made to the test vehicle and warhead to greatly increase the likelihood of success.

In the letter, I state that Congress must know which modifications were made, how they contributed to the success, and the likelihood that such modifications could be used in a real engagement of the missile defense system.

I asked if the kill vehicle or dummy warhead employed a GPS, global positioning system, and if so, at what stages was the GPS system used.

I asked, did the kill vehicle or dummy warhead employ a C-band radar system, and if so, at what stages was the C-band radar system used.

I asked, did either the GPS system or C-band radar system communicate with or reveal any information to the Target Object Map.

I asked if the software modifications to the tracking computer or infrared tracking system provided information to the kill vehicle not normally available in a real-life scenario.

I think before Congress acts on such a resolution, it would be nice to get an answer to some of these questions. Otherwise, what we have is a situation here where we are into a dark fantasyland, where the threat of a nuclear strike against the United States is being exaggerated or it is nonexistent.

Our task as Nation and as a world should be to get rid of existing nuclear arms, to stop nuclear proliferation to new countries, to deal with arms control and arms elimination.

We have people who are actually predicting nuclear war in the future. We are back to the days of the Cold War. We have a responsibility to work for peace, not through nuclear proliferation, not through nuclear rearmament, not through building bigger and better missile systems or systems which defeat the ABM treaty or the nonproliferation treaty, but through the painstaking work, the daily work of diplomacy, of human relations, of seeking cooperation between nations.

It is fascinating that we have technology to restart the arms race, that we have technology which violates the nonproliferation treaty, that we have technology which violates the ABM treaty. But it would be even more fascinating if we used this opportunity to start a new dawn of peace where we get rid of nuclear weapons once and for all.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. LEE).

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, today we are debating a resolution commending defense contractors and the military for the ballistic missile defense test of July 14, 2001. This test, not the personnel, mind you, but this test, is really something to condemn, not to commend.

The defense industry and the Pentagon have now passed their half-scaled-down, simplified test. This is really nothing to celebrate. When our schools have that failure rate, the President wants to close them down. The military-industrial complex is apparently held to a much lower standard.

More fundamentally, this test moves us ever closer to violating the anti-ballistic missile treaty. We signed and ratified the ABM because we recognize that missile defense systems could destabilize more than they could protect.

We cannot go back on our word and abandon this treaty. Peace is really our national security. We cannot be a nation that approaches nonproliferation while really practicing escalation, and that is what this test has taken us down the road to. Instead of leading the way towards responsible disarmament, we are unraveling arms control agreements.

We must be a nation that decides where we really want to go. Do we want to go down a path to a new arms race, or forward to a real post-Cold War peace?

Attempts to build a national missile defense system are really not enhancing our national security, they are destabilizing the world, which I heard over and over again just 2 weeks ago from our European allies. Violating treaties does not make the world a safer place.

Congress should not be celebrating spending billions and billions of dollars on national missile defense. We should be standing by our treaty agreements, we should be working to end nuclear proliferation, and we should be spending that money on vital national needs, such as health care, education, and housing.

Yes, there are dangers in the world, but missile defense systems will spark new arms races, nuclear proliferation, violated treaties, and destabilizations, and also billions in spending. These are the fruits of missile defense. That is nothing to celebrate.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would say that all Americans remember the fact that some 19 Americans were killed in Desert Storm by ballistic missiles. Those Americans who were killed by those incoming Scuds were not killed by tanks, they were not killed by machine gun fire, they were not killed by fighter attack aircraft, they were killed by ballistic missiles.

Those Scud missiles were going faster than a bullet, and we threw up some Patriot missiles, defending against those incoming Scuds. We got some, we missed some. There is a discrepancy as to how many we got and how many we missed. But at the end, when the smoke cleared, 19 Americans were dead and some 500 were wounded.

We have troops around the world, and at some point, and I think we have reached that point, we have to acknowledge that we are squarely in the age of missiles. Missiles will kill Americans in the future, I think we can predict that, unless we build defenses.

The idea that unless we build a perfect defense, we do not have any defense, does not make any sense. Certainly some of those young people who were in Saudi Arabia who were the targets of those Scud missile attacks did come home alive because some of those Patriot missiles that we had defending against the attacks did hit their targets, and some of those Scuds were knocked out of the sky before they could kill Americans.

We have slow missiles, the Scuds; we have medium-speed missiles, the missiles like the SS–20s; and we have very high-speed missiles, like the Minuteman missiles like the target we shot at over the Pacific.

It is very clear these tests are going to get tougher. They have to get tougher to replicate what we think will be operational conditions. We are going to have lots of misses in the future. But for us to not pursue this capability to defend our troops and our people in American cities would be disregarding our obligation as a Congress of the United States to preserve national security.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, on Saturday night, in the euphoria after the test, General Kadish warned against reading too much into this single test. He warned specifically that we have a long way to go before we have a system we can deploy.

I think, at this moment and in days ahead, we should bear his caution in mind and take his prudence to heart. This test shows that the technology for an operational system is within our reach, and that is good news. This was a daunting feat. That is why I support this commendation. But it is not yet within our grasp.

We should continue with this ground-based system, we should commend the people who were developing it, testing it. They are working hard, and they deserve our gratitude. But we should not fool ourselves. Challenges remain. This system should be held to the same standards as any other weapons system before we make the decision to deploy.

Mr. Speaker, I think it would probably be appropriate to quote Churchill after North Africa at this point, who was asked, ''What does this signify?'' He said ''It is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. It is, perhaps, the beginning of the beginning.''

Maybe we are a bit farther ahead than that, but that is where we stand. We should not get too carried away or euphoric about one single test. There are many more to come.

This resolution itself says we had better be prepared for failures, because they are likely to happen, particularly if the program does what we have asked it to do, and that is begin with the simple and move to the complex; add with each test more rigor, more