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NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 (Continued)

BOSNIA LANGUAGE

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to comment on the provisions of the Department of Defense authorization bill relating to the United States military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) expresses the sense of the Congress that United States ground troops should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely. The amendment offered by the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. SMITH) would have required that none of the funding authorized or appropriated for the Bosnia mission under this bill be expended after March 31, 1999, unless both Houses of Congress had voted on the continued deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia.

I supported both of these amendments because I firmly believe that it is of paramount importance for the Senate to go on record at every opportunity with respect to the U.S. mission in Bosnia. It is especially important that the Senate go on record as a part of the Department of Defense authorization bill, which is perhaps the most important piece of defense-related legislation that this body debates each year because it is the framework under which our military will be funded over the next fiscal year.

I have opposed the Bosnia mission since its inception because I did not believe then—and I do not believe now—that the Administration has presented a list of clear, achievable objectives and a definite exit strategy to the American people. To date, taxpayers have paid more than \$9 billion for this ill-defined mission.

I am pleased that the second-degree amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona (Mr. MCCAIN) to the Thurmond amendment calls upon the President to submit a report on the

status of the Bosnia mission with each future request for additional funding for this mission. To date, the Administration has repeatedly come to the Congress seeking more and more money for this mission and offering little justification in return. The McCain language asks the Administration, with each additional funding request, to provide specific information on the Bosnia mission, including objectives for reaching a self-sustainable peace and a schedule for achieving them, and future cost and risk assessments involved with this mission.

Of course, I support our men and women in uniform and the commendable job they have done to help to implement the Dayton Accords and to achieve a lasting peace in Bosnia. What I cannot accept is the mission creep and uncertainty that these men and women are forced to live with, and the hefty price tag the American people have been forced to pay.

While I supported the Thurmond amendment, I would have liked to see stronger language, including calling on the President to devise an exit strategy that included a date certain for the transfer of chief responsibility for this mission from United States forces to European forces. It is my firm belief that the longer U.S. troops remain in the region, the harder it will be for them to leave. We must call upon our NATO allies to assume responsibility for this mission.

In the past, I have supported both a date certain for troop withdrawal, and efforts to cut funding for this mission. I also have come to the floor to express my concerns about the expanding nature of this mission. I would also like to express again my continuing frustration with the emergency designation for the funding for this mission, which is clearly no longer an emergency.

I regret that the Administration chose to deploy troops to Bosnia in 1995 without seeking prior congressional approval. I also regret that this mission

has continued far past its original one-year time frame, and that our troops have been asked once again to continue down an uncertain path toward an ill-defined goal. In December 1997, the President abandoned the purported June 1998 exit date and replaced it with a series of so-called "benchmarks" for U.S. withdrawal. Today, on the 25th day of June 1998, the end of this mission is nowhere in sight. I hope that the Administration will hear clearly the sentiments expressed by the Senate through the Thurmond amendment, which has been adopted overwhelmingly by this body.

PROHIBITION ON EXPANSION OF SALE OF ALCOHOL

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate adopted the amendment I submitted to S. 2057 that puts the Senate on record in opposition to the attempt being made to increase the number of military stores that sell wine and beer. Although alcohol is available for sale on military bases, it is not for sale in the commissary stores along with the groceries. Specifically, my amendment would prohibit the Secretary of Defense from conducting a survey of commissary patrons to determine whether or not they would support the sale of beer and wine in commissaries. In addition, the amendment would prohibit a demonstration project to evaluate the merit of selling wine and beer in commissary stores at exchange store prices. Mr. President, that is the wrong direction in which to take our military. We should be trying to deglamorize alcohol, not taking steps that tend to promote its use. An expansion of accessibility will likely lead to an increase in the military of all the problems that go hand and hand with alcohol use in civilian life; the negative health consequences, the loss of productivity, the cost to society, the increase in violence and crime, and the increase in sexually transmitted diseases. Why in the world would we want

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to embrace such a policy as expansion of access to alcohol as official government policy! Life in the military already has its share of stress—long hours, a rigid hierarchy of command, constant training, travel, and long deployments overseas. Let us not expand the opportunities to pour more fuel on any smoldering embers of alcohol abuse in our population and add to these stresses and strains. Let us keep our soldiers fit and sober, clear-headed and ready to defend our national security interests, and hope that such a policy sets an example which other entities in our society will embrace.

Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, the 1999 Defense Authorization bill before us contains a demonstration project that would allow some DoD-eligible retirees to join FEHBP plans, under a separate risk pool. It is my understanding that this ensures that DoD retirees who enroll in this demonstration project are able to choose from competing, private sector FEHBP plans. It is also my understanding that retirees, like other FEHBP-eligibles, will be able to choose among plans that offer fully integrated health care benefits that use market-based competition to control cost and improve quality of care.

Mr. THURMOND. Yes, we fully expect that OPM and DoD will conduct a demonstration project that provides military retirees with the same health care services provided through the same private sector delivery systems that serve today's FEHBP beneficiaries.

Mr. SANTORUM. I thank the Chairman. I appreciate this clarification and I look forward to evaluating the success of the FEHBP demonstration along with the two other demonstration projects included in this bill.

Y-12 PLANT IN OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE

Mr. THOMPSON. I know the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee agrees with me that nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of our national defense policy, and we should do everything we can to maintain a strong, viable nuclear deterrent in this country. This requires a robust nuclear weapons program, the ability to ensure that our weapons are both safe and reliable, and the ability to remanufacture any component of any weapon in the stockpile at any given time.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from Tennessee is correct. We must preserve our capability to manufacture weapons and weapons components, and we must maintain ongoing weapons surveillance and assessment activities. The four weapons production plants—including the Y-12 plant in the Senator's home state of Tennessee—are key to achieving these goals.

Mr. THOMPSON. As the Chairman knows, production activities at Y-12 were placed in a stand down mode on September 22, 1994, due to procedural and criticality safety concerns identified by the Defense Nuclear Safety Board. Since then, Y-12 has made sig-

nificant progress improving its operations throughout the plant. Since the stand down, Y-12 personnel have worked tirelessly to restart operations in the following mission areas: Receipt and Shipment, Disassembly and Storage Operations, Depleted Uranium Operations, and Stockpile Surveillance, while continuing to meet all defense mission requirements.

Mr. THURMOND. I agree with the Senator that the staff of Y-12 have worked hard to bring operations back up to full speed. I was very pleased to see that, earlier this month, Y-12 resumed the last of its production missions: Enriched Uranium Operations.

Mr. THOMPSON. The Chairman is correct. On June 8, 1998, Y-12 cast its first enriched uranium part since September, 1994. This achievement is a credit to the dedication and commitment of everyone at Y-12, and is a testament to the leadership and management expertise of Lockheed Martin and their teammates at the Department of Energy. It is also critically important to our national security, because Y-12 operations are crucial to the success of our Stockpile Life Extension Program. In fact, Y-12 is currently involved in the life extension program for the Peacekeeper Missile warhead, called the W87. Initial delivery of key components of this weapon are due at the end of this year, and manufacturing will continue for several years.

I am very pleased that operations at Y-12 are up and running again, so that these critical national security missions can continue on schedule and uninterrupted. In that vein, I want to express my concern about any action on the Department of Energy's part that would disrupt the progress that has been made at Y-12 and jeopardize the timely completion of this very important Stockpile Life Extension project.

Mr. THURMOND. I share the Senator's concern, and I urge the Department to make every effort not to disrupt the tremendous progress that has been made at Y-12. The production activities taking place at the plant are a critical component of our national security policy.

Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the Chairman.

DOD TEACHER QUALITY

Mr. BINGAMAN. When the Armed Services Committee met to mark up the FY 1999 Defense Authorization bill, I introduced a measure designed to encourage the Department of Defense schools to assure the high quality of its faculty in DoD schools. Senator COATS and I have discussed ways to improve the proposal and have agreed on words that we believe would be appropriate to include in the Conference report on the Defense Authorization bill.

Mr. COATS. That's correct, Senator BINGAMAN. I believe the words we have agreed to here will encourage the Department to emphasize hiring high quality instructors for the Department's schools. In my view, the most appropriate vehicle at this point to in-

corporate this initiative in the defense bill is to seek a provision in the Conference report. Senator THURMOND, would you assist our efforts to do so during the upcoming conference?

Mr. THURMOND. I appreciate your efforts to assure continued high quality education in Department of Defense schools and I'll work to see that the provision you seek is adopted in conference.

COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, in 1989, President George Bush called drugs "the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today." Almost nine years later, that threat still exists.

That same year, President Bush tasked the Defense Department to play an important role in the drug war. Specifically, the Defense Department was tasked to engage in the detection and monitoring of drugs in transit towards the United States. At that time, counter narcotics, and drug interdiction were key components of our nation's drug control strategy. As a member of the House of Representatives at that time, I can recall very well the investments we dedicated toward the international and interdiction components of the war on drugs. These investments made a difference. We made a dent in the drug industry. The price of cocaine increased. Drug use declined significantly.

That was 1989. In 1992, the focus and the level of commitment toward a comprehensive drug control strategy has diminished. The drug threat is as strong as ever, but the same cannot be said for our drug interdiction efforts. It's not just a case of fewer resources, it's a case of diminished priorities. In fact, in its list of priorities, the Defense Department currently ranks counter-narcotics dead last in its mission statement.

This is an unfortunate mistake.

Mr. President, it's time we re-ordered our priorities. That is why last week, my friend and colleague from Florida, Senator GRAHAM, myself and Senator GRASSLEY and Senator HELMS, introduced an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill. This amendment, which was adopted by the Senate last week, simply states that a higher priority should be given within the Defense Department to drug interdiction and counterdrug activities. Specifically, our drug control mission should be ranked at the same level as our peacekeeping operations. I thank my colleagues for accepting my amendment by unanimous consent. It is my hope that the final bill will contain similar language.

The facts bring us to no other conclusion—it's time to make drug interdiction a priority again. In 1988, close to 2 million adolescent Americans were drug users, and by 1992, that number was down by 25%. At that time, we had a balanced drug control strategy—with sufficient investments in the key components: interdiction, treatment, education and law enforcement. During

that same period, marijuana use dropped by over 16 percent and cocaine use was down 35 percent. Our efforts were concentrated and effective—with inspiring results.

Mr. President, that progress ceased in 1992, and since that time, teenage drug use has more than doubled—and the ramifications have been far-reaching. For example, drug-abuse related arrests for those under the age of 18 in 1996 were twice those of 1992. Health costs continue to rise as this plague spreads uncontrollably.

Youth drug use is on the rise because drugs have increasingly become both more available and more affordable. The Office of National Drug Control Policy has reported that small “pieces” or “rocks” of crack, once sold for ten to twenty dollars, are now available for three to five dollars. The street price of drugs is decreasing and our efforts to limit their supply are failing.

Mr. President, this increase in illicit drug use can be traced in part to the decline in counter-narcotics as a priority for national defense policy. In 1992, Department of Defense funding for counter-narcotics activities in transit areas was over \$500 million. A steady trend in decreased funding brought it down to an all-time low of \$214 million in 1995. Mr. President, that is more than a 50% decrease in funds. Thankfully, due to efforts by my Senate and House colleagues, last year’s allocation was increased to \$300 million. However, we are nowhere near the 1992 levels.

In recent years, the Department of Defense has been called upon to support counter narcotics activities in transit areas in the Caribbean. However, assets critical to the drug interdiction effort have been consistently diverted to matters considered a “higher priority.”

Mr. President, this decrease in funding has had an unfortunate impact on our drug interdiction efforts in the Caribbean. For example, the number of days per year that our ships spend patrolling the Caribbean has shrunk by two-thirds. Some of our key interdiction agencies have reported that the ships and manpower needed for effective interdiction are unavailable. Also, there radar system is less extensive—and even if drug traffickers can be identified, we lack the manpower necessary to intercept and seize the illegal drug imports. In 1996, only half of the known maritime drug events detected resulted in apprehension or seizure. Our defenses are down and the drug lords are taking advantage of this weakness. Added to this decline in resources is the increase in more sophisticated resources utilized by the drug cartels.

According to the State Department, about 760 metric tons of cocaine were produced in South America in 1996. Of that, 608 tons were destined for the United States through the transit zone. U.S. government agencies that deal with cocaine seizures indicated that

with additional equipment, annual cocaine seizures can be significantly increased. The Department of Defense, however, has indicated that it will not be able to provide these additional assets because of other priorities.

Mr. President, this attitude was not acceptable in the late 1980’s and it should not be acceptable now. It is necessary that we once again implement an effective transit zone operation as an integral measure to limit the availability of illicit drugs to our youth.

It is time to renew drug interdiction efforts, provide the necessary equipment to our drug-enforcement agencies, and make the issue a defense priority again. I thank my colleagues for supporting this amendment and helping turn the tide of the drug crisis in our country.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss language in the DoD authorization report contained in the “Additional Matters of Interest” section. The language in the DoD Authorization targets an amendment Senator WYDEN and I were able to get accepted during the Superfund markup.

Earlier this year the EPW Committee marked up S. 8, which if passed and signed into law would significantly improve the Superfund program. At markup Senator WYDEN and I proposed an amendment clarifying the waiver of sovereign immunity currently contained in Section 120 of Superfund. A waiver of sovereign immunity basically allows private parties and state and local governments to bring suit against the federal government for noncompliance.

This original waiver was added in 1986 when Superfund was last reformed and was accepted with broad bipartisan support. The intent of Section 120 is clear and unambiguous to those who research the legislative history and read it faithfully. The words are plain and they read: “Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title.”

My reading of this is that the federal government needs to comply with the law just like any private party or state or local entity.

As Senator Stafford said during passage of the 1986 Superfund amendments, “. . . the legislation recognizes the reality that, only in unusual cases, th[at] national security may require issuance of circumscribed Executive orders exempting a Federal facility from the requirements of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. In all such cases, Executive orders should adopt the method of protecting legitimate national security interests that maximize compliance with the environmental and health requirements imposed by the legislation. For

example, it may be appropriate to require EPA employees reviewing clean-up plans [to] obtain a national security clearance, but it would not be appropriate to exempt such plans from national cleanup standards simply because EPA employees are assigned to ascertain what standards should apply to the cleanup.” However, the language in the ’86 Amendments was not exact enough and wiggle room was left for the Federal government to avoid their environmental responsibilities. Unfortunately, even though our amendment is merely clarifying, some in the Senate would like to maintain dual clean-up standards, one for those who live near a private National Priority List (NPL) site and another for those who live near an NPL site the federal government has responsibility over. Simply put, that should not be happening.

The Armed Services Committee has expressed concern with our Amendment and has even gone so far as to include report language in their bill commenting on legal language in another bill. Further they have asked for a study on the cost of our amendment.

I provide the above background as context for my reply to the Committee’s characterization of our amendment to S. 8. In their report the Armed Services Committee made several claims with which I disagree. They also make claims which can be disputed which are outlined below:

(1) the report states that, “[t]he amendment would require federal facilities to comply with state and local substantive and procedural requirements, rather than the uniform, national process described in the National Contingency Plan.” The implication is that federal facilities would no longer be subject to the National Contingency Plan (NCP) and that all cleanups would be done pursuant to state and local law. That is not the case. What our amendment in Committee simply did was allow state, local, and to some extent EPA the authority to enforce compliance with current Superfund and similar State and local laws. Enforce the current Superfund law including its implementing regulations, the NCP, and similar state and local laws against federal facilities just as they would against private parties. I have attempted to make this point clear in the past and I will attempt to do so once again, this amendment would ensure that Federal entities are held to the same standard of compliance as local, state, and private parties. Nothing more, nothing less.

(2) The report also states that, “[u]nder current law, Federal facilities are already subject to state laws concerning removal and remedial action, including laws regarding enforcement (42 U.S.C. 9620(a)(4)), but state challenges must be brought after remedial action is complete. (42 U.S.C. 9613(g)) [sic]” The Federal government has not followed this section of law faithfully, in reality they have argued that it merely requires them to comply with

substantive sections of the law, for example, Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARAR's). As evidence of this is a letter from the Chief Counsel for the National Guard Bureau on September 13, 1996 to Assistant Attorney General Steve Shackman, regarding Duluth Air Force Base State Superfund Site. In this letter Mr. Hise asserts that, "[c]ompliance with a state CERCLA law's substantive requirements, via the ARAR's process [which includes provisions to waive ARAR's], fulfills CERCLA's legal requirements."

To state it once again, my concern is that, even though the report asserts that States can take action under 113(h) after remedial action is complete the federal polluters do not acknowledge this section means what it says. Instead, they maintain it only requires them to comply with state standards as ARARs. In fact, the only case in this area, U.S. versus Colorado, held that the federal government could not escape regulation under an authorized state RCRA program merely by listing on the NPL. Clearly, clarification is necessary that Congress intended all federal agencies to comply with this law in substance and procedure.

Beyond the merely incorrect statements in the report there is a fundamental difference in philosophy. In my view the Federal government needs to be held to the same standard as any other entity. If we are going to have a Federal Superfund law then it should apply to everyone. In other words everyone needs to be in the same bath tub with the same scrub brush. I believe this was true when we made all laws applicable to Congress and believe we need to make at the least this law applicable to all Federal agencies.

When I proposed this amendment in Committee it was claimed that it would cost the government too much money. In fact, if we examine what has occurred under RCRA, which has had the same language in effect since 1992, the conclusion is the opposite. A study done by the EPA entitled, *The Federal Facility Compliance Act: Enforcement Analysis of RCRA Administrative Orders at Federal Facilities* indicates that State governments have been easier on the Federal government than the EPA. The study found the following: while Federal orders averaged 369 days before settlement, state orders averaged 196. Also, during the study period the EPA fined Federal facilities over \$9 million while states fined Federal facilities only slightly over \$4 million. In other words those who claim the states will gold plate remedies have no basis for that belief.

Finally, I note that the Armed Services Committee has asked for a study which is due at the end of September outlining the additional potential liability a Superfund waiver would incur. I'm not opposed to such a study but I am sending a letter to the President's Council on Environmental Quality bringing it to their attention and

asking them to oversee the collection of the data. I am certain that the authors of the amendment wouldn't object to such oversight which would avoid the perception of the fox guarding the chicken house.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1999. The need for a strong and capable military was clearly demonstrated during the Iraqi crisis over the UN-mandated inspections. Our forward-deployed forces were quickly strengthened by additional personnel as the crisis deepened. The diplomacy of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, backed up by the credible, on-scene forces of the United States Armed Forces, successfully kept the peace.

This bill provides the proper support for our military forces while maintaining a realistic balance between readiness to take care of immediate needs, and the needed investment to develop and procure new systems for the future.

The bill provides for those who serve in uniform today, and those who gave this country so much during their careers in military service. A fully funded and well-deserved 3.1% pay raise for military personnel is included in the bill.

Additionally, the bill includes a provision for the Department of Defense to initiate a comprehensive test plan to evaluate the best way for us to provide health care to retired military personnel and their families who have reached the age of 65. The plan will build on the Medicare test program included in last year's Bipartisan Budget Agreement. The new expanded plan will include test sites for participation in the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan, the Department of Defense's Tricare health care program, and a mail order pharmacy program to reduce out-of-pocket costs.

The daily operations of our military forces have obvious risks and dangers. All branches of the Armed Forces have made progress in improving safety in the military, but more remains to be done. I commend the Department of Defense for its accelerated installation of needed additional safety systems on military aircraft that carry passengers.

This bill also includes a worthwhile provision to evaluate the way the Pentagon investigates aviation accidents. We must ensure that no stone is left unturned in finding the cause of every accident and taking the necessary corrective action to reduce the risk of future accidents.

The growing frequency and sophistication of attacks on the Pentagon's computer networks highlight the need for improved protection of critical network infrastructures. This bill includes research and development funding for the exploration and development of defenses against cyber attacks. This step will greatly improve the Pentagon's focus on this growing threat.

In the past eight years, the Navy-Marine Corps team has responded to over

90 contingencies—almost one per month. As the Ranking Democrat on the Seapower Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, I am pleased that the bill provides the support necessary for our naval forces as they modernize to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

The bill includes the necessary advance procurement funding for Fiscal Year 1999 for the Navy's next aircraft carrier, CVN-77. The Navy's procurement schedule for the next carrier, revised from its budget submission of last year, will be under the cost cap mandated in last year's defense bill. Also, much of the new technology being developed for the next generation aircraft carrier, the CVX, will be included in CVN-77.

The budget request for the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the Marine Corps' MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft is fully funded. The Super Hornet combines the outstanding characteristics of earlier F/A-18 models with cutting edge technology in an affordable aircraft with significantly improved performance and endurance. The MV-22 Osprey is a vertical take-off and landing aircraft designed to replace the Marine Corps' aging fleet of CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters.

In contrast to these aspects of this bill, I do have concerns about reductions in the Administration's budget request for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, demilitarization of chemical weapons, and the nuclear weapon stockpile stewardship program. I hope that these reductions will be corrected in the final bill.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is the most cost-effective program for reducing the dangers of nuclear weapons. Thousands of nuclear warheads remain in the nations of the former Soviet Union. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program plays a key role in the control and dismantling of these weapons. We must continue this all-important program and ensure that every single nuclear warhead is secure, and eventually destroyed.

Funding reductions in the chemical weapons de-militarization program will endanger our ability to comply with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Conventions Treaty approved last year. As a world leader and the only superpower, we have an obligation to lead the worldwide effort to eliminate chemical weapons. I urge the restoration of these funds.

All of us have grave concerns over the recent nuclear testing in India. Russia and the United States continue to work hard to reduce the world's stockpile of nuclear weapons. India and other nations must also be involved in the reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a major milestone on the road to a nuclear free world. A cornerstone of the implementation of this treaty is the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program. We must be able

to certify that our remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons is reliable, while reducing the number of nuclear weapons through START II and, hopefully, a START III treaty.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program is the key component in verification of the reliability of our nuclear weapons. The program has experienced a fundamental shift in policy since the United States ceased live testing of nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy is developing new capabilities to complete this certification without live testing of nuclear weapons. The funding cuts in the budget request will hinder these efforts. I urge the restoration of these funds to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

In closing, I welcome the opportunity to commend the distinguished services of the members of the Committee, particularly the extraordinary services of the three members who will be leaving the Senate at the end of this Congress. Their efforts have added significantly to this year's Defense Authorization bill. The Airland Subcommittee has benefited from the efforts and insights of Senator GLENN and Senator COATS. Senator KEMPTHORNE's able leadership of the Personnel Subcommittee has ensured that the needs of our service men and women are paramount in this legislation. It has been a privilege to work with these able members of the Committee over the years, and we will miss their leadership in the years ahead.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to say a few words about the admirable work of the Senate Armed Services Committee. For the past two years, we have had budget agreements that have forced the Committee to make tough choices with shrinking resources. Under the able leadership of Chairman THURMOND and the Ranking Member, Senator LEVIN, the Committee has once again enhanced the quality of life for our brave men and women in uniform and have invested in programs vital to our future fighting forces. As the Ranking Member on the Foreign Relations Committee, I am constantly reminded of how vital a strong military is to protecting American interests and security around the world. I have said it before and I'll say it again, for diplomacy to be effective, not only must it be adequately funded, it must also be backed by a strong military and superior intelligence activities.

But, Mr. President, before I say any more about this bill, I want to say a word or two about Chairman THURMOND. His service to this nation has been truly remarkable. From the beaches of Normandy to the halls of the U.S. Senate, he has shown an outstanding dedication and commitment to doing the work of this nation. He and I worked together on the Judiciary Committee for 12 years—he was Chairman for the first 6 years and I was Chairman for the last 6. Then, as now, he has been a leader by example. He is one of the most remarkable individuals I have ever had the privilege of work-

ing with. We are not merely colleagues, we are friends.

He has served on the Armed Services Committee for 40 years, the last 4 of which he has been its Chairman. This is his last year as Chairman, so I want to say now what deep respect I have for the Senior Senator from South Carolina's military expertise and for the able manner in which he has worked with Senator LEVIN to keep our military strong. The Committee, the Senate, and the American people have gained from Senator THURMOND's leadership and his willingness to work with Senators from both parties to put America's national security interests ahead of partisan interests.

This bill is an example of that. It includes a 3.1 percent pay raise for military personnel. It also includes an important increase in hazardous duty incentive pay for mid- and senior level air crew personnel. I thank my colleagues for joining me in addressing that concern and showing these experienced personnel that we value their unique and vital contribution to America's national interest.

In addition, there is an important \$12 million increase in C-5 airlift squadrons research and development. This money is critically needed by the Air Force to examine the needs of these crucial aircraft as new technology becomes available to improve their performance. As many already know, the C-5 is capable of carrying more cargo than any other aircraft in our military. It has supported military operations from Vietnam to Desert Storm to the current operations in Bosnia and the Persian Gulf. I applaud the Committee's foresight in providing the money necessary to maintain these planes at peak performance levels.

Mr. President, I also want to take a minute to talk about the health care demonstration programs in this bill. With the growth in the number of retired military personnel, the rising costs of health care in general, and the closing of military bases, great strains have been placed on military medical facilities. This, in turn, has placed in some jeopardy the idea of guaranteeing high quality health care to our military retirees.

Last year, Congress recognized this growing problem, and we took a step in fixing it. Last year's Defense Authorization bill included a demonstration project on Medicare subvention—where Medicare reimburses military medical facilities for the treatment of retirees who are also eligible for Medicare. I am pleased that the Dover Air Force Base in Delaware has been selected as one of the six sites for this national demonstration project.

Again, this was a first step. But, there are other ways that might help us to fulfil our commitment to military retirees. And, so I strongly support the three additional health care demonstration projects in this bill—one to allow military retirees to participate in the Federal Employees

Health Benefits Program once they reach age 65; one to allow retirees to continue their eligibility for TRICARE and not have to switch to Medicare when they turn 65; and one to allow military retirees who are also eligible for Medicare to continue to participate in the Department of Defense's mail order pharmacy program.

Providing health care is an obligation we owe to our military retirees. It is a promise we made—but a promise that is now in jeopardy. The health care demonstration projects in this bill will not solve the problem we face. They are, after all, only demonstrations. But, hopefully, they—along with last year's Medicare subvention demonstration project—will help point the way to a solution so we can ensure that the federal government upholds its commitment to the men and women who so bravely served our country.

Mr. President, this bill includes an amendment that I joined with four colleagues in voting against yesterday. It was a compromise Sense of Congress resolution offered by Senator LEVIN, Senator COATS, and Senator THURMOND, regarding budgeting for continued participation of United States forces in NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The three cosponsors deserve credit for their hard work in having crafted what was, in the main, a very well thought out amendment. It contained several positive elements. And their compromise amendment was far preferable, in my opinion, to another amendment on U.S. forces in Bosnia, which Senator HUTCHISON and Senator BYRD were considering introducing.

Nonetheless, I voted against the compromise amendment, and I would like briefly to explain the reasoning behind my vote.

First, I agree with the amendment's intent to keep the pressure on our European allies to constitute the bulk of ground forces in the Stabilization Force, known popularly as SFOR. I want to clarify, however, that non-American forces already make up approximately three-quarters of the SFOR total.

Second, I am in complete agreement with the amendment's not giving a date-certain for the withdrawal of United States ground combat forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a date-certain would constitute the worst kind of micro-management of military affairs by the Congress, and would quite likely endanger the lives of American troops on the ground.

My principal reason for voting against the compromise amendment is that I do not agree that our goal should be a withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina as long as a NATO-led stabilization force remains in that country.

To be perfectly candid, Mr. President, I believe that such a move would serve to undermine American leadership in NATO. Even Combined Joint

Task Forces, commonly known by their CJTF acronym, should, unless there are exceptional circumstances, have a U.S. ground combat force component. While American air, naval, command and control, logistical, and intelligence support, and even a ready reserve over-the-horizon force in the region would be vital to any future mission, the participation of some American combat ground forces will remain a vital bona fide of U.S. commitment to Alliance operations.

In other words, for the United States to retain control of NATO-led operations, we must be present in all components of missions, including on the ground. This would apply to any follow-on force in Bosnia, whether it is NATO-led or is a CJTF with the Western European Union.

Let me pose a question to my colleagues. If the Bosnia ground operation becomes a purely European affair, do they not think that pretty soon some of our European allies will begin to question whether an American should continue to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)?

I for one think the answer is yes. The compromise amendment, against which I voted, may, I fear, begin to set in motion a process that will severely erode American leadership in NATO.

Let anyone think that my fears are far-fetched, I would remind my colleagues that France has already called for a European to take over command of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples and that initially the French were supported by several other European allies.

Keeping a contingent of U.S. ground combat troops in all NATO and NATO-led missions is a powerful symbol of American leadership and is recognized as such by allies and potential foes alike. We should think long and hard before advocating a change in that policy.

Mr. President, I will conclude where I began. I compliment the managers of this bill and the Armed Services Committee for providing a bill that continues to strengthen our nation's national security. It enhances the quality of life of our loyal and dedicated men and women in uniform. It addresses important weapons systems needs and takes steps toward finding the best way to meet our health care obligations. While I disagree with the Bosnia provision added for the reasons I've already mentioned, I think this bill gives America the strong military it needs to support our diplomatic work and to promote our national security interests.

Mr. McCain. Mr. President, every year I come down to the floor of the Senate and ruminate over the propensity of Members of Congress to add programs to spending bills solely, or at least primarily, for parochial reasons. The majority of us in Congress who supported the line-item veto were ostensibly doing so as an overdue reaction to the profligate spending prac-

tices that, over time, resulted in a \$5.5 trillion federal deficit. The fact that we have a balanced budget for the first time since 1969 should not detract from the fact that we continue, as a result of past spending practices, to pay as much per year in interest on the federal debt as we do for national defense.

The practice of adding programs to spending bills for parochial reasons has not abated, as a review of the ISTEA legislation reminds us. For many of us in the Senate, however, there has been a growing consensus that inadequate resources are being allocated for national defense, and that the financial burden associated with foreign operations like those in Bosnia and Southwest Asia, the funding for which is repeatedly ignored in Administration preparation of annual budget submissions, is seriously exacerbating readiness and modernization problems stemming from the combination of shrinking force structure and expanding commitments. When the stress from these conflicting trends is combined with the fact that no funding was added by Congress to the national defense portion of the federal budget for the first time since President Clinton took office, the seeds of a further, serious degradation in the state of our Armed Forces are firmly planted.

Because Congress did not add to the Administration's request for national defense, it would have seemed to be incumbent upon Members to act with a modicum of responsibility and not perpetuate funding problems with a business as usual approach. Unfortunately, we have once again failed to live up to that relatively minor expectation. The bill before us is one more example of why the President's failure to adequately exercise his line-item veto authority last year has provided Members every incentive to manipulate the budget process for the good of individual districts or states and, often, at the expense of what is best for the Armed Forces.

In my remarks last year, I was highly critical of the politicization of the services' unfunded priorities lists. That concern remains to some degree. My comments today include items that were added to the Administration's request and are on the unfunded priorities list both because of my concerns about the integrity of the process through which those lists are produced and because the lists were always submitted in the past within the context of congressionally-implemented additions to the defense budget. As additions to the budget request this year had to be offset within the 050 account, I have included projects added by Members even if they are on the lists because, in some instances, they are displacing funding from higher priority programs.

I commend the chairman of the Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee for his valiant effort at minimizing the usual considerable damage to science and technology programs that

are the seed corn of our future. Senator SANTORUM deserves credit for the manner in which he has balanced the need to preserve high priority science and technology spending with the usual onslaught of frivolous pet projects inserted into the budget to mollify this university or that laboratory. It is unfortunate that he could not be spared the onerous and wasteful task of nevertheless finding funding for a number of highly questionable projects. Spending \$1.5 million to study the effects on missile components of high frequency vibrations sounds reasonable. The only problem is, we have been studying that issue with regard to every missile and rocket designed since the dawn of the missile age. It is inclusive in the development of every such weapon system. This is not a better mousetrap; it's a classic waste of scarce resources.

Similarly, the \$3 million added to the budget for research into stainless steel double hull technologies ignores the fact that privately-owned shipyards seeking to profit from the oil pollution act, which mandated that all future oil tankers be double hulled, have already conducted ample research into that area with financial incentives courtesy of the Title XI loan guarantee program. Additionally, what can the Navy learn from this project that it doesn't already know from its years of experience with high strength, light weight steels such as are used in the construction of submarines? Mr. Chairman, this is precisely the type of spending the majority party was supposed to oppose—the kind that helped create a huge federal deficit while diverting funding from higher priority programs.

No better example of Congress operating at its fiscal worst exists than the inclusion in the budget of more C-130J aircraft. The Air Force has repeatedly emphasized its huge surplus of C-130s, yet is forced to buy more completely irrespective of requirements and funding priorities. The annual addition to the defense budget of C-130Js—and we are buying enough of them to house the homeless in brand-new fuselages—is fiscally irresponsible in the extreme. To see four new aircraft added to the bill when the accompanying report is highly critical of the C-130J due to cost overruns and developmental problems sets a new standard for absurdity. What if we said, "we don't need the Sergeant York air defense gun, it was a developmental nightmare, we can't afford it, it was canceled by the Reagan Administration, so let's add the purchase of some to this budget?" It would be the only thing more incomprehensible than the continued acquisition of unrequested C-130s.

Let anyone think that I exaggerate the budgetary impact of purchasing four unrequested, unneeded C-130J airframes, consider this: The cost of those aircraft is over \$200 million. That is a lot of money at a time when we are struggling to pay for important quality of life programs and maintain readiness. Yet, this is not even the most

egregious example of unnecessary, unrequested spending in the budget. This bill also includes a \$50 million down payment on a \$1.5 billion amphibious assault ship that was not requested by the Navy.

The defense authorization and appropriations bills cannot continue to be the vehicle for pumping tax dollars into favored districts and states. There are \$2.5 billion in Member-adds in this bill, a bill, to reiterate, that did not enjoy an increase in its top line. That means that the funding for these programs had to be found within the Defense Department's request. It means that the priorities of the military were ignored in favor of channeling dollars toward projects of low or nonexistent priority. How much more should we provide to the flat panel display industry, which should be funding its own research? With all due respect to Norway, a NATO ally, how long are we going to allow it to leverage its weapons purchases from the United States against our purchase of Penguin missiles, which the Navy has not requested?

Mr. President, there are a number of programs inserted into the budget by Members of Congress that bear little or no relation to the mission of providing for the common defense. There are programs that arguably will, over time, contribute to our national security. I further recognize that Congress does not exist to perfunctorily bless whatever recommendations emerge from the federal agencies we are tasked to oversee. The Constitution of the United States vests Congress with the authority to raise and support Armies. That is a responsibility some of us take very seriously. The practice of adding and earmarking funding for programs and activities that marginally contribute to the national defense in order to protect jobs, however, represents an abuse of that authority we should not countenance. We should take no pride in the fact that the Army was forced to accept the National Automotive Center as the focal point for the development of automotive technology. Why should the public not think the worst of us when they see their tax dollars handled so cavalierly?

These statements, which I make on every spending bill, get tiresome after a while. My colleagues don't like to hear them, and I certainly don't win any popularity contests on account of them. I would like to wax poetic about charging windmills, but I am under no illusions that my Dulcinea waits outside the chamber or that a final reward awaits me in the great beyond. All I ask is for it to stop. Adding ships, planes, helicopters and the usual myriad of arcane research and development projects to a defense bill at a time when the state of the Armed Forces continues to suffer from high operational rates and contracting force structure, when we struggle to provide military retirees the medical care they were promised when they enlisted,

when the services are repeatedly telling us that they don't need what we insist they buy, does not speak well of Congress as an institution. I urge my colleagues to heed the warning not of me, but of the combatant commanders and the men and women in the field who are tired and leaving the military because we cannot get our priorities in order.

Mr. President, I will keep coming to the floor to rail against wasteful federal spending because I believe it is warranted, and not just a little cathartic. I thank you for indulging me once again and I ask unanimous consent that this list of programs added to the budget, most for the kind of questionable reasons to which I referred, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Program	In millions
Army procurement:	
Aircraft procurement:	
US-35 air transport aircraft (3 A/C)	15.9
UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters (8 A/C) ¹	78.5
Modification of aircraft:	
C-12 flight maintenance system ..	6.0
Apache longbow AH-64 training devices and modifications ¹	40.2
Weapons and other combat vehicles:	
M249 armor machine gun 7.62mm ¹	6.5
MK-19 grenade launcher ¹	3.0
Tactical and support vehicles:	
Family of medium tactical vehicles (600 units) ¹	88.0
High mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle ¹	65.7
Medium truck extended program (1,085 units) ¹	63.9
Combat communications:	
Army data distribution system (ADDS) ¹	28.0
SINCGARS tactical radio (reserves) ¹	61.9
ACUS modernization program (WIN-T/T) ¹	47.8
Electronic equipment—tactical survival:	
Night vision devices ¹	13.5
Navy procurement:	
Combat aircraft:	
F-14 lantirn targeting PODS ¹	8.0
AH-1W night targeting system ¹ ..	11.0
EP-3 spares	2.0
P-3C ANIT—surface warfare improvement	2.2
Weapons procurement:	
Drones and decoys: 70 improved tactical air launched decoys	10.0
Penguin missile	7.5
Surface mode upgrade: close in weapons system	10.0
MOD 4 rotatable gun pool for cruiser conversions	15.0
Shipbuilding and conversion:	
LHD advance procurement	50.0
Air-cushioned landing craft life extension ¹	16.0
Other procurement:	
AN/WSN-7 inertial navigation system	12.0
AN/BPS-154 surface search radar	9.0
Space warfare system center	2.0
Submarine acoustic off-the-shelf processor insertion ¹	25.0
Aegis support, computer lesson system	8.0
DDG-51 Smartship equipment	12.0
NUKLA assembly qualification ...	1.0

Program	In millions
Communications automation equipment (IT-21) ¹	
Submarine connectivity equipment ¹	15.0
Naval shore communications equipment	20.0
Night vision goggles ¹	22.6
Marine Corps Procurement:	
MOD kits for tracked vehicles ¹ ...	4.6
Night vision equipment ¹	11.1
Carrier, electronics infrastructure, Marine email & year 2000 fix ¹	84.1
Light Tactical vehicle (buys 672 units) ¹	37.0
Avenger FLIR upgrade	7.6
Maritime technology	5.0
Material handling equipment (forklifts) ¹	10.4
New generators (1,311) ¹	9.5
Shop equipment contact maintenance ¹	5.4
Air Force Procurement:	
Combat aircraft:	
C-130J aircraft (2 aircraft)	157.5
WC-130J aircraft (1 aircraft)	75.4
EC-130J aircraft (1 aircraft)	85.0
Trainer aircraft:	
Joint Primary aircraft training system—JPATS (3 A/C)	9.1
Other aircraft:	
E-8C JSTARS aircraft advanced procurement	72.0
Modification of in-service aircraft:	
F-15 aircraft (engine replacement) ¹	25.0
F-15 aircraft (ALQ-135 countermeasures set) ¹	25.0
F-16 aircraft reconnaissance system ¹	13.3
Other aircraft:	
DARPA—Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program	56.0
National Guard and Reserve Equipment:	
\$10 million per service	60.0
Modifications of in service missiles:	
Minuteman III missile modifications	46.0
Organization and base equipment:	
Theater deployable communications ¹	17.7
Army Research Development, Test & Evaluation	
Army missile defense systems integration:	
Tactical high energy laser (THEL)	10.0
Space and missile defense battle lab	7.0
Aluminum metal matrix research and development	3.0
Future missile technology integration	6.0
RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, prototype #2 acceleration ¹	24.0
All source analysis system: Software integration	
Firefinder-accelerate software	0.9
Passive adjunct sensor capability ..	4.0
Advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS) ¹	12.5
Combat vehicle improvement programs: Flat panel display improvement program	
Materials technology: Hardened materials	3.0
Missile technology:	
Scramjet technology	3.0
Acoustics effects	1.5
Environmental quality tech:	
National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence	24.0
Radford Environmental Development and Management Program (REDMAP)	3.5
Plasma Energy Pyrolysis System (PEPS)	5.0

<i>Program</i>	<i>In millions</i>	<i>Program</i>	<i>In millions</i>
Computer software technology:		Phillips Lab: HAARP	9.0
Software security	0.5	Crew systems & personnel protection technology: Night vision technology	3.0
Military engineering technology:		Defense-wide Research Development, Test & Evaluation	
Cold Regions Research Laboratory	1.2	Support technologies: Wide band electronics	14.0
Medical advanced tech: Nutrition research	2.0	Explosive demilitarization technology:	
Weapons & munitions advanced technology: Precision guided mortar munitions	4.5	Blast chamber tech	4.0
Advanced tactical computer science & sensor technology: Digital intelligence technology	2.5	Portable blast chamber tech	1.5
Army technological test instrumentation & targets ¹	7.0	Counter terror tech support: PFNA Counter proliferation support: HAARP	5.0
Survivability/Lethality analysis: Intelligence and warning vulnerability assessment	4.0	Support technologies: Atmospheric interceptor tech	22.0
DOD high energy laser test facility, solid state laser ¹	8.0	Space based laser demonstrator ..	94.0
Navy research, development test & evaluation:		Scorpius	5.0
Space and electronic warfare: Advanced communications and information technology	3.0	Excaliber	5.0
Space and electronic warfare: Global C4ISR visualization	4.0	Navy Theater Wide Missile Defense System:	
Precision strike and air defense technology	5.0	Navy upper tier acceleration	70.0
Joint strike fighter demonstration/validation: Alternate engine program	15.0	High power discriminator	50.0
Integrated defense electronic counter measures (IDECM)	10.0	Ballistic missile defense technical operations: Advanced Research Center	5.0
Air & surface launched weapon technology: Pulse detonation engine technology	1.0	International cooperative programs: Arrow Interoperability	12.0
Ships, submarine & logistics technology: Stainless steel double hull	3.0	Counter proliferation support	4.0
Materials, electronics and computer technology: Thermal management materials	1.5	Advanced sensor applications	2.0
Materials, electronics and computer technology: Electronic propulsion technology	2.0	Endurance U.A.V. (Global Hawk) ...	32.5
Materials, electronics and computer technology: Carbon/carbon heat shield	2.5	Chem-BIO Defense Program: Sensors	5.0
Medical development: Freeze dried blood research	1.0	Medical free electron laser	7.0
Non-lethal weapons demonstration/validation	13.3	Biological warfare defense: Multimedia technology	1.5
Medical development: Voice instructional devices	1.0	Chem-Bio Defense Program: Light weight detectors	5.0
Air Force research development, test & evaluation:		Chem-BIO Defense Programs: Safeguard	4.0
Ballistic missile technology	5.0	Integrated C2 technology: High definition system, flat panel display	8.0
Advanced spacecraft technology:		Materials & electronics technology: Mixed mode electronics	6.0
Range improvements for liquid upper stage ¹	5.0	Weapons of mass destruction related technology:	
Micro-SAT	10.0	Core competencies	10.0
Solar orbital transfer vehicle	10.0	Deep digger	3.0
National polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system: Satellite survivability	30.0	Electro magnetic pulse	2.0
Enhanced global positioning system—block IIF (space)	44.0	Advanced electronic technology: Lithography	10.0
Space test program: Maneuver vehicle	10.0	Generic logistics R&D demands: Computer assisted technology transfer (CATT)	4.0
Theater missile defenses: TAWS	12.0	High Performance Computer Modernization Program: High performance technology	20.0
Information systems security program	10.0	High performance computer modernization program: High performance VIZ technology	3.0
Electronic combat precision location and identification (PLAID) ..	14.0	CALS initiative: IDE	2.0
Variable stability in-flight simulator test aircraft (VISTA)	7.0	Joint robotics program	6.0
Electronic warfare development: EC-130H	20.0	Joint simulation system	4.5
Target systems development: Big Crow program office	10.0	Defense technology analysis: Commodity management technology	2.0
Theater battle management system			
Manned reconnaissance systems:		Total	2,494
U-2 upgrade	17.0		
Aircrew laser eye protection	5.5		
Materials: Friction welding	1.5		
Aerospace propulsion: Variable displacement vane pump	2.0		

¹Items were included on service unfunded priorities lists.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the bill before us.

In this bill the Armed Services Committee has—under unprecedented fiscal austerity—ably worked to balance the many important yet competing needs for scarce funding, maintaining a first-class military and providing important benefits for personnel, their dependents, and retirees.

Allow me to highlight several particularly good provisions in this bill, for which Chairman THURMOND and Senator LEVIN should be congratulated.

First, this measure wisely has full funding for National Missile Defense for FY99. Treaty-friendly, affordable, effective NMD has always had my strong support.

I am also pleased that funds have been added to begin to make up the readiness funding deficit of the Army National Guard. The Guard Bureau informs me these accounts were more than half a billion dollars short in the FY99 budget request. I hope the funding added by the Committee can be supplemented during conference.

Third, an additional \$46 million has been included for Minuteman III ICBM upgrades. The Minuteman III force will be service for decades to come, and modernization must go forward. The Committee acted wisely regarding the Guidance Replacement Program.

The Committee has also moved to accelerate key military construction projects for North Dakota. These include \$8.5 million for repair of the taxiway at Minot AFB, and \$3.65 million for renovation of a supply shop for the North Dakota Air National Guard. George Lauffer and Mike McCord on the Committee staff deserve thanks for their work on these items.

Additionally, the Authorization bill calls for demonstration programs regarding allowing Medicare-eligible military retirees to enroll in the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program.

Finally, but very importantly, I am pleased that the Senate has approved an amendment bringing the pay raise in this bill up to the level in the House bill, 3.6 percent.

However, there are a number of matters in this bill of great concern.

First, the Committee's bill would call for a cut of nearly \$100M to the Air Force's budget request for the Airborne Laser, a revolutionary theater missile defense program, and top priority for the USAF.

Second, this bill provides inadequate funding for the B-52H bomber force. Although I will not discuss this matter in detail at this time, let me say this: today's thoroughly upgraded B-52H can deliver a greater quantity and diversity of conventional and nuclear munitions a greater distance at a lower cost than any other airborne combat platform in the world today. Cutting the B-52 force doesn't make good national security or fiscal sense, and I applaud Senator STEVENS and Senator INOUE—the distinguished leadership of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee—for acting to fund all 94 B-52s in the FY99 Defense Appropriations Bill.

I hope that ABL and B-52 funding can be addressed in conference. Even so, I am pleased to support this bill, especially in light of the Committee's acceptance of my amendment regarding Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, at this point I would like to speak briefly about the amendment.

The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan serve as an unsettling reminder that nuclear weapons continue

to be sought for their terrible destructive power and prestige. An equally serious, if not greater, nuclear threat still lies to the north of the Indian subcontinent, however—in Russia's enormous, ill-secured, and potentially destabilizing non-strategic, or "tactical," nuclear arsenal.

As my colleagues may be aware, Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile could be larger than ours by a factor of eight-to-one, and is not covered by any arms control accord.

I believe it is time for the Congress to do three things.

First, go on record as concerned about the significant "loose nuke" dangers associated with Russia's tactical stockpile, and the growing strategic relevance of Moscow's tactical arsenal.

Additionally, we must call for the Russians to make good on the 1991 and 1992 Gorbachev and Yeltsin promises to deeply reduce tactical weapons, just as the US has followed through in good faith on President Bush's similar promises in September 1991.

And finally, the Congress needs a detailed report, and the benefit of the analysis of the Defense Department, the Intelligence Community, and the US Strategic Command.

Today, I wish to thank the Armed Services Committee for accepting my amendment earlier this week that does just these things.

I also wish to thank the following distinguished Members of the Armed Services Committee, who have cosponsored my amendment: Senators KEMPTHORNE, KENNEDY, BINGAMAN, and LEVIN. Glen Tait, Menda Fife, Bill Monahan, and Madelyn Creedon, in addition to Monica Chavez with the committee—deserve thanks for their good work.

Before asking unanimous consent that the full text of my amendment be included after my statement, I would call the Senate's attention to the testimony of the Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command, Gen. Eugene Habiger. Gen. Habiger, testifying before the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, responded to a question regarding Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile by Senator KEMPTHORNE—a cosponsor of my amendment—by stating that "it is time for us to get very serious about tactical nuclear weapons."

My amendment responds to the General's sage advice, advancing the cause of getting deep reductions to Russia's non-strategic nuclear arsenal. At the very least, we should ask them to come down to our level—and prove it to us.

Before closing, Mr. President, I would like to emphasize that my amendment should be properly viewed in context with the funding for the vital Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat program in the FY99 Defense Authorization bill. Senate passage of my amendment ensures that we send to Russia a message of concern and cooperation.

Let me be clear: continuing the Nunn-Lugar program is absolutely crit-

ical. I can think of no better investment of national security dollars than simply expending money for the destruction of horrible weapons capable of killing millions of Americans.

Continuing and fully funding the CTR program is especially important in light of the Russian tactical nuclear dangers I have discussed. Although there are arms control agreements requiring Russian strategic force reductions, there are no arms control agreements requiring reductions to Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile.

In addition to the diplomatic pressure called for in my amendment, continuing and possibly expanding work under Nunn-Lugar on tactical nuclear weapons is the best bet we've got to put this aspect of the Russian nuclear genie back in the bottle. Funding for Nunn-Lugar is vital, and I congratulate the committee for fully supporting this program in their bill.

Again, Mr. President, I would thank my colleagues for approving my amendment, and the amendment's cosponsors for their support. This is a good bill—but a better bill because we have taken this initial step toward eliminating the tactical nuclear dangers from the former Soviet Union.

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the Senate is now in the process of creating arguably the most important legislation we produce all year, the Defense Authorization Bill. We are authorizing the activities of government which keep Americans free and safe, and we are authorizing activities which are carried out by young Americans in a spirit of courage and selfless service. So there is no more serious legislation than this. My purpose today is to ask my colleagues as they deliberate on this bill to consider the threats to our country as they are and as they likely will be in the decade ahead, so we authorize armed forces which will be able to deter or defeat those threats.

The arms forces we authorize in this bill keep America safe mainly by their credible potential for overwhelming, focused, sustained violence. We allocate the funds by categories such as training, operations and maintenance, quality of life, readiness, but in actuality these funds are to support the credibility of that potential for violence. It is a potential to counter and, if necessary, defeat the threats which put at risk our national life, the lives of Americans, and in some cases the livelihoods and interests of Americans. It is a potential which is an essential element of our national power.

Our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee have taken on the daunting task of measuring the forces the President has requested against the threats we face. I say this is a daunting task because while the threats are dynamic, there is a normal human trait to see the threats as static, particularly when we are already heavily invested in a technology or a family of weapons that have proven successful against a particular threat in the past.

It is our duty, Mr. President, to resist that trait, to see the world as it is and to try our best to see it as it will be. In our analysis our most useful tool is the information produced by our Intelligence Community.

Let's look out across the world of the present and near future. We see Russian nuclear forces, still deployed, still on alert, still capable of killing scores of millions of Americans. We see growing indiscipline in the way Russian nuclear weapons are stored and maintained, combined with a hunger for plutonium and weapons-grade uranium among the world's weapons proliferators. In China we see a much smaller but still deadly Chinese nuclear force, reportedly with its weapons targeted on the U.S. We depend heavily on the intelligence community to monitor Russia's and China's nuclear status, for the reason we always did: because our national survival could be at stake.

In Russia we see conventional forces in steep decline and in China conventional forces which appear to be outmoded and immobile, compared with U.S. forces. Looking more broadly, we see a small and diminishing number of countries with capable conventional land or naval forces, but an increasing number of countries and movements trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. In the case of India and Pakistan, we see vividly how successful proliferation efforts add to global danger. We also see non-national and multi-national threats such as terrorist movements and drug cartels posing greater threats to the safety of Americans than the threats posed by the conventional military forces of the few isolated, weak rogue states who claim to be our adversary. Looking more broadly, past the ability of our potential adversaries to do violence, we see a new world in which people increasingly do not look to their national governments as the sole means of accomplishing their goals in international matters. The age of imperialism, in which national governments invaded each other's territory to extend their power, seems a distant memory. Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait eight years ago and the current nuclear tension between India and Pakistan are two indicators that we must keep a sharp eye on relations between states, and if our policymakers choose to intervene in such conflicts, we must have armed forces capable of doing so. But we are in a world in which nonnational actors—individuals as well as corporations and movements have taken international relations into their own hands.

The global nature of the Internet and the global, not national, outlook of the world's dominant corporations, are well known to all. Daimler-Benz' recent purchase of a company which less than twenty years ago we were bailing out as a patriotic duty, and the lack of concern in this country about that purchase, underscores the point. At the

other, individual end of the scale, we see individual Irish citizens, both north and south, looking beyond their governments and the borders created by governments and seeing the advantage of direct personal and commercial relationships, the advantage not just of peace but of lower barriers. The relentless integration of Europe, most recently marked by the introduction of a common currency, is a sharp contrast to the conflicts and ancient rivalries which marked and divided Europe for centuries. European conflict called forth the greatest armies America ever raised, twice in this century. Today we are concerned with residual ethnic disputes in isolated corners of Europe and in the case of Bosnia even deploy military force in an effort to stabilize and contain the conflict. But large-scale conventional conflict in Europe, for the first time since the invention of gunpowder, is unthinkable.

Outside Europe, we see economic integration throughout Asia and in our own hemisphere, and we see economic integration leading cultural integration. The national boundaries are blurring. In this metropolitan area, for example, there are cable TV stations broadcasting in Spanish, Arabic, Japanese, and other languages. Even in Pakistan and India, the elites who rattle nuclear weapons at each other are part of the same global culture; their children are studying in American universities.

There are exceptions to the trend of global integration. There are pockets of recalcitrance: dictatorships who retain power by force, immature democracies in which crime rivals legitimate business and creates internal civil wars, unscrupulous leaders in places like the Middle East, South Asia, and the former Yugoslavia who manipulate ethnic rivalries as a tool to retain power. These are the places likely to generate conflicts which threaten our safety or our interests. These are the places which, especially if economic disparity is added to ethnic or religious differences, from which violence will emanate. These are the places in which U.S. intelligence ought to provide policymakers and warfighters the edge. Given that such places exist, and given the enduring strategic threat we also face from Russia, what should our armed forces be able to do?

First, our forces should be able to deter the threat of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons, along with the growing threat posed by regional nuclear programs. The Wall may have fallen, but until verifiable arms control agreements bring this nuclear episode of military history to an end, we need modern, robust nuclear forces and we need the intelligence to closely watch not just Russia and China, but also the nuclear activities of proliferating countries. Good intelligence is inextricably linked to a sound strategic defense, and it is not cheap. Strong nuclear forces in the absence of nuclear testing means a dependable Stockpile

Stewardship Program. We and the world must have absolute confidence in our nuclear capabilities. I will therefore support the efforts of the Senator from New Mexico to restore full funding to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Defending America from nuclear threats also means preventing fissile materials from falling into the hands of those aspiring to develop nuclear weapons, be they aspiring countries or terrorists. The Indian-Pakistani attainment of nuclear weapons does not cease our efforts; it means we should redouble them. In this sense, the security of Russia's vast nuclear arsenal is very much in our interest. The Armed Services Committee has long recognized this fact through the Nunn-Lugar program, and I will support restoration of full funding for Nunn-Lugar in this bill. Beyond the nuclear threat, the increasingly interconnected world I described presents little likelihood of a clash of large conventional forces. In addition to globalization, we see a reduction in conventional forces of most countries. With the vitally important exception of the United States, I also see a decline in recent years in the fighting spirit in the remaining large conventional forces in the world. All these trends suggest we will not see our military engaged in a major conventional conflict in the foreseeable future. Certainly the example of the Gulf War should dissuade other countries from putting a large armored force into the field against the United States. Large-scale conventional modernization can therefore safely be a lower priority for us. However, smaller, highly mobile, highly ready conventional forces will be a necessity.

Ethnic conflict will continue to erupt on the peripheries of global integration. Because of America's unique power and because, as the performance of our NATO allies in Bosnia prior to our arrival there showed, other countries' militaries will not take forceful action without an American example, we will be called upon for future deployments much like the Bosnian mission. Certainly we cannot answer every call. But if a conflict threatens a wider war which would require an even greater American involvement, we must deploy to nip some conflicts in the bud. It is an obligation of leadership. If we do it right, others will imitate us and we will have to deploy less often.

In designing our forces we should bear in mind the characteristics of the ideal deployable forces: highly capable (packing a strong punch), highly mobile, highly trained, well maintained, closely connected to national and theater intelligence, integrated with the command and control systems of the allies with whom we will operate, rapidly transportable to the theater of deployment, and supported by tailored logistics. These forces should operate in an environment in which we control the coasts and sea lanes in the vicinity and the airspace over the vicinity, for

purposes of support, surveillance, and air strikes if necessary.

Beyond regional deployments, we face non-national threats such as weapons proliferation, terrorism, and the casualties we continually suffer from drug trafficking. As with the Russian nuclear threat, the first line of defense against these threats is the best possible intelligence. We require military forces that can respond to the intelligence when policy makers so direct: agile, superbly trained and equipped special operations forces. Increasingly the military future belongs to the sophistication and stealth of the special operator, rather than the armored masses of the past. Maintaining such forces in all the services should be among our highest priority.

Mr. President, a new threat has materialized in recent years, the threat of electronic attack against the communications systems and computer networks which are increasingly the fundamental infrastructure of our country. Recent Defense Department exercises have helped size the potential problem and the Administration has a number of agencies developing a response. As with every threat, intelligence plays a key role in warning against and countering this threat. In developing our defenses, we need units with great knowledge, the best equipment, technically sophisticated people, and speed in both decision and execution. Fortunately, these are American traits. In fact, those who contemplate attacking us in the realm of information operations are really attacking into one of our greatest national strengths. But we should not be overconfident. We need to defend in cyberspace, and the forces authorized in this bill should do so.

The Armed Services Committee was faced with a tight budget and difficult choices. I propose reviewing those choices with this criterion: how does this or that program help create or sustain the kind of military forces I have described, forces responsive to the threats and global realities we face? We simply cannot afford to allocate these scarce resources on the basis of other criteria. It is not enough to state a particular class of equipment is wearing out or should be replaced, we have always had that class of equipment, so we should get a new modern version. We must ask: how does that class of equipment respond to the threats we face and will face? It is not enough to state, the defense plant in my state will lack work if we do not buy a particular item. It is not enough to state, the military base in my state must continue to operate at or above its current level of manning, regardless of the national need. It is unfair to our service members and their families, it is unfair to taxpayers, but above all it is unfair to the nation we are pledged to defend, to force precious defense funds to be spent on a basing system which is reportedly over twenty percent larger than the nation requires.

Mr. President, I will be looking closely at this legislation in terms of its contribution to the forces we require. It is far more agreeable to stay the course and stick with the traditional weapons and organizations and bases which helped win the Cold War. With an institution as large and complex as the Defense Department, change is also a lengthy process. But we must lead change and make the defense choices to align our forces with the world as it is and will be. Our fighting men and women deserve it and our country should expect it of us.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Authorization Act. This legislation focuses on the military of tomorrow by establishing priorities that will allow American forces to prepare for the conflicts of the 21st Century.

We consider this measure under the leadership of a remarkable Senator whose personal sacrifice and professional insight have contributed to the molding of the military in our time. The public life of STROM THURMOND has reflected the evolution of conflict and war fighting capabilities in the last half-century. Emerging as a Colonel from World War II, he persevered through the traumas of Korea and Vietnam; the turbulent "hollow force" years of the 1970s; the recovery of our might under President Reagan; the collapse of imperial communism; and the computer-age attacks during the Persian Gulf War.

Today, he manages a bill that capitalizes on the lessons of the military history to which he contributed. The FY99 Defense Authorization Act increases the speed, precision, and analytical capacity of soldiers who will face post-Soviet adversaries as determined or dictatorial, but more numerous, than those whom we have confronted in the past.

While he steps down at the end of the year as Committee Chairman, his leadership will resonate in our deliberations and hearings for years to come. He brings an authorization before the Senate this week having groomed three generations of successors in the byzantine ways of defense legislation.

Mr. President, this bill includes several programs that enhance the readiness and modernization of the military. Our Committee has worked diligently during the 1990s to control the bleeding of funds from next-generation procurement systems and the stress on our forces from escalating peacekeeping commitments. President Clinton's out-year budget projections bring defense outlays as a percentage of GDP to 2.7 percent, the lowest level in almost 50 years. The President targets the military as the only federal function that sustains deep outlay decreases between 1993 and 2003. While mandatory domestic expenditures will increase over time by 23.6 percent, those for national defense fall by exactly the same level.

In modernization accounts—those for weapons procurement—funding has

fallen by 67% since 1985. This trend, in constant dollars, means that at the height of the Reagan build-up thirteen years ago, the Pentagon obligated \$138.7 billion for procurement. This spending fell to its lowest point—\$44.2 billion—in FY97. The FY99 budget finally increases the account to \$48.7 billion, and I commend Secretary Cohen for submitting the first budget by this administration that brings procurement back to the annual average threshold of \$60.1 billion, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, starting in 2001.

Exploding expenditures for peacekeeping operations since the end of the Persian Gulf War directly threaten spending for procurement and modernization. To confirm this point, we only need to read the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Among all Pentagon programs, the QDR singled out "incremental costs of unplanned deployments and smaller-scale contingencies" as the "least predictable operating expenses" which "displace funding previously planned for procurement."

America's 29 contingency operations since the end of the Persian Gulf War have cost us a total of \$18 billion. Our Bosnia commitment alone has consumed \$7.2 billion. Even excluding Bosnia, the American taxpayers gave another three billion dollars just to support U.N. peacekeeping programs throughout the 1990's. The administration, however, has never offered us a comprehensive readiness and mission assessment of U.S. Contingency Operations (CONOPS) policy to justify or rationalize the expenditure of this \$21 billion, or eight percent of the whole defense budget.

The Committee, therefore, supported an amendment that I offered along with Senator CLELAND during the mark-up session making the Pentagon statutorily responsible for providing all congressional defense committees with a Contingency Operations budgetary, mission, and readiness assessment by January 31, 1999. We did not establish the deadline by coincidence. I strongly believe that the Committee should consider any CONOPS authorization or supplemental appropriations requests next year only with the benefit of the president's strategic analysis of how and why the Armed Services will obligate their peacekeeping budgets.

This amendment subsequently directs the department to address five issues: the effects of ongoing CONOPS on Service retention and reenlistment rates; whether they cause sustained or significant shortages of military personnel and equipment in other regions of the world; the specific programmatic accounts on which the department has relied to underwrite CONOPS deployments; what clear objectives guide each of these undertakings; and the conditions, based on such objectives, that would define the end of each operation.

Presidential Decision Direction 25 of May 1994, Mr. President, outlined the scope and purpose of the administration's CONOPS policy. It promised the application of strict standards to determine whether the U.S. should participate in any overseas peace operation.

The reporting categories specified by my amendment intentionally overlap with this directive. PDD-25 specifically declared that potential CONOPS commitments would depend on whether our participation advanced U.S. interests, the "unique and general risks" to American personnel, if "clear objectives" could determine the role of our forces, and the identification of an "endpoint."

We would not impose an unfair burden on the Defense Department by mandating a pre-posture hearing or pre-budget request report on the steps that the administration has taken to implement its own plan.

This year, the Committee received Posture Statements from the Navy and the Air Force that contained warnings of potential negative readiness impacts as a result of long CONOPS deployments. Secretary Dalton cited the "requirements of the Unified Commands"—those that participate heavily in peacekeeping missions—as effecting the readiness of non-deployed fleet units.

The number of Air Force personnel dedicated to contingency operations grew fourfold since 1989 from 3,400 to 14,600 by FY97. "Caution indicators," as the report characterized it, have emerged in the areas of retention, reenlistment, and depleted inventories of spare parts.

In addition, by October 1999, the Army, the Service most involved in peacekeeping, could lack the heavy armored divisions designed for rapid deployment to crisis areas. Two of the divisions that train full time for this mission may have one-third of their troops on duty in Bosnia or Kuwait.

Four years ago, the Army had 541,000 active duty soldiers and no commitments in Bosnia. The Armed Services Committee, according to former Chairman Nunn, considered this level the minimum necessary for responding to two regional crises. Yet today, the Army faces the challenge of preparing for two Major Theater Wars at a reduced force strength of 491,000, coupled with a deployment in Bosnia.

Consider the exorbitant contingency operations costs that the Army absorbed in just one fiscal year. The amount, \$1.5 billion, represented more than one-fifth of the entire research and development budget for the Service. It exceeded the total Army aircraft procurement line by almost two hundred million dollars. If we take these examples of the strains imposed by peacekeeping commitments on Army research and hardware programs, how can the administration state that it has adequately weighed the "unique and general risks" of these missions, as required under PDD-25, to our people in uniform?

Despite the alarming budgetary trends, the QDR predicts that contingency efforts will dominate the Pentagon's planning agenda over the next two decades. The law, Mr. President, must also move in this direction by requiring a CONOPS policy rationale with a CONOPS budget request. My amendment supports this transition by mandating the first pre-budget report to Congress on the national security and OPTEMPO implications of our increased contingency commitments.

Whether for contingency operations or more traditional missions, naval modernization programs will remain vital to the overseas projection of American forces. As a result, I salute the Chair of the Seapower Subcommittee—Senator WARNER—for this support of the \$2.680 billion continuation of the DDG-51 multi-year destroyer procurement, the \$2.003 billion going to produce the second ship of the New Attack Submarine class, and the \$639 million going for the next LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Ship. In addition, I am pleased that the Subcommittee fully authorized the Navy's \$85 million DD-21 land-attack destroyer Research and Development request to keep this new effort on schedule and within budget.

These four programs meet the Navy's requirements for the type of warfare that will dominate our military strategy of the future: littoral operations near coastal plains. Littoral engagements require the Navy to maneuver "close enough to influence events on shore if necessary." This post-Soviet mission continues to match our force structure with our security interests since 80 percent of the world's population lives near the coastal areas and waterways that open into the littorals.

Littoral concepts of war stem directly from the changing worldwide political environment in which the United States operates. Soviet power no longer threatens the open plains of Central Europe. Soviet ships and submarines no longer prepare for platform-to-platform battles on the open seas. For the first time since the end of World War II, a Pentagon planning document, the QDR, steered the military in the direction of deterring conflict and instability wherever it might occur rather than containing a single enemy force.

The surface ship and submarine programs authorized in this bill will provide the Navy more firepower and endurance at a lower cost. Smooth and modular construction materials will deceive the enemy radars that can detect the hard angles of older vessels. Electronic integrators will give ships and submarines split-second systems for communications and munitions targeting. A new series of rapid transporters will bring unprecedented levels of forces and weapons to the shorelines of instability or humanitarian rescue. From safe distances at sea, smaller crews will program missiles for strategic inland targets.

A littoral Navy, Mr. President, also corresponds with lower life-cycle costs.

Carriers and surface combatants will carry more firepower and fewer people. This development, in addition to a greater reliance on commercial "off-the-shelf" technologies, holds the promise of decreasing maintenance expenditures by between 50 and 70 percent.

We also cannot forget that political limitations as well as political changes shape the new Navy. The visible and invisible forward presence provided by the Fleet assumes greater importance in an age when we no longer enjoy permanent bases throughout Europe or Southern Asia. As a result, the administration will increasingly rely on the Navy as a key agent of force behind our diplomacy.

For this reason, I was honored to participate in a Subcommittee markup that also expanded naval air programs. To stabilize the transition from the *Nimitz*-class of nuclear aircraft carriers to the new-generation CVX system, the Subcommittee allocated \$124.5 million for acceleration of advance procurement and component construction of the CVN-77 system. We furthermore instructed the Navy to invest carrier research and development budgets in a way that will directly enhance the planned capabilities of the CVX. Our mark-up also placed the P-3 Orion Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement Program on an efficient 12-month modification track.

The changing mix of threats to our national security represented by these maritime and other high-technology defense programs finally influenced the Committee vote against authorizing another base closure (BRAC) round.

This amendment tried to address two of the many problems with the BRAC process: the fact that no law guarantees the proper investment of any quantifiable returns from base closures, and the president's temptation to manipulate commission rulings in his own political interest.

But the Committee rejected the BRAC amendment because it did not, nor could it, solve the fatal flaws in the process. No base closure round, Mr. President, has yielded the taxpayers any clear or proven savings. We do not need to rely on the claims of congressional BRAC opponents to demonstrate this point. We only need to consider the conclusion of the leading advocate of BRAC: The Department of Defense. DoD's April 1998 base closure report to Congress states explicitly that "no audit trail, single document, or budget account exists for tracking the end use of each dollar saved through BRAC."

We can also turn to the findings of independent evaluators. Last summer, the GAO flatly told us that "DoD accounting systems are not designed to track savings." The Congressional Budget Office concluded in December 1996 that the Pentagon "is unable to report actual spending and savings for BRAC actions." Accounting uncertainties, Mr. President, have made apparent base closure savings a frustrating mystery rather than a confirmed fact.

The Defense Department cannot continue to decide which installations to downsize or close by making arbitrary comparisons to personnel reductions. The standard should not focus, as DoD contends, on closing 36% of our bases if 36% of all people in uniform have left the military since the peak of the Cold War. The standard must remain the adaptation of infrastructure to new or developing security threats. But as it did last year, the administration rests the argument for more base closures on the premise that facility cuts have lagged behind those in personnel by 15 percent.

A simple percentage, Mr. President, cannot answer the questions that should determine the future of domestic military bases. What depots, for example, do we require to provide competition with the private sector and to insure the precision and endurance of fighter aircraft?

What shipyards can provide the Navy with a diversified industrial base to sustain the next-generation modular vessels that will maneuver in littoral waters?

What air bases must stay active to support our long-range power projection capabilities now that we have a diminished forward presence in Europe and Southern Asia?

These questions do not exhaust the list. But I raise them as examples of the factors absent in most of the base closure assessments that have come to Congress from the Pentagon.

Page one of the April base report estimates that the military could save 21 billion dollars between 2008 and 2015 if we approve two more BRAC rounds. Even if the Committee had accepted this projection, the QDR acknowledges that it could re-capture \$18 billion of this amount in three ways: by following through with DoD management reforms and technology upgrades, providing consistent guidance to the Services on budget priorities, and controlling the costs of contingency operations.

The QDR indicated that this \$18 billion dollar loss as from three specific causes, came exclusively from procurement accounts. It therefore has three specific plans, *all* of which relate to policy changes and internal reforms, and none of which relate to base closures, for restoring funds to modernization. The April base closure report even admits that if the Pentagon could quantify BRAC savings, there would be no guarantee that procurement programs might gain from the extra dollars because the four separate Services make their own investment decisions.

To assert that the department cannot save \$18 billion dollars through rigorous budget management, Mr. President, is to assert that it cannot follow the mandates of the QDR, which called for "reducing unneeded standards and specifications," and the "leveraging of commercial technology."

And how unreasonable or impractical is it to control the level of unplanned expenditures on Bosnia through clear

policy objectives? According to the administration, while it predicts extensive U.S. involvement in contingency operations beyond 2015, our engagement "must be selective, depending largely on the interests at stake and the risk of major aggression elsewhere."

The Clinton Administration advertises a commitment to multi-billion dollar defense management reforms while asking for base closures to generate savings that it can neither find nor re-invest. At the same time, it has submitted very real Bosnia bills that now exceed seven billion dollars and freeze our forces in a political vacuum.

By rejecting the BRAC amendment, the Committee invited the administration to provide us with a more compelling plan that links facility to mission needs. In the meantime, DoD can also realize billions of dollars of savings through firm policy decisions about our overseas strategic interests, internal reforms, and Service programmatic goals. The Defense Department must continue to work directly with Congress on the issues that will improve the military of the next decade instead of shifting them to yet another panel for which we can claim no responsibility.

Mr. President, the FY99 Authorization Bill accelerates the modernization of the Armed Services while recognizing the strong evidence of the degrading impact of open-ended contingency Operations on Personnel Temps and unit readiness. It ultimately holds the Pentagon accountable for documented savings through policy and management reforms rather than accepting the unproven promises of BRAC savings that would come 15 years away. I therefore urge all of my colleagues to vote in favor of this responsible legislation.

U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND
CONDEMNATION OF TESTING IN SOUTH ASIA

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, my support for this amendment must be qualified. I too am concerned about proliferation. However, I do not welcome the potentially negative consequences relying strictly on U.S. unilateral sanctions in this case. I strongly urge we combine sanctions with engagement. This engagement must be based on comprehensive, calculated non-proliferation policies.

I believe that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses an imminent threat to U.S. and international security. The geopolitical strings that contained states' individual aspirations of mass destruction capabilities have been severed. The emerging multipolar world—in which the U.S. is, without question, the dominant economic, military and cultural power—creates new threats and offers new opportunities.

Capitalizing on opportunities requires U.S. leadership. No other nation has the wherewithal to facilitate the creation and implementation of thoughtful and deliberate strategies to

counter threats to U.S. and international security. No other nation parallels the power the U.S. can bring to bear in creating a stable international order. There is no doubt that we live in an increasingly interdependent world. Most major problems—economic, environmental, military—cannot be handled by the U.S. alone, despite our dominant position.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one such problem. This threat cannot be stemmed by unilateral U.S. actions. The dangers of weapons of mass destruction proliferation—whether by rogue nations or terrorist organizations—poses a threat to the U.S. military and U.S. civilians, as well as the future of humanity. In light of the changed global circumstances and the U.S. position as the global power, we urgently need to rethink antiquated doctrines of defense and provide a coherent approach to non-proliferation policies.

Our nuclear reality has radically changed in the past weeks. Recent rumblings from the detonation of nuclear devices in Southeast Asia should awaken us to a few simple realities: our non-proliferation policies have failed; any country desirous of nuclear capability can attain it; and sanctions alone are an inadequate deterrent and potentially dangerous approach.

Sanctions alone will not suffice in deterring would-be proliferators. When leaders of a country are willing to state that the people "will eat grass" in order to obtain weapons of mass destruction capability, this should be a sign of the relative impotence of U.S. unilateral attempts to alter their behavior.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—the lynchpin of nuclear control—is under assault. North Korea, Iraq, India and Pakistan sent clear signals—nuclear proliferation is a threat now. How obvious do the warning signs have to be to evoke an effective response?

The U.S. should be taking the lead in formulating national and multilateral efforts to contain proliferation. If not contained, the recent events in India and Pakistan will become a common occurrence in the world of the near future.

As stated by Secretary of Defense William Cohen in recent defense Appropriation hearings, India's actions could set off a chain reaction—not solely of a fissile nature but nonetheless having similar cataclysmic ramifications. Without swift and multilateral intervention this chain reaction could easily lead to a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan that would spill over into other countries' strategic calculations.

More ominous is that Indian and Pakistani defiance will set the tone for other less developed states. It is clearly in the U.S. interest to prevent uncontrolled proliferation. A U.S. response proportionate to the threat would involve bringing all the policy tools we can bring to bear in reducing that

threat. In sum, this requires a reasonable, consistent and aggressive non-proliferation strategy.

I would like to take a minute to look at India as an example of the failures in U.S. non-proliferation policies. India's tests resulted from international and domestic concerns. The international issues point to problems in the form of lack of consistency in U.S. non-proliferation policies.

First, India's strategic concerns are most succinctly formulated as follows: China, Pakistan, and the former's assistance to the latter. India has fought three wars in the last 50 years with Pakistan. These two states' relations with one another at their best are more perilous than U.S. relations with the Soviet Union were leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Moreover, India enjoys front row seats to observe how the existing non-proliferation regimes fail to check China's transfer of controlled technologies to Pakistan as well as another potential enemy, Iran. If China enjoys unimpeded export of missile technologies to Pakistan, and Pakistan proceeds to demonstrate its missile capabilities, why should India refrain from flexing its nuclear muscle?

Second, India has repeatedly indicated its frustration with lack of progress toward global nuclear disarmament. As my colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN, former U.S. Ambassador to India, recently suggested, India rejects the discriminatory nature of the existing non-proliferation regimes. Perhaps due to their frustration with the lack of progress on disarmament, India believes that these tests would lend urgency to the process.

The domestic dimension boils down to the nationalist and isolationist inclinations of the political leaders in India at present. The election manifesto of India's BJP states that it "rejects the notion of nuclear apartheid and will actively oppose attempts to impose a hegemonistic nuclear regime." India will not have its matters of security or its exercise of the nuclear option dictated to it. Nor would any other sovereign state.

While the world was generally appalled by India's actions, the reaction among Indians bordered on euphoria. Even though only four members of the BJP made the decision to test, that choice obviously enjoys widespread support. We witnessed similar domestic jubilation for Pakistan's response.

I agree with my colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN, who suggested that the U.S. should attempt to engage India and provide it with incentives to join international non-proliferation regimes. The current government in India only welcomes our sanctions. To approach the situation with India by invoking sanctions only plays into the aims of the strong nationalist and isolationist currents in that country.

Invoking sanctions on Pakistan raises even more serious concerns. Pakistan is a poor and unstable country. Should our sanctions push it over

the brink and induce a collapse—we would have nuclear weapons in the possession of a desperate regime. As Henry Kissinger astutely observed, non-democratic regimes often use external conflict to coalesce support in the face of domestic unrest. Our sanctions may only force Pakistan's hand.

The U.S. should temper its sanctions with constructive engagement. And we should make the lifting of those sanctions contingent on India and Pakistan's willingness to negotiate their entry into non-proliferation regimes as is suggested in this amendment.

A comprehensive and effective non-proliferation policy would include several elements.

The recent call made by the five nuclear powers for these states to freeze their weapons development is a step in the right direction. The U.S. must ensure that these multilateral efforts get the sustained and clear commitment requisite to turn the tide of proliferation.

Our objectives should be clear:

First, we need to induce relations between India and Pakistan with the objective of preventing an arms race on the Subcontinent. We must convince them that their security is NOT enhanced by the weaponization or deployment of these devices.

Second, we should capitalize on recent overtures made by these countries to negotiate their entry into numerous non-proliferation regimes. We should focus particular attention on a fissile materials cutoff agreement as well as India and Pakistan's commitment to cease testing.

Third, the negotiations among the nuclear powers must take bold actions to address the discriminatory nature of the existing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This reality was a longstanding and central reason for India remaining outside of the regime. We must assume that other nations recognize the discrimination codified in this regime, and we must begin to address it.

The implementation of these policies will be anything but easy, but they are critical to international stability and security. To be successful, U.S. non-proliferation policy must utilize the full array of policy tools available; it must be consistent and aggressive; and it must take into account other nations' perspectives and cost-benefit calculations. Imposing sanctions and muddling through simply will not suffice.

Meeting U.S. security needs in the 21st Century will require renewed commitment and more complex strategies than those that sufficed for the last several decades. Make no mistake about it though, these issues must be addressed now, and our commitment must be unwavering.

I concur with Senator MOYNIHAN in one other important respect. In the case of India, we should not be focusing on the intelligence failure, but rather the major failure in our statecraft, or lack thereof.

Statecraft in the form of addressing these problems as a leader, as the dominant global power. If the U.S. does not step up to the plate, the new millennium will be characterized by nations—both hostile and friendly—being armed with weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver those weapons to our doorstep.

The 21st century will either witness widespread proliferation of mass destruction capabilities or the building of international norms and consensus to scale back incentives to acquiring costly and dangerous weaponry. The U.S. is the only country in a position to take a leadership role in defining the course and shape of the future international order.

If we don't act now, the 21st Century will, indeed, be the era of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, I support the amendment currently before the Senate. However, this support is qualified. I do not assume that our condemnation and unilateral economic sanctions will be adequate to turn the tide. I support the provisions centered on reducing tensions between India and Pakistan, urging multilateral efforts to address proliferation threats and expressing the need for U.S. leadership. We must act now. We must be consistent and vigilant. And we must utilize all policy tools available to achieve our aims.

Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

AMENDMENT NO. 3010

(Purpose: To permit recipients of Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarships to attend the participating college or university of their choice)

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Texas [Mr. GRAMM] proposes an amendment numbered 3010.

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place, add the following:

SEC. . ATTENDANCE OF RECIPIENTS OF NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS SCHOLARSHIPS AT PARTICIPATING COLLEGES OR UNIVERSITIES.

Section 2107 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(i)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any policy or regulation of the Department of Defense or of the Department of the Navy, recipients of Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarships who live in the state which has more scholarships awardees than slots available under the Navy quotas in their state colleges or universities may attend any college or university of their choice in their state to which they have been accepted, so long as the col-

lege or university is a participant in the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps program.

“(2) The Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy are prohibited from setting maximum limits on the number of Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarship students who can be enrolled at any college or university participating in the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps program in such state.”

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, this amendment is a very important amendment, at least to this Senator. I would like to very briefly outline the problem I am trying to deal with. I have narrowed the solution to this problem so we might get a place holder in the bill. Then, our conferees can fix the Nation's problem in conference.

We cannot get an agreement on a final solution now. I think my colleagues, when they hear my argument, will agree to my amendment. I simply want a place holder, so this problem can be fixed in every school in every State in the Union.

Mr. President, what is happening is that the Navy is engaged in setting quotas in allowing students to attend colleges and universities under Naval ROTC scholarship programs. It is interesting, because the quotas are very similar to the problem we have with having more facilities than we have military personnel and functions. This is really very similar to the whole base closing crisis that we have faced.

The basic problem is we have 69 colleges and universities that participate in the Navy ROTC scholarship program. Many of these schools are schools that do not have large numbers of students who would like to attend them. Historically, the selection process, which has not changed, is a process whereby young men and women, the best and the brightest in America, apply for a Navy ROTC scholarship.

Here is how the system works, here is the change that has been made, here is the problem, and here is my proposed beginning of a solution. I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will take this amendment.

Under our current program, a young man or woman who graduated from high school in America, who has excellent SAT scores, extremely high grades, and who has taken a strong scientific curriculum in high school, can apply for a scholarship through the Navy ROTC scholarship program. The selection is made by the Navy on a national basis. For example, for this coming year, 206 young men and women from my State have been selected by the Navy to receive a Navy ROTC scholarship—206.

Now, the way the Navy ROTC scholarship program worked prior to the implementation of quotas was that a young man or woman received a Navy ROTC scholarship and then chose to attend one of the 69 colleges that participated in the program. As the Navy has reduced the number of people participating in the ROTC scholarship program, rather than evaluating university programs and shutting down those

programs that enroll literally two or three students per year, what the Navy is doing is setting a scholarship cap on each university's Navy ROTC program. The Navy ROTC scholarship programs that has been historically popular have been the program at MIT, the program at Notre Dame, the program at Purdue, the program at Texas A&M. The Navy has said, if we let students choose, 250 students would go to MIT and 250 students would go to Texas A&M.

Now, I fail to see the problem. Here is the point—by setting a cap of 25 students who can attend any one of the participating colleges, what happens in my State is two things. No. 1, we have 206 young men and women who have just won a Navy ROTC scholarship, one of the biggest things ever to happen to them in their lives.

Mr. MCCAIN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRAMM. Yes.

Mr. MCCAIN. If the Senator dispenses pretty quick, we will accept the amendment and move on.

Mr. LEVIN. Apparently, Senator BYRD wants to be heard. Will you withhold?

Mr. GRAMM. Then I will continue.

Basically, the problem I am trying to deal with is the following problem.

Mr. MCCAIN. Senator BYRD does not wish to talk on your amendment.

Mr. GRAMM. I have completed my remarks.

I thank my colleagues.

Mr. MCCAIN. I urge adoption of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?

Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, is there an amendment pending?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has an amendment pending.

Mr. BYRD. That amendment is open to an amendment in the second degree?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The amendment is open for a second degree.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I will have an amendment in the second degree. First, I will talk about my amendment.

Mr. President, earlier this month, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced a plan that he believes will improve initial entry training programs and policies of the U.S. military services. Secretary Cohen's plan will implement about 95 percent of the recommendations put forth by the Kassebaum-Baker panel. The 95 percent I refer to is not an exact mathematical term here. It is just a figure of speech to indicate that the great majority of the recommendations that were recommended by the Kassebaum panel will be put into effect.

This was a panel directed to assess the current training programs and policies, with an eye to correcting the structural problems that had allowed truly scandalous situations to occur involving the harassment of female re-

cruits. The membership of former Senator Kassebaum's panel was selected directly by Secretary Cohen himself.

While many of the policies under the Secretary's plan are to be commended, debate has been brewing over those core recommendations that remain and that were not put into effect by Secretary Cohen. That deviation pertains to Secretary Cohen's support, in the face of the report of the Kassebaum Commission to the contrary, for continuing the practice of men and women undergoing basic training together, and allowing coed barracks. Not only does this stance counter specific recommendations made by the Kassebaum/Baker panel, but it counters legislative provisions approved by the House of Representatives. In my view, it also counters plain common sense.

Similar to recommendations in the Kassebaum report, the House of Representatives' Fiscal Year 1999 Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Bill includes provisions that would require separate living facilities for men and women during basic training; prohibit after-hours access to barracks by the opposite sex, including drill sergeants; and separate training of men and women at the basic level. Senator BROWBACK yesterday offered an amendment to the Senate Defense Authorization Bill that would require separate barracks for men and women, and limit access to these barracks by members of the opposite sex.

Secretary Cohen has announced that he is strongly opposed to the House provisions. But regardless of the Secretary's position in the debate, one looming fact remains: Sex scandals are plaguing our military training facilities. The papers are filled with headlines involving sexual misconduct in the services—misconduct involving extensive investigations and trials, and high-profile ends to military careers. This is a serious situation, a situation that, in all probability, must have negative ramifications for our overall national security. That is what we should be concerned about, not political correctness, not social engineering, not social theory, not social planning—not political correctness, but the military security of our country. That is why we have a military.

While some may claim that most of the sexual misconduct is not occurring during basic training but during follow-on training programs, that claim misses the point. It is my opinion that day 1 of training is a good place to start—day 1. I strongly support a policy that directly states the rules and values of our military services to new recruits on day 1. This policy should clearly dictate to new recruits that the U.S. military is about service, honor, and integrity.

The sad sagas in the press about sexual misconduct in the military and the sorry disrespect on the part of some members for the dignity of and the courtesies owed to other members of the military, including women re-

cruits, can only serve to undermine the appeal of the U.S. military to our young men and women.

If we want the brightest and the best recruits, we must be committed to ensuring that the U.S. military service delivers on its recruiting promises of outstanding career opportunities. The best and the brightest will demand no less.

But that is only part of the issue, as far as I am concerned. While we must implement policies that attract cream-of-the-crop recruits and that carry through on the promise of providing them with world-class training, we must also remember that the objective of military service is the defense of the Nation. That is the objective of the military service. That is what it is all about. That defense, that security, must be the paramount aim of the Military Establishment. All other goals must be secondary to the goal of establishing the best fighting force that our Nation can field.

I have grave concerns—particularly in light of the Kassebaum report—that our current policy is failing to keep its eye on that paramount concern.

The Kassebaum panel stated:

There is no more valuable military resource than its personnel, making training indisputably a top priority.

The panel further noted:

The principal objective of the military's training programs is to produce an effective, efficient, and ready force. In order to achieve this objective, the training programs must, first and foremost, emphasize and instill discipline.

I heartily agree with those conclusions. And the Kassebaum report's recommendations supporting separate barracks for men and women during basic training, as well as calling for some same-gender platoons, seem to me to be in the best interest of the troops, as well as providing the right atmosphere for sound and serious training. I believe we need to do what is best for our national security and what is best for the men and women who join our military forces and whose very lives depend upon the quality of the training they receive.

Mr. President, last year, I worked with Senator KEMPTHORNE on the Senate Armed Services Committee. I joined with him on an amendment to the fiscal year 1998 defense authorization bill that created an independent blue-ribbon body to thoroughly examine, review, and evaluate the reasons for the ongoing number of sex scandals in training commands. This blue-ribbon panel is also chartered to examine fraternization and adultery issues. This panel has been created with unquestioned credentials. I believe that the report generated from this group will be a significant contribution to the body of work on gender policy. I regret that that report will not be completed until next year. And if its recommendations mirror, or reflect, those of Kassebaum-Baker, it is likely also to be ignored by the powers that be.

I also favor the language included in the House of Representatives fiscal year 1999 Department of Defense authorization bill that provides for the separation of men and women in training at the basic level. Echoing my priority in this regard, the Kassebaum report concludes:

... separating the recruits at the operational training unit level should provide a better environment for teaching military values, including professional relations.

Again, the bottom line must be about ensuring that military service is a profession of service, honor, and integrity. Let us also remember this—let me say it again—the purpose of our Military Establishment, which costs us scores of billions of dollars, is to protect the national security of these United States, the security interests of the United States of America.

Our military is not an equal employment opportunity commission. It does not exist to ensure perfect political correctness by responding affirmatively to the demands of this group or that interest group or some other interest group. It is the ultimate protector of the sovereignty of this mighty Nation and the ultimate protector of the freedoms of her people. That is quite a heavy responsibility and one that needs the most conscientious and vigilant attention to be adequately addressed.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in taking a constructive first step towards cleaning up the mess in the military and putting some common sense back into the service training regime. I like the way the Marines do it. And I think we ought to take a page out of their book.

Mr. President, I will have more to say possibly on this amendment. As of now, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in the debate on the Brownback amendment yesterday some Armed Services Committee members observed that the Brownback amendment would adopt recommendations of the Kassebaum/Baker commission report by passing the Senate's own commission created last year. It was said that doing so makes a "mockery" of the Senate's own action, and wastes the time of the 10 members of the commission.

Well, Mr. President, Secretary Cohen has flouted the recommendations of the Kassebaum/Baker report that he himself commissioned. He has promised to implement the easiest recommendations in that report while publicly repudiating its core recommendations. He has not waited for the Senate commission's report either. He got out in front of it.

Senator BROWNBACK's amendment, and the amendment that I have prepared, would say if you are in for a penny, you are in for a pound. If the report has merit—and Secretary Cohen has acknowledged that at least parts of it do have merit in his estimation—then we ought not to reject those parts of the report that do not seem politically correct. In fact, the Kassebaum/Baker report notes that "the committee has made recommendations regarding gender integration in training where appropriate, but has also made recommendations regarding the large number of other issues that we concluded have an impact on the effectiveness of the overall training program. It is the committee's intention that its recommendations be viewed as a complete package since training is a building-block process beginning with the quality of the recruit."

Other Members have reported the objections of senior military officials to the recommendations in the Kassebaum/Baker report. And they have stated their strong support for keeping mixed-gender training just the way it currently is.

I would remind those officials and my colleagues that not so long ago the military trained women completely separately from men. It was only since the early to mid-1980's that the military began mixing the sexes during the early training phases. I believe, if I recall it correctly, that Army women were trained together at Fort McClellan, which is now closing as a part of the base realignment and closure process.

The great social experiment of putting men and women together from day 1 in the training process is not, therefore, some hallowed military tradition. It is a policy, and if that policy gets in the way of a process that is designed to remold these undisciplined young individuals into focused disciplined soldiers, then we should not hesitate to change it.

Our focus must be on national security—not political correctness; not social policy. And the basic safety and security of our recruits should not be compromised.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment may be temporarily laid aside so that others may call up other amendments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

PROVIDING FOR AN ADJOURNMENT OF BOTH HOUSES

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of H. Con. Res. 297, the adjournment resolution, which was received from the House.

I further ask consent that the resolution be agreed to, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 297) was agreed to.

The concurrent resolution is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 297

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring). That when the House adjourns on the legislative day of Thursday, June 25, 1998, it stand adjourned until 12:30 p.m. on Tuesday, July 14, 1998, or until noon on the second day after Members are notified to reconvene pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when Senate recesses or adjourns at the close of business on Friday, June 26, 1998, Saturday, June 27, 1998, or Sunday, June 28, 1998, pursuant to a motion made by the Majority Leader, or his designee, in accordance with this concurrent resolution, it stand recessed or adjourned until noon on Monday, July 6, 1998, or such time on that day as may be specified by the Majority Leader or his designee in the motion to recess or adjourn, or until noon on the second day after Members are notified to reconvene pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.

SEC. 2. The Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the Minority Leader of the House and the Minority Leader of the Senate, shall notify the Members of the House and the Senate, respectively, to reconvene whenever, in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, we are working on a unanimous consent agreement, and orally we have at least agreed that Senator FEINGOLD would speak on his amendment for about 20 minutes, and Senator ABRAHAM wants to speak for 10 minutes. We are proceeding with the unanimous consent agreement. We think we can get things done in about an hour and a half, and final passage. We are moving forward on that.

We will be voting on Senator BYRD's amendment pretty much after he feels that everyone has spoken. But at the moment, we should move forward, I think, with the Feingold amendment.

I yield the floor.

Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the senior Senator from Arizona. I will use some of the 20 minutes that I have been allocated at this time and then reserve some of it in order to respond to whatever arguments are made about the position of the amendment.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield just very briefly without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. FEINGOLD. I will be happy to yield.