6E.

The court wrote, ''Matters occurring before the grand jury'' that cannot be disclosed ''* * * include not only what has occurred and what is occurring, but what also is likely to occur.''

What is therefore so shocking about Mr. Starr's own defense of his activities, his disclosures, is not that there is a precedent to the contrary to which one can be referred, it is that Mr. Starr himself is fully aware of this restriction. They are in the law. He knows them and he violated them.

In one of his impromptu sidewalk press conferences, held February 5 of this year, Mr. Starr told reporters that he could not talk ''* * * about the status of someone who might be a witness [because] that goes to the heart of the grand jury process.''

Exactly, Mr. Starr. Disclosing potential testimony, likely testimony of someone who might appear before a grand jury, is not outside the Federal statute or its precedence; in your own words, Mr. Starr, it goes to the heart of the process and the protection afforded citizens of this country. There is a reason. This being a Nation that is ruled under the precedence of law, there is a reason why this Congress, the Justice Department, and the courts have protected grand jury information.

If Mr. Starr's violation goes unanswered and he is not held accountable, there are consequences for all Americans, in all investigations, by all prosecutors, in all years to follow, because without it we could not guarantee that witnesses would ever feel free to disclose information to an investigator. They would live in fear that it would always potentially be disclosed. We could not ensure that grand jurors would be able to deliberate free from the influence of interested parties who would manipulate their investigation in public debate. We could not preserve the reputation of witnesses called before the grand jury, but found not guilty of any crime.

Mr. Starr's activities are not simply a violation of the rights of President Clinton or grand jury witnesses, they are a violation of the administration of justice in this country.

Mr. President, all crimes in the United States are not equal or serious. But crimes committed by Government in the administration of justice against individual Americans, given the vast and enormous and disparate power of Government in the administration of justice can be the most serious crime of all. It is that to which Mr. Starr stands accused today.

Mr. President, I do not know how Attorney General Janet Reno is dealing with these allegations. One can only imagine, because when the public debate began about possible grand jury leaks and the violations of Federal criminal statutes with regard to disclosing information, Mr. Starr stood silent. He permitted the Attorney General of the United States to allow him to proceed with an internal investigation of these grand jury leaks of his own office when all the time he knew that he was the source of some of the leaks, potentially undermining not only public confidence in the investigation but almost assuredly the confidence of the Attorney General herself.

Mr. President, I don't know what Janet Reno is thinking. But Kenneth Starr made a fool of the Attorney General of the United States having her proceed with Mr. Starr investigating his own transgressions.

This maneuvering, however, to many in this institution will not come as a surprise. The problems with the independent counsel have been coming for some time, and, indeed, almost incredibly Justice Scalia predicted in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson exactly what has now occurred.

A prosecutor so focused on one suspect under the laws of the independent counsel would, and he wrote, and I quote, ''What would normally be regarded as a technical violation * * * may in his or her world assume the proportions of an indictable offense.''

Mr. President, this is exactly what has occurred. Mr. Starr has been transformed from one who is supposed to be an objective prosecutor into a partisan political actor without oversight from the Department of Justice, control of the Federal courts, and no longer even operating within Federal law.

Mr. President, I call upon my colleagues to join me in urging the Attorney General to once again assume her lawful responsibilities in the administration of justice, recognizing that the Office of Independent Counsel cannot operate outside of Federal law. Mr. President, it is high time at last to restore the credibility of this investigation.

ENCRYPTION

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I rise today out of concern for our nation's computer and electronic industries. As you are well aware, the Administration's

export policies prohibit American companies from selling state-of-the-art encryption technology abroad without recovery keys and back door access. Encryption is a series of mathematical formulas that scramble and unscramble data and communications. It is used to thwart computer hackers, industrial and foreign espionage agents, and criminals from gaining access to and reading sensitive personal, business, and military communications. The higher the bit-key length, the more difficult it is for unauthorized persons to break the code. Technically advanced encryption ensures that an individual's medical, financial, business, personal records and electronic-mail cannot be accessed without their consent. The Administration is now promoting the deployment of recovery keys so designated third parties would be able to access and share with law enforcement the computer data and communications of American citizens without their knowledge. Currently, government mandated key escrow is not required and is opposed by the computer industry, privacy advocates, legal scholars, and by many members of Congress.

Mr. LEAHY. While current law does not mandate any key recovery, the current Administration, just as past Administrations, uses the export control regime to ''dumb down'' the encryption available for widespread integration into high-tech products intended for both domestic use and for export to foreign customers. Export regulations in place now are being used expressly to coerce the development and use of encryption products capable of giving law enforcement surreptitious access to plaintext by conditioning the export of 56-bit DES encryption on development of key recovery features.

These regulations are scheduled to sunset in December 1998, at which time export of even 56-bit strength encryption will no longer be permitted. I understand that the Administration is already undertaking discussions with industry on what will happen upon sunset of these regulations. I have long contended that taking unilateral steps will not resolve this issue, but instead could delay building the consensus we so urgently need. This issue simply cannot by resolved by Executive fiat.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I have been involved in the debate regarding encryption technology and privacy for more than three years now. In the course of that time I have not seen any real attempt by the White House to resolve this problem. In fact, over the course of that time the Administration has moved further from negotiation by taking increasingly extreme positions on this critical national issue.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, as you have heard, current U.S. policy allows only encryption below the 56-bit key length to be sold abroad. For a long time now, software companies have argued that this level of encryption is so low it provides little security for the information being transmitted over the ''super highway.'' This policy also states that, in the production of encryption stronger than 56-bit, software companies must provide some type of ''backdoor'' access to ensure law enforcement can decode encrypted material.

Addressing this from an economic perspective, customers—especially foreign customers—are unwilling to purchase American encryption products with backdoors and third-party access. This is particularly true since they can buy stronger encryption overseas from either foreign-owned companies or American owned companies on foreign soil without these invasive features.

Mr. WYDEN. Since coming to the Senate, I have worked side-by-side with Senators BURNS, ASHCROFT, LEAHY and others on the critical issue of encryption. Our common goal has been to craft a policy that puts the United States squarely out front of the cryptocurve, rather than locks us permanently behind it. A one-size-fits-all government policy simply won't work in this digital era. We all recognize and acknowledge the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the national security communities, but tying the hands of America's high technology industry in the process will serve neither those needs, nor the national interest in maintaining our competitive edge in the fiercely competitive global marketplace. It's time to move forward with comprehensive encryption reform legislation.

Mr. BURNS. I would like to point out that the government's plan for encryption—whether they call it ''key escrow'' or ''key recovery'' or ''plaintext access''—simply won't work. Eleven of the world's most prominent computer security experts have told us government mandated key recovery won't work because it won't be secure, as explained in a study published this week by the Center for Democracy and Technology. Key escrow also won't work because it will cost billions, as revealed in a recent study published by the Business Software Alliance. We have also been told that the kind of system the Administration wants is not technically feasible. Additionally, constitutional scholars testified that government mandated key escrow, third party recovery probably violates the Bill of Rights.

Mr. LOTT. Even though a national recovery system would be technically unfeasible, costly, and violates an individual's privacy rights, the Administration continues to require key escrow as a precondition for relaxing America's encryption policy. Again, Mr. President, I would point out that state-of-the-art encryption is available in the international marketplace without key recovery and without backdoor access. This backdoor door requirement is simply backward thinking policy. It does not make sense to hold the computer industry hostage to force the creation of such an unworkable system.

Mr. BURNS. The Majority Leader is absolutely right. We do not need experts to tell us key recovery will not work. All that is needed is a little common sense to understand that no one will buy systems with backdoor access. Criminals will not escrow their keys and terrorists will find keyless systems from America's foreign competitors. There is nothing we can do to stop undesirables from using strong, unescrowed encryption.

Mr. LOTT. Even though advanced encryption products are widely available across the globe, the White House continues to stall Congressional and industry attempts to reach a sensible market oriented solution to the nation's outdated encryption export regime. This stonewalling tactic will only cede even more of our nation's technology market to foreign competitors and America will lose forever its ability to sell encryption technology at home and abroad.

It is time to change America's export policy before it is too late. If the Administration will not do what is right, reform its export regime, then Congress must enact encryption reform during this session.

Mr. LEAHY. The Majority Leader is correct that reform of our encryption policy is needed. The Attorney General came to the Hill in March and asked for a legislative moratorium on encryption matters. This request was made because the Administration wanted to talk with the information technology industry about developing means for law enforcement to gain surreptitious access to plaintext scrambled by strong encryption. According to eleven of the world's leading cryptographers in a report reissued on June 8, the technical risks and costs of such backdoors ''will exacerbate, not alleviate, the potential for crime and information terrorism'' for America's computer users and our critical infrastructures.

In the Senate we have a name for debate that delays action on legislative matters. We call it a filibuster. On encryption policy, the Administration has been willing to talk, but not to forge a real solution. That amounts to a filibuster. The longer we go without a sensible policy, the more jobs will be lost, the more we risk eroding our privacy rights on the Internet, and the more we leave our critical infrastructures vulnerable.

Mr. BURNS. We can readily see that the current U.S. policy on encryption jeopardizes the privacy of individuals, the security of the Internet, and the competitiveness of U.S. industry. We have been debating this issue since the Administration's introduction of the ill-fated Clipper chip proposal over five years ago. Yet no substantial change in Administration policy has taken place. It is time for us to take action.

I first introduced comprehensive encryption reform legislation in the

form of the Pro-CODE bill over two years ago, then reintroduced it in this Congress with the cosponsorship of the Majority Leader, Senators ASHCROFT, LEAHY, WYDEN, and others. Along with Senators ASHCROFT, LEAHY, and others, I am also an original cosponsor of the E-PRIVACY bill, which would foster the use of strong encryption and global competitiveness. We have held numerous hearings on the issue. Yet despite the increasingly desperate drumbeat of criticism from industry, individuals, and privacy groups, from across the political spectrum, the Administration's policy has remained fundamentally unchanged.

Mr. LEAHY. Since the hearing I chaired in May 1994 on the Administration's ''Clipper Chip'' proposal, the Administration has taken some steps in the right direction. Clipper Chip is now dead, and the Administration has transferred authority over the export of encryption products from the State Department to the Commerce Department, as called for in legislation I introduced in the last Congress with Senators BURNS, WYDEN and others. Furthermore, the Administration has permitted the export of up to 56-bit DES encryption, at least until the end of this year. But these actions are simply not enough for our high-tech industries to maintain their leading edge in the global marketplace.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Our technology companies need to be able to compete effectively. Without reasonable export laws our technology sector will be seriously harmed. More encryption companies will leave the country so they are free to sell their products around the globe as well as within the United States. Make no mistake, the market will not be denied. Today, robust encryption products from Canada, Japan, Germany and elsewhere are being sold on the world market. You have heard of the companies that are manufacturing and selling encryption. They are Nortel, Nippon and Seimens. These are not upstart companies. They are substantial players on the international scene, and they offer encryption products that are technically and financially competitive with those produced in the U.S.

Mr. LOTT. That's right. In fact, a recent survey conducted by Trusted Information Systems found that hundreds of foreign companies sell over 600 encryption products from 29 countries. It is even possible to download some of the strongest technology available, 128-bit key length encryption, off of the Internet. Clearly, America's policy of restricting the sale of American encryption software and hardware has not impacted the availability and use of this technology throughout the globe.

No one disputes the fact that the development and use of robust encryption worldwide will continue with or without U.S. business participation. What is particularly disturbing to me is that export controls, instead of achieving their intended purpose, have only served to deny America's premier computer industry the opportunity to compete on a level playing field with foreign competitors. Costing our economy and our nation billions of dollars and the loss of countless American jobs in the process. Given the wide availability of encryption technology, continuing to restrict U.S. access to foreign markets makes no sense.

Mr. ASHCROFT. That is absolutely correct. The Administration's encryption policy is, in effect, a tax on American consumers. We owe it to these customers and the innovators in the software industry to reform this encryption policy now. From the birth of the United States, this country has been a world leader in innovation, creativity, entrepreneurship, vision and opportunity. Today all of these American attributes are on display in our technology sector. Whether in telecommunications, or computer hardware or software, the United States has maintained a leadership position because of the opportunities afforded to people with the vision, determination and responsibility to reach for their highest and best. We must work diligently to ensure that ample opportunities are maintained in this country for our technology sector to continue to thrive and innovate. If companies are stifled and cannot compete, then the people, the ideas, the jobs, and the economic growth will simply go elsewhere.

Mr. BURNS. In the computer business these days, they talk about ''Internet time.'' In the Internet industry, where product life cycles can be as low as 6 months, the world changes rapidly. Yet we have been debating this issue for over five years now, while America's sensitive communications go unsecured, our critical information infrastructures go unprotected, and our electronic commerce jobs get shipped overseas. It is time for the Congress to act.

Mr. ASHCROFT. If this issue is not resolved, and resolved soon, we will lose this industry, we will lose our leadership position in technology, and our national security will suffer. We have a choice to make as policy makers—do we allow our companies to compete internationally or do we force them, by our antiquated and ill-conceived government policy, to move overseas. We cannot simply ignore the reality that robust encryption exists in the international marketplace now. Instead, we must allow our companies to compete, and do so now. We cannot allow extraneous issues to stand in the way of remedying the deficiencies with our current approach to encryption. We must recognize that keeping the encryption industry on American shores is the best way to ensure national security. We would not think of allowing all our defense industries to move abroad. By the same token, we should not force the encryption industry abroad through outdated policies. Simply put, strong encryption means a strong economy and a strong country. This concern is just one of the many reasons we need to pass effective encryption legislation this year and just one of the reasons that Senator LEAHY and I recently drafted the E-PRIVACY bill, S. 2067.

Mr. LEAHY. I join with my colleagues from both sides of the aisle in calling for passage of good encryption legislation that promotes computer privacy, fosters the global competitiveness of our high-tech industries, and encourages the widespread use of strong encryption as an online crime prevention and anti-terrorism tool. The E-PRIVACY bill that I have sponsored with Senator ASHCROFT, Senator BURNS and others, satisfies these goals. Prompt Senate consideration of encryption legislation is sorely needed to protect America's economy and security.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the E-PRIVACY bill seeks to protect individual privacy, while at the same time addressing national security and law enforcement interests. It would also modernize export controls on commercial encryption products.

The E-Privacy Act specifically addresses the concerns of law enforcement. First and foremost, it makes it a crime to intentionally use encryption to conceal incriminating communications or information. It also provides that with an official subpoena, existing wiretap authority can be used to obtain communications decryption keys/assistance from third parties.

Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I want to thank Senator LEAHY, Senator BURNS and Senator ASHCROFT as well as Senator LOTT and Senator DASCHLE for their work and leadership on the issue of encryption. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of S. 2067, the E-PRIVACY Act.

This is my sixth year as a member of the Senate and the sixth year I have advocated for reasonable legislation on encryption. Sadly, the Administration has not been a constructive player in this debate. It is time for the United States to acknowledge that we no longer exclusively control the pace of technology. Purchasers around the world can download software off of the Internet from any country by simply accessing a website. Foreign purchasers have turned to Russian, German, Swiss and other foreign vendors for their encryption needs.

Washington state and American companies deserve the opportunity to compete free from unreasonable government restrictions. Their role in the international marketplace should be determined by their ingenuity and creativity rather than an outdated, ineffectual system of export controls. The time to act is now. I urge the Senate to consider the E-PRIVACY Act at the earliest opportunity.

Mr. BURNS. The basic facts remain the same. People need strong, unescrowed encryption to protect themselves online in the information

age. Law enforcement has legitimate concerns about the spread of this technology, and we must work to provide them the tools and expertise they need to keep up with advances in encryption technology. We cannot stop time, however. The genie is out of the bottle. As Bill Gates, the CEO of Microsoft, recently said, ''Encryption technology is widely available outside the United States and inside the United States, and that's just a fact of life.''

Mr. CRAIG. With the rapid expansion of the ''super highway'' and Internet commerce it is crucial we bring encryption legislation to the forefront. A secure, private and trusted national and global information infrastructure is essential to promote citizens' privacy and economic growth.

Mr. BURNS. As my colleagues recognize, technically advanced and unobtrusive encryption is fundamental to ensuring the kind of privacy Americans will need and desire in the years to come. Congress must choose a future where individuals and companies will have the tools they need to protect their privacy, not a future where people fear the use electronic commerce because they have no security.

I commend the Majority Leader, Senators ASHCROFT, LEAHY, CRAIG, WYDEN, and MURRAY for their vision and bipartisan leadership on this issue. I hope that Congress will be able to move forward with real encryption reform legislation that protects the privacy and security of Americans in the Information Age, before it is too late.

Mr. LOTT. I think it is worth repeating to my colleagues that the Administration's approach to encryption makes no sense. It is not good policy. Continuing to restrict the foreign sale of American encryption technology that is already available abroad, or will soon be available, is anti-business, anti-consumer, anti-jobs, and anti-innovation.

The time for a change in America's export regime is long overdue. Unfortunately, the Administration continues to support its outmoded and competition-adverse encryption control policy. That is why this Congress needs to find a legislative solution to this issue.

If America's export controls are not relaxed now, then Congress places in peril our entire technology industry. Not just those companies that create and market encryption products and services, but virtually every company involved in the development and sale of computer hardware and software. Congress cannot and will not put America's entire technological base at risk for an ineffective and outmoded export policy on encryption.

HEROISM OF RONALD WATERS

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to a man who nearly lost his life in the pursuit of Justice, Mr. Ronald Waters, of Columbia, South Carolina.

Waters was driving along Interstate 95 in North Carolina around noon on September 23, 1997 when he noticed a North Carolina Highway Patrol car on the side of the road and a Cumberland County Sheriff's car in the median. Upon approaching the scene, he observed one of the officers laying face down next to his patrol car. He then noticed two unidentified men moving between the patrol car and a green Toyota, also parked on the side of the road. Waters called 911 emergency on his cellular phone and informed the operator of the situation. He then pulled off the road to investigate, and upon getting out of his car he heard several gun shots.

The two unidentified men then drove off in the Toyota and Waters followed the suspects, all the while relaying their position to the 911 dispatcher. The two men then exited the interstate and traveled down a dirt road. Waters, out of concern for the victim's families, pulled to the side and waited for their return.

About five minutes later the Toyota returned and Waters drove in the opposite direction, hoping the suspects would assume he was just another motorist. Once they were out of sight he moved towards the entrance ramp of the interstate, mistakenly under the impression that the two men were in front of him. Not seeing them on the ramp, Waters looked in his mirror and noticed that they were parked on the overpass behind him. Waters then pulled off the ramp and stopped, once again informing the dispatcher of their location.

About that time the Toyota began closing in on him at a high rate of speed. As Waters pulled out the two men began to fire at him with an AK–47 assault rifle. The suspects fired several rounds which struck a critical portion of his vehicle, leaving it disabled. Now stranded on the side of the road, Waters watched as the two men pulled up along side him. Then one of the men pointed the assault rifle directly at Waters and pulled the trigger. Waters felt at this point that he would never see his wife or infant son again, but for some unexplained reason, the rifle jammed and would not fire. The two men then sped off, only to be arrested by officers shortly thereafter, due in large part to the constant contact Waters had with the dispatcher in relaying their position to the authorities.

Unfortunately, the two police officers who were shot in this incident, Highway Patrol Trooper Ed Lowry and Cumberland County Sheriff's Deputy David Hathcock, were both killed as a result of gun shot wounds inflicted by the two suspects. While it may not serve to make this tragic loss of life any easier for the victim's families, it certainly goes to show that crime does not pay, and those who commit these atrocities will be apprehended.

This display of courage by Waters exemplifies the characteristics of true heroism, and serves to reassure the many law abiding citizens that good really does triumph over evil. So often acts of selflessness such as this go unnoticed simply because the danger faced is of a lesser degree, but Ronald Waters is one of many who have risked their lives for what they know to be right.

I am pleased to stand before you today, Mr. President, to relay this story of courage and valor personified to its greatest degree. I join the State of South Carolina in honoring Ronald Waters for his adamant service and devotion to Justice, and I thank you for allowing me the time to speak.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. MCCAIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair, following 10 minutes of debate of Senator WYDEN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WYDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I believe it is very clear that the tobacco industry and their allies will pull out all of the stops to kill legislation that protects our children. It is very clear how the tobacco industry hopes to bring about this legislation's demise. The tobacco lobbyists want to produce a death by distraction. It is very easy to see why the tobacco lobbyists are pursuing this strategy. They cannot derail our cause of protecting children from starting to smoke on the merits. The case for passing legislation to protect our kids is too powerful. It is too strong. It is too moral.

So the tobacco lobby hopes to throw everything but the proverbial kitchen sink into this debate, hope that it doesn't stink the place up too much, and then hope that the American people lose sight of what this is really all about. But the fact is that the American people get it. They know that this is about protecting children. They are not going to fall for this strategy of trying to produce enough distraction that somehow the Senate will have to move on to other issues or somehow some other question will have to be addressed on this floor. I believe that allowing this bill to die by all of these distractions would be one of the most shocking abdications of our public responsibilities that has been seen in years.

If this body stays focused on the goal of protecting children, works through the relevant amendments, and passes this important legislation, this Congress would have a lasting legacy of accomplishment in the cause of keeping our children healthy in the 21st century.

There are a variety of legitimate issues that have come up in this debate. The question of education policy,